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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the utility of using Complexity studies to improve our 
understanding of peacebuilding and the coherence dilemma, which is regarded as one of the 
most significant problems facing peacebuilding interventions. Peacebuilding is said to be 
complex, and this study investigates what this implies, and asks whether Complexity could be 
of use in improving our understanding of the assumed causal link between coherence, 
effectiveness and sustainability.  
 
Peacebuilding refers to all actions undertaken by the international community and local actors 
to consolidate the peace – to prevent a (re)lapse into violent conflict – in a given conflict-
prone system. The nexus between development, governance, politics and security has become 
a central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and peacebuilding is 
increasingly seen as the collective framework within which these diverse dimensions of 
conflict management can be brought together in one common framework. The coherence 
dilemma refers to the persistent gap between policy-level assumptions about the value and 
causal role of coherence in the effectiveness of peacebuilding and empirical evidence to the 
contrary from peacebuilding practice.  
 
The dissertation argues that the peacebuilding process is challenged by enduring and deep-
rooted tensions and contradictions, and that there are thus inherent limits and constraints 
regarding the degree to which coherence can be achieved in any particular peacebuilding 
context.  
 
On the basis of the application of the general characteristics of Complexity to peacebuilding, 
the following three recommendations reflect the core findings of the study: 
(1) Peacebuilders need to concede that they cannot, from the outside, definitively analyse 
complex conflicts and design ‘solutions’ on behalf of a local society. Instead, they 
should facilitate inductive processes that assist knowledge to emerge from the local 
context, and such knowledge needs to be understood as provisional and subject to a 
continuous process of refinement and adaptation.  
(2) Peacebuilders have to recognise that self-sustainable peace is directly linked to, and 
influenced by, the extent to which a society has the capacity, and space, to self-
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organise. For peace consolidation to be self-sustainable, it has to be the result of a 
home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific process.  
(3) Peacebuilders need to acknowledge that they cannot defend the choices they make on 
the basis of pre-determined models or lessons learned elsewhere. The ethical 
implications of their choices have to be considered in the local context, and the 
effects of their interventions - intended and unintended - need to be continuously 
assessed against the lived-experience of the societies they are assisting. Peacebuilding 
should be guided by the principle that those who will have to live with the 
consequences should have the agency to make decisions about their own future.  
 
The art of peacebuilding lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international 
support and home-grown solutions. The dissertation argues that the international community 
has, to date, failed to find this balance. As a result, peacebuilding has often contributed to the 
very societal weaknesses and fragilities that it was meant to resolve. 
 
On the basis of these insights, the dissertation concludes with a call for a significant re-
balancing of the relationship between international influence and local agency, where the role 
of the external peacebuilder is limited to assisting, facilitating and stimulating the capacity of 
the local society to self-organise. The dissertation thus argues for reframing peacebuilding as 
something that must be essentially local.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die toepaslikheid van Kompleksiteitstudies om ons begrip van 
vredesbou en die dilemma van koherensie te verbeter, wat as een van die gewigtigste 
probleme vir die toetrede tot vredesbou beskou kan word. Vredesbou word as kompleks 
beskou en die implikasies van hierdie siening word in hierdie proefskrif ondersoek.  
Dienooreenkomstig word die vraag na die nut van Kompleksiteitstudies vir die verbetering 
van ons begrip van die veronderstelde kousale verband tussen koherensie, doeltreffendheid en 
volhoubaarheid aangespreek.  
 
Vredesbou verwys na alle handelinge wat deur die internasionale gemeenskap en plaaslike 
belanghebbendes onderneem word om vrede binne ŉ gegewe sisteem, wat neig na konflik, te 
konsolideer om sodoende ’n (her)verval in gewelddadige konflik te voorkom. Die 
aanknopingspunt tussen ontwikkeling, staatsbestuur, staatkunde en sekuriteit is tans die 
sentrale fokus van die internasionale poging om sodanige oorgange te beheer, en vredesbou 
word toenemend as ’n kollektiewe raamwerk beskou, waarbinne hierdie onderskeie dimensies 
van konflikbestuur in een gemeenskaplike raamwerk saamgebring kan word. Die 
koherensiedilemma verwys na die voortdurende gaping tussen beleidsvlakaannames ten 
opsigte van die waarde en kousale rol van koherensie vir die doeltreffendheid van 
vredesboupogings en empiriese data vanuit die vredesboupraktyk wat hierdie aanvaarde 
kousale verband weerspreek.  
 
Die proefskrif toon dat vredesboupogings uitgedaag word deur voortdurende en 
diepgewortelde spanninge en teenstrydighede, en dat daar dus inherente beperkings en 
stremmings is ten opsigte van die mate waartoe koherensie binne enige spesifieke 
vredesboukonteks moontlik is.  
 
Op grond van die toepassing van die algemene kenmerke van Kompleksiteitstudies op die 
vredesbouproses, weerspieël die volgende drie aanbevelings die kernbevindings van die 
studie: 
(1)  Vredesbouers moet toegee dat hulle nie daartoe in staat is om komplekse konflikte van 
buite af bepalend te analiseer en ‘oplossings’ namens ’n plaaslike gemeenskap te 
ontwerp nie. Hulle behoort eerder induktiewe prosesse te fasiliteer om ondersteuning 
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te bied sodat kennis uit die plaaslike konteks na vore kom, en sodanige kennis moet as 
voorlopig en onderhewig aan ’n voortdurende proses tot verfyning en aanpassing, 
verstaan word.  
(2) Vredesbouers moet besef dat  die selfvolhoubaarheid van vrede direk verband hou 
met, en beïnvloed word deur, die mate waartoe ’n gemeenskap oor die vermoë tot en 
ruimte vir selforganisering beskik. Vir vredeskonsolidering om selfvolhoubaar te 
wees, moet die proses wat daartoe aanleiding gee inheems, van ‘onder-na-bo’ en 
konteks-spesifiek wees.  
(3) Vredesbouers moet aanvaar dat hulle nie die besluite wat hulle neem op grond van 
voorafbestaande modelle of lesse wat elders geleer is kan regverdig nie. Die etiese 
implikasies van hulle besluite moet in terme van die plaaslike konteks beoordeel word, 
en die effekte van hulle ingrepe – bepland en onbepland – moet voortdurend 
opgeweeg word teen die daaglikse ervaring van die samelewings wat bygestaan word. 
Vredesbehoupogings behoort gelei te word deur die beginsel dat diegene wat met die 
gevolge van die proses sal moet saamleef, die agentskap behoort te hê om besluite oor 
hulle eie toekoms te neem.  
 
Die kuns van vredesbou lê in die vasstel van ’n toepaslike balans tussen internasionale 
ondersteuning en inheemse oplossings. Die proefskrif se argument is dat die internasionale 
gemeenskap tot dusver daarin gefaal het om hierdie balans te vind. As gevolg hiervan het 
pogings tot vredesbou dikwels bygedra tot die presiese swakhede en broosheid in die 
gemeenskap wat dit veronderstel was om aan te spreek. 
 
Op grond van hierdie insigte sluit die proefskrif af met ’n beroep tot ’n betekenisvolle 
herbalansering van die verhouding tussen internasionale invloed en plaaslike agentskap, 
waarin die rol van die eksterne vredesbouer beperk moet word tot die ondersteuning, 
fasilitering en stimulering van die plaaslike gemeenskap se vermoë tot selforganisering. Die 
proefskrif bepleit dus dat vredesbou herontwerp word binne ’n essensieel plaaslike raamwerk.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What rarely happens, though, is a solid discussion about the underlying assumptions and 
norms peacebuilding strategies are based on and how they influence the activities and 
objectives of a programme…implementing agencies, such as the UN or bilateral donors, 
rarely question their moral frameworks and normative assumptions. Instead, they continue 
to export a liberal understanding of peaceful coexistence, without considering that their 
underlying hypotheses on how change can be secured, influence and determine the results 
of the programme. (Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 2011:79) 
 
System Theory’s main contribution, to my thinking, is that it shifts our understanding 
away from static, simplified views of conflict into an appreciation of what Coleman 
describes as ‘the complex, multilevel, dynamic, and cyclical nature of these phenomena’. 
(Hughes, 2012:108) 
 
Since successful peacebuilding is, over time, inherently organic in nature and driven from 
within the war-torn society, it is rarely the case that – despite the degree of outside support 
received – smooth and linear progressions are achieved. (Ponzio, 2011:252) 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Coherence, or rather the lack of coherence, has been identified as one of the most critical 
shortcomings in international peacebuilding interventions to date (Smith, 2004). There seems 
to be a persistent gap between policy-level assumptions about the value and causal role of 
coherence in peacebuilding effectiveness and sustainability, and the empirical record. There is 
a widely held and acted upon assumption in the peacebuilding policy community that 
improved coherence leads to greater efficiency and effectiveness, but the empirical record 
shows that, despite significant attempts to improve coherence, there appears to be persistent 
and inherent limitations to the degree that coherence is attainable in peacebuilding systems 
(Smith, 2004). In this dissertation, this gap is referred to as the coherence dilemma. 
 
In this dissertation the assumed causal linkages between coherence, effectiveness and 
sustainability will be questioned and explored. The intention is that our understanding of the 
relationships between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability in the peacebuilding context 
be improved during the process, and to learn more about how system effectiveness and 
sustainability can potentially be influenced through manipulating system coherence.  
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Peacebuilding is used here as a collective term to refer to all actions undertaken by the 
international community and local actors to consolidate the peace in a given conflict system, 
i.e. inclusive of the whole range of political, security and development actions taken to 
prevent a lapse into violent conflict. All the agents that pursue the peace consolidation goal in 
such a conflict are framed as being part of a particular peacebuilding system. 
 
One of the most common explanations offered in the policy and research literature for this 
lack of coherence is that peacebuilding is ‘complex’. There is wide recognition among the 
research, policy and practitioner communities that peacebuilding systems have so many 
interconnected agents that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to track the effects a specific 
programme or initiative may, or may not, have on the sustainability of a peace process. When 
systems become so dynamic that we are no longer able to keep track of the effects of specific 
initiatives, they are commonly referred to as ‘complex’. What does it mean when we say a 
particular conflict, or the international response to it, is complex?  
 
In this dissertation, an attempt is made to answer this question by exploring how the study of 
Complexity, a field of research dedicated to studying complex systems, may assist us in 
gaining new insights into the peacebuilding coherence dilemma. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, a complex system is characterised as a system that has the ability to adapt and 
that demonstrates emergent properties, including self-organising behaviour. Complexity 
comes about, and is maintained, as a result of the dynamic and non-linear interactions of a 
large number of elements within a system reacting to the information available to them 
locally. Some of the elements react to feedback generated by their interaction with their 
environment, and all the elements are continuously reacting to the feedback they receive from 
one another (Cilliers, 1998).   
 
In this dissertation, these characteristics of Complexity are applied to the peacebuilding 
context. It is argued that peacebuilding systems can be understood as being complex in the 
same way that this concept is understood in the study of Complexity. This characterisation 
opens up the way for exploring the relevance of Complexity for peacebuilding systems. What 
do we know generally about how complex systems can be influenced, and how can we apply 
this knowledge to the peacebuilding context? Could insights from the study of Complexity 
assist us in improving our understanding of some of the peacebuilding challenges, including 
especially the coherence dilemma? 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
In the context of this dissertation, peacebuilding refers to a large number of interdependent 
short, medium and long-term programmes and activities that simultaneously address both the 
causes and consequences of a social system in conflict. In the short term, peacebuilding 
programmes and activities assist the society emerging out of conflict in stabilising the peace 
process and are aimed at preventing a relapse into violent conflict. In the longer term, 
peacebuilding programmes, collectively and cumulatively, are aimed at assisting the society 
emerging out of conflict by addressing the causes of a conflict and in laying the foundations 
for social justice and sustainable peace.  
 
Peacebuilding is characterised by its multidimensionality and the large number and broad 
range of internal and external actors engaged in one way or another in pursuing peace 
consolidation goals. The internal or local actors include all levels of government, political 
parties, civil society and the private sector in a given conflict setting. The external or 
international actors include international and regional institutions and agencies, states, the 
international private sector and international non-governmental organisations. Together, the 
internal and external actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes and activities that 
span the security, political, governance, development and economic dimensions of social 
transformation. Collectively and cumulatively, these programmes and activities are aimed at 
building momentum towards sustainable peace in the societies in which they operate. 
Peacebuilding systems are said to be successful when a society can sustain its own peace 
consolidation process without external support (De Coning, 2005:89).  
 
Peacebuilding is still emerging as a distinct form of international cooperation, but its record 
thus far has been mixed (Hughes, Hunt & Kondoch, 2010:2).  Licklider (1995:685) and 
Collier (2003) have found that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five to ten 
years after having been signed.
1
 The rate at which peace processes fail, and the societies 
involved that relapse into violent conflict, shows that the international community is better at 
stopping violence than building or consolidating peace. It seems that the challenge is not as 
                                                 
1
 The approximately 50% figure generally cited has been demonstrated by Suhrke and Samset to be a 
misrepresentation, with a more correct finding of the Collier et al. study being approximately 23% over 5 years, 
but reaching almost 50% over 10 years (Suhrke & Samset, 2007:199). 
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much about making peace, as it is about figuring out how to make peace last (Ricigliano, 
2012:5).  
 
There are many reasons why some peace processes are not sustainable;
2
 some relate to the 
role of spoilers
3
 (Stedman, 1997; Newman & Richmond, 2006; Gueli, Liebenberg & Van 
Huysteen, 2005:11) and the dynamics of post-conflict settlements (Du Toit, 2001 & 
2003:105), whilst others are associated with shortcomings in the support provided by the 
international community (Stedman, Cousens & Rothchild, 2002; Chesterman 2004b; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Paris, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009). This dissertation is focused on the 
complex interrelationships among peacebuilding agents, and specifically on the problems 
associated with the perceived lack of coherence among them. Throughout the remainder of 
this study, this challenge is referred to as the ‘coherence dilemma’. 
 
This study provisionally defines coherence, in the peacebuilding context, as the effort to 
ensure that the political, security and development dimensions of a peacebuilding system in a 
particular crisis are directed towards a common objective. The lack of coherence among the 
development, governance, political and security spheres in most peacebuilding operations to 
date have been highlighted in almost all the major evaluation studies undertaken over recent 
years (Dahrendorf, 2003; Porter, 2002; Sommers, 2000; Stockton, 2002).  
 
Many of these studies have identified the lack of meaningful coherence and coordination 
among the peacebuilding agents as a major cause of unsatisfactory performance and, hence, 
an important contributing factor to the unsustainability of the peace processes. For example, 
the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding, which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects 
implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway, identified a 
lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it terms a strategic deficit – as the most 
significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding (Smith, 2004). The Utstein study found that 
more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not have any links to a larger country 
                                                 
2
 For a quantitative analysis of the factors that have influenced the outcome of peacebuilding operations since 
1944, see Doyle & Sambanis (2000). 
3
 Spoilers are those actors that resist a peace process, typically because they stand to lose power and access to 
resources if it is successful. They include warlords, organised criminals, business interests and elites, and they 
may differ in the way and the degree to which they resist the peace process. What they have in common, from 
the perspective of this study, is that they are not part of the peacebuilding system, because they do not share the 
peace consolidation objective. However, they are still part of the environment in which the peacebuilding system 
has to operate. 
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strategy. For all these studies cited, coherence was thus deemed essential for effective and 
sustainable peacebuilding interventions.  
 
This study explores the contradiction between the importance assigned to coherence as an 
essential factor for peacebuilding effectiveness and sustainability, and the empirical record 
that indicates that there are persistent and inherent limitations to the degree that coherence is 
attainable in actual peacebuilding interventions. Most studies have responded to this 
challenge by trying to identify what can be done to improve coherence so that these obstacles 
can be overcome. The lack of coherence has been identified as a problem that needs to be 
resolved. In this study, a different approach is attempted. It is directed towards trying to 
understand why, despite vigorous efforts, peacebuilding systems resist coherence. The 
question asked is whether there may be some dynamics inherent in the Complexity of 
peacebuilding systems that limit the scope for coherence. 
 
The coherence dilemma is especially relevant because it reflects and represents many of the 
underlying assumptions and ambiguities of the larger peacebuilding field and also provides us 
with a tangible, yet sufficiently wide, subject. As Antonio Donini argues, when addressing 
coherence, we deal with “…fundamental issues concerning the rationale for peace-making 
and peace-building efforts as well as the purposes, principles, and functions of assistance in 
post-ceasefire or post-regime-change settings” (Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:3). This 
also implies that some of the insights we may gain on the dynamics of the coherence dilemma 
may also be relevant to the larger peacebuilding context. 
 
Particular attention is paid in the dissertation to the relationship between local and 
international peacebuilding agents and the so-called liberal peace debate. As Donais 
(2012:153) points out: 
To the extent that liberal peacebuilding is in crisis, it is in many respects a crisis of 
local ownership, stemming from the failure to generate support, among both the elites 
and societies of war-torn states, for the key elements of the liberal peacebuilding 
agenda.  
 
The prevalent post-Cold War approach to peacebuilding is widely referred to as the liberal 
peace approach, and its overall goal can be described as bringing “war-shattered states into 
conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic governance” 
(Paris, 2002:638).  
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Oliver Richmond (2007:462) argues that the liberal peace approach – which focuses on 
promoting democratisation, economic liberalisation, neoliberal development, human rights, 
and the rule of law – has exerted a dominant influence over contemporary peacebuilding 
policy and practice. The liberal peace debate refers to the prolific and still ongoing debate 
between those that defend the liberal peace approach, and those that are critical of it 
(Campbell, Chandler & Sabaratnam, 2011). The liberal peace approach was seen as relevant 
for this study because it represents the dominant approach to peacebuilding, and it thus has 
important implications for expectations regarding effectiveness, sustainability and coherence.  
 
One of the aspects of the liberal peace debate that is of special interest in this dissertation 
relates to the roles and relationships between internal actors and local societies, as this 
relationship is key to our expectations regarding sustainability, effectiveness and coherence. 
Of particular interest is the question whether any insights could be gained from the 
application of Complexity to the liberal peace and local ownership debates and, in so doing, 
to make a contribution to the larger critical discourse around improving peacebuilding 
practice. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the utility of using Complexity to gain insights into the 
coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. 
  
The research question is informed by the widely held assumption in the peacebuilding policy 
community that improved coherence results in more effective, and thus more sustainable, 
peacebuilding systems. On the basis of this assumption, and in light of the poor peacebuilding 
record in generating sustainable peace processes, considerable energy and time have been 
invested over the last decades in trying to improve the coherence of peacebuilding systems.  
 
The assumed causal link between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability in the 
peacebuilding context is therefore questioned and explored. In the process, the study aims to 
gain improved understanding of the interlinkages between coherence, effectiveness and 
sustainability, and to learn more about how the effectiveness and sustainability of complex 
social systems, such as peacebuilding, could potentially be influenced.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 7 
 
The possibility of a casual link between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability in such a 
system suggests that it should be possible to influence effectiveness and sustainability by 
increasing coherence. And if this is possible, the study is expected to assist in improving our 
understanding of how to influence or manipulate coherence in peacebuilding operations. 
However, if no such link can be found to exist, one of the core assumptions in peacebuilding 
policy would be challenged and this would have significant implications for the way in which 
coherence is currently viewed in peacebuilding theory. 
 
To explore this research question, the study will turn to Complexity studies, a field of 
research dedicated to studying complex systems, in an attempt to determine what could be 
learnt from applying the knowledge generated by the study of Complexity to the 
peacebuilding context, and whether insights from the study of Complexity could assist in 
improving our understanding of the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. 
 
In order to consider these issues, the research questions that will be addressed in the study are: 
 What constitutes coherence in peacebuilding systems? 
 Is there a relationship between the degree of coherence in a peacebuilding system, 
and the effectiveness and sustainability of those systems? 
 Which factors influence changes (an increase or decrease) in the degree of coherence 
in a peacebuilding system? 
 Can the degree of coherence in a complex system be manipulated, and if so, how? 
 What, if any, are the limitations to achieving coherence, i.e. how much coherence can 
one reasonably expect to achieve in a given complex system? 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND KEY POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
 
This study utilises qualitative, reflective, explorative and conceptual methodological 
approaches. It consists of identifying, collecting, ordering, structuring, analysing and 
interpreting the concepts, debates and data relevant to an understanding of the coherence 
dilemma of peacebuilding systems and of the utility of using Complexity to gain further 
insights into this dilemma and peacebuilding more generally. 
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In addressing the available body of literature on peacebuilding, coherence and Complexity, 
use is made of both primary material (original reports, planning documents, evaluation 
studies, etc.) and secondary material (the body of analysis and research).  
 
The coherence dilemma of peacebuilding systems is explored by analysing the problem in a 
number of original ways. The first involves the distinction between coherence and 
coordination. Most of the literature available to date consists of operational evaluations that 
focus on specific coordination problems. This focus on coordination has steered these studies 
to a more practical agent-level analysis of how coordination has been undertaken, and what 
could be done to improve coordination. This has resulted in these studies being blind to some 
of the system-level dynamics that explain why most peacebuilding agents tend not to pursue 
coherence, even when it appears to be in their interest to do so. By emphasising coherence, 
and by utilising Complexity, the researcher aims to focus on the relationships between 
peacebuilding agents and the local societies they interact with, and how the dynamic and non-
linear interactions among them collectively and cumulatively shape the peacebuilding systems 
that both these sets of actors operate in. 
 
Although the lack of coherence in peacebuilding interventions has been identified as 
problematic by many researchers and evaluators, surprisingly little research has been done on 
what would constitute coherence in peacebuilding systems. There has also been surprising 
little work done on identifying and improving our understanding of the factors that constrain 
coherence. The intent with this study is to improve our understanding of what coherence 
entails and how it contributes to effective and sustainable peacebuilding. Also of interest is 
the question of whether coherence is indeed attainable, i.e. determining what the limitations of 
achieveing coherence are.  
 
The second way in which this study makes an original contribution is by framing the 
coherence dilemma in a complex-systems context. One of the distinguishing features of 
peacebuilding is that it is a combined effort by multiple independent or autonomous agents. 
None of these agents can achieve the overarching peacebuilding goal of consolidating the 
peace process on their own. It is the combined effort of these agents that generates the overall 
or system-level peacebuilding effect. This perspective implies that, in order to understand the 
role of coherence in peacebuilding systems, one needs to look at the role of coherence from a 
systems perspective.  
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Most studies on coordination frame the problem as an inter-organisational or inter-agent 
issue, and thus approach it from an agent-level perspective. This study, instead, takes a whole-
of-systems perspective. In so doing, the intention is to highlight a different layer of meta-
processes and dynamics involved in generating coherence, which is expected to assist us in 
gaining a new or original perspective on the coherence dilemma.   
 
In order to gain a whole-of-systems perspective, Complexity is used and the insights 
generated by the study of complex systems will be applied to peacebuilding systems in 
general and the coherence dilemma in particular. Because Complexity forms such an integral 
part of this dissertation, the next section is devoted to explaining Complexity in more detail.  
 
1.5 COMPLEXITY 
 
This dissertation makes use of Complexity theory (introduced in Chapter 5) in the search for 
answers to a series of questions related to the assumed complex nature of peacebuilding 
systems. There has been a growing acknowledgement of the complexity of peacebuilding 
systems, both in policy statements and in the research literature. For instance, the emergency 
relief community has started to use the concept ‘complex emergencies’ in the early 1990s and 
the peacekeeping community now use the concept ‘complex peace operations’ widely to 
describe the multi-dimensional and multi-functional nature of contemporary peace operations 
(UN, 2000b).  
 
For the humanitarian community, a ‘complex emergency’ refers to a situation of such 
magnitude that it requires a multi-sectoral response that exceeds the mandate of any single 
agency.
4
 For instance, a refugee crisis of limited scope can be managed by the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but once the scope of the crisis crosses a certain 
threshold, it will require the combined effort of several humanitarian agencies. 
 
In the peacekeeping and peacebuilding community, the common-sense understanding of 
complexity usually refers to two frequently cited factors. The first is the large number of 
international and local agents involved, and the second is the wide-ranging scope of activities 
                                                 
4
 Complex and major emergencies have been defined in the “Working Paper on the Definition of Complex 
Emergencies”, Inter-Agency Steering Committee Secretariat, 9 December 1994. 
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undertaken by these agents. The scale of the interactions among the agents and the 
interconnectedness and the diverse range of activities they undertake make it impossible to 
meaningfully track or manage the overall system. The general recognition, among both the 
research and practitioner communities is that these peacebuilding systems have become so 
large and interconnected that they are incredibly complex (Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 
2011:7). 
 
It is thus surprising that the link between the complexity observed in the peace operations and 
peacebuilding context and the study of Complexity has not been pursued more vigorously.
5
 If 
peacebuilding systems are indeed complex, some of the general insights into the behaviour 
and characteristics of complex systems that are gained from the study of Complexity could 
perhaps be used to improve our understanding of how complex peacebuilding systems 
function.  
 
This dissertation argues that peacebuilding systems are indeed complex (see Chapter 6), in the 
way this term is understood in Complexity theory, on the basis that they (i) consist of a large 
number of interdependent agents that demonstrate dynamic and non-linear behaviour, and (ii) 
that they exhibit self-organising and emergent systems behaviour. This characterisation opens 
the way for exploring the relevance of some of the research findings generated by the study of 
Complexity for peacebuilding systems. The implications of Complexity for peacebuilding are 
explored by contrasting the dominant peacebuilding policy and planning approach, termed the 
‘determined-design’ approach in this study, with an alternative ‘complex systems’ approach. 
A number of implications that emerge from the comparison are discussed, including 
especially the linkages between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability On the basis of the 
insights gained from applying Complexity to peacebuilding, the dissertation concludes with 
recommendations for coping with peacebuilding Complexity.  
 
As highlighted in the problem statement and in the previous section on methodology, this 
study focuses on coherence rather than coordination. To recap, this implies a focus on the 
function of coherence from a systems’ perspective, rather than a focus on coordination from 
the perspective of the relationships among individual peacebuilding agents. The shift in focus 
                                                 
5
 In this sentence, and throughout the remainder of the dissertation,’complexity’ when not capitalised, refers to 
the common sense use of the word, which is typically employed when there is so much of something that it is 
difficult to keep track of it. However, ’Complexity’ capitalised, it refers to a specific type of system that is non-
linear, self-organised and emergent.  
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from an analysis of the parts to understanding the dynamics of the whole is a defining 
characteristic of Complexity studies. Cilliers (1998:5) framed it as follows: “When we look at 
the behaviour of a complex system as a whole, our focus shifts from the individual element in 
the system to the complex structure of the system.” George Richardson, quoted in Robert 
Ricigliano (2012:23), offers another perspective; he argues that a system’s view of the world 
allows one to “stand back just far enough to deliberately blur discrete events into patterns of 
behaviour”. Hence, the use of a Complexity theory approach enables this study to assume a 
whole-of-system, rather than an inter-organisational perspective, on the peacebuilding 
coherence dilemma.  
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
 
The first chapter serves as an introduction by providing the background to the study, 
identifying the research problem, describing the methodology and explaining the structure of 
the study.  
 
The substantive arguments of the dissertation are divided into three parts. The first part deals 
with peacebuilding and the coherence dilemma. The second deals with Complexity and its 
relevance for peacebuilding systems. In the third section, the dissertation presents a number of 
recommendations generated for coping with Complexity. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces peacebuilding and the liberal peace debate. Peacebuilding is introduced 
as a developing concept and different ways in which the concept can be approached and 
understood are discussed. The liberal peace debate is also introduced and some of its 
implications for contemporary peacebuilding practice and political debates are discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces coherence and discusses how this concept is used and understood in the 
international peacebuilding context, as well as its linkages to concepts such as effectiveness 
and sustainability. In Chapter 4, the factors that hinder or constrain coherence, such as long-
term impact versus short-term output, conflicting values, principles and mandates, the 
influence of conditions conducive to coherence, and the tension between local and 
international actors are discussed. 
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In the second part of the dissertation, the focus turns to Complexity. Complexity is introduced 
in Chapter 5 by discussing some of the concepts and characteristics that are key to 
understanding Complexity, including non-linearity, emergence and self-organisation. The 
implications of Complexity for epistemology and ethics are also addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
In Chapter 6 the characteristics of Complexity are applied to peacebuilding and the case for 
understanding peacebuilding as a complex system is made. In Chapter 7 the relevance of 
Complexity for peacebuilding is explored, and a number of specific implications that can be 
drawn from Complexity for peacebuilding coherence are identified and discussed. The 
implications of Complexity for the problem-solving and stabilisation approaches to 
peacebuilding are explored, and consideration is given to the assumptions about time and 
pace, as well as to the positions external or international actors occupy in the liberal peace 
approach to peacebuilding. 
 
In the third part of the dissertation, the findings of the first two parts of the study are 
synthesised. In Chapter 8, the leverage points that can be used to influence complex systems 
are discussed. This chapter considers whether it is indeed possible to influence or manipulate 
complex systems, and how it may be done, if it should be possible. Fifteen specific 
recommendations for coping with peacebuilding Complexity are presented in Chapter 9. 
These recommendations serve as a summary and categorisation of the insights gained through 
this study by applying the characteristics of Complexity to peacebuilding in general and the 
coherence dilemma in particular. As such, the recommendations suggest what a complex 
systems approach to peacebuilding would consist of, and they are offered as a general 
guideline for coping with peacebuilding Complexity. 
 
The last and concluding chapter, Chapter 10, consists of a summary the findings of the 
various parts of the dissertation, suggestions for further research, and a discussion of the 
degree to which the research questions has been addressed. 
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1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this first chapter of the dissertation, the problem statement, background and context, 
methodology and key concepts related to peacebuilding coherence dilemma have been 
introduced.  
 
The central focus of the dissertation is the coherence dilemma that challenges peacebuilding 
interventions. Peacebuilding is a key instrument for the international community to maintain 
peace and security, but its record has been mixed. Thus there is great interest in improving the 
effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions. The dominant view among the 
peacebuilding policy community is that one of the ways in which the effectiveness and 
sustainability of peacebuilding interventions can be improved, is by enhancing coherence. In 
this dissertation, the causal links that are assumed to exist between coherence, effectiveness 
and sustainability are questioned.  
 
Complexity is the primary theoretical tool used in this dissertation for critically considering 
the linkages between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability. The focus on coherence and 
the use of Complexity enables this study to transcend the inter-agent or inter-organisational 
level that has dominated the research into coordination challenges to date. The dissertation, 
instead, is focused on the patterns of interactions among the agents and the macro-level or 
whole-of-system level behaviour of the peacebuilding system. This dissertation thus presents 
an exploration of the utility of using Complexity to improve our understanding of the 
peacebuilding coherence dilemma. 
 
The study now turns to Part I: Peacebuilding and the Coherence Dilemma, and Chapter 2: 
Peacebuilding, where the concepts and major debates around peacebuilding will be 
introduced. 
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PART I: PEACEBUILDING AND THE COHERENCE DILEMMA 
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CHAPTER 2 
PEACEBUILDING 
 
 
This is the era that marks the humble recognition that no single recipe stands out to assure 
peace and stability and that all partners in multilateral endeavours should come together to 
achieve lasting success. - Mr Ad Melkert, Under Secretary-General and Administrator a.i. of 
the United Nations Development Programme. (3C Conference Report, 2009) 
 
Creating the conditions for sustainable peace and economic growth in a country that lacks 
such conditions is one of the most difficult intellectual and policy puzzles imaginable. It has 
all the features of a ‘wicked problem’, too complex and indeterminate to be modelled in its 
entirety and therefore defying straightforward solutions. Indeed, the greatest danger for 
peacebuilding practitioners and academics alike may be a hubristic combination of 
overconfidence plus insufficient or unreliable knowledge. (Paris, 2011c) 
 
Each actor contributes only a part of the whole. It is the overall collective and cumulative 
effects that build up the momentum towards sustainable peace and development. – Ms. 
Aurélia Bouchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Regional, Economic and 
Multilateral Affairs, NATO. (3C Conference Report, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation explores the utility of using Complexity to gain insights into the coherence 
dilemma in peacebuilding systems. In this chapter, peacebuilding is introduced and 
contextualised. First, peacebuilding is placed in a larger historical context through explaining 
what the circumstances were in which the need to develop a specific conflict-management 
approach, called peacebuilding, became necessary. The peacebuilding concept is introduced 
through exploring a number of its emerging characteristics. What peacebuilding means in the 
United Nations (UN) context is discussed and how it is used in this dissertation is explained. 
 
A number of theoretical and political debates around how peacebuilding has been understood 
and used to date are also introduced and touched on. These debates are ongoing and will 
influence how peacebuilding is understood in future. This dissertation arose from engagement 
in these debates and the exploration of the contribution a complex-systems perspective may 
bring to them. This section serves as a mapping, or overview, of a number of the key 
theoretical and political debates that are relevant to the focus of this study. 
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2.2  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly 
shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, 
which has to do with managing change (Eide, Kaspersen, Kent & Von Hippel, 2005:3). The 
nexus between development, peace and security has become the central focus of the 
international conflict-management debate (Uvin, 2002:5).  
 
From the way peacebuilding has been used in major UN policy documents, such as In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All (UN, 2005a) and 
Delivering as One (UN, 2006b), it can be argued that peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the 
collective framework under which these peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human 
rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at 
country level (De Coning, 2007c:3). These developments culminated, as the centrepiece of 
the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the establishment of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission. 
 
In the early 1990s, the approach to international conflict management, as developed in the 
context of then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace (UN, 
1992), was to first try to prevent violent conflict (conflict prevention). If that failed, the next 
step was to make peace by facilitating dialogue among the belligerent parties (peacemaking). 
If a ceasefire or peace agreement was reached that included a neutral third-party monitoring 
role, the UN or a regional organisation authorised by the Security Council would typically 
deploy a peace operation to monitor the ceasefire and to support the implementation of the 
peace agreement (peacekeeping). Once the conflict had been stabilised, the emergency 
humanitarian needs addressed and a peace process agreed upon, the international community 
would shift its focus to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase was focused on rebuilding and 
reconciliation (peacebuilding) with the aim of addressing the root causes of the violent 
conflict so as to prevent it from reoccurring (De Coning, 2006:242). 
 
As a result of a series of peacekeeping failures and challenges in the 1990s, especially the 
experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica, understanding of international conflict 
management has become more nuanced (Thakur & Schnabel, 2001:14). When this 
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dissertation refers to a lack of effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding efforts, it 
relates to the fact that, thus far, the record of peacebuilding interventions have been mixed 
(see Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:7). Whilst some argue that the number of armed conflicts 
have fallen substantially since the end of the Cold War and that this is linked to the increased 
effectiveness of UN peace interventions (Aguirre & Van der Borgh, 2010:1), others such as 
Licklider (1995:685) and Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoefller, Reynal Querol and Sambanis (2003) 
have argued that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five to ten years after they 
have been signed. However, it should be noted that the figure of an approximate failure of 
50% of all peace agreements that has become widely cited in UN and other reports has been 
demonstrated by Suhrke and Samset (2007:199) to be a misrepresentation, with the more 
correct finding of the Collier et al. (2003) study being approximately 23% over five years, but 
reaching almost 50% over 10 years. 
 
As a result of this mixed record, and based on the lessons learned over the period since 1992, 
there is now recognition that the different elements of the international response introduced in 
the Agenda for Peace do not necessarily follow as neatly, in a linear or chronological 
progression, on one another as suggested by the Agenda for Peace. In practice, these elements 
seem to overlap, are interlinked, mutually support each other and often take place 
simultaneously.  
 
The emergence of peacebuilding should thus be understood in the context of an increasingly 
complex and interdependent international conflict-management system (Thakur, 2006:54). 
During the Cold War period, the United Nations, regional organisations and independent 
agencies were called upon to undertake humanitarian relief, and peacemaking and 
peacekeeping actions at a scale usually manageable within the scope of the independent 
capabilities of these organisations, or at a level that could be managed with limited 
cooperative arrangements.  
 
The scale and complexity of the crises faced by the international community in the post-Cold 
War era has been of a different magnitude and, as a result, it has often been the case that no 
single agency, government or international organisation could manage them on their own.  
These organisations were ill prepared to deal with the complexity of the challenges posed by 
the emerging post-conflict reconstruction challenges of the post-Cold War era (Chesterman, 
Ignatief & Thakur, 2005:340). As a result of the international community’s experiences in El 
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Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Nicaragua and Mozambique in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
a major shift in focus and approach became necessary (Tschirgi, 2004:1; Lederach, 1997:73).  
 
The question was no longer how a situation can be stabilised in order to maintain the 
precarious Cold War balance; instead, the focus shifted to a new agenda: How can the 
international community collectively better facilitate and support the implementation of 
comprehensive peace agreements in countries emerging from violent conflict and civil war? 
In the context of these developments, peacebuilding was increasingly seen as the collective 
framework under which the political, security, rule of law, governance, human rights and 
development dimensions of these international interventions could be brought together under 
one common strategic framework (De Coning, 2010b:3). As Susan Woodward (2011:316) 
points out, the solution, as codified in the 2005 Paris Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States, which were adopted in 2007 by the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), was that 
development donors should now “focus on state-building as the central objective” (OECD, 
2005:2). 
 
As a result of these developments, peacebuilding emerged as a new form of peace 
intervention; one aimed at assisting societies emerging out of conflict with managing their 
peace processes. However, beyond this broad notion, the concept itself remains highly 
contested. In the next section the focus is on some of the emerging characteristics that, taken 
together, may assist in better understanding what this concept entails. 
 
2.3  EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Whilst no one common definition, approach or model for peacebuilding has become widely 
accepted, it may be possible to start defining the concept of peacebuilding by discussing a few 
characteristics that have emerged over the last decade and a half of peacebuilding practice 
(Berdal, 2009:25). The first is that peacebuilding is primarily concerned with securing or 
‘consolidating the peace’. This phrase refers to a concern with preventing a lapse, or relapse, 
into violent conflict. Peacebuilding is aimed at consolidating the peace by addressing those 
conflict factors that may in the short to medium term threaten a lapse, or relapse, into conflict, 
as well as addressing the root causes of conflict that may threaten the peace over the long 
term.  
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In Liberia, for instance, such short-term conflict factors may be land disputes, youth 
expectations, political polarisation and a weak justice system, whilst the root causes are 
related to the structural inequalities inherent in that society (Liberia, 2008:171). For instance, 
reforming the security forces may form part of the long-term development goals of Ghana, 
but that is different from pursuing similar goals in Liberia. In Ghana the motivation is 
governance effectiveness and efficiency, whilst in Liberia security sector reform is primarily 
motivated by a need to consolidate the peace and preventing a relapse into conflict. There is 
thus a peace-consolidation aspect that is central to peacebuilding, and that sets it apart from 
development.  
 
The second characteristic is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide 
undertaking that spans several dimensions. There are different models or approaches, but 
most range from the most basic, which differentiate between three core dimensions, to the 
more elaborate, which list six to eight different dimensions. The UN Secretary-General’s 
report No Exit without Strategy (UN, 2001d) argues that peacebuilding should be understood 
as fostering the capacity to resolve future conflicts by: (1) consolidating security, (2) 
strengthening political institutions, and (3) promoting economic and social reconstruction. 
Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea (2007:49) refer to the same three dimensions as: (1) 
stability creation, (2) restoration of state institutions, and (3) socioeconomic recovery. Others, 
such as the UN’s Integrated Approach (UN, 2006a) model prefers a more elaborate list that 
includes the following dimensions: political, developmental, humanitarian, human rights, rule 
of law, social reconciliation and security. The African Union’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development Framework (AU, 2006a) comprises six similar constitutive elements, but it 
adds gender as a self-standing element, in other words, it regards and treats gender as a 
separate dimension in the same way that security, politics, governance and economics can be 
regarded as dimensions of peacebuilding.  
 
Humanitarian assistance should be highlighted as one dimension that is treated differently in 
the various models. A number of models, such as the Utstein Report (Smith, 2004), the UN’s 
Integrated Approach (UN, 2006a & 2008b) and the NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Policy Framework for Africa (NEPAD, 2005) include the humanitarian dimension. However, 
the humanitarian community argues that humanitarian assistance should not be included in 
peacebuilding models because it needs to be recognised as independent, neutral and impartial 
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(Weir, 2006; Metcalfe, Giffen & Elhawary, 2011). Peacebuilding is about changing the causes 
and drivers of violent conflict fundamentally so that it does not re-occur, and is thus 
inherently political. For humanitarian aid to reach its intended beneficiaries in complex 
emergencies, it has to be recognised as being above politics, hence its principles of 
independence, neutrality and impartiality. A key issue for humanitarian actors thus is to gain 
access to their intended beneficiaries and in order to do, so they value their independence 
highly. They are therefore concerned that inclusion into peacebuilding coordinating 
frameworks may harm their perceived independence. 
 
Some models, including the UN’s Integrated Approach (UN, 2006a & 2008b), nevertheless 
include humanitarian assistance within their peacebuilding frameworks, based on the 
argument that the humanitarian dimension needs to be factored into the overall peacebuilding 
planning and coordination mechanisms. However, it is stillrecognised that the humanitarian 
dimension has a special status and that it needs to be treated as an independent, but parallel, 
peacebuilding dimension.  
 
It should be noted that, in this dissertation, the humanitarian dimension is also considered to 
be one of the dimensions of a broad peacebuilding system, as shown in Table 2.1, with due 
regard for the principle of the independence of humanitarian action, as also recognised in the 
UN Secretary-General’s Notes of Guidance on Integrated Missions.  
 
Table 2.1: The Dimensions of Peacebuilding Systems 
 
Security & Rule of Law 
Providing a Safe and Secure Environment 
Protection of Civilians 
Mine Action 
Security Sector Reform 
Disarmament & Demobilization 
Police, Corrections & Judicial Reform (Rule of Law) 
Political & Governance 
Support the Peace Process & Oversee the Political Transition 
Political Participation, National Dialogue & Reconciliation 
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Electoral Capacity Building and Oversight (Observation) 
State and Government Institutions, Public Administration  & Civil 
Service Capacity Building (Governance) 
Extend State Authority Throughout the Territory 
Conflict Management Capacity 
Socio-economic 
Recovery 
Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports; Electricity; 
Telecommunications 
Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population 
Registration 
Stimulating and Facilitating Economic Growth and Employment 
Strengthening Civil Society 
Human Rights Human Rights Education, Advocacy and Monitoring 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Emergency and Early Recovery Services in the areas of Food, Water & 
Sanitation, Shelter, Health, Protection and Return of Refugees/IDPs 
 
 
The third emerging characteristic of peacebuilding is that, in addition to its multi-dimensional 
character, it is also a multi-stakeholder system. One of the aspects that set peacebuilding apart 
is the diverse range of international and local agents that have to be engaged in any particular 
peacebuilding system, including states such as donors or neighbours, international and 
regional institutions, non-governmental organisations, local communities and corporations. 
Their work spans across all dimensions of life: political, security, developmental, governance, 
economics and socio-cultural. In each specific case, the full spectrum of national actors, 
including the government, political parties, militias, traditional leaders, civil society, and so 
forth, are engaged in the peacebuilding process.  The relationships and interactions among 
these many different internal and external agents generate the complexity in the peacebuilding 
system. Complexity studies are introduced in Chapter 5, and the issue of relationships and 
interactions will be presented in greater depth in the chapters that follow.  
 
The fourth emerging characteristic relates to our perspective of time. Broad agreement seems 
to have developed around two time-related issues (Tschirgi, 2004:9). The first is recognition, 
at least at the policy level, that post-conflict peacebuilding is a long-term process and that a 
longer and more sustained international commitment is necessary than was believed a decade 
ago (Lederach, 1997:74). The fact that a longer-term timeframe is necessary for post-conflict 
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peacebuilding was agreed on at the World Summit in 2005 (UN, 2004a & 2005a) and resulted 
in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The core aim of the PBC 
was to ensure that the international community, in general, and the UN, in particular, remain 
engaged in countries in the post-conflict peacebuilding stage.  
 
This was regarded as necessary because the UN Security Council’s attention tends to be 
focused on those crises where the UN has a direct stake, usually in the form of a UN 
peacekeeping operation. When such operations come to an end, the post-conflict countries in 
question tend to move off the Security Council agenda. Failure to sustain the international 
engagement in countries like Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone was seen as an important factor 
in the serial-relapse into violent conflict experienced in these cases (De Coning, 2010b).  
 
The international community now seems to recognise a causal link between sustained 
international attention and longer-lasting peace processes (World Bank, 2011; OECD, 2011a). 
However, there is still a large gap between the time period that the UN, World Bank and 
international donors seem willing to plan around and commit to (which rarely exceeds one to 
three years) and the time it takes for these transformative processes to take hold.  For instance 
the UN Secretary-General (UN, 2009) has chosen to focus his 2009 post-conflict 
peacebuilding report on the two to three years comprising the immediate aftermath of conflict, 
which is an indication of the focus and appitate for peacebuilding in the UN system. In 
contrast, Pritchett and De Weijer’s (2010:13) research shows that the fastest and most 
exceptional transformers of the 20
th
 century, countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, took 
20 to 30 years to attain levels of institutional solidity comparable to present-day Ghana or 
Vietnam, and their research suggests that it would take the average fragile state approximately 
116 years to reach similar levels. Whilst there is no agreed upon minimum period for 
sustainability, most policy makers and researchers seem share a sense that it takes at least two 
to three decades for peace to take hold. Another way in which one can express this time factor 
is to frame it in generational terms, i.e. that it takes at least one generation for a conflict to be 
resolved, and a few for a conflict to be truly transformed. We will return to this time factor in 
Chapters 7 and 9. 
 
The second time-related characteristic is the recognition that, although post-conflict 
peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment, there is also a need for immediate and short-
term gains to solidify the peace, build confidence in the peace process and stimulate a vision 
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of a better future (Wesley, 2008:377; UN, 2009). This has resulted in the creation of the UN 
Peacebuilding Fund and practices such as the now standard inclusion of a budget for quick-
impact projects in UN peacekeeping operations (UN, 2007a). There is thus a tension between 
the parallel needs for long-term engagement and commitment and short-terms gains, and the 
co-existence of both these needs, and their respective cultures, approaches and practices, 
contribute to complexity of peacebuilding. 
 
In this section, a number of emerging characteristics were discussed that, when taken 
together, may assist practitioners in better understanding why peacebuilding is such a 
complex matter. These include characteristics such as peace consolidation, the multi-
dimensional and multi-stakeholder nature of peacebuilding and the various tensions that are 
brought about by different, and competing, time perspectives. In the next section, the focus is 
narrowed to how the peacebuilding concept has developed and has been defined in the UN 
context, as well as to how it is used in this dissertation.  
 
2.4  CONCEPTS AND DEFINITION 
 
Although the term ‘peacebuilding’ was coined by Johan Galtung in 1975 (Smith, 
McCandless, Paulson & Wheaton, 2011:12; Galtung, 1976), the term only became widely 
used as part of our contemporary conflict-management vocabulary in 1992 when the then UN 
Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, used it as one of the key concepts of his ‘An 
Agenda for Peace’ (UN, 1992). In this policy document, peacebuilding was described as 
“action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid 
a relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992:21). Peacebuilding was described as the counterpart of 
preventive diplomacy, where preventive diplomacy was seen as action aimed a avoiding a 
crisis whilst peacebuilding is aimed at preventing its recurrence (UN, 1992:57).  In the 
Agenda for Peace, conflict prevention and peacebuilding were thus juxtaposed at the opposite 
ends of the conflict-management spectrum, with preventive diplomacy representing the first 
or opening stage of an intervention and peacebuilding the last or closing stage.  
 
This original conceptualisation and chronological model has had an enduring impact, and 
many people at the policy, funding and operational levels still have these original concepts in 
mind when working with conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues (Paris & Sisk, 2009:5). 
In fact, the UN Secretariat has to some degree institutionalised the model, with separate 
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departments responsible for prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and, with the new 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), now also for peacebuilding (De Coning, 2008c). 
Bureaucratic dynamics among these departments ensure that there is a healthy dose of 
competition for resources and influence among them, and although they cooperate in many 
meaningful ways, these competitive tendencies also reinforce their different identities along 
with the very notion that prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are 
separate phases or facets of a peace process. However, over the past decade and a half, our 
understanding of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as established by the 
Agenda for Peace, has been refined through practice and analysis, and they are now broadly 
understood to be interdependent and interlinked aspects of the same process, rather than 
chronological steps or stages in a linear conflict-management continuum (Berdal & 
Wennmann, 2010:59).  
 
There thus is a tension between how these practices are operationalised in the UN system via 
different departments and funding mechanisms, and how they are understood to be interlinked 
in practice. There is a need to revisit and clarify exactly what it is that the United Nations 
system as a whole means when it uses these concepts. This is not merely of academic interest. 
Conceptual confusion leads to policy vagueness, duplication, omission and competition. It 
complicates the mobilisation of resources and causes budgetary confusion. For instance, a 
major complication in the UN context is that peacekeeping operations are funded from 
assessed contributions,
6
 whilst prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding work has to be 
funded from the UN’s regular budget or through voluntary contributions. This has a perverse 
effect on the relation between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, because the UN 
Security Council has to authorise the deployment of military peacekeepers in order to get 
access to the assessed contribution budget. As a result, UN peacekeeping missions with 
military peacekeepers are deployed in some cases when a civilian conflict prevention or 
peacebuilding mission may be equally meaningful. In others, peacekeeping missions are kept 
in theatre longer than may be necessary, because this is the only way that a UN presence can 
be funded by the assessed contribution budget (Martin, 2010:13). The result is that the UN 
peacekeeping budget for the 2010/2011 period is approximately 8 billion US dollars, whilst 
                                                 
6
 Assessed contributions refer to the system whereby each Member State has to contribute, against a pre-agreed 
formula based on GDP, to the peacekeeping budget. Once the UN Security Council approves a peacekeeping 
mission, there therefore is an automated system for retrieving the cost from Member States. The cost is related to 
the approved troop strength of the mission and the assessed contribution system, in effect, is therefore directly 
related to the military component of the mission.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 25 
the UN regular budget for prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding is less than 8 million 
US dollars (De Coning, 2010c). How peacebuilding is understood is thus not merely a 
conceptual exercise – the ways in which these concepts are coined influence how they are 
employed in practice. And the way they are employed in practice, e.g. how peacebuilding is 
financed, influences the way we understand and use the peacebuilding concept. 
 
Peacebuilding, like peacemaking and peacekeeping, is thus not a static concept that can be 
defined by a committee, endorsed by an assembly and then operationalised, as is, ad 
infinitum. The use of the concept needs to be continuously refined, improved and adjusted, 
depending on the context within which it is being operationalised. In fact, as the work of the 
UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Fund to date has shown, there is a degree 
to which peacebuilding will take on a unique meaning in every specific context in which it is 
applied, and this tension between what is common to different situations and what is context 
specific, is partly what needs to be captured in a refined understanding of the evolving 
peacebuilding concept. The UN Peacebuilding Commission is ideally placed to take on the 
task of developing and refining a conceptual and operational model of peacebuilding for the 
UN system, and this should be a responsibility that is central to its long-term work plan (De 
Coning, 2010b). 
 
In the meantime, and for the sake of working from the basis of one official definition, the 
working definition of peacebuilding approved by the UN Policy Committee in May 2007 can 
be utilised here:  
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing 
into conflict, to strengthen national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay 
the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be 
coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national 
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively 
narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives. (UN, 2007b) 
 
It should be noted that coherence is specifically mentioned as an integral part of what the UN 
understands under “peacebuilding” in this definition. The definition expands on some of the 
elements of coherence that are deemed essential for peacebuilding, including the need for a 
prioritised and sequenced set of activities designed around achieving the peacebuilding 
objective. The definition also highlights national or local ownership, a concept that will be 
returned to often in the course of this dissertation.  
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In broad terms, it can thus be said that peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalise 
peace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyond merely preventing violence—what 
Galtung (1985) termed ‘negative peace’. It aims to address the underlying root causes of 
conflict and to create the conditions for a just social order—what Galtung (1985) termed 
‘positive peace’. However, this broad understanding of peacebuilding becomes muddled when 
the same concept is used in practice to describe two very different perspectives or 
approaches—what, in this dissertation, will be referred to as ‘programmatic peacebuilding’ 
and ‘systemic peacebuilding’.  Much of the conceptual confusion comes about when these 
two distinct approaches to peacebuilding are used interchangeably or confused with one 
another. 
 
2.4.1  Programmatic peacebuilding 
 
Programmatic peacebuilding refers to specific activities aimed at addressing urgent or 
imminent risks to a peace process. ‘Risks’ in this context refers to an assessment that a certain 
situation or condition may contribute to the increased likelihood of lapsing into violent 
conflict. These risks can be identified as short to medium-term conflict factors that may 
potentially impact negatively on the peace process. The programmatic peacebuilding theory 
of change is that a lapse into conflict can be avoided by addressing these risk factors through 
specifically targeted programme interventions. One can also think of this as ‘preventative 
peacebuilding’ or ‘instrumental peacebuilding’ in that it refers to specific programme 
interventions that are meant to prevent a lapse into conflict.  
 
Some donors now have funds specifically earmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds 
would most likely be used to fund specific programmes in this category. The activities 
supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund typically also fall in this category and are aimed at 
addressing specific peace consolidation needs that have either remained unfunded, or under-
funded, or have newly emerged. The Peacebuilding Fund is meant to act as a catalyst that 
helps to alleviate specific risks through relatively short, focused interventions or helps to 
jump-start specific processes that will contribute to achieving the given peace-consolidation 
objectives. 
 
The timeframe for programmatic peacebuilding is necessarily short to-medium term, because 
it is focused on countering immediate or imminent threats to the peace process. Examples of 
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such peacebuilding programmes include: conflict resolution training and capacity building; 
the development of institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention, such as the Peace 
Commission in Southern Sudan or the Ituri Pacification Commission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo; support for civil society or women’s groups to participate in 
peacemaking initiatives; and support for national reconciliation initiatives, including aspects 
of transitional justice.  
 
Some donors would also include support for specific programme activities that form part of, 
or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Rule of Law (RoL) and 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) in this peacebuilding category. However, in Sierra Leone, 
Burundi and Liberia, it was noted that some of the activities earmarked in this category appear 
to be very similar to traditional development categories such as youth employment, 
infrastructure development and basic social services. This is because frustration with the lack 
of progress in these areas has become critical in some of these communities. It thus became a 
source of grievance that could have contributed to a relapse into violent conflict, and urgent 
action was required to show that some of these needs are being met (Tschirgi, Lund & 
Mancini, 2010). 
 
Some donors do not earmark funds specifically for peacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a 
conflict-sensitive approach to development when working in conflict-affected countries. 
Conflict-sensitive development programmes have a developmental objective—for example, 
poverty reduction—but are sensitive to the conflict environment within which they operate, in 
that specific steps are taken in the design and management of the programme to avoid 
aggravating the situation. In some cases, the design of the programme can also be intended to 
proactively support conflict-prevention efforts; and, in the latter case, such activities are 
almost indistinguishable from targeted peacebuilding (Anderson, 1999).  
 
An important prerequisite for a programmatic peacebuilding programme to be effective is an 
understanding of the risks to the peace process and the conflict factors that characterise the 
conflict system. It is now common that a Post-Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), or another 
form of conflict or risk analysis, is recommended to be undertaken as part of the process 
leading up to the design of appropriate targeted peacebuilding programmes. A PCIA is meant 
to assist the peacebuilding agent and key stakeholders to work towards a common 
understanding of what the conflict factors in a particular context are, from the earliest 
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planning stages and continuously throughout the life cycle of the peacebuilding system 
(McCandless, 2008:15). Funding for and capacity building towards effective participation in a 
PCIA approach could also be regarded as a programmatic peacebuilding activity.  
 
As with most of these processes, the real value does not lie so much in the end product – the 
PCIA report, for example – but rather in the sustained, focused interaction among 
stakeholders that is necessary to generate it. This is because this process of interaction among 
stakeholders leads to an improved and nuanced understanding of one another and the situation 
at hand, and this deeper level of insight will have numerous spin-offs far beyond just the 
PCIA report. A network is created in the process, and the members of the network can 
continue to work together, or in smaller hubs, to resolve or manage issues that may emerge 
subsequently.  This concept receives further attention in Chapters 6-9. 
 
2.4.2  Systemic peacebuilding 
 
Systemic peacebuilding, on the other hand, emerges out of the total combined effort of the 
activities undertaken under the various peacebuilding dimensions introduced earlier (see 
Table 2.1), and thus exists in the form of a system-wide or holistic process. In this dissertation 
peacebuilding is referred to as a system because the various dimensions of peacebuilding, and 
the agents engaged in them, are interdependent. None of these elements can achieve the peace 
consolidation objective on their own, and neither can any of the agents. Whilst each 
peacebuilding agent is independent, in that each has control over his or her own goals and 
resources, they are also interdependent because each agent only represents one or some of the 
many facets necessary to collectively and cumulatively contribute to achieving the 
peacebuilding objective.  
 
From the perspective of such a system, a distinction can be made between peacebuilding 
agents, who represent elements in the peacebuilding system that are bound together because 
they share this common objective, and other domestic and international actors, who are 
motivated by interests other than peace consolidation, for instance spoilers (Stedman, 1997), 
i.e. actors that have a vested interest in maintaining the conflict system and who undermine 
the efforts of the peacebuilding agents. Such actors, from the perspective of the peacebuilding 
system, are part of the environment within which the system is embedded. Zartman refers to 
the environment as “cooperation’s outer shell” (Zartman & Touval, 2010:8).  
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The overall peacebuilding effort may sometimes be anchored in a strategy or vision, for 
example, an integrated strategic framework such as the ‘Lift Liberia’ Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (Liberia, 2008) or the Afghan Compact in Afghanistan. There may be specific 
processes and structures that facilitate the development, management and monitoring of such 
peacebuilding frameworks and these may be purposely funded.
7
  
 
In general, however, support for systemic peacebuilding occurs in a highly fragmented 
manner in that the various agents who participate in and contribute to the overall process each 
independently designs, manages, monitors and evaluates, and secures funding for his or her 
own programmes. These activities are not necessarily identified as, or funded as 
peacebuilding activities at the programme level, although some of the programmes discussed 
in the previous section on programmatic peacebuilding will be. Instead, they would be 
considered and funded, for instance, as peacekeeping, development, human rights, job 
creation, or Rule of Law activities. It is when these activities are considered together in the 
context of their combined and cumulative peace consolidation effect over time that their 
contribution to a larger peacebuilding effort becomes apparent. 
 
A strategic or integrated framework that is aimed at an overall strategic vision for the 
systemic peacebuilding process, such as a conflict-sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS), maps out the overall priorities and objectives of the systemic peacebuilding strategy 
for a particular country. Examples include the Results Focussed Transitional Framework 
(RFTF); interim IRSP and RSP in Liberia; the Peace Consolidation Strategy and PRSP in 
Sierra Leone; and the Integrated Peacebuilding Frameworks in Burundi and the Central 
African Republic. Individual programmes become part of the systemic peacebuilding process 
when they contribute to, and are considered as part of, the overall effort directed towards 
achieving the objectives set out in such a common strategic vision.  
 
In some cases, the individual agencies may be conscious of their role in the overall 
framework, but in many cases this linkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance in 
                                                 
7
 For instance, the earlier Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) of the Results Focused 
Transitional Framework in Liberia and the more recent UN and Government of Liberia Joint Steering 
Committee that manages the Peacebuilding Funds grant for Liberia. 
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strategic evaluations or in annual PRS reports.
8
 This does not imply that the connections are 
artificial, but rather that those at the programme level are not always aware of the degree to 
which their individual activities contribute to an overall systemic peacebuilding framework.  
 
There is disagreement over the extent to which a development activity such as a programme 
aimed at poverty reduction or infrastructure development such as the construction of a road, 
for example, can be regarded as having a peace-consolidation effect and thus be considered to 
be part of a peacebuilding effort. The confusion lies both in the perspective and the context. 
An individual donor or implementing agent may not think of, or categorise the funding of, the 
construction of a road as peacebuilding from a programme level or budget-line perspective. 
However, from a systemic perspective, i.e. in the context of an integrated peacebuilding 
framework, the construction of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger 
systemic peacebuilding framework. It may create work, also for ex-combatants; it may 
stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by providing access to markets; it may 
stimulate local contractor capacity; it may open up outlying areas previously marginalised 
because of their inaccessibility and assist in the extension of the authority of the state into 
those territories; and it may contribute to overall economic growth, all of which are important 
aspects of an environment conducive to a successful peace process and thus preventing a 
relapse into conflict.  
 
Any particular system is framed by the observer, and an overall systems perspective is thus 
required to recognise that a specific programme activity, such as the road-building project in 
this example, is having a positive feedback effect on peace consolidation and is therefore 
regarded as being part of the peacebuilding system. It is not necessary for the agent to be 
aware that it is part of a particular system for it to contribute to the overall system effect. 
 
The two distinct ways in which we tend to think about peacebuilding, namely in either 
programmatic or systemic terms, has now been explained. Our understanding of 
peacebuilding becomes unnecessarily complicated when, in a conversation about 
peacebuilding, some people unconsciously approach the discussion from a programmatic 
peacebuilding perspective, whilst others approach it from a systemic peacebuilding 
                                                 
8
 The Utstein Study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger 
country strategy. See Smith (2004:16). 
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perspective. When this happens, people tend to talk past each other without realising it. This 
confusion contributes to the lack of coherence in the peacebuilding debate. 
 
In this dissertation, peacebuilding is approached from the systemic perspective, and when the 
term is used, the reader can assume that it is being used in that sense. When reference is made 
to instances of programmatic peacebuilding, this will be explicitly stated and explained. 
 
How the peacebuilding concept has developed and has been defined in the UN context, and 
how it will be used in this dissertation informed the discussion in this section. In the next 
section of this chapter, some of the theoretical debates that show how the concept is contested 
and how it has been used and perceived by different geo-political constituencies are 
considered. 
 
2.5  UNDERLYING THEORIES 
 
How peacebuilding is understood, is influenced by a number of related and underlying 
theories about society and especially about societal change. Theories about the rise and fall of 
complex societies and civilizations are particularly relevant to the contemporary 
understanding of peacebuilding. Another aspect concerns the norms that prevail in our 
cultures and the question whether it is desirable to interfere in these processes; i.e. should one 
try to prevent a society’s collapse? Should anybody try to assist a society to become more 
complex? Does anyone have the right to interfere in these developments? A number of 
different theories are engaged in a debate with one another on these issues in the 
peacebuilding field. These debates reflect competing worldviews, ideologies and theories of 
change. Two of the major debates are presented in the next section. The first is about whether 
state formation occurs along a common pattern or whether each society develops in its own 
unique way. If there is a common pattern, peacebuilding can be an instrument to modulate 
state formation along that pattern, but if each society develops in its own unique way, 
peacebuilding needs to be context driven.  
 
The second is about the degree to which peacebuilding can be an externally or internally 
driven process. If it can be externally driven, further questions arise: How intrusive should 
this external process be? It is thus both a functional and ethical question. Who has, or should 
have, agency over the outcome of a peacebuilding process? Should the agenda and goals of 
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peacebuilding efforts be determined by internationally agreed upon universal norms like 
human rights and standards for good governance, for example? Or does each society have the 
right to determine its own norms, values and rules? In other words, should peacebuilding be a 
local act, with external support limited to the degree that such assistance is requested and 
welcomed? Or should peacebuilding be an external act, guided by international norms and 
standards? Should peacebuilding be a local process, informed by what is in the best interest of 
the society in question, but supported by the international system? Or should peacebuilding be 
an international conflict-management tool applied to maintain the international system, but 
informed by the local context? 
 
These two debates are closely related in that both have an internal-external tension, but the 
former is concerned with the implications for peacebuilding of the historical patterns of state 
formation, whilst the latter is concerned with the location of agency. The former can be said 
to be more concerned about the structure of the world system and the function of the state, 
whilst the latter can be said to be more normative, i.e. it questions who has the right to decide 
how a particular society should develop.  This dissertation engages both these theoretical 
debates, and explains whether the application of Complexity to peacebuilding can generate 
any new insights into these questions (see Chapters 6-9). 
 
2.5.1  Patterns of state formation  
 
With regard to the first debate around the pattern of state formation, the dominant European 
theory on the rise and fall of civilizations has been that societies develop along a common 
progressive trajectory (Olsen, 1982). For instance, archaeological historians like Tainter 
(1988) and Morris (2011) argue that all human societies follow a more-or-less linear 
progressive development path, i.e. they increase in social complexity over time, following a 
common trajectory from hunter-gatherers to settled agricultural communities, and from there 
they develop into feudal systems, kingdoms and eventually the nation state.  
 
Some argue that the next stage in this trajectory is a global government, whilst others argue 
that we are already operating in a global system, but that governance at this level is not, and 
will not, develop into formal, state-like governance (Wallerstein, 2000, 2007). Instead, 
governance at this level takes the form of networked cooperation (Ostrom, 2009). In other 
words, global governance is a reality, but it does not take the form of ‘a government’ in the 
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Westphalian sense of state-hood; rather, it is a web of interrelated international agreements 
and mechanisms that, taken together, aggregate into a system of global governance 
(Bartelson, 2009; Krücken & Drori, 2010; Harrison, 2006).  
 
From a cultural-technology perspective a similar progressive trajectory is the one from stone 
tools, through to bronze, iron, steam, carbon and information-based cultures (Morris, 
2010:108). In some cases empires have developed, i.e. nation- or city-states that have gained 
control or influence over vast areas. Such empires have developed economies, which served 
as the nodal point for commerce within the areas under their political and/or military control 
(Morris, 2010:169).  
 
The dominant theory therefore is that there is a natural, almost automatic, linear progression 
over time, with societies becoming more and more sophisticated and complex. Complexity, in 
the context of this theory, is understood in terms of the number of specialised roles performed 
in a society; the number or range of products it generates; and the complexity of the social 
hierarchy in these societies. By comparing such indicators, archaeological historians make 
judgements about the relative complexity of different societies, and they then construct 
arguments about the comparative state of development, or level of civilization, of a given 
society at a certain point in time.  
 
The linear progressive argument persists despite the obvious examples of the rise and fall of 
civilizations and empires, such as the Egyptian Pharoahs, the Mayan cultures, the Roman 
Empire, various Chinese empires, the Ottoman empire, the periods during which Portuguese, 
Spanish and Dutch explorers dominated the world economy, the British empire and the period 
which now seems to be coming to an end, during which America has been the sole 
superpower. The linear progressive theory holds that, whilst specific forms of social 
organisation, statehood or empire, may stagnate and even collapse, the overall trend in the 
history of societies as a whole, is progressive (Tainter, 1988; McAnany & Yoffee, 2010). 
 
However, why and how civilizations collapse has been a central question in this field (Tainter, 
1988; Diamond, 1997 & 2006). Others are interested in why Europe, or the West in general, 
has come to assume such a prominent and influential position in the history of state formation 
(Morris, 2010).  Both Diamond and Morris argue that geography is the most important 
determining factor that explains why complex societies first appeared in some regions and 
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then spread to others. Diamond (2005) argues that the collapse of complex societies is due to 
their inability to adapt to environmental changes, especially those changes brought on by 
themselves. Tainter and Morris argue that social systems collapse when they become too 
complex – they tend to develop to a point where they overextend themselves, i.e. the cost of 
maintaining the system increases up to a point where the society can no longer sustain its 
growth.  
 
An interesting feature of both these arguments, very relevant for our contemporary debates 
about climate change and sustainable economic growth, is that these societies were not 
ignorant of the fact that they were overextending themselves or that they were failing to adapt 
to changes in their environment, but that they seem to have been unable to stop their own 
momentum, even though they knew it was driving them to collapse (Meadows, Randers & 
Meadows, 1982). However, Morris (2010:131) argues that the emergence of new technologies 
(e.g. bronze, steel, steam, carbon, nuclear and information) that have been developed at 
critical points in history have resulted in some societies being able to transcend the 
growth/complexity ceilings that had prevented others at the same level of development from 
progressing any further. There is also an interesting emerging body of work, with particular 
relevance for peacebuilding, on how societies recover from collapse (McAnany & Yoffee, 
2010). The articles in McAnany and Yoffee’s edited volume (2010) are positioned against 
what the authors refer to as the “geographic accident theory” and they argue, instead, “that 
resilience in the face of societal crises, rather than collapse, is the leitmotif of the human story 
from the earliest civilizations to the present.”   
 
In his now landmark “The End of History” article, Francis Fukuyama (1989) has argued that 
the neo-liberal model, i.e. political freedoms, democratic pluralism and the free-market 
economy, represents the zenith of this journey towards increasing complexity and higher 
levels of civilization. His argument is that the Western neo-liberal state model has, with the 
defeat of communism, arrived at the highest possible point along this trajectory.  
 
This neo-liberal ideology has dominated our concept of both the nation-state and the 
international system over the last decades since the end of the Cold War. However, the 
outcome of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global financial crisis that started in late 
2007 have been widely interpreted as signals that the neo-liberal system is now suffering from 
the classic problem that most empires experience sooner or later, namely systemic overreach 
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(Diamond, 2005:15). Wallerstein (2007:77) argues that the crisis in which the capitalist world 
economy finds itself may go on for another 25 to 50 years, and that the world system is likely 
to experience wild oscillations during this period. No one is able to predict what kind of 
system will come next. Some speculate that we are already shifting into a multi-polar world 
order. Others argue that a new Cold War with America, China and India as the major powers 
is in the offing. Richard Haas (2008) predicts a world system not dominated by one or several 
great powers, but rather a nonpolar international system characterised by numerous centres 
exercising various kinds of power. One trend that does seem irreversibly obvious is a shift in 
the location of economic gravity from West to East, with China, India and Japan becoming 
major economic powers in the future. Will such a shift imply changes in the way that the 
international system has functioned since the establishment of the UN in 1945, and if so, what 
is the likely impact on peacebuilding? 
 
These developments are relevant for our understanding of peacebuilding, because 
peacebuilding theory has been deeply influenced by the linear progressive theory of state 
formation. It has emerged and has been refined into a specific type of intervention mechanism 
during a period in human history when the neo-liberal ideology was unquestioned and 
unchallenged. However, this is unlikely to remain the case as we go into the future. We are 
forced to ask the question: Is peacebuilding inherently linked to the neo-liberal ideology, or 
can it adapt to the changing world order?  
 
The linear progressive theory of state formation has been the dominant theory in Western 
philosophy and political theory, and is thus deeply ingrained in the Western political identity 
and worldview (Fukuyama, 2011). For a variety of historical reasons (see, for example, 
Morris, 2010), the West has also dominated the development of the international system since 
the 19
th
 century, and this progressive theory has thus also formed the basis of most theories of 
international relations in general and of peace and security in particular (Chan, 2010; Nayak 
& Selbin, 2010).  
 
In this context, the dominant Western, and thus de facto international, view of peacebuilding 
is that it is a tool that is used by the international community to assist societies emerging out 
of conflict to stabilise, and to replace their out-dated models of governance with modern 
institutions (Pugh, 2004:40). The modern state model that such societies are being encouraged 
to adopt is the Western neo-liberal state model, but this model is now presented as the new 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 36 
universal standard (Duffield, 2001; Paris, 2004). This model of the state is based on the 
Westphalian recognition of the nation-state as an institution that has monopoly over violence, 
control over territory and a population, and that is recognised by other states. However, it 
goes further in that it seeks to establish a particular kind of nation-state based on a specific 
concept of rule of law, human rights, the separation of powers, multi-party democracy and a 
market economy (Eriksen, 2009:653). This particular kind of state is often referred to as a 
liberal market democracy (Lidén, 2009:617).  
 
This neo-liberal model is understood to be the highest form, or the most complex form of 
social organisation developed by mankind to date, and it is upheld by the West and 
international organisations like the UN, the African Union and the European Union as the 
ideal state model (Richmond, 2011:227). By adopting the neo-liberal model, societies become 
modern, responsible members of the international community (Paris, 2004:40). All states are 
thus expected to strive for this ideal and are measured against it. Eriksen (2009:653) quotes 
Gopal Balakrishnan as referring to this neo-liberal model as an “objectively operative 
fiction”, i.e. an “idea that forms the basis for the design of formal institutions, even if the 
states in question are far from corresponding to it”.   
 
The neo-liberal model is thus perceived by the international community to be the optimal 
model for sustainable peace, justice and development, and thus also as the best guarantee for 
peace consolidation. Lidén (2009:617) quotes Doyle who, based on Kant’s sketch for eternal 
peace, argues that the role of peacebuilding is to reconstruct “societies in liberalism’s divine 
image”. This is why it is more typically referred to as the liberal peace model in contemporary 
peacebuilding literature (e.g. Lidén, MacGinty & Richmond, 2009; Campbell, Chandler & 
Sabaratnam, 2011). As Alex Bellamy (2008:4) argues: “The principal aim of peace operations 
thus becomes … actively contributing to the construction of liberal politics, economies and 
societies”. When peacebuilding is employed to achieve a neo-liberal state, the aim is to 
establish rule of law, civilian control over the armed forces, protection of human rights, good 
governance and free-market economic policies (Eriksen, 2009:662). The first argument in 
support of the liberal peace model is thus that it is the most advanced model for sustainable 
peace at the domestic or nation-state level.  
 
There is also a further complementary theory – the democratic peace theory – that holds that 
democracies do not go to war against each other (Paris, 2004:43). Another element of the 
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liberal peace logic thus is that the world will become more peaceful and stable if more states 
adopt the neo-liberal model. According to this theory, there is a correlation between the 
increasing number of democracies and the steady decline in inter-state war since the Second 
World War. Thus, in order to make the world more peaceful, organisations like the UN need 
to use tools like peacekeeping and peacebuilding to encourage states to adopt the liberal peace 
model (Pugh, 2004:42). The second argument in support of the liberal peace model is thus 
that it is the optimal model for sustainable peace at the international or inter-state level. 
 
A third argument in favour of the liberal peace model is that the international system and the 
globalised economy are based on neo-liberal principles. Those states that adopt the neo-liberal 
model at the level of the nation-state, especially in terms of their economic policies, will be 
the best suited to ‘plug-and-play’ in the international system and the global economy. They 
will thus have an advantage over others that are still stuck in more primitive models and will 
benefit from their national system being more inter-operable with the dominant international 
system and global economy. 
 
Some also argue that peace processes follow the same linear progressive path, as they are part 
of the state-formation process. Peacebuilding interventions should thus assist societies to 
move through a series of linear progressive steps along the path to the liberal peace model. 
The typical stages of a peacebuilding process are understood to include a stabilisation phase, a 
transitional phase, and a consolidation phase.
9
 In the stabilisation phase a country reaches the 
first level of liberal statehood by consolidating and monopolising the use of violence. In the 
transitional phase, it progresses from an arbitrary to a constitutional political order. If there is 
no existing constitution, or if the existing constitution is unacceptable, the first step typically 
is to negotiate and draft a new constitution. Next, internationally facilitated and observed 
elections are organised, and the first post-conflict and constitutionally legitimate new 
government is elected. This step assures international recognition, and thus satisfies the 
second level of liberal statehood. In the consolidation phase, the new legitimate state is 
supported to develop all the liberal peace capabilities it needs to enable it to manage the state 
and society on its own without relapsing into violent conflict. The peacebuilding period ends 
                                                 
9
 There are a number of different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essential progression. 
See for instance CSIS, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework (Washington D.C: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 2002), in which three 
stages are identified, namely: the initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. For a more 
detailed explanation of the three stages referred to here, namely stabilization, transitional and consolidation, see 
De Coning (2007a). 
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when a country emerging out of conflict has reached the stage where it is able to consolidate 
its own peace process without external support, i.e. when it has achieved self-sustainable 
peace, thus achieving the third level of liberal statehood. 
 
There are other schools of thought, however, that represent a deep-seated scepticism towards 
understanding peacebuilding, or state formation and social development more broadly, as 
naturally following a linear progressive path from more primitive to more advanced, or 
complex, levels of political, social and economic development. One of the things that those 
critical of the liberal peace model have in common is that they argue that the progressive 
model outlined above is valid only from a Western socio-cultural, historic, political and 
philosophical tradition (Foucault, 2008; Hardt & Negri, 2000). These critics argue that other 
cultures have their own histories or legacies and follow different trajectories (Fanon, 1967; 
Hegre, 2004). For instance, William Easterly (2007), who equates what he calls development 
ideology with the liberal peace model, argues that: 
The nations that have been the most successful in the past 40 years did so in such a variety of 
different ways that it would be hard to argue that they discovered the ‘correct answer’ from 
development ideology. In fact, they often conspicuously violated whatever it was the experts 
said at the time. The East Asian tigers, for instance, chose outward orientation on their own in 
the 1960s, when the experts' conventional wisdom was industrialization for the home market. 
The rapid growth of China over the past quarter century came when it was hardly a poster 
child for either the 1980s Washington Consensus or the 1990s institutionalism of democracy 
and cracking down on corruption. 
 
Wallerstein (2000:416) agrees that all states develop along their own trajectories, but argues 
that the West has gained dominance over the international system and, as a result of 
colonialism and Western imperialism, these non-Western trajectories have become influenced 
by, or contaminated with, Western concepts of statehood and the neo-liberal ideology. He 
argues that it is thus no longer possible for these non-Western societies to develop completely 
independently from the Western model, but they may leap-frog, or develop differently from, 
but influenced by, the Western liberal peace model (Wallerstein, 2007:78). Because they had 
a different starting point, and because they have different social, cultural and political 
traditions and trajectories, they will neither blindly adopt, nor directly follow the path of the 
liberal peace model. They cannot, however, avoid being influenced by it (Wallerstein, 
2000:436; Sabaratnam, 2011:248).  
 
In the peacebuilding context, those that argue for a non-linear progression model argue that 
there are many different paths to state formation and long-term sustainable peace (Chandler, 
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2009). Not all go through the stabilisation, transition and consolidation phases discussed 
earlier, nor do they necessarily need an international peacekeeping or peacebuilding 
intervention (Paris & Sisk, 2009). South Africa’s apartheid-to-multi-racial democracy 
transition is an example of a peace process that has neither required a full-blown civil war, 
nor external intervention. Some conflicts are resolved internally, and others may lead to the 
victory of one side over another (Luttwak, 1999; Weinstein, 2005). Many experience relapse 
or remain fragile for a long period after the initial violent conflict has come to an end 
(Fukuyama, 2004; Duffield, 2001). In fact, later in this dissertation an argument is made that 
some societies may never reach a self-sustainable peace, and may have to be supported 
indefinitely, in one form or another, by the international system. This possibility is not 
foreseen in the linear progression model that currently dominates international peacebuilding 
and development policy and practice. The linear progression model assumes that all societies, 
if given enough time and assistance, can achieve self-sustainable peace and development. 
This theme is taken up again in Chapters 8 and 9. 
 
Some of the critics of the liberal peace model argue that, in many cases, the imposition of 
liberal peace, or certain forms of it, actually generates political instability (Paris, 2004) and 
thus may cause more harm than good (Boege, Brown, Clements & Nolan, 2008). Richmond 
(2006:121), for instance, argues that peacebuilding generates conflict because it challenges 
existing entrenched patterns of power and influence, and is thus inherently destabilising – and 
thus not progressive. Some would even argue that the indiscriminate implementation of the 
neo-liberal model has, in some cases, caused state fragility to increase even further, in other 
words, to have had a perverse effect, as in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2009) and in the DRC 
(Eriksen, 2009).  
 
Many of the critics argue that most of the societies and states that the neo-liberal model would 
consider primitive-states, do not, in fact, fit into the Western nation-state paradigm. They are 
not ‘states’ in the Western-sense, in that they have not experienced a state-formation or 
national building process of unification, where different societies converged around a specific 
geographic area, common culture, norms, values and a political identity. Instead, many of the 
so-called ‘states’ in the developing world are, in fact, a loose grouping of societies that have 
been forced together, top-down, by colonial interests and compromises among colonial states, 
that has resulted in maps being drawn and states being artificially formed. As a result, these 
societies have, perhaps as a counter-reaction to being forced together by the colonial and post-
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colonial experiences, shaped their identities on the basis of their differences from each other. 
Many, to this day, do not identify themselves, or recognise in their daily lives, that they are 
living in a ‘state’ where a central authority has a benevolent impact on their lives, e.g. by 
providing security and social services. For many in these countries the ‘state’ is an occasional 
trespasser in their everyday existence and in many cases a negative predatory presence. For 
these individuals and families, their primary security and social needs are provided for by 
their community, often despite attempts by the ‘state’ to exert central control over their lives, 
not because of it. The assumptions of the neo-liberal nation-state model simply does not apply 
to these societies. Susan Woodward (2011:317) argues that neo-liberal assumptions may 
“blind us” to the ways in which these societies are effective. Indeed, it may be that “the non-
Weberian, customary practices” in these “hybrid political orders” are more effective, given 
their socio-cultural context, for managing their conflicts, than a so-called modern alternative 
(317).  
 
Woodward (2011:318) quotes Fukuyama as saying that “the neo-liberal model is promoted by 
public choice economists who believe, wrongly, that there is an optimal model of public 
administration”. Fukuyama’s counter argument is that “there is no optimal set of institutions 
for most aspects of the state, and little if any transferable knowledge … cultural norms and 
specific country histories are far more important than formal institutions and efficiency 
calculations in making states effective” (318).  
 
An important related concept in the peacebuilding debate that needs to be noted here is 
‘fragile states’ or ‘state fragility’ (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009:9). The OECD defines 
the terms as follows: “States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or 
capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to 
safeguard the security and human rights of their population” (OECD, 2007b). The OECD 
definition frames fragility in terms of the failure of the state to meet citizens’ basic needs and 
expectations and to perform basic state functions, such as assuring basic security, maintaining 
rule of law, and providing basic services. Mcloughin (2009:8) describes state fragility in 
terms of “a fundamental failure to keep societal expectations and state capacity in 
equilibrium, which results in non-reciprocal state-society relations and the absence of a 
binding social contract”.  
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The fragile state concept and approach is also highly contested in the broader North-South 
debate on peacebuilding (World Bank, 2011:37). For instance, Gérard Prunier, quoted in 
Berdal (2009:177), argues that the idea of a failed state is a stereotypical category that does 
more to reveal a Western way of thinking than to reflect the reality. The South, broadly 
speaking, argues that the concept “implicitly contains normative assumptions of how states 
should perform and a misguided notion that all states will eventually converge around a 
Western model of statehood” (Mcloughin, 2009:4). Eriksen (2009:663) points out that, if the 
liberal peace model is your reference point, it implies that states that “deviate from the ideal 
tend to be described in terms of what they lack rather than in terms of their actual properties”. 
In this context, those states that fail to imitate the Western norm are labelled failed states or 
weak states (663). 
 
Thus there are two broad theoretical perspectives on how societies and states are formed and 
develop, namely the linear-progression school, and those who are deeply sceptical about this 
approach and who argue that there are many different ways in which societies develop and 
that these are not necessarily linear or progressive. Peacebuilding theory, policy and practice 
to date have been largely influenced by the former way of thinking, but more and more 
critical voices are entering the debate from the latter perspective (Autessere, 2010; Suhrke & 
Berdal, 2012; Duffield, 2001; Eriksen, 2009; Chandler, 2011b; Mac Ginty, 2010 & 2011a; 
Menkhaus, 2009; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2006 & 2011; Sending, 2011; Suhrke, 2011). As the 
above discussion on the critics of the liberal peace model shows, a growing body of research 
and critical theory that questions the linear-progressive assumptions that form the basis of the 
dominant neo-liberal model has emerged over the last decade. 
 
2.5.2  Questions about agency 
 
The second theoretical debate mentioned at the beginning of this section as relevant for our 
discussion on peacebuilding theory relates to the extent to which it is appropriate for external 
or international peacebuilding agents to intervene in internal or local peace processes. On the 
one hand, the minimum-external-role approach argues that it is impossible for external 
peacebuilding agents to ‘build’ peace. Peace has to emerge out of home-grown social change 
processes that are inherently internal. “It is only when societies can deal with their divisions 
and disputes by themselves that one may be able to speak of a lasting peace” (Berdal & 
Wennmann, 2010:220).  
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From this perspective, the more the external peacebuilders interfere and dictate a liberal peace 
outcome, the more dependent internal actors become on the direction, support and patronage 
of the external actors, and the intervention then becomes perverse, or counter-productive, in 
that it undermines its own stated goals of generating a self-sustainable peace (Eriksen, 
2009:663). Sending (2011:55) argues that this could be because both peacebuilding policy 
and research has tended to downplay the role or agency of internal actors. He argues that 
“most of the literature on peacebuilding holds as exogenous or treats as marginal the interests, 
behaviour, and power of local actors” (55).   
 
The counter argument – let us call it the maximum-external-role approach – is that leaving the 
local actors to their own devices usually implies leaving ordinary people in the grip of 
powerful elites that have come into that position as a result of previous conflict or 
exploitation. In other words, the situation is already unjust, and staying neutral to it will just 
give those that have unjustly gained the upper hand the opportunity to continue their 
suppression and exploitation and leave the victims powerless to defend themselves. This is 
what Michael Pugh (2004:51) refers to as the ‘solidarist approach’. This approach argues that 
neutrality typically results in a ‘might-is-right’ type of imposed stability, which is ultimately 
unsustainable and which will inevitably result in a lapse into conflict – the Arab Spring revolt 
against dictatorships in North Africa and the Middle-East is an example here. Not acting is 
thus merely delaying the inevitable and acting sooner rather than later is likely to be less 
costly in the long-term.  
 
The maximum-external-role approach also argues that societies that have lapsed into violent 
conflict has already demonstrated that, when left alone, their systems have collapsed into 
violent conflict, so they are clearly unable to manage their conflict themselves. It would thus 
be illogical and immoral to argue that they should have the agency to resolve their own 
conflict when they have already demonstrated that they cannot do so. Some would go further 
and argue that these societies on their own will not address important universally agreed upon 
rights-based concerns such as gender equality. According to this school of thought, the 
international community has a responsibility to all mankind to introduce a global human-
rights based and international rule-based system that will protect all people from abuse. The 
UN and other agents of the international system thus have a duty to spread the liberal peace 
model, also at national and sub-national levels of governance. On the basis of the arguments 
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summarised here, Roland Paris (2011b:159) argues “that there is no realistic alternative to 
some form of liberal peace strategy.” 
 
At the extreme other pole of the minimum external role argument is the so-called ‘give war a 
chance’ or the ‘let them fail’ theories that are based on the premise that peace born out of one 
side being victorious over the other, or out of a locally-owned sense of failure, has the most 
sustainable outcomes (Herbst, 2004; Luttwak, 1999). A more moderate version of this 
argument is the premature-peacekeeping argument, namely that interposing external 
peacekeepers into a war that is not ripe for resolution leads to a no-peace/no-war stalemate 
(Richards, 2004). The argument is that such interventions may serve the interest of 
international or regional organisations, like the UN in the DRC or the AU in Somalia, in that 
the impression is created that such organisations are meaningfully exercising agency over 
these crises. However, such interventions do not help in finding a sustainable resolution to 
conflict because it prevents the parties involved reaching a settlement themselves (Duffield, 
2001; Chandler, 2011). The impartiality of the external intervention imposes an enforced 
equality among the parties, whilst, if they were left alone to find their own settlement, the 
outcome would be determined by the true power balance among the parties, and this would 
lead to a more sustainable peace settlement. Such premature interventions end up merely 
masking the continuation of lower-scale violent conflict, prolonging the conflict, extending 
the suffering of the local people, and resulting in ongoing political instability and delayed 
socio-economic development (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012). 
 
Some believe these two approaches can be merged into a ‘hybrid-peace’ model that is both 
bottom-up and top-down (Mac Ginty, 2010 & 2011). They argue that it may be possible for 
externally-driven peacebuilding – i.e. a peacebuilding effort that is aimed at transferring the 
liberal peace model to the society emerging out of conflict – to be effective, but only if the 
role and influence of the internal actors in co-shaping the liberal peace can be significantly 
enhanced (Mac Ginty, 2010; Sending, 2011). This school argues that, in order for such a 
liberal peace-driven peacebuilding campaign to be sustainable, it needs to be locally owned 
and context relevant, and this requires much more engagement from local actors in the 
peacebuilding process than has been the case in the past. Peacebuilding has to transcend its 
external actor-bias, i.e. the approach that peacebuilding is something that is done by 
international actors to local actors (Mac Ginty, 2011a:222).  
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The critics of the liberal peace approach also argue that the negative consequences of 
imposing neo-liberal models on societies emerging out of conflict is often caused by external 
actors substituting an externally-driven, institutional-technical approach for what should be a 
locally-owned, normative-transformative approach. Roger Mac Ginty (2006:3) argues that 
liberal peacebuilding tends to be a “technocratic exercise of ticking boxes, counting heads and 
weapons … while the more thorny affective and perceptual issues of reconciliation, exclusion 
and the restoration of dignity are left unaddressed”. For instance, external peacebuilders tend 
to reduce Rule of Law (RoL) to creating institutions, such as a ministry of justice and a police 
force, and may simply rewrite another country’s laws on the basis of Western models, instead 
of understanding that RoL is essentially a normative system that is deeply embedded in the 
culture of a society (Woodward, 2011:319; Carothers, 2006:20).  As Ole Jacob Sending 
(2011:56) summarises: “The critique of the liberal peace has brought out the importance of 
context-sensitivity, of local ownership, of bottom-up and hybrid forms of peacebuilding.” 
 
Despite this growing body of work that is critical of the liberal-peace approach to 
peacebuilding, the public policy view that dominates political speeches and official policy is 
that internationally-driven peacebuilding interventions have made an important contribution 
to bringing liberal peace to countries suffering from conflict. Where problems occur, these are 
most often seen as being due to lack of resources and/or a lack of coherence, and it is assumed 
that more resources, better coherence and more sophisticated technical approaches are all that 
is required to further improve a peacebuilding effort’s effectiveness and efficiency (Berdal, 
2009; Call, 2008; Caplan, 2005; Paris, 2011b; Tschirgi, Lund & Mancini, 2010).   
 
A variation of this argument is that, whilst the liberal peace is the ideal that peacebuilding 
should pursue, it must be accepted that, in a complex world, it is not always possible to fully 
achieve a liberal peace end state. The alternative presented in this regard is the so-called 
‘good-enough’ or ‘compromised-peacebuilding’ approach (Aguirre & Van der Borgh, 2010; 
Paris & Sisk, 2009:48). In other words, actors who pursue idealised end states may end up 
wasting resources and detracting local and international agents from what may be more 
realistic goals to aim to achieve (Eriksen, 2009:664). By pursuing unrealistic outcomes they 
may actually end up contributing to the weakening of the very state systems they intended to 
strengthen (Pritchett & De Weijer, 2010:2). By adopting more realistic or ‘good enough’ 
approaches, both internal and external agents can focus their effort on what is realistic and 
attainable, given the available resources, capacities and context, and in so doing they may end 
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up achieving more – i.e. making more progress towards an intermediate good-enough peace, 
and the stability that this good-enough peace may generate, can then be used to pursue more 
long-term liberal peace objectives (Suhrke, 2011). 
 
In some approaches these various schools are interlinked. Barnett and Zürcher (2009:49) and 
Roberts (2009:183), for instance, argue that ‘good enough’ approaches are appropriate when 
there are large differences in approach between external and internal actors and that pursuing 
‘good enough’ approaches in such contexts may result in more realistic and context-relevant 
solutions. They argue that the inability of the internal and external actors to agree on a 
common approach, forces both to be more realistic about what can be achieved, given the 
context. Oliver Richmond (2011:227) argues for what he refers to as a ‘post-liberal’ form of 
peace, which he describes as a ‘local-liberal hybrid peace’, where “agencies are expressed 
that contaminate, transgress and modify both the international and the local”. In other words, 
the peace that emerges from the interaction between the local and the international produces a 
hybrid mix of both local and liberal influences, and it is thus neither local nor liberal, but 
something new. 
 
This debate about whether the internal or external actors have the ultimate agency to 
determine peacebuilding outcomes or the degree to which they can come together in some 
kind of hybrid or post-liberal approach is prominent in contemporary theoretical debates and 
is likely to start to spill over into the policy arena (De Coning, Jansson, Lotze & Torjesen, 
2010). Peacebuilding, also in the context of this dissertation, thus needs to be understood in 
the context of this disagreement about agency. This dissertation is also focused on exploring 
whether the application of Complexity to peacebuilding will generate any new insights into 
this debate. 
 
The way in which the peacebuilding concept has developed and the way in which it has been 
interpreted and applied has been deeply influenced by these various approaches and schools 
of thoughts. When the peacebuilding concept was introduced in the Agenda for Peace, it 
reflected a Fukuyama-type optimism that existed in the immediate post-Cold War period 
about the potential for collective and consensus-based third-party interventions. There was a 
sense, in the period between the end of the Cold War and before 9/11, that collective, third-
party peacebuilding could represent a new era of benevolent international intervention in 
conflict situations. That sense of optimism has since evaporated, especially in light of the 
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failures of external intervention in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Iraq, Darfur, Haiti, Libya and 
Afghanistan. In each of these cases the international intervention had limited or no success 
and failed to stabilize the conflict, In each of these cases the interventions failed to protect 
some civilian populations from further harm, and in many the civilian population were more 
at risk during and after the conflict as a result of the intervention. These cases convinced the 
international community that they could not solve all conflicts through international 
intervention. The optimism of the early-1990s has since been replaced by deeply divided 
views on the virtue of international interventions and the neo-liberal model that has come to 
dominate the international system and peacebuilding policy and practice since the end of the 
Cold War.  
 
An overview of the theoretical debates that are raging over intervention in general and 
peacebuilding in particular has been given in this section. These theoretical debates are 
converging with the emergence of a new global political order, an issue that is investigated in 
the next section. When one considers the theoretical debates and the shifting global political 
order together, one can foresee that this convergence opens up an opportunity for new 
approaches to interventions and peacebuilding to emerge. This dissertation should be 
understood as a contribution to exploring which forms such a new approach to peacebuilding 
might take.  
 
2.6  CURRENT POLITICAL DEBATES 
 
Some countries in the North, for instance most of the G8 and NATO countries, view post-
conflict intervention, including UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions, as a tool 
for managing failed or weak states. Their policies are aimed at assisting such societies by 
helping them to adopt neo-liberal values and structures, which those in the North view as 
synonymous with responsible sovereignty and thus sustainable peace (Paris, 2004).  
 
Some in the South, for instance most of those active in the Non-Aligned Movement and the 
G-77, are sceptical of international interventions, including UN peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. They are concerned that such interventions can be used as new forms of 
colonialism, which, if unchecked, can result in the neo-imperialist and capitalist exploitation 
of vulnerable post-conflict societies (Paris & Sisk, 2007:9).  These countries believe that each 
country has the right to self-determination, as codified in international law, and in order to 
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protect the right to self-determination, they insist on a narrow interpretation of sovereignty. 
Most of the countries in this grouping have themselves experienced some form of 
colonialism, and they continue to feel under pressure to conform to the Western-dominated 
international system. Their insistence on self-determination and sovereignty is one of the 
ways in which they are trying to protect themselves from the dominance of the neo-liberal 
ideology, which they are experiencing as a new form of exploitation and suppression by the 
West/North.  
 
At the same time, it now seems clear that the West, in general, and America in particular, are 
in decline, and although this is anticipated to be a slow and drawn-out process, the transition 
is likely to raise a lot of uncertainty (Haas, 2008). As the centre of gravity of the geo-political 
order is slowly shifting from the West to the East, one of the developments that can be 
anticipated during this period is the re-negotiation of some of the Western-influenced aspects 
of the international system (Chan, 2010). It is to be expected, in particular, that emerging 
powers, such as China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa (the so-called BRICS 
countries), will increasingly challenge internationally-sanctioned interventions that are 
perceived to be vehicles for spreading the liberal peace ideology, as was demonstrated in the 
positions they articulated before and after the intervention in Libya in 2011 and with regard to 
the crisis in Syria in 2012. The emphasis they place on the principles of sovereignty and self-
determination in international relations are likely to result in more pressure on internationally 
sanctioned peacebuilding to become less prescriptive, i.e. not to promote a specific ideology, 
such as the liberal peace approach, but to rather give societies the space to develop their own, 
context-specific, approaches. 
 
The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rights abuses that occurred during the Bush 
Administration’s war on terror, and the poor track record of the neo-liberal interventions in 
bringing about development and peace over the last two decades have resulted in a new level 
of recognition in the public and academic debate that neither the North nor the South have an 
exclusive claim to the moral high ground (Chandler, 2011; Duffield, 2001; Eriksen, 2009; 
Suhrke, 2011). Despite billions of dollars of development assistance, most least-developed 
countries are poorer now than they were decades ago (UNCTAD, 2002) and there is an 
emerging sense that the neo-liberal model itself has contributed to an overall decline in living 
standards, weaker institutions and less liberal societies overall (Eriksen, 2009:663).  
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The argument is that the neo-liberal model has advocated policies that have left the least-
developed countries open to resource and trade exploitation and capital flight (Collier et al. 
2003; Klein, 2008; UNCTAD, 2002). It has also discredited the existing local institutions and 
replaced them with imported institutional models that have turned out to be empty shells, 
unconnected with the societies they are meant to serve, and accountable only to the donors on 
whom they are dependent for patronage – what Pritchett and De Weijer (2010:2) refer to as 
“isomorphic mimicry”. The net result is weaker governance, weaker economies and thus less-
liberal societies overall. The critical body of empirical research that has emerged over the last 
decade amounts to a mounting case against the assumed virtues of the liberal-peace model 
(Autessere, 2010; Berdal & Suhrke, 2012; Duffield, 2001; Eriksen, 2009; Chandler, 2011b; 
Mac Ginty, 2010 & 2011; Menkhaus, 2009; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2006 & 2011; Sending, 
2011; Suhrke, 2011). Roland Paris’s At War’s End (2004:151), which is widely regarded as 
one of the most authoritative studies in the peacebuilding literature, concludes that: 
Some missions were clear successes (Namibia and Croatia); others were obvious failures 
(Angola and Rwanda). The remaining operations fell in between these two extremes. In most 
of these eleven cases
10
, the process of political liberalization, or economic liberalization, or 
both, produced destabilizing effects that worked against the consolidation of the peace. In 
some countries, liberalization exacerbated social tensions, and in others it reproduced 
traditional sources of violence.  
 
There obviously were no such concerns in the 1990s when there was a strong sense that a 
global liberal order was imminent. The Bush era, with its war on terror and failed 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global financial crisis that started in 2007 and 
which was brought on by American overreach (Hinnebusch, 2007), have resulted in a new, 
more open debate about the virtues and shortcomings of the neo-liberal model. As David 
Chandler argues: 
Instead, it appeared that the ‘lessons learned’ from international intervention over the past two 
decades was that the global liberal order was not imminent, but rather that the world was as 
bifurcated as ever – not between a capitalist and a socialist world, but between a liberal and a 
non-liberal world. As the world became less liberal, so the discourses of liberal 
internationalism have been recast and rewritten. Whereas Roland Paris was half-right, in his 
view that they were unable to safely rule themselves, we have since discovered that he was 
half-wrong, in his assumption that the West had the capacity to direct and control a path to 
‘enlightenment’ in a liberal internationalist teleology. Without a liberal teleology, without a 
belief in an imminent liberal global order of harmony, law and human rights – without a belief 
in the transformative capacity of Western states – the right of intervention against the right of 
sovereignty no longer has any meaningful purchase. Today’s discourses of intervention 
therefore operate without a belief in the linearity of progress. (Chandler, 2011:3) 
 
                                                 
10
 The remaining cases Roland Paris refers to are: Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatamala, Liberia, 
Nicaragua and Mozambique.   
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The tensions in this current debate about the nature of interventions came to boiling point in 
the context of the UN-authorised NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Whilst some countries 
in the North, most vocally France, the UK and the USA, openly argued for regime change as 
an integral aspect of resolving the Libyan conflict, others in the South, most verbally the so-
called BRICS, opposed any military intervention in Libya that was aimed at regime change, 
arguing that only the Libyan people had the agency to choose its leaders and political system 
and arguing instead for an approach informed by respect for self-determination and 
sovereignty (Putin, 2012; Sangqu, 2012).  
 
The outcome of the intervention in Libya and the perception that the West has abused the UN 
mandate, which in UN Security Council resolution 1973 of 2011 was limited to protecting 
civilians in order to effect regime change, is now seen as a turning point in the international 
debate about when interventions are justified and how intrusive interventions should be. In 
subsequent months the shadow of the vastly different interpretations of the North and South 
vis-à-vis the intervention in Libya has prevented the Security Council from reaching 
consensus on how to deal with the crisis in Syria. The representatives of the Global South in 
the Security Council argued that they will not make the mistake again of trusting the North 
with authority to undertake ‘limited action’, which can then be used as a justification to 
launch a liberal peace intervention that amounts to regime change. Some countries, like South 
Africa, have invoked the UN Charter’s articles on self-determination and sovereignty as a 
legal basis for constraining the scope of interventions authorised by the UN, arguing that UN 
interventions should not have the agency to impose liberal market democracies. In his 
statement to the UN Security Council on 4 February 2012, when South Africa voted in favour 
of a resolution on Syria, South Africa’s Permanent Representative clarified that: 
It is important that the Syrian people be allowed to decide their own fate including their future 
leadership. Fundamentally, no foreign or external parties should interfere in Syria as they 
engage in the critical decision making processes on the future of their country. Any solution 
must preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. We were also satisfied 
that the final draft resolution was not aimed at imposing regime change in Syria, which would 
be against the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. (Sangqu, 2012) 
 
The position of the South is thus that only the Syrians have the agency to determine their 
future, and that, whilst such a process can be encouraged and facilitated by the international 
community through diplomacy and related means, such actions should stop short of imposing 
on the right of the Syrian society to determine their own future political and economic 
policies. Russian President Vladimir Putin provided a similar clarification at the close of the 
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G20’s 2012 summit in Mexico, when he was asked about the Russian position on Syria. He 
explained that "we believe that nobody has the right to decide for other nations who should be 
brought to power, who should be removed from power" (Putin, 2012). 
 
The point South Africa and Russia, and indeed the Global South more generally, are making 
in this regard is captured well in the following formulation by Stein S. Eriksen (2009:663):  
…even if one accepts this (liberal peace) model as normatively valid, the prospects of 
succeeding in creating such a state will be undermined if the nature of the state that is to be 
built is taken as given, prior to any dialogue between the external state-builders and those 
whose state is to be built. Such an approach implies that the relationship between donors and 
recipients becomes one between subject and object. 
 
Robert Jackson (2000:366) goes even further when he argues that, 
[t]here is a greater international good than democracy, and that good is pluralism or 
international freedom, which itself makes democracy possible by giving people a choice and a 
space to build democracy in their own country – if that is what they desire and if they have the 
political virtues to do it.  
 
Kristoffer Lidén (2009:619) argues that peacebuilding missions that are authorised by the 
Security Council and invited by local authorities cannot be in breach of positive international 
law, but that it can be argued from Jackson’s communitarian perspective that “liberal 
peacebuilding, in its promotion of universal political standards, violates the right of political 
communities to self-governance”. 
 
The way one understands peacebuilding interventions therefore is informed by how one 
believes it is being employed in any specific context. Just as there are multiple interpretations 
of the agreed rules of the international system, there will also be different understandings of 
what peacebuilding is, or should be. The understanding of peacebuilding cannot be static or 
universal, but should evolve continuously, partly as a result of the ongoing international 
debate about the appropriate meaning and role of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the 
international system, and partly as a result of the specific context in which the concept may be 
employed  (De Coning, 2010b).  
 
As these debates indicate, there is a considerable gap between how the North and the South 
view intervention, peacebuilding, and related concepts such as fragile states. The international 
community in general and the UN in particular will find it difficult to develop a coherent 
international approach to peacebuilding in the context of such deeply divided South-North 
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perspectives. At worst, the UN may find itself back in the Cold War loop where contradictory 
interests and disagreement over the concept, content and process of peace interventions, for 
instance among members of the UN Security Council, prevents the international community, 
and especially the UN, from taking coherent action. There are growing signs that these 
tensions are increasing and may have more of an impact on international relations in the years 
ahead – for instance the deadlock in the 2011 session of the so-called C-34 Committee, the 
General Assembly’s special committee on peace operations; the tensions between the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Council and the UN’s Security Council over the handling of the 
Libyan crisis in 2011; and the impasse in the Security Council around the Syrian crisis in 
early 2012. 
 
This dissertation is about the coherence dilemma as it plays out in the contemporary 
peacebuilding system. The two last sections of this chapter make the point that how the 
contemporary peacebuilding system is understood has been deeply influenced by the way 
peacebuilding has been conceptualised, theorised and debated over the last few decades. 
These debates, and the competing theories of change that influence them, need to be taken 
into consideration when trying to understand how peacebuilding has been practiced and how 
it has been perceived by the different stakeholders and agents who have been engaged in 
some way or another in pursuing coherence whilst undertaking peacebuilding programmes 
and activities. 
 
2.7  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has introduced and contextualised peacebuilding systems within both the larger 
conflict-management field and in terms of its role in a changing global order. The nexus 
between development, governance, politics and security has become a central focus of the 
international effort to manage transitions, and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the 
collective framework under which these diverse dimensions of conflict management can be 
brought together under one common framework.  
 
Peacebuilding operations are consent-based interventions undertaken by states and 
multilateral institutions, like the United Nations, with the aim of providing a safe and secure 
environment, facilitating humanitarian assistance and supporting the provision of basic 
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services on the one hand, whilst supporting the implementation of a peace agreement on the 
other (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009:6).  
 
Peacebuilding, at its most basic, is aimed at peace consolidation, i.e. managing the prevention 
of a (re)lapse into violent conflict. At its most ambitious, peacebuilding is aimed at conflict 
transformation, i.e. completely transcending the primary and secondary dynamics that gave 
rise to a particular conflict so that the community in question is beyond the risk of lapsing into 
violent conflict and is focused on new political, social and economic considerations that are 
not related to the past conflict (Lederach, 1997:73).  
 
Whilst there is broad agreement on the former, this latter, more ambitious approach to 
peacebuilding is highly controversial and contested, both in the academic literature on the 
liberal peace and in the contemporary international political debate on interventions.  
 
Peacebuilding was introduced and discussed in this chapter and the major trends, theories and 
debates, as well as different ways in which the peacebuilding concept can be understood, were 
considered. In the next chapter, coherence is introduced, and some of the dilemmas and 
constraints that pursuing coherence has revealed over the past decades are considered.  
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CHAPTER 3 
COHERENCE 
 
The rate of negotiated peace relapsing into violence shows that the international community is 
better at stopping violence than building or consolidating peace. The challenge is not making 
peace, it is making peace last. (Ricigliano, 2012:5) 
 
This leads to a tautology, because liberal peace approaches only support local ownership if it 
adheres to the basic components of liberal peace and if it does not undermine liberal values. 
(Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 2011:83) 
 
Questioning the central elements of the prevailing peacebuilding culture – notably the 
propensity to understand and approach violence in a top-down manner and to conceive of 
local tensions as an unimportant issue – is a first step integral to designing new, more efficient 
intervention strategies. (Autessere, 2010:272) 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, coherence will be introduced, and the reasons for it becoming such an 
important concept in the peacebuilding context will be addressed. The assumed causal link 
between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability is considered. Special attention is given to 
the gap that has opened up on between the policy community that continues to act on this 
assumption on the one hand and the practitioners who report that, despite numerous 
significant efforts over almost two decades, no or little progress has been recorded on 
improving peacebuilding coherence, on the other hand.  
 
Over the last two decades, many of the prominent reports and evaluations on peacebuilding 
have identified a lack of coherence as one of its most common critical shortcomings (e.g. 
Dahrendorf, 2003; Porter, 2002; Sommers, 2000; Stockton, 2002). An aspect that most of 
these studies have in common is an argument that the lack of coherence among peacebuilding 
agents has negatively impacted on the overall effectiveness and sustainability of the 
peacebuilding intervention in the specific cases under consideration (Smith, 2004). The focus 
in this chapter will be on exploring the assumed causal linkages between coherence, 
effectiveness and sustainability. The aim is to understand why coherence has assumed such a 
central role in the peacebuilding context and why it is perceived to be such an important 
factor for mission success.  
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The argument in the dissertation is that the way in which the peacebuilding community has 
responded to this coherence dilemma has been to develop and apply ever more sophisticated 
or improved strategic planning- and coordination models. In other words, the assumption has 
been that the dilemma is caused by insufficiently or misdirected application of the policies. 
An alternative approach is explored in this dissertation in that consideration is given to 
whether there are inherent constraints in peacebuilding systems that explain why 
peacebuilding agents persistently and stubbornly resist most efforts to improve strategic 
coherence. The argument will be made that by viewing peacebuilding coherence from a 
Complexity perspective, it may be possible to gain new insights into the role of coherence in 
complex systems, such as peacebuilding systems. 
 
In this chapter, the coherence dilemma is introduced by considering why it has gained such 
perceived prominence, while a number of factors that constrain coherence in the 
peacebuilding context are considered in the next chapter. These factors include the tension 
between short-term and longer-term approaches and perspectives; differences in values, 
principles and mandates; the degree to which a specific context may be conducive to 
coherence, and the tensions and power imbalances between internal and external agents. 
Together, these two chapters introduce and consider the core problem that this dissertation is 
concerned with, namely the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. 
 
3.2 EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY  
 
It was stated in Chapter 1 that coherence in the peacebuilding context can be understood as 
the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, governmental, 
developmental, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a 
peacebuilding system towards common strategic objectives (De Coning, 2007b:3).  Donini 
explains this prevalent policy view of coherence in the peacebuilding context as follows:  
At its most basic, coherence refers to the attempt to coordinate, bring together, or join political 
intervention with other relevant types of action, including humanitarian and human rights 
actions. At its most developed, coherence suggests the harmonization or merging of 
objectives, strategies, and programming tools within and across relevant actors so that they are 
all agreed toward the pursuit of a common end goal or are in line with an articulated vision. 
(Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:3) 
 
Peacebuilding was introduced in Chapter 2 and it was explained that one of its characteristics 
is its multidimensionality. A typology of these dimensions was presented in Table 2.1. 
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Coherence refers to the policy of pursuing or facilitating a positive synergetic system-wide 
relationship among these peacebuilding dimensions. It was explained in Chapter 2 that there 
have been different perspectives as to how best such a positive synergy can be achieved. 
Some argue for co-existence, others for cooperation, and yet others for integration. However, 
the prevalent and dominant policy position that has emerged over the last decade is one in 
which coherence is pursued by aligning these peacebuilding dimensions behind a common 
strategic objective (OECD, 2011a:13).  
 
In this dissertation it is argued that in the peacebuilding context the common strategic 
objective, at its most basic, is peace consolidation, i.e. avoiding a lapse into violent conflict. 
The prevalent policy position is that peace consolidation cannot be achieved without security, 
a political process, or development (see Table 2.1). In order to consolidate the peace, these 
different dimensions need to be linked up, integrated and pursued together, so that 
collectively and cumulatively, they can generate momentum towards a system-wide peace 
consolidation effect (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:53). 
 
Antonio Donini argues that coherence has both a normative and an organisational dimension 
(Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:3). He says that organisational coherence lies at the 
intersection of coordination and strategy, where coordination is a tool to manage the 
achievement and implementation of the strategy. And he argues that normatively, coherence 
is presented as a global good that is value neutral. It is portrayed as being “synonymous with 
the pursuit of greater efficiency and effectiveness, and is touted as desirable both as a process 
and outcome” (ibid.). 
 
The peacebuilding policy and research community have come to share an implicit 
assumption, namely that peacebuilding missions will be more efficient and effective, and thus 
have a more meaningful impact, when the different peacebuilding agents have a common 
objective, based on a common understanding of the problem, a common theory of change, 
and a common plan for implementing and evaluating such a strategy (Friis & Jarmyr, 2008). 
The underlying assumption is that “better synergies based on agreed-upon objectives and 
principled interventions would make for better peace prospects” (Donini, Niland & 
Wermester, 2004:3). 
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For instance, at a high-level international conference in March 2009 in Switzerland, where 
more than 300 delegations representing countries, the African Union (AU), the European 
Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and a number of 
international non-governmental organisations were present, the following principle was 
adopted:  
A coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach is needed to improve the 
effectiveness of support to countries and communities affected by conflict and fragility. 
Coherence, coordination and complementarity require both whole-of-government and whole-
of-system approaches. 3C is understood as collaborative and mutually reinforcing approaches 
by international actors and partner countries, including civil society, to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their support to peace, security, and development in situations of conflict 
and fragility. (3C Conference Report, 2009:5) 
 
This kind of statement is indicative of the degree to which, among the policy community, 
there is an assumed cause-and-effect relationship between coherence and effectiveness. The 
UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence (UN, 2006b:32) 
explains this causal link as follows: “Through consolidation, priority-setting and the 
elimination of duplication, a reconfigured development system will improve performance and 
increase cost effectiveness.” The Panel summarises the coherence challenge as follows. It 
describes the UN’s work as  
… often fragmented and weak. Inefficient and ineffective governance and unpredictable 
funding have contributed to policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness 
across the system. Cooperation between organizations has been hindered by competition for 
funding, mission creep and by out-dated business practice. (UN, 2006b:1) 
 
In response to these problems, the Panel recommends that by “…overcoming systemic 
fragmentation” the UN “could deliver better focus on performance, efficiency, accountability 
and results within the UN system” (UN, 2006b:1). The Panel’s central recommendation is for 
‘One UN’ and ‘Delivering as One’:  
. . . the UN needs to overcome its fragmentation and deliver as one through a stronger 
commitment to working together on the implementation of one strategy in the pursuit of one 
set of goals…We recommend the establishment of One UN at country level, with one leader, 
one programme, one budget and, where appropriate, one office. (UN, 2006b:2)
11
  
                                                 
11
 It is interesting to note, however, that the Panel does not recommend the creation of a single UN entity at UN 
headquarters “… because many individual agencies can best achieve their vital role…by operating individually 
in their specific sectors” (UN, 2006b:3). It seems the pael applies a different logic to headquarters and the field, 
despite the fact that the Panel identifies the same problem at headquarters as in the field, namely that “…it is 
clear there are a large number of overlapping functions, failures of coordination and policy inconsistency within 
the UN system” (UN, 2006b:3). Instead, the Panel recommends that a task force be established that should 
clearly delineate the roles performed by the various UN agencies, and it should make concrete recommendations 
for mergers or consolidation of duplicative functions and ensure complementarity of mandates. The only merger 
that has subsequently been proposed and enacted is the integration of various agencies working on gender issues 
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Whilst the Panel seems to be motivated by the need to improve the overall effectiveness of the 
UN system, they do not discuss potential tensions and trade-offs between effectiveness and 
efficiency. In fact, the report seems to equate effectiveness with efficiency and to focus most 
of its recommendations on ways in which enhancements in management and operational 
efficiency can result in cost savings and related improvements in the organisational 
performance of the UN.  In fact, the Panel suggests that “…this exercise has the potential to 
release significant annual savings possibly in the range of 20% per annum…” (UN, 2006b:3).  
 
The Panel seems to be informed by an overriding assumption that improvements in 
organisational efficiency will automatically translate in greater operational effectiveness. For 
instance, the Panel argues that “performance, funding and accountability of UN organizations 
are integrally linked. Funding must follow performance and reward results…”, but it also says 
that “the purpose of linking funding to performance is to improve outcomes not to reduce 
funding” (UN, 2006b:4). The Panel seems to believe that it is possible to make this clear link 
in practice, and it recommends “…system-wide agreement on results-based management as 
well as independent UN system-wide evaluation and common evaluation methodologies and 
benchmarking” (UN, 2006b:5).  
 
It should be pointed out that the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-
wide Coherence was mandated to look into the areas of development, humanitarian assistance 
and the environment. It was not mandated to address the peacebuilding context. However, the 
Panel’s recommendations is indicative of the way leading states, multilateral institutions and 
international NGOs assume that there is a causal link between coherence, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
Although the specific recommendations of the Panel were focused only on the development, 
humanitarian assistance and the environmental dimensions of the UN system, the UN has also 
applied the concept of system-wide coherence to the integration of the peace, security and 
development dimensions of the UN’s work, most notably in the formulation and 
operationalisation of the so-called Integrated Approach.  
                                                                                                                                                        
into one new agency called UN Women. The Panel does not explain why it thinks that individual agencies can 
be more effective when they operate separately at the headquarter level, when much of the rest of the Report is 
focused on the negative effects of system fragmentation, with the main recommendation focusing on the ‘One 
UN’ concept at the country level. 
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The UN’s Integrated Approach refers to a specific type of operational process and design, 
where the planning and coordination processes of the different elements of the UN family is 
integrated into a single country-level UN system when it undertakes complex peacekeeping 
operations (UN, 2008b). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the concept as 
follows:  
An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the 
priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of 
the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its 
contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in 
a coherent and mutually supportive manner. (UN, 2006a:4)  
 
The notes of the Secretary-General on integrated missions (UN, 2006a & 2008b) establish the 
Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex 
UN peace operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of 
peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and 
security aspects) into a coherent support strategy (UN, 2006a:4). UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki Moon has reaffirmed the Integrated Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and 
post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these 
missions are structurally integrated or not (UN, 2008b). An integrated approach requires: 
(1) A shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives; 
(2) closely aligned or integrated planning; 
(3) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to 
consolidating peace; and 
(4) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation (UN, 2008b). 
 
The assumption of the Integrated Approach is thus that a more coherent model that manages 
to produce a comprehensive and coordinated UN system-wide effort will have a more 
relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process (De Coning, 2008a).  
 
The two UN examples cited here – the High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence and the 
Integrated Approach – should not be seen as isolated developments. As the 3C Conference 
statement quoted earlier indicates, policy statements at the highest level and across a broad 
spectrum of international and regional organisations present coherence, often in the form of 
‘the comprehensive approach’, as the key to successful peacebuilding (Donini, Niland & 
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Wermester, 2004:2). For instance, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in his very first statement as 
NATO Secretary General (NATO, 2009), declared: “We need a comprehensive approach, a 
reinforced interaction between our military efforts and our endeavours with regard to civil 
reconstruction.” Similarly, ex-British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, referring to 
Afghanistan, has argued that what is needed is a “comprehensive approach including better 
governance, economic development such as a single financing mechanism, and when 
necessary appropriate military pressure” (Brown, 2009).  In 2001 the UN Security Council 
stated that it “reaffirms that the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and 
determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and 
social dimensions” (UN, 2001e).  
 
These deeply held assumptions about the role of coherence are also reflected in many of the 
key policy documents relating to international interventions and peacebuilding that have been 
adopted over the last decade, including: 
   The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document that highlights the interlinkage of 
peace and security, development and human rights, and emphasises the need for a 
coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace (UN, 2005a).
12
 
   The 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN 
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (OCHA, 2003a). 
    The Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the follow-up Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008) and the most recent Bhusan outcome document, the Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (2011). 
  The OECD Ministerial Policy Commitment to improve development effectiveness in 
fragile states (OECD, 2007d: 29). 
  The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD, 2007c:29). 
  The OECD Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development (approved 
by Ministers of OECD countries at the Ministerial Council, on 4 June 2008). 
  The 2007 European Council Conclusions on Fragile Situations, and the 2007 
European Council Conclusions on Security and Development (3C Conference, 
2009:33). 
                                                 
12
 See specifically A/RES/60/1 paragraphs 9 and 97. 
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All these policy statements and documents share a common assumption, namely that 
overcoming the fragmented nature of past interventions by pursuing coherence among the 
political, development, governance, economic and security dimensions of international 
interventions is one of the most promising ways in which the effectiveness and sustainability 
of international peace and stability operations can be improved (Stedman, Cousens & 
Rothchild, 2002:89).  
 
This assumption is also shared by the leading evaluation reports (Cutillo, 2006; Dahrendorf, 
2003; Donini, 2002) and research studies (Dobbins et al., 2005; Paris 2004; Stedman, 
Cousens & Rothchild, 2002) that have analysed the record of post-Cold War peacebuilding 
efforts. These studies and reports have all identified significant problems with coherence and 
coordination, and they have argued that this has contributed to the poor rate of sustainability 
of these operations (Paris & Sisk, 2009:53).  
 
For example, the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding that analysed 336 peacebuilding 
projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over 
the last decade has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it terms a 
strategic deficit – as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding (Smith, 
2004:16). The Utstein study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not 
show any link to a larger country strategy.  
 
These panels, conferences, studies and reports thus share a broad consensus that inconsistent 
policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, 
a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, thus ultimately, of a reduced 
capacity for delivery (OECD, 2003). The logic of the causal argument is thus that a lack of 
coherence results in inefficient and ineffective peacebuilding, and the impact of the 
programmatic interventions will therefore not last as long, or they will take longer to take 
hold, i.e. they will lack sustainability. Before these assumptions around efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability are analysed in further detail, it is necessary to first establish 
what the current dominant and broadly accepted understanding of these concepts are.  
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3.2.1 Definitions of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) definitions of 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability are used in this dissertation, as the OECD’s 
definitions reflect the most widely held understanding of what these terms mean among the 
international actors in the peacebuilding context.  
 
The OECD defines efficiency as “a measure of how economically resources and inputs 
(funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results”. Economy in this context refers to the 
absence of waste for a given output: “[A]n activity is economical when the costs of the scarce 
resources used approximate the minimum needed to achieve planned objectives” (OECD 
Glossary of Key Terms, 2002:20). 
 
The OECD defines effectiveness as “the extent to which a development intervention’s 
objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative 
importance” (OECD Glossary of Key Terms, 2002:20).  
 
Sustainability is defined by the OECD as “the continuation of benefits from a development 
intervention after major development assistance has been completed” (OECD Glossary of Key 
Terms, 2002:36). 
 
The OECD is an organisation of mostly developed or Northern donor nations that have made 
a considerable effort over the years to reach a common understanding around these concepts. 
This group of countries fund the bulk of humanitarian and development efforts, and they are 
also the major financial contributors to international and UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
missions. Through the assessed contribution system introduced earlier, America is responsible 
for 27% of the UN peacekeeping budget, while Europe’s combined contribution represents 
approximately 43%. Together, the OECD countries are responsible for approximately 88% of 
the UN peacekeeping budget (Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 2010). 
 
These countries use the OECD definitions to evaluate and compare their support to 
international humanitarian and development efforts, and these concepts are now also 
increasingly used in peacekeeping and peacebuilding evaluation contexts. A number of 
emerging powers, such as India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) are also emerging donors, 
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but their efforts have not yet matured to the extent that they have influenced new 
understandings of these concepts (White, 2011).  
 
It should be noted that another initiative is also under way, namely the International Dialogue 
on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, which is an initiative aimed at facilitating a dialogue 
between donors and countries that have hosted international interventions or that are 
otherwise considered to be fragile.
13
 These countries are organised in an initiative that is 
referred to as the g7+, or the mini-g7, hence the lower-case ‘g’, in contrast to the G7 grouping 
of the most powerful Western states. The g7+ initiative consist of 19 countries, including 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-
Leste. This group has started to generate interesting alternative approaches, for instance in the 
form of the ‘New Deal’ that was adopted at Bhusan (2011), and it would be interesting to 
track their development and impact. However, at the time of the conclusion of this 
dissertation, the g7+ initiative had not yet made sufficient inroads to challenge or change the 
prevailing understanding of these OECD concepts in the international peacebuilding 
discourse. It can thus be accepted that the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and 
sustainability as defined by the OECD have to date been widely adopted and used and have 
informed the basic assumptions of what should constitute progress in development and 
peacebuilding initiatives.  
 
The OECD issued a note on “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
Activities” in 2007, in which the same evaluation criteria that have traditionally been used for 
developmental and humanitarian interventions were applied to the peacebuilding context. 
However, in addition to the standard evaluation criteria of the OECD, this guidance note 
recommends that peacebuilding activities should also be evaluated against the degree of 
coherence they have achieved.
14
 On coherence, the OECD Guidance note says:  
In the conflict prevention and peacebuilding contexts, a policy, programme or project cannot 
be assessed in isolation. What may seem appropriate from the point of view of one activity 
may not be appropriate from the point of view of the system as a whole. It is important to 
consider the degree to which the intervention is consistent with or aligned to the larger policy 
contexts (national and international) within which it is taking place; the degree to which it 
forms part of and is connected to a conflict strategy or overall country framework; and the 
                                                 
13
 For more information on the Dialogue, see: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_43407692_1_1_1_1_1,00.html [22 September 2011]. 
14
 In the interest of transparency, it should be declared that the author assisted the Norwegian development 
agency (NORAD) with the initial drafting of the Guidelines, including work on coherence, and that this initial 
input may have informed the later work of the OECD team that developed the final draft guidance note. 
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degree to which it is co-ordinated with other policies, programmes or projects within its 
conflict environment, thematic cluster or region. (OECD, 2007:44)  
 
In this section it has been argued that there is a widely held view in the international 
peacebuilding policy community that there is a causal link between coherence, effectiveness 
and sustainability. In the next section our understanding of coherence is refined further by 
means of a typology of coherence that distinguishes between four spheres of policy 
coherence. 
 
3.3 A COHERENCE TYPOLOGY 
 
Coherence can be pursued among a broad range of peacebuilding agents, across various 
dimensions, and at various levels. The levels, dimensions and agents often get mixed up and 
this causes confusion. A typology that distinguishes between four spheres of coherence, 
namely agency coherence, whole-of-government coherence, external coherence and internal-
external coherence is proposed in this section. The aim of the typology is to assist in 
maintaining a meaningful distinction between the agents, dimensions and levels involved in 
peacebuilding coherence in the remainder of the dissertation. 
 
3.3.1 Agency coherence 
 
Agency coherence refers to consistency amongst the policies and actions of an individual 
agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme. Examples 
include the internal coherence of a ministry of foreign affairs, or an agency such as the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
 
Consistency in this context refers to avoiding one agency working at cross-purposes with 
itself.
15
 Coherence in this context does not imply that there should not be room for differences 
and debate during the policy formulation and review process, but it is understood to imply 
that once a policy position has been adopted, it needs to be implemented in such a way that all 
the different elements of the agency contribute to the overall objective in a complementary 
fashion. It is thus understood to be a distinction between implementing an approved policy 
and the evaluation and revision of such a policy. Whilst there may thus be a process underway 
                                                 
15 ‘Consistency’ in this context is not necessarily ethical, i.e. doing like under like circumstances with respect to 
any one rule or norm and avoiding double standards. I am grateful to Ramesh Thakur for pointing out this 
difference (e-mail correspondence, 15 May 2007). 
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to review a given policy, and such a process may invite critical reflection, the policy is still in 
place, it is expected to be implemented as approved, until it is replaced or revoked.  
 
Most studies that deal with coordination focus on inter-agency or inter-organisational 
relations (e.g. Stockton, 2002; Eriksson, 1996; Porter, 2002). However, in this dissertation the 
view is upheld that internal agency coherence lies at the root of many of the factors that 
inhibit, constrain and undermine coherence. Of particular concern is the tension between 
those parts of an agency that set medium- to long-term goals and objectives and that measure 
achievement on the basis of the effects of such a policy over time, and those parts of an 
agency that are responsible for managing programming on a day-to-day basis, and that 
manage results on a short-term basis, for instance those reporting on financial expenditure and 
motivating for new budget allocations according to annual budget cycles. It is argued that this 
tension between short-term, mostly internally driven, efficiency-based management processes 
and longer-term, results-based policy processes aimed at influencing complex systems lies at 
the root of the coherence dilemma. This distinction, and the tensions between efficiency and 
effectiveness that flow from it, will be returned to in the next section where the factors that 
constrain coherence are discussed, and this argument will be expanded throughout the 
remainder of the dissertation. 
 
3.3.2 Whole-of-government and whole-of-system coherence 
 
Whole-of-government coherence refers to consistency among the policies and actions of 
different departments and agencies of the same government, e.g. among the ministries of 
defence, foreign affairs and international development assistance of the United Kingdom. The 
Canadian Government’s so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence) concept is the 
classical example and is aimed at ensuring that its peacebuilding interventions are supported 
coherently by all the relevant arms of government (Patrick & Brown, 2007:56).  
 
The whole-of-government coherence effort is thus typically a national effort that involves 
several government departments or agencies. There is a given commonality, i.e. the different 
departments and agencies all serve the same government, and, once deployed, all share the 
same national identity. Coordination typically takes place both at the national level and, once 
deployed, through some kind of in-theatre coordination mechanism (De Coning, Lurås, Schia 
& Ulriksen, 2009). Various tensions exist, however. The different government departments 
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and agencies compete for funding and national prestige and do not have a tradition of 
coordinating international operations or co-deployments (OECD, 2007b). Another important 
tension is that between national commitments and international cooperation (Picciotto, 2005). 
The greater the effort devoted to adopting national priorities and plans prior to deployment, 
the less room there is for these agencies to coordinate and adapt to the priorities and plans of 
their counterparts in the countries that host international operations and other international 
partners (De Coning et al., 2009). 
 
At the multilateral level the UN, EU, AU and NATO are each engaged in various initiatives 
aimed at improving their own internal whole-of-system coherence.  In the UN context, as 
discussed earlier, examples of these efforts include the work of the High-Level Panel on 
System Wide Coherence and the adoption of the Integrated Approach Model. Integration was 
also one of the central themes of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 
the so-called Brahimi Report (UN, 2000b). The Secretary-General, in his comments on the 
Report, called for a plan that can help the different parts of the UN system to work together to 
develop country-specific peacebuilding strategies that are coherent, flexible and field driven 
(UN, 2003c). The UN Peacebuilding Commission is also meant to play an important role in 
facilitating and encouraging Whole-of-System Coherence in the UN system when it comes to 
the peacebuilding context, with the specific aim of also enhancing coherence among Member 
States, and with the country affected by conflict (UN, 2009).    
 
3.3.3 External coherence 
 
External coherence refers here to consistency among the policies pursued by the various 
international or external actors in a given country context. ‘External’, in this country-specific 
context, distinguishes the international agents from the local or internal agents. An example of 
External Coherence in the peacebuilding context could be the way in which NATO, the EU 
and the UN each had a defined role in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pillar system, 
and the way in which those combined roles were supposed to generate a system-wide 
response (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:54). 
 
External coherence is regarded as necessary and desirable because it is assumed that the 
various international agents share a common peacebuilding goal in any given context. If they 
are pursuing common objectives, are relating to the same internal actors, and are reliant on the 
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same international donors, it makes sense for them to coordinate their policies and actions 
(Porter, 2002). As argued in the previous section, these external actors also share the same 
policy assumptions about the role of coherence and its linkages with effectiveness and 
sustainability (OECD, 2007c). At the same time, however, these agents are in competition 
with each other for donor funding and international prestige, and whilst they are usually 
engaged in a range of coordination efforts, they are also typically in competition with each 
other at other levels (Patrick, 2000).  
 
One area that is particularly relevant for External Coherence is the relationship among donors, 
both bilateral and multilateral. Coherence in this context addresses the need for donors to 
harmonise their policies and practices, amongst others, so that they can limit the transaction 
costs associated with their support.
16
 In this context, transaction costs refer to the additional 
cost or burden that donor assistance places on donor recipients. For instance, a country like 
Tanzania may have to report to several donors, each according to a different template and 
time-scale. A different approach may be to have one annual report that all the donors can 
accept as sufficient for their purposes (OECD, 2003). Despite their cooperation in forums 
such as the OECD, the UN and the EU, donor countries are also in competition with each 
other for influence and prestige and, in pursuing these interests, often take decisions that 
undermine external coherence. 
 
The UN’s peacebuilding architecture provides the donor community and other international 
actors, e.g. major Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs); members of the Security Council; or 
countries from the region, with an additional meeting place where they can further improve 
their attempts to foster external coherence (Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), 2007). The 
added advantage of the UN Peacebuilding Commission is that it provides a forum not only for 
security-development linkages, and the internal-external debate, but it also brings together 
donors and others with a special interest in a specific country (UN, 2011). As Kwesi Aning 
and Ernest Lartey (2010) point out, another important aspect to external coherence, especially 
in the African context, is the relationship between the UN peacebuilding architecture and 
regional organisations or mechanisms. This is especially valid in those cases where conflicts 
that manifest in a specific country have a regional-system dynamic that makes it impossible to 
                                                 
16
 ‘Harmonisation’ in this context refers to the harmonisation between donor approaches. Note the Rome 
Declaration on Harmonization of 25 February 2003. See http://www.aidharmonization.org [12 May 2009]. 
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address them in isolation, such as in the Great Lakes, Mano River and Horn of Africa 
contexts. 
 
3.3.4 Internal/external coherence 
 
Internal/external coherence refers to consistency between the policies of the local and 
international agents in a given country context. In the context of donor and aid recipient 
relations, this is also known as alignment.
17
 Internal/external coherence in the peacebuilding 
context typically relates to the perceived need for a clearly-articulated, comprehensive 
peacebuilding strategy that can provide the various internal and external peacebuilding agents 
with a common frame of reference (Smith, 2004). Examples here could be an agreed national 
strategic framework between the international community and host government, such as the 
2008-2011 ‘Lift Liberia’ poverty reduction strategy of Liberia (Liberia, 2008). 
 
The importance of an overall strategic process is widely recognised and accepted in policy 
and research circles (Dahrendorf, 2003). However, as the Utstein (Smith, 2004) and other 
studies cited earlier have pointed out, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy has been 
identified as a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peacebuilding operations. 
The most general response to this finding has been a re-doubling of efforts to increase 
coherence. 
 
The introduction of this coherence typology is not meant to suggest that coherence is pursued 
exclusively in one or another of these four spheres of coherence. Quite the contrary; actors are 
likely to pursue coherence in all the spheres where they are active. For instance, an actor like 
the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands will be concerned with coherence in connection with 
its policies towards, for instance, Afghanistan, and is likely to pursue coherence 
simultaneously at all four spheres foreseen in this typology. Firstly, among the various units 
within the Foreign Ministry; secondly, in a whole-of-government context with other 
government agencies; thirdly, in the inter-agency context among donors or as a member state 
of NATO, the EU, and the UN; and lastly, in the internal/external coherence context in its 
bilateral relations with Afghanistan and its participation in collective efforts at international-
local coherence, such as at international donor conferences. The typology is thus meant as a 
                                                 
17 ‘Alignment’ is a development concept referring to the alignment between the interests of international donors 
and the needs and priorities of the recipients. Note in this context the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, of 
2 March 2005. See http://www.oecd.org [12 May 2009]. 
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tool to assist in distinguishing between peacebuilding coherence in different spheres, but it 
does not suggest that these spheres are not closely inter-connected. 
 
3.4 COHERENCE AND COORDINATION 
 
As was explained in the introductory chapter, one of the ways this dissertation differs from 
other studies that have looked into similar problems is the way the study distinguishes 
between coherence and coordination. The decision was to focus on coherence, rather than 
coordination, because most of the literature available to date comprises operational 
evaluations that focus on specific coordination problems (Stockton, 2002; Eriksson, 1996; 
Porter, 2002). This focus on coordination has steered these studies to a more practical- or 
tactical-level analysis of how coordination has been undertaken, typically between one or 
more organisations, coupled with suggestions on what can be done to solve coherence 
problems. This has resulted in these studies being blind to some of the system-level dynamics 
that influence the reasons why peacebuilding agents tend not to pursue coherence, even when 
it appears to be in their interest to do so.  
 
Some of the key issues that need to be considered to understand the differences between 
coherence and coordination and to contextualise the role of coordination in peacebuilding 
systems will be addressed in this section. Even though this study was designed to frame the 
dilemma from a coherence perspective, it is still important to understand why coordination is 
such an important issue from a general peacebuilding policy and practice perspective.  
 
The distinction between coherence and coordination is not widely recognised, and most of the 
studies cited earlier use the two terms interchangeably. In fact, many have used coordination 
in the way coherence is used in this study, i.e. to refer not only to coordination as a way to 
achieve coherence, but also as a synonym for coherence, i.e. as both the way to achieve the 
aim and the aim itself.  
 
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English explains that cooperation 
means “working together for a common purpose”, whilst coordination means making things, 
people and parts function together efficiently and in an organised way (Crowther, 1995). The 
Collins (1995) English dictionary provides an insight into coordination that seems even more 
relevant for our purposes. It defines coordination as “the organization of the activities of two 
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or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the 
other group(s) are doing”. Both of these definitions are consistent with the way the concept is 
used in this study. However, whilst coherence and coordination are interlinked, one should 
not assume a linear or causal relationship between the two, as the one does not necessarily 
lead to the other, nor does more of the one necessarily result in more of the other. Each needs 
to be independently considered in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the 
inter-linkages between the two. 
 
The most commonly recognised processes that are used to pursue coherence in peacebuilding 
systems are assessment and analysis, design and planning, management and coordination, and 
monitoring and evaluation. These four processes will be returned to, compared and referred to 
throughout the dissertation. It has been pointed out that coordination is often directly 
associated with pursuing coherence in most of the studies cited and is often used as a 
synonym for coherence; in this dissertation, however, it is argued that coordination is only 
one of the ways in which we pursue coherence and that it needs to be considered alongside 
the three other processes mentioned here, namely assessment, planning and monitoring and 
evaluation.  
 
Coordination describes an activity of exchanging information with the intent to either, as a 
minimum, ‘de-conflict’ future activities, or to synchronise future activities so that one can 
take into account what the other agents are doing and adjust one’s actions accordingly. For 
instance, people may agree on a division of work to avoid overlap or they can agree to 
concentrate efforts on the same problem to achieve greater leverage, without necessarily 
taking joint or cooperative action. For instance, in the UN Mission to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC), during the 2006-2009 period, the joint working group on 
protection coordinated the activities of various peacekeeping, development, humanitarian and 
human rights agents so that, together, but not necessarily jointly (meaning acting visibly 
together in the field), they could focus their efforts on agreed protection hot spots (De Coning, 
2008b).  In practice this meant that the peacekeeping force increased its patrols in a specific 
area, and that independently, certain human rights NGOs may also have increased their work 
in the same area. The intent was that several agents concentrated their resources on a pre-
identified hot spot, with the assumption that the aggregated effort should result in more 
effective protection in that area. This is an example of a coordinated effort and is distinct 
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from, for instance, a cooperative or joint effort, which in this case would have meant a joint or 
combined patrol of UN peacekeepers and NGO personnel. 
 
The most authoritative definition of coordination in the humanitarian community has been 
coined by Minear and Chelliah (1992:3):  
Coordination is the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian 
assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic 
planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and ensuring 
accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour; (5) negotiating and 
maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing 
leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of 
discipline without unduly constraining action.
18
  
 
In this definition, coordination is seen as a meta-goal of humanitarian action, because it 
contributes to efficiency and effectiveness. For Minear and Chelliah, functions such as 
strategic planning, gathering information, mobilising resources, providing leadership, etc. are 
thus all seen as sub-elements of coordination. This definition makes sense in the humanitarian 
context where there is a specific principled position for the various agents to remain 
independent, and whilst they are willing to coordinate operational activities for the sake of 
greater efficiency and effectiveness, they would not agree to the notion of pursuing 
coherence, i.e. pursuing a common strategic objective. 
 
The understanding assigned to coordination in this dissertation is different from the Minear 
and Chelliah approach in that it views coordination as more or less limited to the exchange of 
information and the synchronisation of action. Coherence is understood as an aspirational 
objective and coordination as one of the things we do – alongside assessments, planning, 
monitoring and evaluation – to pursue that objective. Nevertheless, the Minear and Chelliah 
definition is useful in many ways, amongst others because it sheds light on additional aspects 
that can contribute to coherence, such as mobilising resources, ensuring accountability, and 
negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities.  
 
One interesting way of distinguishing between coordination and coherence in the UN 
peacebuilding context may be to compare the role of the humanitarian coordinator (HC) with 
that of the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). Whilst the SRSG is 
responsible for ensuring that the overall international effort, and especially the UN system-
                                                 
18
 This definition is used or quoted in most evaluation studies and related works on humanitarian coordination 
(see for instance Sommers, 2000; Donini, 2000; Stockton, 2002: Strand. 2003). 
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wide effort, is coherent, the HC is responsible for ensuring that the various humanitarian 
actors in a given humanitarian emergency, including the NGO actors, are coordinated (De 
Coning, 2010a). In this context coordination refers to a division of labour, exchange of 
information and, in some cases, joint or cooperative action, whilst coherence refers to 
pursuing common objectives.  
 
In the humanitarian context one can assume that all the humanitarian organisations that 
ascribe to the principles of the humanitarian code of conduct
19
 share a set of common 
principles. As they are highly independent, however, there is a need to coordinate their 
actions. Coordination in the humanitarian context is, in fact, based on the recognition of 
independence, and those responsible for coordination, such as the UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator, need to provide ‘leadership’ without impeding the independence of any of the 
humanitarian agencies that voluntarily participate in the coordination process (Reindorp & 
Wiles, 2001). ‘Leadership’ in this context does not imply authority to direct or command and 
control, but refers rather to a pre-agreed convening and process facilitation role.  
 
Whilst there are similar tensions between independence and leadership in the peacebuilding 
context, there are two important differences. The first is that there can be no assumption that 
the peacebuilding agents have shared or common principles. Many peacebuilding agents have 
values and principles that place them in direct competition with one another. This aspect is 
considered in greater detail in the next section. However, peacebuilding agents are also, at the 
same time, interdependent in that none can achieve the overall peace consolidation objective 
on their own. Each has to contribute their part, but it is only the combined effort that can 
achieve the overall peace consolidation objective. 
 
Humanitarian actors are not interdependent in the same way. They can achieve their 
objectives – saving lives and alleviating suffering – without each other. Every life saved and 
every person assisted is valued. They can thus operate independently from one another, but 
they may choose to cooperate and, as a result, a certain degree of specialisation has developed 
among them. This specialisation has made some of the humanitarian actors more 
interdependent on one another, but the point is that humanitarian action is not fundamentally 
                                                 
19
 The most widely recognised is the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’, but there are also others such as the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and 
Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.  
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predicated on an interdependent relationship in the same way that peacebuilding actors are 
(OCHA, 2003a & 2003b).  
 
Humanitarian action is aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering. Success is not 
measured by achieving these aims in a sustainable way. In fact, from a humanitarian 
perspective, the responsibility for the longer-term resolution of the conflict that causes the 
humanitarian suffering, in the case of man-made as opposed to natural disasters, lies with the 
peacebuilding agents. Peacebuilding agents, on the other hand, have as their aim the 
consolidation of a peace process and the long-term resolution of a conflict. Success, for them, 
is measured in the sustainability of the peace process. The argument in this dissertation is that 
it is this distinction that necessitates, in the peacebuilding context, a focus on coherence, 
rather than on coordination, and that necessitates a system-wide coherence rather than an 
inter-agency coordination approach. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter introduced and analysed coherence and the coherence dilemma. Coherence, in 
the international peacebuilding context, can be understood as the effort to direct the wide 
range of activities undertaken in the political, governance, development, human rights, 
humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system towards 
common strategic objectives. 
 
The coherence dilemma refers to the persistent gap between policy-level assumptions about 
the value and causal role of coherence in peacebuilding effectiveness, and empirical evidence 
to the contrary. In this chapter it has been established that there is a widely held and acted 
upon assumption in the peacebuilding policy community that improved coherence leads to 
greater efficiency and effectiveness, and that this, in turn, will result in a more sustainable 
peacebuilding impact.  
 
A number of evaluation studies and reports cited in this chapter have found that the 
peacebuilding interventions undertaken to date have lacked coherence and that this has 
undermined their sustainability and ability to achieve their strategic objectives. These findings 
have further strengthened the policy-level view that if we improve coherence we will also 
improve the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions.  
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An analytical typology that provides for four types of policy coherence: agency coherence, 
whole-of-government coherence, external coherence and internal/external coherence, was 
proposed in this chapteras a way of looking into some of the unique features of coherence in 
each of these contexts. However, it was also stressed that all peacebuilding agents are active 
across most, if not all, of these typologies, so the suggestion is not that specific cases of 
coherence need to fit neatly into one of these categories.  
 
In the next chapter the aim is to identify and consider some of the factors that limit, inhibit or 
constrain our ability to achieve coherence. Four factors are discussed, namely the tension 
between long-term impact and short-term output; conflicting values, principles and mandates; 
the context-specific scope for coherence; and the power imbalance between local and 
international peacebuilding agents. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FACTORS THAT CONSTRAIN COHERENCE 
 
What rarely happens, though, is a solid discussion about the underlying assumptions and norms 
peacebuilding strategies are based on and how they influence the activities and objectives of a 
programme…implementing agencies, such as the UN or bilateral donors, rarely question their 
moral frameworks and normative assumptions. Instead, they continue to export a liberal 
understanding of peaceful coexistence, without considering that their underlying hypotheses on 
how change can be secured, influence and determine the results of the programme. (Körppen, 
Ropers & Giessmann, 2011:79) 
 
The current process [in Afghanistan] shows with all certainty that international support is 
inherently problematic as there is always a risk it will end in dependence rather than local 
ownership of the peace. (Olsson & Jarstad, 2011:103) 
 
The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies is to nurture and create the political, economic, 
and social space within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the 
resources necessary to build a peaceful, just and prosperous society. (Bush, 1996:86) 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, coherence was introduced and consideration was given to why it has 
gained such prominence among the peacebuilding policy community. In this chapter, a 
number of factors that constrain coherence in the peacebuilding context will be considered. 
These include the tension between short-term and longer-term approaches and perspectives; 
differences in values, principles and mandates; the degree to which a specific context may be 
conducive to coherence; and the tensions and power imbalances between internal and external 
agents. This chapter introduces and considers those factors that constrain coherence and, in so 
doing, contribute to the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding. 
 
In Chapter 3, it was established that there is a widely-held understanding in the peacebuilding 
policy community that the lack of coherence among the diverse international and local agents 
that make up the peacebuilding system has resulted in, among other things, inter-agency 
rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and less than 
optimal economies of scale (Fukuyama, 2004:40). It was also established that this lack of 
coherence and its effects have contributed to an overall poor success rate measured in the lack 
of sustainability of the systems that have come about as a result of these international 
interventions (Collier et al., 2003; Suhrke & Samset, 2007:199).  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, various agencies, governments and organisations have started 
experimenting, independently from one another, with a range of models and mechanisms 
aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict-
management systems in order to address these shortcomings and improve the overall success 
rate of the international conflict-management system. All these initiatives have similar 
objectives, namely to achieve greater harmonisation and synchronisation among the activities 
of the different international and local agents. The overall goal is to bridge the security-
development divide and to integrate the political, security, developmental, economic and 
other dimensions assumed to ensure a system-wide response to any specific conflict system 
(Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:3). 
 
The coherence dilemma has been explained as the gap between the value and role ascribed to 
coherence at the policy level and the limits of coherence experienced at the operational level 
by practitioners. At the policy level, coherence is viewed as a critically important approach 
that works to improve effectiveness and sustainability. At the operational level, the feedback 
from the practitioners is that, despite their best efforts over many years and despite having 
tried various approaches, models and tools to enhance coherence, it remains an elusive and 
unattainable goal. This chapter is aimed at improving the understanding of why practitioners 
find coherence so unreachable by exploring some of the factors that seem to limit, inhibit or 
constrain their ability to achieve coherence. 
 
There are two ways of responding to the gap between policy and practice. The first approach 
would be to argue that the gap is caused by poor or insufficient policy implementation 
(Kaspersen & Sending, 2005). If that is the case, it should be possible to improve the 
coherence deficit by increasing or improving efforts to implement existing policy, by 
investing in more and better coordination, by focusing on more and better training, and by 
improving the organisations, systems and processes that are used to manage and support 
coherence (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:67). It is probably fair to say that this has been the 
most common and prevalent policy response to date and that most of the policy developments 
and operational experiments discussed in this dissertation are examples of the kinds of efforts 
that have been invested over the last decades to try to further improve our ability to achieve 
coherence. However, despite rigorous and sustained efforts over this period, the persistent 
feedback from the field is that achieving coherence remains as elusive as ever. 
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An alternative approach could be to argue that the gap is caused by inherent contradictions in 
the mandates, interests and value systems of the peacebuilding agents. For instance, Paris and 
Sisk (2007) argue that peacebuilding should be understood as inherently contradictory, with 
competing imperatives facing the internal and external actors, both between and among 
themselves, that constitute ‘vexing policy dilemmas’, that requires trade-offs between 
multiple mandates, needs and priorities without any obvious solutions. As a result, the 
agencies that are responsible for programmes and campaigns may often have to settle for 
‘second best’ or ‘partially coherent’ solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for 
cooperation (De Coning, 2007c). Paris and Sisk (2009:49) argue that, as a result of these 
inherent contradictions and the policy dilemmas they create, peacebuilding agents may have 
to settle for a kind of good-enough or “compromised peacebuilding” result. 
 
Both these approaches may have merit and may, in some contexts, complement each other. In 
some contexts it may be possible to enhance the level of coherence by working harder to find 
common ground. However, there may be other contexts where achieving more coherence is 
simply not possible. To understand these nuances better, and in order to recognise the 
contexts within which we may have to accept that more effort will not yield more coherence, 
we need to take a closer look at some of the factors that limit, inhibit or constrain the scope 
for coherence. Four such factors are explored in this chapter: impact/output tensions; 
conflicting values, principles and mandates; external-internal power imbalances and the 
degree to which a specific context is conducive, or not, to coherence. The argument is that 
these four aspects, which are not meant to be an exhaustive list, are indicative of the kind of 
factors that inherently constrain the scope for achieving coherence. 
 
4.2 LONG-TERM IMPACT VS SHORT-TERM OUTPUT CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Peacebuilding agents have to manage competing demands and try to balance multiple 
considerations. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India evaluates its engagement in the 
peacebuilding process of, for instance South Sudan, it is likely to make that assessment at two 
levels. On the one hand the Ministry will consider the long-term impact that India’s 
engagement has had, or is having, on the peace process, i.e. whether, from an overall and 
long-term perspective, their contribution has had, or is having, the intended effect. In reality, 
such assessments are rarely made, except perhaps by historians. It is extremely difficult to 
make such assessments with any accuracy, except long after the fact. However, the idea that 
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such a level of assessment can be made is important, because it is the macro theories of 
change that inform the specific policies of a peacebuilding agent in a given country. It is only 
by evaluating how these assumptions have played out in specific contexts that peacebuilding 
agents will adjust their theories of change.  
 
As said above, such evaluations are rarely attempted in reality, especially whilst such 
missions are still ongoing. However, in some cases—especially when a specific mission or 
initiative seems to have stalled, seems to be taking longer than anticipated, or is facing some 
crisis of trust—peacebuilding agents have attempted to undertake strategic assessments that 
question whether the right strategy is in place and whether the existing strategy is having the 
desired effect or not. However, in most cases, long-term impact is simply assumed and 
continuously re-framed as an aspirational goal. 
 
On the other hand, a peacebuilding agent like the Foreign Ministry of India in the previous 
example, is likely to actively monitor and evaluate the actual programmes and initiatives India 
is supporting and undertaking in Southern Sudan. These actual programmes typically are 
assessed on an annual basis when further funding has to be approved. In other words, success 
is measured in the context of whether a specific budget has been spent, on whether specific 
programmes are being implemented as planned, in terms of how many people have been 
trained, etc.  
 
The policy-level approach to coherence assumes that organisations are motivated by the long-
term impact perspective, but the empirical evidence suggests that their short-term output 
considerations are much more important in influencing decisions that impact on coherence. 
This difference should not really matter if it is assumed that the short-term outputs 
cumulatively build-up to generate the long-term impact. This aggregated effect is assumed in 
most theories of change, i.e. that the aggregated effect of all the peacebuilding programmes 
and activities collectively and cumulatively contribute to building momentum towards the 
larger and longer-term peacebuilding objectives. However, what the Utstein (Smith, 2004) 
and other evaluation reports cited earlier have found is that there is a significant gap between 
most of the peacebuilding programmes and activities and the larger strategies they are meant 
to pursue. In other words, many of those who are implementing the programmes and activities 
in practice are not aware of, or directed by, longer-term strategies. Instead, their day-to-day 
decisions are informed by, or overshadowed by, more immediate concerns, namely how best 
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to achieve the goals and results on which they will be evaluated in the short-term, i.e. on a 
weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis.  
 
The following quote by Peter van Buren is a good example of the kind of negative 
consequences that can be generated by this short-term decision-making culture. He was a 
United States Foreign Service Officer who served in Baghdad during the American 
occupation of Iraq, and he wrote a book about his experiences entitled “We meant well: how I 
helped lose the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people”. The following quote is 
from Carol Jean Gallo’s blog: 
We were never able to do things on a large enough scale to make a difference, because the 
thinking was never long term. Everyone in Iraq was there on a series of one-year tours, myself 
included. Everyone was told that they needed to create accomplishments, that we had to 
document our success, that we had to produce a steady stream of photos of accomplishments, 
and pictures of smiling Iraqis, and metrics of charts. It was impossible under these 
circumstances for us to do anything long term… We rarely thought past next week’s situation 
report. (Gallo, 2011) 
 
As this quote reminds us, a week or a month can feel like a long time from the perspective of 
a peacekeeping officer or a peacebuilding programme manager in the field. An annual plan or 
evaluation, or budgeting for the next year, can feel like long-term planning in the context of 
the pressures of a results-based management approach and the urgent pace of this kind of field 
operations. However, considering that many peacekeeping missions are deployed for five to 
ten years and that most peace processes require decades of sustained engagement before they 
can be considered to have become sustainable, one can gain a more realistic perspective. In 
the context of this dissertation, short-term refers to the immediate programme window, 
perhaps not longer that 12 months, medium-term refers to the current phase of engagement, 
perhaps not longer than 24 to 36 months, and long-term refers to the time it is estimated to 
take for a peace process to be consolidated and eventually to be self-sustainable, usually from 
one to several decades. 
 
The short-term decisions of those responsible for managing specific programmes are 
informed by the attempt to demonstrate immediate gains that can be used to report that these 
programmes are producing results within a given reporting period, which is typically 
quarterly, and annually. They are concerned with spending an annual budget within the 
allocated time and according to plan. From this perspective, it is often more important to 
spend all the money that has been allocated than ensuring that it has been spent sustainably. 
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The short-term incentives encourage spending the money to demonstrate output. Those 
responsible know that they will be evaluated against whether the budget has been spent and 
the on the outputs achieved. The question as to whether it has been spent meaningfully can 
only really be answered in the long term. Programme managers are thus understandably more 
concerned about those aspects that they know they will be assessed against in the short-term. 
The longer-term aggregated effect is perhaps assumed to be factored in at the overall 
programme and campaign designing and planning level and is thus not the concern of the 
manager implementing the programme in the field. All they have to demonstrate is that they 
are following the plan, applying the guidance and policy direction, and achieving the 
immediate goals set for them. The longer-term impact is the responsibility and concern of 
those making the policies and longer-term plans. 
 
The basic tenets of the results-based management approach are well meaning and have 
laudable objectives from a public auditing perspective. However, these well-meaning 
intentions have negative consequences when they result in a management culture that rewards 
short-term and self-reflective gains that amount to increasing the influence, recognition and 
market share of their respective agencies. In other words, when not directed strategically, 
bureaucracies tend to revert to the fail-safe fall-back position of self-preservation – making 
yourself and your organisation look good – as evaluated in the short term, i.e. within a given 
reporting period (De Coning, Lurås, Schia and Ulriksen, 2009).  
 
In a peacebuilding context, where the objectives are peace consolidation and sustainable 
peace, as measured in terms of the given society emerging out of conflict over many years 
(and not in terms of the success of the external agency), the results of this kind of short-term 
results-based management approach can often be perverse. In order to spend the annual 
budget according to plan, the agency is under pressure to forge ahead even if the conditions 
are not conducive to that kind of programming. For instance, those responsible may realise 
that, ideally, they should have taken more time to consult their local counterparts or to 
coordinate with other external actors to avoid overlap, but the pressure to spend the budget in 
the given timeframe may be such that the money has to be spent now, with the hope that 
downstream coordination can correct and refine impact. The result may be a well-executed 
programme that meets all the output deliverables, but that, in reality, is poorly aligned with 
the needs of the people it was intended to benefit. Some may even have a perverse effect on 
the very people it is meant to assist. For instance, the net effect may be that the rate of 
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delivery overwhelms the ability of the local community to absorb the assistance, and this may 
have unintended negative consequences, such as fuelling corruption.  
 
Thus, there is a significant tension between measuring peacebuilding gains from the 
perspective of the society emerging out of conflict and in terms of the time it takes for such a 
society to develop the capacity to manage their own peace process without external 
assistance, and measuring peacebuilding gains from the perspective of an external agency 
responsible for overseeing specific programme interventions, and that measures progress on 
the basis of its outputs and in quarterly and annual cycles. These short-term and long-term 
considerations, and these external agency and local community considerations do not have to 
be incompatible; in fact, they are assumed to be complementary, but in reality the short- to 
medium-term incentives often undermine the long-term objectives.  
 
The overall effect may actually undermine the ability of the society to develop the self-
resilience necessary to manage their own peace consolidation process, because the pressure 
on short-term gains tends to generate dependency on substitution measures rather than invest 
in long-term local capacity (Eriksen, 2009:663). For instance, in order to achieve the results 
sought by the external agencies, a large proportion of the educated and experienced local 
work force typically ends up working for the external agencies instead of for local 
institutions. Similarly, for the external agencies to show results, the bulk of the foreign 
assistance is likely to flow through these agencies, as opposed to through local institutions. 
The end result is a system that enables the external agencies to show that it has carried out a 
range of activities in country x that show how successful the external agency has been and 
how much good it has done, while the intended impact, in fact, was to generate local capacity 
so that the society transitioning out of conflict is able to generate and maintain its own self-
sustainable peace consolidation process. 
 
For instance, De Coning, Lurås, Schia and Ulriksen (2009), in a study of Norway’s 
engagement in Afghanistan found that, in the absence of a clear strategy, Norway’s diplomats, 
police advisors and military personnel fell back into a ‘make Norway look good’ mode. This 
meant, for instance, that instead of concentrating their efforts on one or two areas where their 
relatively small contribution could have made an impact, they chose to spread themselves 
across the widest possible range of activities. This had the desired effect of creating visibility 
for Norway across the largest possible range of initiatives, but lessened the impact their 
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actions could have had on the peace process in Afghanistan. Short-term output driven-
programmes and activities that are not directed by a long-term strategic vision can thus 
actually undermine the long-term goal. The long-term aim of making a contribution to the 
sustainable peace was the stated goal of the Norwegian intervention, but the short-term 
objectives of making sure Norway was seen to be effective and efficient in making such a 
contribution became the driving force that determined which activities were engaged in and 
on what money would be spent. The activities and their immediate outcomes are valued in the 
short-term and result in measurable outputs and outcomes that can be used to explain and 
motivate the expenditure to the auditor-general. The long-term benefit is assumed, but in 
reality it is not considered because the effect is so long-term that it will not have an impact on 
the decision-making process that directs the funding during this intervention cycle.  
 
In the context or timeframe within which decisions are being taken on a specific 
programmatic intervention, one can thus conclude that the incentives to generate short-term 
and self-reflective outputs and outcomes are strong and persuasive, whilst the incentives to act 
in the long-term sustainable interest of the affected society is weak and unsupported.  If this is 
the effect that this long-term impact vs. short-term output tension has on the actions of one 
agent, and in the context of one programme, imagine the aggregated effect this tension is 
having on all the peacebuilding agents and all the programmes they undertake. Is it surprising, 
then, that these societies remain fragile and risk lapsing back into violent conflict, despite 
sustained engagement over decades and billions of dollars of foreign assistance? 
 
This tension is further aggravated by the problem that the overall effect of the combined 
activities of all the peacebuilding agents are observable only from a system-wide impact 
perspective, and that its sustainability can only be measured over the long term, and in 
hindsight. The interdependence among the actors and the benefits of improving coherence 
among them are thus not immediately obvious to the agent at the programme or output level. 
Those measuring progress at the systems or impact level and those measuring progress at the 
programme or output level are disconnected. They operate at different levels and in different 
timeframes. By the time the longer-term impact evaluations are undertaken, those that have 
had to take the day-to-day and year-to-year decisions about what to fund and how to best 
undertake their respective programmes have long since moved on to other positions and 
concerns.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 82 
Pursuing coherence thus makes sense in hindsight, and from the long-term, impact-level 
perspective, but it does not drive the day-to-day decisions of most of the peacebuilding 
agents. That is why peacebuilding agents may seem to have multiple personalities in that they 
are able to identify, discuss and lament many of the dysfunctions of the systems they work in 
and recognise that many of the activities they are engaged in do not make sense from a long-
term, local-ownership or sustainable-peace perspective, and yet they continue to carry out 
those same activities, because that is what they are driven to do by the incentive structure in 
their organisations and the criteria against which their performance is measured.  
 
Another contributing factor is that even if these agencies were motivated to try to pursue 
long-term impact strategies, it is extremely difficult to meaningfully measure the effects of 
any one activity, programme or organisation on a highly complex non-linear and dynamic set 
of systemic events (OECD, 2007a). It is almost impossible to single out one specific activity 
or programme and then determine its effect on the outcome of a specific sector or phase, let 
alone the peace process as a whole (De Coning & Romita, 2009).  The further away we move, 
over time and in terms of the scope of factors taken into consideration, the more complex it 
becomes to determine impact. This therefore makes it very difficult for organisations to focus 
on impact and, as a consequence, on coherence (Caplan, 2005:13). 
 
This tension between long-term impact and short-term output is thus an integral part of the 
internal dynamics of the agencies that undertake peacebuilding. It is one of the factors that are 
inherent to how our systems function, and it will therefore always constrain coherence. This 
tension is one of the factors that make it impossible to achieve the kind of high-level 
coherence that the policy community assumes is attainable.  
 
This finding also means that agency coherence is much more of a significant coherence 
challenge than generally acknowledged. Whilst most studies dealing with coordination 
focuses on the relations between organisations, the coherence dilemma caused by the inherent 
tensions between long-term impact and short-term output resides principally within each 
agency. There is a lack of coherence between those parts of the agency that control the 
activities of the agency based on short- to medium-term feedback processes and those parts of 
the agency that sets long-term goals (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:70). This tension is one of 
the important factors that limit our ability to achieve coherence in peacebuilding systems. 
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4.3 CONFLICTING VALUES, PRINCIPLES AND MANDATES 
 
Another factor is related to the observation that the values, principles and mandates of some 
of the agents in a peacebuilding system are inherently incoherent (Paris & Sisk, 2009; 
Fukuyama, 2004). Each peacebuilding agent comes from, or has his/her roots in, a specific 
discipline and paradigm, be it humanitarian, military, human rights, development, law 
enforcement, private sector, diplomacy, or something else. They have been educated in and 
have developed their career experiences steeped in the values, principles, worldviews and 
theories of change specific to that discipline or profession (World Bank, 2011:25). These 
different educational and professional paradigms are further reinforced by separate 
institutional and bureaucratic traditions and approaches.  
 
In the UN context, for instance, the political and security dimensions are associated with the 
Security Council and the Secretariat, whilst the humanitarian and development dimensions 
are associated with the UN’s agencies, programmes and funds.  In the national context, there 
are typically considerable cultural and professional differences between those working in the 
military, police, diplomatic and development sectors, and these differences are even more 
pronounced when we add the private sector and non-government organisations to the mix. 
 
These multiple, parallel paradigms result in different institutions and agents with different 
values, principles and mandates working side-by-side, but each with their own rationale and 
theories of change. The result is that the various agents have different approaches with regard 
to how best a given peace process should be supported, and these differences typically 
manifest in different ideas about which aspects to prioritise, what forms of coordination are 
appropriate and how to measure success (Stedman, Cousens & Rothchild, 2002:89).  
 
In general, those that operate in a political and security paradigm may prefer to, or be 
specifically mandated to, prioritise stabilising a situation before dealing with social justice 
and human rights issues. This may result in them giving priority, at least in the short term, to 
regime security and negotiated agreements that are likely to generate stability, rather than to 
addressing human rights violations and bringing persons accused of crimes to justice. For the 
same reason, they are typically less enthusiastic, at least in the short term, about dealing with 
issues such as corruption, black-market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if the 
actors they perceive to be key to stabilising the situation are also suspected of being 
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responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour (Stewart, 2006; Chesterman 
2002).  
 
On the other hand, agents for whom rule of law and human rights are the primary paradigm 
are likely to have a directly opposing view. They are likely to argue that enforcing national 
and international laws and safeguarding human rights will have a far greater stabilising effect 
and that any delay in introducing and addressing human rights will simply serve to further 
undermine peace consolidation. Furthermore, they also have a longer-term or system-wide 
argument, namely that ensuring that justice is seen to be done in any given case will also have 
a deterrent effect on others in future conflicts in that they will realise that they are likely to be 
punished, nationally or internationally, for their crimes and abuses (Thakur, 2006).  
 
In Darfur, this fundamental peace-vs.-justice tension has driven the debate between those 
arguing in favour of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Bashir on 
the one hand, and those favouring some kind of arrangement that can give priority to first 
securing a peace process, on the other (Egeland, 2008). Those that align themselves with the 
peace-first position argue, for instance, that the UN was on the cusp of negotiating a peace 
agreement with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and, if successful, this agreement would 
have saved countless lives and have removed a major destabilising factor in the region where 
Sudan, Uganda, the DRC and the Central African Republic come together. However, the ICC 
indictment of Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, removed Kony’s incentive to enter into a 
peace agreement, and this has resulted in the LRA returning to the bush, and the continuation 
of the fighting in that region at a very high cost in terms of human suffering and the stability 
of the region (Egeland, 2008). 
 
Even among the actors engaged in security there is often a difference in the emphasis that is 
placed on state security as opposed to human security. The latter is often seen as ‘soft’ 
security since it focuses on individuals and the civilian population and has therefore 
traditionally enjoyed lower priority among peacekeepers or stabilisation forces (Sande Lie & 
De Carvalho, 2009). Advocates of human security, by contrast, often stress that sustainable 
peace can be achieved only by focusing on the needs of the population, including their 
security needs as they perceive them, and that any security operation which fails to take this 
into account is likely to fail in the end. The security actors may thus agree on the end state, 
but those that are influenced by a state-security approach will have different theories of 
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change about how to get there and different measures of effectiveness from those with a 
human security approach. The former gives priority to stability and the latter to long-term 
sustainability (Berdal, 2009). One would think that the two should be compatible, but 
experiences in countries like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the 
last decade have shown how the prioritising of the one over the other can easily result in a 
winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war syndrome (Stewart & Knaus, 2011; Friis, 2010). 
 
The tension between ‘protection of civilians’ and ‘combating opposing forces’ is another case 
in point and also relates to the impact/output discussion in the previous section. In 
Afghanistan, fighting the Taliban made sense from an outcome perspective that measured 
progress against number of combat actions, number of Taliban killed, etc. Measured against 
this kind of output indicators, the NATO operation in Afghanistan appeared, at first, to be 
performing well. However, the worsening security situation eventually forced NATO to re-
appraise its approach and to refocus on the protection of civilians (Friis, 2010). Very few 
organisations are faced with such stark feedback, and most are likely to continue unaware that 
their output-oriented actions are having little impact ‒ or worse, an adverse impact. 
  
In some cases, the timetable of one actor or dimension may be in conflict with the principles 
of another. One case in point is the elections timetable in Liberia that motivated those 
responsible for the elections to encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 
Monrovia to return to their original communities in 2005 to be registered there to vote. The 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of the UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) put pressure on those agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to 
return and to start offering them reintegration support in their communities of origin. 
However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable proposed by UNMIL because 
their assessments informed them that conditions were not yet conducive to sustainable 
returns. This situation caused serious tension between the political and 
developmental/humanitarian actors because their respective mandates and their respective 
operating values and principles brought them into direct opposition with one another 
(McCandless, 2008).    
 
The differences highlighted in these examples reflect fundamental differences in the 
mandates, value systems and principles of some of the actors engaged in peacebuilding. It 
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would be naïve to assume that these differences can be resolved through coordination on the 
assumption that all the agents share the same overall goals (Paris & Sisk, 2009:60). In the 
end, as these examples indicate, such differences will need to be negotiated on and trade-offs 
agreed to in each specific context (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:9). These case-specific trade-
offs cannot resolve the fundamental underlying differences. In fact, this type of negotiated 
cooperation often leaves the specific actors less tolerant of each other than before they were 
forced into the situation that required them to enter into such a transaction, because the 
outcome typically ends up favouring those with more leverage and political clout and, whilst 
the outcome may be an agreed way forward, the end result is not greater coherence but 
increased tension and resentment (Zartman & Touval, 2010:2). And yet, such trade-offs are 
necessary, in a given situation, to overcome the practical impasse and find a workable 
solution that will enable the actors to move beyond that point so that they can continue to 
carry out their respective mandates. Such ad hoc tactical transactions should not be confused 
with strategic coherence, which aims to achieve a common understanding of a situation as 
well as a common strategic response to it. 
 
Sometimes the mandates of the different partners are inherently irreconcilable and hence 
significantly limit the potential for coherence. Donini points out, for instance, that there is a 
deep underlying tension between those agencies that derive their mandate from international 
treaties and agreements that are universally applicable—such as those on human rights, the 
rights of the child, refugees and the laws of armed conflict—and those agencies that are 
mandated to act on the authority of the Security Council in specific cases. He argues that: 
…when the crunch comes, expedient politics nearly always trumps universal principles. It is 
unlikely that the tensions among the international actors that derive their legitimacy from time-
bound Security Council resolutions and those who claim their legitimacy from international 
treaties and international humanitarian law will evaporate like morning mist anytime soon. 
(Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:4) 
 
Here Donini is specifically referring to the tension between political and security actors like a 
UN peacekeeping mission and humanitarian actors like the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) or 
a humanitarian NGO like Doctors Without Borders (MSF). As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
humanitarian relief organisations constitute one particular set of actors that operate under a 
different mandate to all the others. International humanitarian law and the humanitarian Code 
of Conduct (IFRC, 1994) stress the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian 
actors. As a result of this principled approach and operational framework, humanitarian actors 
have resisted attempts to become integrated into a comprehensive or integrated approach. 
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Humanitarian actors have no wish to be ‘coherent’ with the political and military dimensions 
of peacebuilding interventions, both because of their different priorities and because of their 
need to remain neutral and impartial. A blurring of these distinctive identities and roles 
undermines the operational framework of the humanitarian community and impacts 
negatively on their security (Metcalfe, Giffen & Elhawary, 2011). Humanitarian actors 
therefore resist being made part of a comprehensive or integrated approach arrangement and 
react strongly if other actors (the military in particular) claim to be engaging in humanitarian 
activities (Cornish, 2007).  
 
This is not to say that it is impossible for there to be a meaningful relationship between 
humanitarian actors and peacebuilding agents; however, such a relationship will need to be 
built on the recognition of each other’s different roles, and not on any preconceived notions of 
the inherent value of coherence. For the humanitarian actors, the humanitarian principles of 
independence, neutrality and impartiality are non-negotiable fundamental principles, whilst 
coordination is something pragmatic and tactical, and therefore context specific. For 
peacebuilding actors, on the other hand, coherence and comprehensiveness is increasingly 
becoming a core operational principle because they perceive it to be intrinsically linked to the 
successful achievement of their end goals. These two different approaches to the value of 
coherence further contribute to the tension between these two communities. 
 
To conclude this discussion on the role that fundamentally different values, principles and 
mandates play in limiting the scope for coherence, Bruce Jones is quoted as saying that 
“managing such trade-offs is an inherent challenge – perhaps the inherent challenge – in 
managing the implementation of peace agreements or managing regime consolidation in 
transition” (Donini, Niland & Wermester, 2004:215). There are fundamental differences in 
the values, principles and mandates of some of the peacebuilding agents, as well as other 
stakeholders such as humanitarian actors, that act as inherent constraints on the degree to 
which it is possible to achieve coherence in peacebuilding systems.  
 
4.4 CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO COHERENCE 
 
In Chapter 3 it was established that there is an assumption in the policy community that more 
coherence leads to more effective and thus more sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. In this 
section that assumption is challenged and the argument will be made that the correlation that 
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has been observed between the degree of coherence and the relative sustainability in some 
peacebuilding contexts is not indicative of a causal link.  
 
Instead, it is shown that contexts where there is a low level of volatility or a low risk of a 
relapse into violent conflict are conducive to greater coherence (De Coning & Friis, 2011). In 
other words, the context determines the scope for coherence. In those peacebuilding systems 
that can be characterised as less volatile—where violent conflict has ended and the likelihood 
of a relapse into violent conflict in the short- to medium term is low, for instance the 2007-
2011 post-conflict ‘UNMIL-period’ in Liberia—a relatively high degree of coherence has 
been attained. In contrast, in more volatile peacebuilding systems, for instance, Afghanistan, 
Chad and the DRC, where some degree of violent conflict is still ongoing and where the 
likelihood of a lapse into large-scale violent conflict cannot be ruled out, it has been observed 
that despite significant efforts to improve coherence, the results have been marginal, at best. 
This is surprising because the pressure from the political and policy level to achieve 
coherence seems to peak during periods when the peacebuilding systems are most volatile. As 
a result, these are the periods during which the most effort, in terms of resources, time and 
political will, seems to be invested in improving coherence at all levels,  especially in whole-
of-government and inter-agency coherence. The lack of coherence recorded in these contexts 
is thus not due to lack of effort. 
 
This observation suggests that systemic or contextual influences—the degree to which a 
system is conducive to coherence—may be a more important factor in determining the degree 
of coherence that is likely to be achieved than the intensity of the effort or the coherence 
model that is applied. Simply put, certain contexts may be more conducive to coherence than 
others. This would imply that in those cases where more coherence has been achieved, for 
instance in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, the result is not necessarily linked to the 
intensity of the coherence effort or the specific model employed, but rather to the favourable 
environment and the prevailing attitude of the principle stakeholders, including and especially 
the local actors (Stedman, Cousens & Rothchild, 2002:666).  
 
The tensions caused by differences in mandates, values and principles addressed in the 
previous section tend to become even more acute when the security situation is volatile. If 
security forces are engaged in combat operations against spoilers or insurgents, or if 
insurgents carry out violent attacks, the volatility introduced into the system is likely to have, 
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at the very least, short-term negative effects for progress in other parts of the system, for 
instance in the political, governance, humanitarian and developmental domains (Newman & 
Richmond, 2006:17). If the situation is so volatile that the military component needs to use 
force to prevent or manage an outbreak of violent conflict, it signals a degree of risk and 
uncertainty that will impact on all the other dimensions of the peace process. Civilian 
casualties, displacements that generate refugees and IDPs, and the destruction of livelihoods 
and infrastructure are all typical consequences of the use of force. Actors engaged in 
humanitarian relief operations or development programmes may therefore be outraged by the 
human suffering and destruction generated by the military action, even if those actions are 
intended to improve the protection of civilians, for instance the actions taken by MONUC in 
the Kivus in the 2006-2008 period (Autessere, 2010).  
 
The conclusion, therefore, is that coherence will be negatively affected once there is an 
outbreak of violence, especially if the use of force becomes necessary to prevent or manage 
such an outbreak of violent conflict. The use of force and violent conflict has a polarising 
effect, regardless of the motive. A serious lapse into conflict tends to undermine whatever 
strategic coherence may have been arrived at, and under such pressure the coherence that the 
peacebuilding system may have achieved is likely to collapse and to be re-configured into 
smaller clusters or factions that have like-minded values, principles and operational cultures. 
The levels of coherence in these smaller factions may increase because their positions 
crystallise for or against the use of force, but the overall or system-level coherence between 
these sub-systems is likely to decrease. In severe cases, the peacebuilding system may 
collapse and will thus have to be regenerated once a new peace agreement has been 
negotiated. A general finding in this regard is thus that violence negatively affects coherence 
at all levels–agency coherence, whole-of-government coherence, external coherence and 
external/Internal coherence—in the following ways: 
 Agency coherence: There is likely to be a greater degree of disagreement within 
different parts of an agency about how to respond. For instance, the department 
dealing with humanitarian actors and those dealing with security organisations in the 
same foreign ministry are likely to disagree more about what is an appropriate 
response. Those dealing with humanitarian actors are likely to argue for greater 
safeguards and for more isolation between the humanitarian and stabilisation actions, 
whilst those dealing with the peacebuilding mission and the security actors are likely 
to insist on more coordination and integration.  
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 Whole-of-government coherence: There is likely to be a greater degree of 
disagreement among government agencies engaged in a whole-of-government 
process about how to respond and the civilian agencies of government. Those 
involved in development and humanitarian work are especially likely to want more 
distance between themselves and their military counterparts.  
 External coherence: There is likely to be a greater degree of disagreement among the 
different external agencies in a given context, especially amongst those that are 
security and politically focused, and those that are working on development and 
humanitarian issues. 
 External/Internal coherence: There is likely to be a greater degree of disagreement 
between the internal and external actors about how to respond to the increased risk of 
a relapse into violent conflict, and this is likely to be further exacerbated by a higher 
degree of disagreement among the internal actors in the given context. In the DRC the 
government would like the UN mission to be more active in directly using force 
against armed groups, whilst in Afghanistan, the government is increasingly 
distancing themselves from NATO when the use of force results in civilian casualties 
(Suhrke, 2011). 
 
A useful example is the action taken by the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the UN Mission (MONUC) to forcefully disarm those militias that did not 
voluntary join the disarmament campaign and who continued to destabilise and harm civilians 
in North and South Kivus (Autessere, 2010:187). These militias were not party to the peace 
process and committed atrocities against the local population. The intention was thus to 
improve the protection of civilians by removing the threat posed by these militias. However, 
the government’s military campaigns, supported by MONUC, also resulted in the 
displacement of the local population, and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo also abused the communities in the areas over which they gained control (Autessere, 
2010:188). The net result was more instability, violence and abuse and a greater risk to the 
civilian community. The UN mission was, at first, taken aback by the negative reaction of the 
humanitarian community because it found it difficult to accept that their action, which was 
intended to increase the protection of civilians, had the opposite effect. Over time, however, 
the negative impact of the armed forces of the DRC became obvious, and the UN Security 
Council refined the mandate of the mission, and linked UN support to a strict monitoring and 
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compliance regime.
20
 This experience demonstrated, however, that even the well-intentioned 
use of force has a negative effect on the scope for coherence. 
 
What this example and the feedback from the field in similar volatile situations in 
Afghanistan, Darfur and Chad suggest, is that the use of force by international security forces 
and the level of volatility in the society in question have a negative effect on the scope for 
coherence. Hence, it can be postulated that one of the most important indicators of the degree 
to which meaningful coherence is likely to be achievable in a given context is the level of risk 
of a lapse into violent conflict, or the extent of that violence once an outbreak has occurred.  
 
The polarising effect of violent conflict, or the threat of imminent violent conflict, implies that 
the values and operating principles that guide the various actors are more likely to be in 
conflict with each other in contexts where some of the international and local actors are 
hostile to one another. Violent conflicts tend to sharpen distinctions and to bring differences 
to the fore, also among those that are allies or that may agree otherwise on a broad range of 
issues.  
 
An important factor that may determine the scope for coherence thus concerns the extent to 
which violent conflict is part of the system’s characteristics. Situations like those in Somalia, 
Darfur, the Eastern DRC and Afghanistan where conflict is ongoing produce highly 
challenging coherence experiences. In comparison, in those situations where violent conflict 
has come to an end, and where there is a low likelihood of a relapse into violent conflict in the 
short to medium term, as in Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone, the scope for coherence is 
high, as demonstrated by the peacebuilding frameworks and related agreements achieved and 
the degree to which a broad range of peacebuilding agents are cooperating to implement these 
agreements.  
 
If the scope for coherence in situations where violent conflict is imminent, or where there has 
been an outbreak, is more limited than in situations where there is a low risk of violent 
conflict, this would mean that the degree of coherence that can be achieved in a given context 
cannot be expected to change independently from the degree to which the system dynamics 
are conducive to coherence. 
                                                 
20
 For more information on the mandate of the UN mission in the DRC see: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/resolutions.shtml 
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The situation in Southern Sudan in 2012 can serve as an example of how this finding can be 
applied to contemporary and future developments. After nearly a decade during which the 
peace process between (North) Sudan and South Sudan has generated slow but steady 
progress, and during which high levels of coherence have been achieved, the situation started 
to deteriorate seriously in 2011 after the independence of South Sudan was achieved. South 
Sudan’s first major test came in the heavy communal clashes that escalated from August 2011 
up to February 2012 in Jonglei State. During December 2011, an estimated 6,000-8,000 Lou 
Nuer men carried out attacks in Pibor County. Early in 2012, Murle youth retaliated by 
launching attacks on Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka areas. During this cycle, the UN reported 888 
people were killed, with hundreds more injured and over 170,000 displaced between late 
December 2011 and April 2012.
21
 If the finding that links the scope for coherence with the 
degree of tension and volatility in a given context is applied, a proportional shrinking of the 
space for coherence in the South Sudan context is likely to occur. The breakdown of 
coherence among the internal actors in South Sudan, and between the governments of Sudan 
and South Sudan, is likely to ripple outwards and negatively affect the scope for coherence 
between the internal/external agents, among the external agents, among those engaged in 
whole-of-government efforts and within the different agencies engaged in South Sudan.  
Tweaking the coherence models employed, or increasing the coherence effort, is unlikely to 
have any significant effect on the level or scope for coherence in the South Sudan 
peacebuilding system in the months following such highly levels of violence. The risk of 
relapse into violent conflict, and the actions that are taken by the internal and external actors 
to reduce the risk and to address the issues that have resulted in an increase in tension among 
the internal actors, will determine the scope for coherence.  
 
In other words, if a post-conflict period is relatively stable, the peacebuilding system is likely 
to be characterised as one with a high degree of coherence. However, if a given situation 
remains unstable with various factions competing for power and with a moderate to high 
degree of risk of violent conflict, or with ongoing low-level conflict between competing 
factions, then the scope for coherence between the internal and external actors, among the 
                                                 
21
 UNMISS, Incidents of inter-communal violence in Jonglei State, UNMISS Report, June 2012 Available at: 
http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=pY4XSdl8TT8%3D&tabid=4969&language=en-US   
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external actors, between government agencies and among different parts of the same agency, 
is likely to be reduced.   
 
This inter-linkage between the degree of volatility in the system and the scope for coherence 
may thus explain why trying different models of coherence and why intensifying coherence 
efforts have had little effect in highly volatile environments such as Afghanistan, Darfur and 
the eastern DRC (Paris & Sisk, 2009:62). In these contexts, attempts to increase the 
investment in coherence seem to have had little effect on the quality of the interactions among 
the agents and hence ultimately on the degree of coherence achieved. This may thus be one of 
the underlying reasons why, despite vigorous efforts, these actions have not resulted in 
generating a greater degree of coherence.  
 
It would seem that the local and international peacebuilding agents in those contexts that are 
termed more favourable may be more willing to enter into a longer-term cooperative approach 
because there have been sufficient momentum and progress to generate confidence in the 
process under way, and because their assessments indicate that there is low likelihood of a 
short- to medium-term relapse into violent conflict. As their level of confidence in a peaceful 
future grows, and as the likelihood of a relapse into violent conflict fades, both international 
and local peacebuilding agents become more confident in their own ability to prevail and have 
less to lose in cooperating with each other. Under such circumstances they are more likely to 
recognise their interdependence and the added value of investing some of their effort in 
pursuing common peacebuilding objectives. The more likely a successful outcome, the less 
concerned they are about their core values and principles being challenged, and the more 
likely they are to be pragmatic about dealing with the remaining challenges. In other words, 
the less volatile the context, the more confident agents are in their ability to cope with the 
situation, and the less worried they are about maintaining freedom of movement; they are 
more likely to recognise the value of their interdependence on one another and more willing 
to give up some of their freedom of movement for the sake of the benefits of cooperating in a 
larger community of actors. 
 
In contrast, the more volatile the context, the more likely agents are to value their 
independence because they feel better equipped to manage the uncertainty if they retain the 
maximum freedom of movement to make their own assessments and make decisions 
informed by their own values, principles and approaches. In contexts that are volatile, and 
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where there is still a likelihood of a lapse into conflict, local and international peacebuilding 
agents have much to lose and they are therefore likely to be more cautious about entering into 
relationships that may limit their ability to act independently. They are more likely to group 
around other like-minded agents and to seek stability and reassurance by sticking to safe and 
tested principles and approaches and by associating themselves with others who have similar 
belief systems and operational principles and approaches.  
 
The observation that context may be a more significant determining factor for coherence than 
the type of coherence model or the intensity of the effort to achieve coherence has important 
implications for coherence policy. It implies that investing more effort in achieving a degree 
of coherence that is unrealistic in certain contexts will be wasteful and that more attention 
needs to be invested in understanding what levels of coherence are realistic in a given context. 
It is also likely that different types of coherence-seeking tools will be more effective in 
different contexts. For instance, coherence mechanisms that are based on the recognition of 
the independence of the participating agents and that are limited in ambition to share 
information may have more success in volatile situations. 
 
On the basis of these observations, this dissertation argues that the correlation between 
coherence and effective peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been 
misinterpreted. The correlation does not imply that there is a causal relationship between 
coherence and effectiveness, but rather that the systems that have achieved relative stability, 
and that may thus be associated with effective peacebuilding, are also conducive to greater 
coherence.  
 
In the next subsection attention is focused on the last of the four factors that constrain 
coherence to be discussed in this chapter, namely the power imbalance between internal and 
external actors. 
 
4.5 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER IMBALANCE 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is broad recognition that externally-driven peacebuilding 
processes are unsustainable (Stewart & Knaus, 2011; Paris & Sisk, 2009). Whilst there are a 
those that argue that external actors should play no role in peacebuilding (Herbst, 2004; 
Luttwak, 1999; Weinstein, 2005), most developing and developed countries and most 
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commentators (e.g. Autessere, 2010; Berdal & Suhrke, 2012; Eriksen, 2009; Mac Ginty, 
2010; Menkhaus, 2009; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2006; Sending, 2011; Suhrke, 2011) favour 
peacebuilding systems that are informed and determined by local actors and contexts and 
supported by international expertise and resources (OECD, 2011a:12). From this perspective, 
local ownership means that peacebuilding activities should be needs-based and the priorities, 
sequencing and pace of delivery need to be informed by the choices and dynamics of the 
society that is going through transition, not by those providing assistance and support (OECD, 
2011b). 
 
The need to achieve an appropriate balance of power between the internal and external 
peacebuilding actors is now widely recognised, and the agreed partnership model is one 
where peacebuilding should be country-owned and country-led (OECD, 2011b). This model 
has been recognised, at least in high-level policy statements such as ‘the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States’ agreed to at the end of 2011 in Bhusan (OECD, 2011b), as one 
of the most important success factors for current and future peacebuilding interventions 
(Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009:73).  
 
Implementing the ‘New Deal’ and ensuring local ownership will not be easy. Thus far, 
achieving even a modest degree of local ownership has been one of the most difficult and 
elusive aspects of peacebuilding (Fukuyama, 2004:39). Wilén and Chapaux (2011:532) make 
the point that it has become common knowledge in peacebuilding practice “that all projects 
and processes need to be anchored and ideally initiated by local actors to ensure 
sustainability. Yet, despite this strong insistence on local participation, there are few 
successful examples that show how this works in practice”. Donais (2012) agrees: 
The empirical record of peacebuilding over the past two decades, however, suggests that while 
the principle of local ownership enjoys broad rhetorical acceptance it has proven inherently 
difficult to operationalize; modern peacebuilding operations, as a result have tended to more 
closely resemble externally driven exercises in statebuilding and social engineering than patient, 
elicitive processes of peace nurturing. (Donais, 2012:1) 
 
The following discussion is centred on why the power imbalance between local and 
international actors appears to be an inherently locked-in feature of peacebuilding and how 
this limits, inhibits and constrains coherence. Three aspects of the internal/external actor 
relationship are looked at in greater detail, namely local ownership, local context and local 
capabilities. 
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4.5.1 Local ownership 
 
Local ownership in this context refers to the principle that the future direction of a particular 
country should be in the hands of the people of that country, i.e. the transition should be 
country-led and country-owned. The future of a society should not be determined by external 
actors (Chesterman, Ignatief & Thakur, 2005:365). Donais (2012:1) argues that local ownership 
refer to: 
… the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes, in post-
conflict contexts, the notion conveys the commonsense wisdom that any peace process not 
embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2 and in the introduction to this section, this principle is now 
widely accepted as a guiding principle for peacebuilding; yet how it should be achieved, and 
what this implies for the ideal internal/external actor relationship is still hotly debated, 
amongst other things, in the debate over the liberal peace model.  
 
Berdal & Wennmann (2010:220) frames the ideal internal/external relationship as follows: 
“Conflict resolution and development in the aftermath of war is inherently a locally defined – 
yet internationally embedded – transformation process.” In other words, local actors need to 
make their own decisions, but they also have to recognise that their local system is embedded 
in a larger international system. This implies that there is a larger international culture with 
norms, structures and expected forms of behaviour that acts as a constraint and that will 
determine the parameters within which the local actors can make decisions about their future 
(Richmond, 2011:227). International law, such as the UN Charter, and international 
conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as a web of other 
agreements and arrangements, e.g. relating to trade, the environment and cooperation on 
international organised crime, create a network of international system governance 
arrangements that any one country would need to conform to if it wants to also benefit from 
being part of an interconnected international system.  
 
However, even if we acknowledge that being part of the international system places some 
limits or parameters on the range of choices that a state can make, states still have ample room 
to manoeuvre when it comes to deciding on the shape and future direction of their internal 
political, economic, security and social-cultural systems. Countries in transition have a unique 
opportunity to re-consider how they wish to structure their own systems. Most established 
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countries have made these choices at some point in the past and are now locked into a process 
of slow evolution and adaptation, but countries in transition have the opportunity to radically 
re-consider their own systems of governance. Naturally, such an opportunity is both exciting 
and dangerous, because whatever choices are made will have an enormous influence on the 
lives of the societies and people. Much is at stake, and therefore many internal and external 
stakeholders will try to influence the choices being made. 
 
The local ownership principle states that these choices should be made by the people who will 
have to live with the consequences (Mac Ginty, 2011:222).  
The central principle is the ownership and participation of communities. Change needs to be 
determined and controlled by the people themselves. Participation of affected peoples on all 
levels of intervention is the key element of restoring dignity and developing trust in 
transformation. (Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 2011:251)  
 
Whilst this principle is now widely accepted, including at the highest policy levels (OECD, 
2011b), so much is at stake that it has not been honoured in practice. As discussed in Chapter 
2, and as demonstrated in the recent interventions in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, the 
major powers in the West tend to impose a specific external state model, namely the liberal 
peace model, on countries in transition. As Oliver Richmond (2007) argues, “the ideas 
underlying the liberal peace – democratization, economic liberalization, neoliberal 
development, human rights, and the rule of law – have exerted a dominant influence over the 
ways in which contemporary peacebuilding is both conceptualized and practiced” (Richmond, 
2007:462).  
 
Although less comprehensively imposed, the same model is nevertheless also the template 
that is being used to inform UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions in countries in 
transition, such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
South Sudan, to mention a few current examples. The net effect of these interventions is that 
these countries are under sustained pressure from almost all the external and some internal 
peacebuilding agents to conform to the liberal peace ideology when making decisions about 
the future direction of their internal political, economic, security and social-cultural systems. 
In the liberal peace context, local ownership takes on a new meaning: “ownership exists when 
they do what we want them to do, but they do so voluntarily” (Donais, 2012:4). 
 
The local ownership principle is partly a normative position that makes claims as to who 
should rightfully have responsibility for the problem and the solution and therefore the 
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legitimacy to take decisions that would determine the future course of events (Duffield, 
2001:261).  And it is now, at least officially, recognised that the internal actors clearly own 
the problem and should therefore also have the right to own the solution. As they will have to 
live with the consequences, they should have the right to make the decisions that will 
determine their future (Call & Wyeth, 2008:380). As Richard Ponzio (2011:247) argues in the 
context of democratisation efforts: 
It is inappropriate for international peacebuilders to engineer electoral outcomes or even impose 
a specific voting system on a conflict country. The risks of subverting the development of a 
sustainable indigenous brand of democracy are too high – and if mistakes are made, they should 
be local mistakes as this is an inherent part of democratization. 
 
However, questions are raised as to who these local actors are that can rightfully claim to 
speak on behalf of the local people. As Donais (2012:9) points out: 
Taking seriously the question of which agents matter within the debate on ownership requires a 
recognition that in any post-conflict society, there is never a single coherent set of local owners, 
and that post-conflict spaces, almost by definition, are characterized far more by diversity and 
division than by unity. 
 
In the absence of an internationally recognised elected government – and such elections are 
typically only held three to five years into a transition – it is unclear which voices truly 
articulate the needs and preferences of the people, and there is thus much room for 
interpretation and manipulation during this period (Paris, 2011:162-164). Crucial decisions 
are being taken about the structure and policy direction of new institutions, such as the 
security forces and key ministries. In the absence of an elected government, most of these 
decisions are informed and influenced by those international actors that choose to engage in a 
given sector and project. These international actors will typically attempt to consult and elicit 
local input into these programmes and are aware of their own official policies that relate to 
local ownership, and they will typically be able to explain the steps they have taken to consult 
and otherwise ‘ensure’ that the decisions they have taken have been endorsed by the 
transitional government or otherwise have some claim to local legitimacy. 
  
Olsson and Jarstad (2011:89) argue that the local ownership debate can be understood in the 
light of two opposing notions of peacebuilding: “[O]ne based on the formation of a strong, 
central state like Thomas Hobbe’s Leviathan, and the other resting firmly on the power of the 
people like in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s volonté generale, General Will”. They argue that the 
first approach could be interpreted as seeking to strengthen state control over the population, 
while the second sets out to empower the population to control the state (Olsson & Jarstad, 
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2011:90). Whom the peacebuilders select as the main ‘local owner’ – the state or the people – 
thus has important implications for sustainable peace-building (Olsson & Jarstad, 2011:89).  
 
International peacebuilding agents seem to favour a Hobbesian statebuilding approach that is 
focused on institution building and governance (World Bank, 2011). However, the institutions 
that these efforts generate tend to look remarkably like mirror images of the template 
institution of either the international donor or of the international model (Pritchett & De 
Weijer, 2010:2). Again, the security forces are an obvious example because their 
organisational structure, ranks, uniforms, vehicles, etc. are such obvious symbols of the 
template model they mirror. The end result clearly demonstrates that the external actors had 
the most influence in the process as there is usually little to distinguish the institutions 
established in one fragile state from those in another, i.e. little to suggest that there has been 
any real local-ownership influence. The external actors have the resources and the expertise, 
and in the absence of strong internal actors with alternative policy options, it is only natural 
that the external actors will fill the vacuum and end up determining key features of the future 
direction of the country in transition.  
 
One of the reasons why local ownership is so elusive is thus that, despite the fact that the 
principle is in place and widely accepted, the choice of who the locals are who should take the 
lead during the transition period is made by the internationals, at least until the first 
internationally recognised elections have been held. At that point, however, so many aspects 
of the new state have already been decided on that the newly-elected government typically 
has no choice but to simply continue to implement the policies and continue to work with the 
institutions established under mostly external influence during the transition period. 
 
However, the local-ownership argument also has a functional dimension, namely that local 
ownership is a prerequisite for sustainability (Eriksen, 2009:663). Lederach (1997) argues 
that, for solutions to be sustainable they have to be home-grown and have to emerge out of 
locally-owned processes of reconciliation and social transformation. Regan (2010:159) 
stresses that “sustainable public sector reform does not occur unless there is a domestic 
demand for it…there will be little chance of sustainable reform…unless the local populations 
are committed to and taking a leading role in the design and implementation of reform.”  
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There are not many ‘natural laws’ in politics and peacebuilding, but the principle of local 
ownership comes as close to a ‘natural law’ as can be—we can confidently state that a system 
cannot be self-sustainable – function on its own without external support – if it is not locally 
owned. In other words, systems of governance that are externally imposed and with whom the 
local society and people fail to identify, will not be supported, maintained and utilised once 
the external influence is removed. “If a significant percentage of the citizenry perceives that 
their formal state provided justice and security system is foreign, incomprehensible, and 
contrary to their beliefs, cultural values, and expectations, there is little likelihood that the 
system can be legitimate, accessible or effective” (Scheye, 2010:270). As Donais (2012:12) 
warns: “Local ownership may be deferred, but it cannot ultimately be avoided.” 
 
This functional motivation for local ownership is powerful in explaining the fragility and 
weakness of states that have recently undergone, or are still undergoing, transition. These 
societies fail to identify with externally imposed liberal peace institutions and instead 
informally govern themselves by using their own resilient forms of social organisation, such 
as traditional kinship systems and traditional forms of justice. In many of these cases, hybrid 
forms of governance have emerged, where the informal social practice and formal state 
models of governance co-exist (Mac Ginty, 2011:217).  
 
Those who believe in the need for strong formal central state institutions as a pre-requisite for 
strong states frame these hybrid models as fragile and weak (World Bank, 2011; OECD, 
2011a). In fact, what is weak and fragile is the prevalent peacebuilding and statebuilding 
models that fail to recognise and discount the functional reality of the local ownership 
principle and continue to impose external state and institutional models on societies, despite 
that fact that this model clearly is not working and despite the fact that these societies are 
clearly demonstrating their rejection of this approach to peacebuilding.   
 
One of reasons why the external actors continue to persist with this top-down approach could 
be that they have become locked into a specific type of state-building model (OECD, 
2008:13). They choose to focus on the administrative functions and structural dimensions of 
the institutions, and they have become blind to considerations of how these institutions come 
into being and what their relations are to the society in which they are embedded. In other 
words, in the state-building approach, the virtue of the institutions are taken as given – as 
fully formed, either because they existed before or because they fit the liberal peace model, 
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and the focus is on making them as administratively effective and efficient as possible. It is 
assumed that they will best serve the interests of the people. There is no room for questioning 
whether they should exist in the first place or whether there are alternative ways in which 
similar needs can be addressed in the local context. For instance, the virtue of the template 
modern police force is seldom questioned. There is rarely room for questioning whether the 
needs of the people for what the internationals would refer to as ‘rule of law’ and ‘law 
enforcement’ can be better satisfied in other homegrown ways. And yet, in many countries, it 
is well known that the official police force is highly corrupt or in other ways experienced as 
predatory and that local communities instead turn to alternative means of ensuring community 
safety and security (Andvig, 2010). In these context, further investing in strengthening the 
capacity of the official police force may actually undermine security, as perceived and 
experienced by local communities. 
 
Statebuilding is too often narrowly focused on the executive branch, and peacebuilding today 
is overly associated with security sector reform and rule of law (World Bank, 2011). These 
areas are popular because the international agencies view them as ‘technical’ and thus value-
free, and reforming these institutions lend themselves easily to the kind of targeted 
peacebuilding interventions external actors are able to do (Tschirgi, Lund & Mancini, 
2010:409). The external actors are so comfortable with the liberal peace model that they fail 
to grasp that it represents their ideology, and they genuinely think that by imposing it on the 
local actors that they are simply giving the locals a value-free technical solution to their 
problems (Mac Ginty, 2006:3). External peacebuilding agents prefer to invest in building 
institutions instead of investing in the relationship between people and the institutions that are 
meant to serve them, because the former is something that has tangible short-term results that 
meet their requirement for results-based reporting, whilst the latter is long-term, vague and 
complex. As Charles Call points out, “Strategic peacebuilding by international actors requires 
recognition that the state is not a neutral ground for technical programmes, but a central locus 
of social conflict.” (Call & Wyeth, 2008:385). 
 
The alienation between these state institutions, the elected government and the society at large 
is further accentuated by these institutions being accountable to their foreign backers, rather 
than to the politicians and societies they are meant to serve (Sending, 2009). These 
institutions are designed, financed and implemented by external agents, and they are 
dependent on the external donors for their continued survival. They are typically too big and 
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costly to be supported by the normal state budget, and they thus remain dependent on external 
funding well beyond the transitional phase. As the external actors remain engaged through 
funding, they will also want to remain engaged in managing those funds and in deciding how 
the funds are used. They will typically have staff or consultants working in these institutions. 
Those internal actors running these institutions, to the degree that they can be said to be in 
charge of and responsible for managing these externally funded and guided institutions, know 
that for these institutions to survive they need to be accountable to the external agents. In 
other words, they need to follow the direction of the external advisors and give attention to 
what they regard as important priorities, even if they personally may assess other aspects as 
more urgent or important to address. The degree to which they are accountable to their own 
governments and societies is limited, because their own political government and their own 
society are not critical in determining their budget or programme of work. The local actors in 
these institutions are not oblivious to the principles and theatre of local ownership, and they 
will, typically under pressure and advice from the external actors, engage in rituals of public 
consultation, engagement with civil society, reports to parliament, etc., but the reality on the 
ground is that the continued survival of their institutions is dependent on the continued 
support of the external actors. Thehe internal actors in these institutions understand very well 
that they need to: (a) continue to serve the needs of the external donor to continue to receive 
their patronage, and (b) that they need to continue to be fragile and weak to warrant the 
continued engagement of the external donors.  
 
It is these kinds of perverse effects – effects that demonstrate that the programmes generate 
the opposite effect to what was intended by generating and perpetuating fragility instead of 
building capacity for self-sustainable peace – that reveal how the prevalent liberal peace 
model creates inherent power imbalances between internal and external actors, which 
undermine and constrain the scope for internal/external coherence. As Donais (2012) points 
out: 
To the extent that liberal peacebuilding is in crisis, it is in many respects a crisis of local 
ownership, stemming from the failure to generate support, among both the elites and societies of 
war-torn states, for the key elements of the liberal peacebuilding agenda. (Donais, 2012:153) 
 
4.5.2 Local context and external legitimacy 
 
Local context means that peacebuilding needs to be informed by local, not international, 
needs, priorities and contexts (Baranyi, 2008:312). This, again, is an obvious principle that 
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few will challenge, but in reality it has proven very difficult to operationalise (Wilén & 
Chapaux, 2011:532). There are very few examples, if any, where this has actually been 
achieved. Two forces work against this principle: The first is that the local actors are in 
disarray, i.e. typically highly fragmented and poorly organised in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict, and their ability to articulate their needs and priorities remain weak for years 
thereafter. The second is that the external actors have a well-resourced and internationally 
legitimised system that thinks it is acting on local needs when, in fact, it is overtly influenced 
by its own interests, by previous experiences and by internationally-generated models and 
theories of change (Sending, 2009:6). 
 
The local-context notion is easy to grasp but is very difficult to operationalise because it takes 
time and effort to develop truly collaborative partnerships. Most international actors report 
that they are under pressure to achieve results within short timeframes, and so they end up 
surging ahead of their local counterparts by substituting or otherwise finding ways of coping 
with their inability to engage and collaborate with local actors. Of this, Hughes (2012:100-
102) states that:   
The overwhelming tendency of external actors to date has … been to contemplate local 
societies through a reductionist lens bereft of the rich, multilayered, dynamic interaction that 
makes up any social context…as such, the realities of the lives of ordinary people are often 
overlooked (Hughes, 2012:100-102) 
 
However, what they cannot freely admit is that they create a façade of local participation, 
when in reality their programmes are nearly undiluted by local input (Wilén & Chapaux, 
2011:536).  
 
Local leaders and officials are under similar pressures. They would like to have more 
influence on the kinds of programmes undertaken and the assistance offered, but, more 
importantly, they do not want to interrupt the flow of goods and assistance because that 
enables them to maintain their patronage (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). They are, therefore, happy 
to be co-opted into appearing to lead in the short term, because they  believe that they will be 
able to manipulate the outcome in the medium to longer term, regardless of the compromises 
they are forced to enter into for the sake of access, privilege and patronage in the short term 
(De Waal, 2009). As Gelot and Söderbaum (2011:86) remind us, “Having argued that the 
exclusion of the intervened upon has led to poor peace and security governance, we cannot 
simplistically assume that their inclusion will ensure the best outcome in all cases.” 
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Another consideration is that the true implications of taking local context into account may be 
difficult for the external system to accept (Chesterman, 2004b:257). Local needs and priorities 
may be different from what the international system is willing or able to provide. Promoting 
norms that have a high priority for the donor community, such as human rights and gender 
equality, may not be a priority for the local community. The international community may not 
have the technical expertise or systems to provide support for locally articulated priorities, 
such as small-scale animal husbandry, electrifying cities and towns, or supporting traditional 
forms of justice.  
 
At another level, local priorities may result in different timescales to those that the 
international community is comfortable with. For instance, local leaders may seek an upfront 
investment in capacity building prior to the implementation of various medium to long-term 
governance and development initiatives, so that these programmes can be managed by local 
managers, whilst the international community may be under pressure to launch such 
programmes earlier in the process. Local leaders may want to prioritise institutions that 
generate socio-economic rights first and may want to wait with institutions that generate and 
support political rights, but the international community may disagree with such a sequence. 
As Donais (2012:12) points out, “While locals may be viewed by outsiders as junior partners 
in the peacebuilding enterprise, domestic power structures retain considerable capacity to 
block, circumvent, and/or undermine the most carefully designed policy reforms.” 
 
Thus there are a number of inherent constraints, or differences in values and approaches 
between internal and external actors, that make it extremely difficult to ensure that 
peacebuilding is informed and guided by local context and needs. 
 
4.5.3 Local capacities and social capital 
 
Local capacities in this context implies the recognition that any society develops a range of 
coping mechanisms that will be shaped and formed by local context and which can be utilised 
to manage or support processes aimed at dealing with various social challenges (Berdal, 
2009:177). The challenge is in identifying and working with such local capacities without 
supporting or further entrenching the inequalities in the society that may have caused or 
contributed to the conflict (Regan, 2010:148). “Local values, traditions, and institutions tend 
to be dismissed in post-conflict settings as a cause of the conflict rather than as a potential 
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resource for peacebuilding, as a problem to be eliminated rather than a foundation to built 
upon” (Donais, 2012:5). 
 
Peacebuilding interventions usually under-value local capacities and tend replace them with 
external models. For instance, traditional compensation-and-reconciliation models of justice, 
may be replaced with a crime-and-penalty based justice system based on international 
standards by which fines are paid to the state or where criminals serve time in jail. However, 
it may take years to train and deploy the prosecutors, judges and defence lawyers necessary to 
run such a system, and in the meantime the community is faced with a situation in which the 
old system is discredited, whilst the new system is not yet operational. This is an example of 
the many ways in which the imposition of well-meaning external models tend to undermine 
or destroy the little capacity that exists in a society and replace it with a weak and 
dysfunctional new model (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:8). It is necessary to find new and 
innovative ways of working with existing social capacities and perhaps transforming those 
that are problematic from within, rather than replacing them outright with new untested 
systems that subsequently fail to provide an alternative service (Call & Wyeth, 2008:366). It 
has been pointed out earlier that peacebuilding agents seem to prefer to focus on what they 
perceive to be value-free technical and administrative aspects of peacebuilding. In this 
context, Bryn Hughes argues  for an engagement with the ‘political’: 
Effective and sustainable peace support operations do not come from imparting the ‘right’ 
institutions, mustering an ‘appropriate’ level of resources, or honing the technical and 
managerial skills of interveners and recipients alike. The key, rather, is that the thinking and 
practices of intervening actors stem from an engagement with the ‘political’… Importantly, 
‘political’ herein has a particular meaning: it does not denote the formal workings of 
government or the power struggles and personal preferences within or between organizations; 
rather, it refers to ‘the socio-cultural value system that determines which behavior, arguments, 
and actions are (deemed) legitimate… Resistance from indigenous elements is often because the 
programmes have ignored the cultural, ethical and social (the political, in other words). 
(Hughes, 2012:100-102) 
 
Statebuilding, especially in the rule of law and security contexts, thus tends to generate new 
or reformed central state capacities that tend to de-legitimise and sometimes even criminalise 
existing local social capacities in the form of traditional justice systems and local security 
arrangements, without ensuring that an adequate alternative is in place (Woodward, 
2011:317). The result is a net drop in overall capacity because the introduction of external 
models weaken the existing social capacity before offering a viable, credible and legitimate 
alternative. Capacity building should be informed by a recognition that local capacities have 
been shaped by local historic and socio-cultural contexts that make them uniquely suited to 
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the local context and thus locally legitimate (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009:73). “Truly 
fruitful engagements entail working with existing sources of power and legitimacy and the 
social orders they enable rather than dismissing them, with the underlying aim being to 
achieve the kind of positive change that is ‘socially generative’” (Hughes, 2012:100). New 
untested models need to earn local legitimacy before replacing existing local capacities.  
 
While it may be the case that the existing structures are weak and unsatisfactory, it should be 
recognised that they may provide some level of service that should not be disrupted until such 
time as a better alternative is in place. An alternative approach may be to develop new 
systems that complement and build on existing social systems (World Bank, 2011:18).  
One of the key challenges for contemporary peacebuilders who wish to take local ownership 
seriously is therefore to better understand the capacities that exist within war-torn spaces – 
including capacities for peacebuilding – as well as to better understand local perceptions of 
what peace means and how it might be achieved. (Donais, 2012:145) 
 
Where existing social practises are regarded as inappropriate, they can be encouraged to 
transform over time, but it is necessary to recognise that social systems cannot be changed 
overnight and that such change needs to occur at a pace acceptable to the local community for 
it to be legitimatised and sustainable.  
 
There are thus a number of factors that constrain the degree to which internal-external 
coherence can be achieved in any peacebuilding context. Despite the fact that both internal 
and external actors generally agree on the importance of local ownership, local context and 
local social capital, there seem to be inherent dynamics in peacebuilding systems that make it 
extremely difficult to achieve this. It would seem that, at its core, the internal/external 
peacebuilding relationship is inherently unequal, i.e. that external actors have a power 
advantage that is extremely difficult to discount. As a result, they seem unable to prevent 
themselves from using this power imbalance to impose their ideology – the liberal peace 
model – on their internal peacebuilding counterparts. The end result is often perverse, because 
it undermines the stated goal of peacebuilding, namely to pursue the stability and self-
sustainability of the local systems. This creates a culture of dependency that further feeds into 
the weakness and fragility of these local systems. The fundamental dilemma, as Charles Call 
has observed, is that our: 
…efforts to consolidate peace and to strengthen war-torn states are fraught with problems that 
leave war-torn countries vulnerable to weak institutions and to renewed or intensified conflict. 
Despite the potential to play a positive role, international actions more often tend toward the 
inadequate, misguided, or perverse… (Call & Wyeth, 2008:365) 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter some of the factors that limit, inhibit or constrain our ability to achieve 
coherence have been identified and considered. Four factors were discussed, namely the 
tension between long-term impact and short-term output; conflicting values, principles and 
mandates; the context-specific scope for coherence; and the power imbalance between local 
and international peacebuilding agents. 
 
It was argued that persistent evidence-based feedback from the operational and tactical levels 
suggest that many of the policy-level assumptions about coherence are flawed. Peacebuilding 
efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted tensions and inherent 
contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different 
peacebuilding agents.  
 
The tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as 
measured over the long term, and what is in the best interest of the individual agent as 
measured in the short-to-medium term consistently undermines coherence. It was pointed out 
that some peacebuilding agents have inherently contradictory values, principles and mandates 
and that these typically manifest in fundamentally different theories of change and result in 
disagreements with regard to, for instance, prioritisation and how to measure progress. The 
context within which peacebuilding unfolds, and especially the degree of volatility in the 
system, was shown to determine the scope for coherence. And lastly, it was also argued that 
there are fundamental and inherent tensions in peacebuilding systems as a result of the 
inherent power imbalance between the external and the internal agents.  
 
Based on these observations, the conclusion is that there are inherent limits and constraints 
regarding the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding context. The 
exact limits are context specific and have to be transacted on a case-by-case basis. But not 
recognising and addressing the fact that these limits exist by, for instance, blindly pursuing an 
idealised or maximum level of coherence regardless of context is likely to result in such 
efforts ultimately generating perverse effects. 
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The overall finding this chapter is that, whilst pursuing coherence is an integral part of 
peacebuilding, the commonly held causal assumption that more coherence will automatically 
result in more efficient and thus more sustainable peacebuilding operations is flawed. There 
seems to be a threshold beyond which, at first, pursuing more coherence seems to yield little 
additional benefit and, beyond that, pursuing even more coherence starts to have perverse 
effects.  
 
The commonly held assumption in policy circles that coherence can be improved by 
manipulating the coherence model and/or by increasing the intensity of the effort ignores the 
very important influence that the context has on the potential scope for coherence. The four 
factors that limit or constrain coherence discussed in this chapter are examples of the kind of 
factors that have to be taken into account when considering what an appropriate level of 
coherence may be in any given peacebuilding system. 
 
On the basis of these findings it is argued that the correlation between coherence and effective 
peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been misinterpreted. The correlation 
does not imply that there is a causal relationship between coherence, effectiveness and 
sustainability, but rather that the systems that have achieved greater levels of peace 
consolidation and that we may thus associate with effective and sustainable peacebuilding are 
at the same time also conducive to greater coherence.  
 
Having analysed these four factors, it can be concluded that there are inherent dynamics in 
peacebuilding systems that limit, inhibit and constrain the degree of coherence that can be 
achieved in peacebuilding systems. These constraints are not sufficiently recognised and 
discounted at the policy level (De Coning & Friis, 2011:20). The result is that the policy 
debate is setting itself overly-ambitious targets for coherence that are impossible to achieve in 
reality. A more realistic understanding of the limitations of coherence and the inherent 
contradictions in the system will allow the international community to adopt a more sober 
approach to coherence and to set itself more humble goals (Paris & Sisk, 2009:64).  
 
Considering the degree to which coherence is attainable in a given context and adjusting 
expectations and models accordingly should result in more efficient operations, and such an 
approach should also generate greater sensitivity to potential unintended consequences and 
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the negative and perverse consequences of pursuing coherence beyond its limits (De Coning 
& Friis, 2011:21).  
 
In the chapters that follow, the focus is on Complexity and the potential role it could play in 
improving our understanding of the dynamics of peacebuilding systems. While Complexity is 
introduced in Chapter 5, its characteristics are applied to the peacebuilding context in 
Chapters 6 and 7 with a view to generate new perspectives and insights that can further assist 
in improving our understanding of the coherence dilemma. 
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PART II: PEACEBUILDING AND COMPLEXITY 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPLEXITY 
 
 
I believe we are at an important turning point in the history of science. We have come to the 
end of the road paved by Galileo and Newton, which presented us with an image of a time-
reversible, deterministic universe. We now see the erosion of determinism and the emergence 
of a new formulation of the laws of physics. (Prigogine, 1996:viii) 
 
Complexity … has radically changed the way we think about science and society, with special 
reference to notions like fundamental truth, objective knowledge, reductionism and causality. 
None of these notions have been dismissed, but the perspective from Complexity has 
necessitated a re-evaluation of their role and status. (Cilliers, 2007:15) 
 
… modern metaphysical knowledge assigns to Reason the task of providing certainty, 
complexity-based, postmodern knowledge (in a strict Foucauldian sense) tasks Reason with 
the role of enabling humans to cope with uncertainty and the fundamental element of 
randomness that is inherent in nature. (Popolo, 2011:210) 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the utility of using Complexity studies to gain insight 
into the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding. In Part I of the dissertation, peacebuilding, 
coherence and the factors that constrain coherence were introduced and discussed. In Part II, 
Complexity will be introduced, the question whether peacebuilding is complex will be 
considered, and the implications of insights from Complexity studies for peacebuilding will 
be explored. The expectation is that in the process of considering peacebuilding from a 
complex systems perspective new insights will be generated with regard to how we 
understand notions like problem solving, social change, efficiency, effectiveness, 
sustainability and coherence.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce Complexity. It lays the conceptual foundation for 
the use of a complex-systems approach in the remainder of the dissertation. Complexity will 
be introduced through exploring a number of its core concepts and characteristics. The 
chapter starts with a short tour of the origin and history of Complexity to place Complexity 
within the context of the broader scientific spectrum. Next, three of its key characteristics will 
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be considered, namely a whole-of-systems approach, non-linearity and self-organisation. In 
the process, concepts such as emergence, adaptation and feedback will be explored.   
 
In the second-to-last section, the implications of Complexity for epistemology will be 
considered, and in the last section the implications of Complexity will be applied to ethics. 
The discussion is summarised in the conclusion by assessing what can be learnt from 
Complexity about how complex social systems function. 
 
5.2 COMPLEXITY IN CONTEXT 
 
The well-known quote from Aristotle about the whole being more than the sum of the parts 
reminds us that philosophy and science have been interested in the formation and function of 
complex systems from the earliest recorded times (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1045a10). When 
Europe emerged from the Dark Ages, its science was dominated by an approach that favoured 
reductionist reasoning (Mitchell, 2009:ix). Complex systems were studied by learning as 
much as possible about the elements that constitute them and then combining what could be 
discerned about these individual elements. 
 
In the 1950s, Norbert Wiener and W. Ross Ashby developed a mathematical theory of the 
communication and control of systems through feedback, which they called Cybernetics 
(Wiener, 1948). Cybernetics introduced a radical shift away from the preoccupation with 
physics concepts like mass, energy and force, and introduced new concepts such as 
communication, information, control and feedback which drew on similarities between 
information and communication processes in living systems and machines (Mitchell, 
2009:296).  Cybernetics played a key role in elevating our understanding of information to 
“an ontological status equal to that of mass and energy – namely, as a third primitive 
component of reality” (Mitchell, 2009:169). It is thus not surprising that Cybernetics served 
as the precursor to much that was to follow in fields such as computing, robotics and 
information technology (Woermann, 2010:94).  
 
In a parallel development at more or less the same time a focus on systems as a subject 
worthy of scientific study gained new attention when Ludwig von Bertalanffy attempted to 
developed a general theory around those principles that are common to all systems. In 
General Systems Theory, Von Bertalanffy (1968) writes:  
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There exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or their subclasses, 
irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the 
relationships or "forces" between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems 
of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to systems in general.  
 
Cybernetics and General Systems Theory were largely concerned with gaining control over 
complexity, and this stimulated a side interest in trying to understand entropy, turbulence and 
volatility. In the 1970s, René Thom and E.C. Zeeman developed a branch of mathematics that 
they called Catastrophe Theory. It dealt with bifurcations (sudden shifts in behaviour) in 
dynamical systems arising from small changes in circumstances. This influenced the 
development of Chaos Theory in the 1980s, with contributions from, amongst others, Jules 
Henri Poincaré, David Ruelle, Edward Lorenz, Mitchell Feigenbaum, Steve Smale and James 
A. Yorke. The development of Chaos Theory significantly expanded our understanding of 
how it may be possible to scientifically study non-linear and dynamic phenomena. The non-
linear and dynamic properties of complex systems are discussed in detail below, but at this 
point we merely make the point that, before Chaos Theory, the non-linear was by and large 
excluded from science. Chaos Theory opened up a way for integrating non-linearity into 
mainstream science, but, as is argued later in this chapter, it also challenges some of our most 
basic assumptions about our inherent ability to know, control and predict the world. 
 
A further critical contribution came from the biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela (1980) who introduced the notion of self-organisation. They argued that, because 
systems are organisationally closed, their ability to self-create or self-renew is due to the 
system’s capacity for self-production through feedback loops – a process which they called 
Autopoiesis (Woermann, 2010:98). The sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1990) transferred the 
concept of Autopoiesis to social systems and argued that social systems are autonomous and 
self-referential and that they use communication to reproduce and maintain themselves, 
including their specific, and thus self-aware, system/environment distinction (Woermann, 
2009:99). The significance of closed vs. open systems, and of self-organisation is discussed in 
the following sections, but for the moment the development of Complexity is explained by 
showing how one insight led to another and how Complexity is the product of a wide range of 
influences and disciplines. 
 
Complexity thus emerged from the interaction of several scientific disciplines, and this cross-
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disciplinary nature has remained one of its core strengths and comparative advantages.  What 
we regard today as Complexity studies is a conceptual framework that has emerged from the 
interaction between these developments in Cybernetics, General Systems Theory, Chaos 
Theory and Autopoiesis. These insights have been synthesised by, amongst others, Ilya 
Prigogine (mathematics), John H. Holland (psychology), Harold Morowitz (physics) and Paul 
Cilliers (philosophy). Paul Cilliers (2007:3) argues that one can probably trace the origin of 
the early 21
st
 century interest in Complexity to the publication of two popular works on the 
subject, namely: Lewin’s Complexity: Life on the Edge of Chaos (1992/2000) and Waldrop’s 
Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (1992). These books 
reflect the degree to which insights from a diverse set of disciplines have been synthesised 
into a new consensus on what constitutes the core characteristics of Complexity by the early 
1990s. Melanie Mitchell (2009:4) summarises this broad consensus when she describes the 
study of complex systems as  
… an interdisciplinary field of research that seeks to explain how large numbers of relatively 
simple entities organize themselves, without the benefit of any central controller, into a 
collective whole that creates patterns, uses information, and, in some cases evolves and learns. 
 
Complexity’s influence on the social sciences started to have an effect in the mid- to late 20th 
century in a range of disciplines and was, at first, mostly evident in sociology, psychology 
and the management sciences (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Luhman, 1995; Mayntz, 1997). Many of 
the core insights about information, cognition and complex organisational dynamics that 
originated in the physical sciences have proven relevant and transferable to the social sciences 
and have subsequently been further refined and developed in the social science context (e.g. 
Cilliers, 1998; Chapman 2002). Apart from those that consciously made use of the theories 
and concepts of Complexity and complex systems, many others have been influenced by 
some of the premises and insights derived from the study of Complexity. These influences 
can be traced, amongst others, by the influence throughout the social sciences of many of the 
key concepts of Complexity such as feedback, bifurcations and emergence. In some instances, 
these concepts played a role in the co-development of major new schools of thought such as 
postmodernism (Cilliers, 1998).  
 
The use of Complexity in International Relations (e.g. Harrison, 2006; Kavalski, 2007; Geyer 
& Rihani, 2010; Popolo, 2011) and Political Science (e.g. Axelrod, 1984 & 1997; Jervis, 
1997; Innes & Booher, 2010) has increased considerably over the last few years. There is now 
a growing interest in further exploring the implications of Complexity for Political Science 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
and International Relations. Complexity is also increasingly being applied to related fields 
such as Development Studies (e.g. Jones, 2008; Rihani, 2002; Ramalingam & Jones, 2008) 
and International Conflict Management (e.g. Hendrick, 2009; Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 
2011).
22
  
 
Based on the author’s own research experience, and as reflected in this dissertation’s 
bibliography, the size of the Complexity literature relevant to International Relations, 
Development Studies and Conflict Management, has probably doubled over the past five 
years. In other words, a considerable amount of the International Relations, Development and 
Conflict Management-related Complexity literature cited in this dissertation was published 
while this study was being undertaken. The application of Complexity to the fields of 
International Relations, Development Studies and Conflict Management is thus a relatively 
new but fast-growing development. The author has established contact with two researchers 
who are pursuing doctoral research using Complexity in the peacekeeping context: Charles 
Hunt at the University of Queensland and Andrea Strimling Yodsampa (2011) at the Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government.  
 
After two centuries of growing specialisation and isolation among the different academic 
disciplines, Complexity has emerged as one of the fastest growing new conceptual 
frameworks, in part because of the way it was founded in and has encouraged cross-
disciplinary and integrating theoretical approaches. It has managed to generate a broad 
framework of characteristics of complex systems that is applicable to all complex systems 
regardless of whether they are physical, biological, ecological, neurological, cybernetic or 
social.  
 
At the same time, it has generated highly specialised insights into specific types of complex 
systems, for instance, social (Luhman, 1995) and political (Jervis, 1997) systems. The study 
of Complexity has also uncovered important nuances among different types of complex 
systems (Chapman, 2002:29) and different approaches to the study of Complexity 
(Woermann, 2009:100). Some of these differences that are relevant to the current study will 
be highlighted towards the end of this chapter, but Complexity will first be introduced in 
more detail. 
                                                 
22
 See also, for instance, the special issue of the journal Emergence: Complexity & Organization, on ‘Chaos, 
Complexity & Conflict’, 10(4), 2008.  
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Paul Cilliers (1998:3-5) describes Complexity as a system that has the following 
characteristics: 
 It consists of a large number of elements. 
 These elements interact based on the information available to them locally (none of 
the elements are able to comprehend the complexity of the system as a whole). 
 At least some of the elements also interact with the environment (it is an open 
system). 
 The interactions are rich, non-linear, dynamic and they feed back on each other 
(recurrence). 
 The conditions under which such a system operates are far from equilibrium, i.e. the 
elements are under sustained pressure. 
 The combined result causes such a system to spontaneously organise itself, maintain 
itself, and adapt (there is no external, controlling agent). 
 Over time, this process develops a history, i.e. complex systems evolve over time and 
the past is co-responsible for the present behaviour of the system, i.e. a complex 
system cannot be understood as a snapshot of the present, without also taking its 
evolving history into account. 
 
A number of other thinkers engaged in the study of Complexity have identified similar 
characteristics, and some have added additional attributes (e.g. Mitleton-Kelly, 2003;
23 
Clemens, 2001;
24
 Ramalingam & Jones, 2008
25
). When comparing these different sets of 
characteristics, it is clear that there is great degree of convergence among Complexity thinkers 
about the core characteristics that constitute complex systems. In this introduction to complex 
systems three of these core characteristics, namely a whole-of-systems approach, non-
linearity and self-organisation, will be discussed. In the process, a number of related concepts 
that form the basis of our understanding of Complexity, including emergence, adaptation and 
feedback will also be explored.  
                                                 
23
 Self-organisation, emergence, connectivity, interdependence, feedback, far from equilibrium, space of 
possibilities, co-evolution, historicity and  time- and path-dependence. 
24
 Fitness, co-evolution, emergence, agent-based systems, self-organisation, self-organised criticality, 
punctuated equilibrium and fitness landscapes. 
25
 Interconnectedness and interdependence, feedback processes, emergence, non-linearity, sensitivity to initial 
conditions, trajectory in phase space, relevance of chaos and the edge of chaos, adaptive agents, self-organisation 
and co-evolution. 
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5.3 A WHOLE-OF-SYSTEMS APPROACH 
 
The concept of Complexity is embedded in a whole-of-systems approach. A system can be 
defined in a very general sense as a collection of interacting elements that together produce, 
by virtue of their interactions, some form of system-wide behaviour (Mitchell, 2009:297). In 
other words, a system is a community of elements that, as a result of their interconnections, 
form a whole. In complex systems, the interaction is dynamic, i.e. a complex system changes 
with time (Cilliers, 1998:3-5).  
 
Complexity is not, however, interested as much in the agents as nodes in the system, as in the 
patterns of their interconnections and how that generates meaning or purpose in the system as 
a whole (Cilliers, 1998:120). In other words, Complexity is interested in how the elements 
interact and how this interaction develops into the system as a whole having new capacities 
that did not exist within the individual elements. Each element interacts with at least one other 
element, and in complex systems these interactions cumulate in a non-linear fashion—they 
show asymmetrical properties where the effect of the interactions is not directly proportional 
to the sum of the inputs.  
 
In complex systems, the whole has properties that cannot be found in the constituent elements 
or in the sum of their properties. In social systems, for instance, the society as a whole 
develops and maintains norms and identities that serve the common needs of the community. 
In some ways this results in suppressing some of the interests and needs of the individual and 
of special interest groups in the interest in the general wellbeing and survival of the society as 
a whole. Morin (2005) points out that not only is the whole more than its elements because 
new qualities or properties emerge due to the organisation of the elements in a whole, but the 
whole can also be less than the sum of its parts because “a certain number of qualities and 
properties present in the parts can be inhibited by the organization as a whole” (Morin, 
2005:11). In other words, in a social and political context, for the sake of being part of the 
whole and the benefits derived from that cooperation, the parts may have to give up some of 
their individual potential, for example in the way that individuals or states give up some of 
their liberties/sovereignty for the sake of the social/international order.  
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It is in this context that Morin (2005:11) views the notion of systems to be critical, because “it 
is through the organization of the parts into a whole that emergent qualities appear and 
inhibited qualities disappear”. Cilliers (1998) explains that organising the parts into a whole is 
what gives the system meaning, i.e. the meaning of the whole emerges when the parts are no 
longer understood in their individual context, but rather together with others as patterns of 
activity: 
Meaning is determined by the dynamic relationships between the components of the system. 
In the same way, no node in a neural network has any significance by itself – this is the central 
implication of the notion of distributed representation. Significance is derived from the 
patterns of activity involving many units, patterns that result from a dynamic interaction 
between large numbers of weights. (Cilliers, 1998:46)  
 
The concepts ‘social’ and ‘society’ conjure up images of systems made up of people that 
share a common socio-cultural, national or civic bond. When studying people in the context 
of them being part of a society, as opposed to studying them as individuals, a different side of 
their being—including aspects related to their role in society as well as aspects related to the 
restrictions that conforming to the society places on them—is revealed. These are aspects of 
their being that could not be revealed by studying them in isolation. By studying the society 
as a whole made up by the patterns of activity of the individuals and the various networks and 
sub-systems – such as family, clan and tribe that develop out of these patterns – we reveal 
insights into the way individuals derive meaning from their roles in a community and how the 
interactions between these individual roles shape, sustain and transform both the society as a 
whole and the individuals that make up that society. These are insights that could never be 
identified by studying only the individual. 
 
Cilliers’ argument is that, in order to understand distributed representation it is necessary to 
look beyond the obvious roles that certain elements may appear to play and to focus on the 
patterns of activity of the system as a whole. Distributed representation refers to the 
phenomenon that in complex systems the intelligence and decision-making capabilities of a 
system is not concentrated in one place; it is distributed throughout the whole system. There 
is no central governing or command and control centre, i.e. no central processing unit with a 
set of pre-determined rules through which all analysis and decision-making flows. In a 
complex system each element makes its own decisions. Each element analyses its situation 
and acts accordingly. However, these elements are also interdependent. By being dependent 
on each other, their decisions are influenced by each other and their environment. The overall 
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effect of the decision taken by each element, as a result of the interaction among them, results 
in the system as a whole adopting behaviour that cannot be explained by merely analysing the 
behaviour of the individual elements. This behaviour is discussed in greater detail below in 
the context of emergence and self-organisation, but the point here is that distributed 
representation refers to this phenomenon in complex systems where decision making is 
distributed throughout the system.  When applying this insight to social systems, one needs to, 
for instance, look beyond the role certain ‘leading’ individuals play in order to understand 
how a society is self-organising. When the focus is only on individuals of prominence, e.g. a 
chief in tribal societies or a president in contemporary liberal democracies, our analysis is 
unlikely to reveal how societies are self-organised. Instead, one needs to focus on the patterns 
of organisation and how these are distributed to grasp how the society as a whole, including 
the ‘leading’ individuals, is part of the larger process of self-organisation.   
 
A complex-systems approach is thus not interested in the elements that constitute a system 
per se, but in the interdependent relationships among the elements that make up the system, 
and how they are organised to form a system or a whole. Morin (2005:11) says that a system 
is a “relation between parts that can be very different from one another and that constitute a 
whole at the same time organized, organizing and organizer.” For Morin, ‘organized’ refers to 
a specific type of system, where the parts are organised in such a way that their interactions 
gives rise to Complexity. ‘Organising’ refers to the way in which the interactions among the 
parts gives rise to new patterns of organisation, a phenomenon dubbed ‘emergence’ 
(discussed below). ‘Organiser’ refers to a type of system that is self-organising, self-
maintaining and self-perpetuating. Note how Morin emphasises the linkages and connections 
between the concepts of system, emergence and self-organisation. Each reflects a facet of 
Complexity, but none is sufficient to explain Complexity on its own. It is only when they are 
understood together, as part of the dynamic tension that generates and maintains Complexity, 
that we gain insight into the function that each contributes separately.  
 
What is the value of a systems approach in the peacebuilding context? Robert Jervis 
(1997:26) argues that “despite the familiarity of the idea that social action forms and takes 
place within a system, scholars and statesmen as well as the general public are prone to think 
in non-systemic terms.” He makes the point that this is “because the interactive, strategic, and 
contingent nature of systems limits the extent to which complete and deterministic theories 
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are possible” (26). Jervis makes the point that it is necessary to take more seriously the 
notion:  
 
. . .  that we are in a system and to look for the dynamics that drive them. Very little in social 
and political life makes sense except in the light of systemic processes. Exploring them gives 
us new possibilities for understanding and effective action.  
 
Jervis thus argues that a systems approach helps us to understand how things are interrelated 
and how they form part of, and are mutually influenced by, being part of a larger whole. And 
he argues that this insight will aid us in our understanding of the behaviour of social systems, 
including peacebuilding systems.  
 
In moving from the individual to the community and society, we come across organisation. 
Complex systems cannot do without hierarchy and structure, but in complex systems 
hierarchy is not hard-wired or externally determined and controlled; the hierarchy of a 
complex system is emergent and self-organised and thus changes with the system as it adapts 
and evolves in response to its environment  (Cilliers, 2001:143). The vitality of the system 
depends on its ability to transform itself, including its structure and hierarchy (ibid.). 
Hierarchy thus is a typical characteristic of complex adaptive systems, but in complex 
systems hierarchies themselves exhibit complex adaptive characteristics (Chapman, 2002:30). 
 
An important feature of hierarchy in complex systems is that different systems interpenetrate 
each other (Cilliers, 1998:120). An element, or network of elements and their hierarchies may 
thus form part of more than one system simultaneously. A person can be a member of a 
religious community, belong to an ethnic group and be a citizen of a state simultaneously. 
Cross-connections between hierarchies are not accidental but vital to the adaptability of the 
systems involved. Such alternative routes of communication ensure that hierarchies that 
become obsolete can be bypassed (Cilliers, 2001:143). They create robustness and resilience 
in the system. Alternative hierarchies may remain dormant until a specific context makes 
them vital to the survival or effectiveness of the systems involved.  
 
This is an important insight from Complexity that will be returned to later, because 
organisations, and especially their managers, tend not to see themselves and their hierarchies 
as temporary and dispensable. In fact, they tend to view cross-connections as obstacles to 
efficiency and not as investments in the robustness and resilience of their organisations. They 
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fail to realise that the alternative communication routes that these cross connections represent 
provide them with vital information channels that will serve them well in times of crisis when 
important parts of their formal hierarchy may break down or become inefficient (Cilliers, 
2001:144). What is thus perceived as inefficient from one perspective may be viewed as 
critical for the sustained effectiveness of the system from another perspective. 
 
Another characteristic of hierarchy in complex systems is that it is scalable. This means that 
one can look at a complex system at different levels or from different perspectives and find 
the same patterns; one can look at how people organise themselves politically and see some of 
the same processes at work whether your scale is international, national, regional or local. 
One implication is that the insights gained on certain patterns of behaviour can be used at 
many different levels. For instance, insights from known complex social patterns, such as 
Game Theory, Critical Mass, Tipping Point, or the Dilemma of the Commons, can be applied 
in all social scales, regardless of whether we are, for instance, dealing with conflict at the 
family or international relations level (Poundstone, 1992; Schelling, 2006; Zartman & Touval, 
2010).  
 
The last aspect of a whole-of-systems approach that should be discussed is the role of 
boundaries and borders in complex systems. Complex systems are open systems and this 
implies that interactions take place across their boundaries (Cilliers, 2002:81). These 
interactions take place with other systems and the environment, i.e. there is a flow of 
information and/or energy between the system and its environment through its boundaries. 
Systems consist of interrelated subsystems, and some boundaries can thus fall within larger 
systems or share borders with them (Chapman, 2002:30). Not all sub-systems are neighbours 
physically; some are virtually linked – in social systems agents far away from each other may 
link up via social media, for instance, and collaborate, coordinate and otherwise influence 
each other’s systems and in this way interpenetrate such systems. We have seen, for instance, 
how ideas and movements in one society influence another that may be physically far away, 
such as the student uprisings in the 1960s or the more recent contagion of the Arab Spring and 
the Occupy Wall Street movement.  
 
There has to be a difference between borders that separate sub-systems, and borders that 
separate the system from its external environment. Borders contain a system or a sub-system 
like the skin contains the body, but is, at the same time, porous and allows interaction with the 
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environment. All of these descriptions are helpful in some ways, but they can also be limiting 
if they lead us into the trap of thinking only of physical or biological borders such as those 
between countries or cells.  
 
Social systems provide for a much richer and more complex employment of the concept of 
borders and boundaries. The tendency is to think in biological terms when we think of 
systems as organisms, but Cilliers (2001:142) suggests that social systems should rather be 
thought of as systems that exist in virtual space. This makes it easier, for instance, to grasp 
how one sub-system can be part of more than one system and how the boundaries of such 
systems can interpenetrate each other. Social systems consist of people, and people are 
simultaneously part of several systems (family, language groups, professional groups, 
religious groups, political groups, etc.) and their participation in these various sub-systems 
creates inter-linkages and cross-flows between these systems. These interactions can be 
virtual, i.e. they are not necessarily directly in contact with one another, but people and the 
systems they are part of can be influenced by others far away because information about them 
is available in virtual spaces, e.g. in social media.  
 
Chapman (2002:29) distinguishes between natural or biological systems, engineered or 
designed systems and human-activity or social systems. While there are complex systems in 
all three areas, Chapman argues that it is problematic to assume that human-activity systems 
can be identified as clearly as engineered or natural systems. He argues that in human-activity 
systems the framing of the systems depends on the observer. He argues that so-called “hard 
systems” approaches assume that a system exists in the real word that can be discovered, 
designed or otherwise manipulated: 
In contrast, the soft systems approach assumes explicitly that systems exist only in the eyes of 
the beholder and are useful mental constructs for dialogue (29).  
 
Cilliers (2002:81) agrees that the border between the system and its environment is indistinct 
and framed by the observer, i.e. it is determined by the purpose of the description. However, 
he further argues that we are constrained in where the frame can be drawn by the function of 
the system (Cilliers, 2001:141). In other words, framing is not entirely a mental construct free 
from having to relate in an intelligible and verifiable way with perceived reality. 
 
These are important points to bear in mind when describing peacebuilding systems as either 
internal/local or external/international, as is done from time to time in this dissertation. There 
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will be times when it is useful for our purposes to apply such frames and times when it is not. 
It is therefore necessary to understand that these are not absolute boundaries or structures, but 
descriptive frames that are chosen, or not chosen, to be employed to serve a specific purpose. 
 
A system thus has to be ‘framed’ in a certain way, for instance, by making a distinction 
between internal and external peacebuilding agents, in order to get a clearer perspective but it 
is necessary to be aware that this kind of framing will also inevitably introduce distortions 
(Cilliers, 2001:138). We are constrained by the function of the system, i.e. we cannot impose 
a random or arbitrary frame; it has to relate to how the system functions for it to make sense.  
Such constraints thus help to provide a framework that enables descriptions to be built up 
around it (139).  
 
Cilliers (141) adds an important additional insight when he describes a boundary not only as a 
constraint but also as an interface between the system and the environment that participates in 
constituting the system. He argues that boundaries should not be seen in terms associated with 
physical borders only, for instance national borders that serve to keep citizens in and 
foreigners out. He uses the example of an eardrum (ibid.) to show how a border can also be 
the interface through which information is absorbed from the environment. And we can thus 
also choose to see national borders as an interface between two countries through which trade 
and cultural goods, information and ideas, can flow to and fro.  
 
The boundaries and borders of systems become even more complex when we consider that it 
is also possible that a particular sub-system could be part of more than one system, which, if 
so, suggests that different systems interpenetrate each other (Cilliers, 2001:142). For instance, 
the national staff working for the UN, or for international NGOs in a given peacebuilding 
context, are local from the perspective of the international staff, but from the perspective of 
the local authorities they may be seen to represent an international agenda.
26
 Depending on 
the perspective of the observer they thus represent both the local and the international. 
 
It is also possible that parts of the system, especially social systems, may exist in separate 
physical locations. For instance, in the peacebuilding context, a society that is being assisted 
                                                 
26
 This is especially the case for young women in societies that have a very conservative view of the role of 
women in society, and where working for an international organisation may harm their prospects of marriage in 
that they may be perceived as somehow corrupted as a result of their exposure to international norms and gender 
values.   
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to recover from conflict is typically not just located in the geography of the national borders 
associated with that nation state. Societies emerging out of conflict typically have large 
diaspora populations that are very influential in the peacebuilding process, both politically 
and economically. For instance, remittances usually make up an important proportion of 
people’s livelihood strategies. There are also cases where communities in diaspora have been 
important sources of funding for armed rebel groups in conflicts such as in Sri Lanka, the 
eastern DRC and in Rwanda.  
 
The point is that caution should be exercised when using spatial concepts––such as inside and 
outside—when thinking of boundaries and borders in the context of complex social systems. 
The concepts of boundaries and borders cannot be avoided completely when thinking in terms 
of systems, but we can recognise that using these concepts can be as misleading as they can 
be enlightening. It is thus necessary to be very cautious and self-critical when we employ 
boundaries and borders, and it also has to be understood that when boundaries and borders are 
employed in this dissertation the meaning will be contextual, i.e. it is done to make a specific 
point or to illustrate a certain perspective. In Complex systems, describing boundaries and 
borders should never be understood to imply universal or absolute system boundaries. 
 
Complexity thus builds on and is grounded in a whole-of-systems approach. However, it is 
concerned with a specific type of system, namely ‘complex’ systems, and to gain more 
understanding of that differentiation we turn to another set of important properties of 
Complexity, namely non-linearity and self-organisation. 
 
5.4 NON-LINEARITY 
 
In the previous section, a whole-of-systems perspective was introduced and it was explained 
that Complexity is interested in the patterns of interconnections among the elements, and how 
this dynamic interaction generates properties beyond those that exist in its constituent parts. 
In this section, the second characteristic of Complexity is introduced, namely that in complex 
systems the causal patterns of these interactions are non-linear—the outputs are not 
proportional to the inputs (Hendrick, 2009:6). 
 
Jervis (1997:12) argues that mathematical linearity involves two propositions, namely:  
(1) that the changes in a system’s outputs are proportional to changes in its inputs and thus, 
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(2) that the system’s outputs corresponding to the sum of two inputs are equal to the sum of 
the outputs arising from the individual inputs. He goes on to point out that we often intuitively 
expect linear relationships. For example, if a little foreign aid slightly increases economic 
growth, it is expected that more aid should produce greater growth. However, complex 
systems often display behaviour that cannot be understood by extrapolating from the units or 
their relations, and many of the results of actions are unintended (Jervis, 1997:6). “A systems 
approach shows how individual actors following simple and uncoordinated strategies can 
produce aggregate behaviour that is complex and ordered, although not necessarily 
predictable and stable” (Jervis, 1997:77). This is why we cannot predict how complex 
systems will behave beyond a very limited horizon, but we can usually explain some of the 
causal patterns that contributed to their behaviour with hindsight.  
 
Thus, an important characteristic of complex systems is that non-linear variables may have a 
disproportionate impact at one end of its range (Byrne, 1998:14). “Sometimes even a small 
amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns 
sets in, as is often the case for the role of catalysts. In other cases very little impact is felt until 
a critical mass is assembled” (Hendrick, 2009:6). Non-linearity thus refers to behaviours in 
which the relationships between variables in a system are dynamic and disproportionate 
(Kiehl, 1995).  
 
Non-linearity also helps to differentiate between systems that are complex and systems that 
are merely complicated. If a system appears highly complex but can be completely described 
and explained, i.e. known, from a cause-effect or linear perspective, we can think of it as a 
complicated system (Cilliers, 1998:viii). The International Space Station, for example, 
consists of so many parts and requires so many different technologies that no one person can 
understand it all. However, it is theoretically possible to fully explain how and why it works, 
by analysing and understanding the various constituent parts and by describing the causal 
relations between them and their environment, even if this may require several experts in 
different disciplines and a truckload of manuals (Cilliers, 1998; Westley, Patton & 
Zimmerman, 2007). 
 
Complicated systems are determined; i.e. if we have sufficient information and knowledge it 
would be possible to predict and control their behaviour (Hendrick, 2009:5). This is why it is 
possible to plan and execute according to plan, within acceptable risk parameters, a mission 
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that involves using a rocket that blasts off from earth to deliver a payload to a specific point in 
space, so that, for instance, the crew of the International Space Station can be rotated and their 
stores replenished. Such an operation requires a highly complicated planning process and the 
expertise of several scientific disciplines, but it is possible to undertake with a reasonable 
expectation of success, because the science of rocket propulsion and the movement of a body 
through space rely on linear causation, and we are thus able to calculate and predict their 
movements within acceptable limits. In complicated systems we are able to identify a linear 
causal chain, and this implies that when a specific problem arises it is possible to isolate and 
identify the problem and to resolve it. And once we have figured out how to solve this 
particular problem, we can do it over and over again, within a degree of error, which makes 
the whole process predictable and thus controllable. 
 
Complex systems, on the other hand, are dynamic and non-linear, which means that they do 
not follow a predictable causal chain or a linear cause-and-effect path (Cilliers, 2001:138). 
This is why it is not possible to plan and to execute according to plan a mission that involves 
the transformation of a complex social system, e.g. the peaceful transition from authoritarian 
rule to a neo-liberal democracy in post-Gaddafi Libya, in the same way that it is possible to 
plan a mission to the International Space Station. And if Libya were to become a peaceful 
country in a few years’ time, it would not be possible to replicate the specific processes 
followed in Libya in another setting with the expectation that it will generate the same results.  
 
In other words, in a non-linear system, even where we are able to connect the dots and trace 
the cause-and-effect path that generates a certain outcome with hindsight, this knowledge will 
not enable us to replicate that same outcome in future, because even if we were able to 
replicate the model the circumstances would be different and this will result in a distinctive 
set of reactions that will generate a new outcome in each setting where the model is applied. If 
we apply this insight to actual peacebuilding practice, we can see that it is vindicated by 
empirical research that has found that the same neo-liberal peacebuilding model has been 
applied to a range of different contexts over the last decade in countries as diverse as 
Afghanistan, the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Timor-Leste and the Sudan, with a different outcome in 
every case (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Suhrke & Berdal, 2012; Brock, Holm, Sørensen & Stohl, 
2012).   
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When we want to express a common-sense grasp of a complex phenomenon, we often 
jokingly say that “it is not rocket science”. However, if we compare complicated with 
complex phenomena, as we did above with missions to space and missions to build peace, we 
come to realise that whilst ‘rocket science’ is determined, and thus knowable and predictable, 
phenomena that are non-linear and dynamic are unpredictable, unknowable and 
uncontrollable, and thus, in fact, much more complex than ‘rocket science’.  
 
The first characteristic of non-linearity that was introduced was that the outputs it generates 
are not proportionate to its inputs, i.e. they are asymmetrical. The space station example 
above illustrates the second aspect of non-linearity, namely that non-linear systems do not 
follow a pre-determined and thus predictable cause-and-effect path. Nor can such a path, once 
traced in hindsight, be replicated to generate the same effect.  
 
A third aspect of non-linearity that sets complex systems apart from complicated ones are that 
they cannot be reduced to something simpler, like a set of laws or rules that can help us to 
predict the behaviour of the system. Cilliers (1998:4) explains that “a large system of linear 
elements can usually be collapsed into an equivalent system that is much smaller.” For 
example, the linear sequence ‘XYXYXYXYXY’ can be reduced to the formula ‘XYx5’. 
However, a non-linear sequence, e.g. ‘QWERTY’ cannot be similarly reduced. There is value 
in reducing information and making it more manageable. Reducing large linear data 
sequences, such as ‘XY x 5000’, for instance, saves space and enables us to process larger 
amounts of data. However, non-linear data sequences and non-linear system processes cannot 
be reduced to formulae or rules that can compress the amount of information necessary to 
manage them, or to make them otherwise predictable and controllable.  
 
One of the defining characteristics of Complexity is thus that a complex system cannot be 
compressed (Geyer & Rihani, 2010:37: Cilliers, 1998:10; Cilliers, 2001:138). In 
mathematical terms, this inability to be compressed can be demonstrated by a series of 
complex numbers that cannot be reduced to an algorithm that can predict the order in which 
the numbers will be generated (Morin, 2005:9). Chaitin (1975:49) defines computational 
Complexity as “algorithmic incompressibility” and describes it as follows: “[T]he complexity 
of a series is equal to the size of the minimal program necessary to produce that series.” 
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Thus far, three characteristics of non-linearity have been introduced, namely that it is not 
proportional, that it does not follow a pre-determinable cause-and-effect path that can assist us 
to predict or replicate its behaviour in future, and that it is not reducible to a formula or rule 
that can assist us to manage or control it. A fourth characteristic is that linear logic cannot be 
used to explain the behaviour of complex systems. Non-linearity generates outputs that are 
not necessarily proportional to the inputs; i.e. in complex systems it is possible for two inputs 
to generate an outcome that is larger, or smaller, than the sum of the two inputs together. For 
instance, in complex social systems we often talk of indirect or unintended consequences, for 
instance, one may organise a peacebuilding training course with the aim of imparting a skill, 
e.g. conflict management, but then it turns out that the most important benefit that the 
participants gain from the training is not necessarily the skill, but the team-building and social 
networking.  
 
Unintended consequences can also be negative. The law of diminishing returns holds, for 
instance, that one cannot continue to add inputs to a system and expect that there will 
automatically be a proportional growth in outputs. Economic and other social complex 
systems often reach a saturation point beyond which additional inputs may have no further 
benefits or where they may actually start having negative or perverse effects (Case & Fair, 
1999).
27
  
 
The African philosophy of Ubuntu is an example of this social complexity in that it holds that 
the individual can only have meaning in the context of a relationship to others and its 
embeddedness in a specific social system.
28
 The social system is made up of individuals and 
is represented in individuals, but studying only the individual will not reveal their social 
context, i.e. if you were to separate the individual from the social system and study them in 
isolation from the system you will fail to understand the essence of their value and meaning.  
 
Four characteristics of non-linearity in complex systems have now been introduced. As these 
four examples have demonstrated, our common-sense understanding of non-linearity is often 
closely associated with the concepts of disorder, chaos and randomness because we typically 
                                                 
27
 In this context, ‘perverse’ refers to effects that have the opposite outcome to what was intended. 
28
 Desmond Tutu explains that “Ubuntu says that I am human because you are human. If I undermine your 
humanity I dehumanize myself. You must do what you can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually 
undermined by resentment, anger, desire for vengeance. That’s why African jurisprudence is restorative rather 
than retributive.” (Gibson, 2002:543) 
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explain non-linearity as the opposite of the linear, the logical and the orderly. It is thus 
important to emphasise that in the context of Complexity non-linearity is not associated with 
disorder. In fact, non-linearity is an essential ingredient in the processes of emergence and 
self-organisation that generate order in complex systems. 
 
Non-linearity has been presented as the element that distinguishes a complex system from a 
linear-deterministic mechanical system. The latter is fully knowable, predictable and, 
therefore, controllable in principle. It, therefore, is also unable to do anything that is not pre-
programmed or designed if it is man-made system or new in the sense that we could not know 
of it in advance if it is a natural system. In contrast, the non-linearity in complex systems is 
what makes it possible for these systems to adapt and to evolve, i.e. to create something new 
that goes beyond what is pre-programmed in the parts that make up the system. Non-linearity 
is thus an essential part, in fact a pre-condition, for emergence, self-regulation and adaption in 
complex systems (Cilliers, 1998:120). 
 
This is why complex systems can be non-linear without being chaotic or random. Non-
linearity makes complex systems unpredictable at certain levels or scales, but this is not the 
same as being random. A system may appear predictable and stable on one scale, but 
unpredictably complex on another. For instance, we can predict the behaviour of our solar 
system on a timescale of years and decades, and this gives the system a feeling of permanency 
and stability. However, we know, at the same time, that our solar system has undergone, and 
will undergo, radical change on a timescale of hundreds and millions of years (OECD, 
2008:8). Similarly, we can predict the weather on a timescale of hours and days, but we 
cannot predict the weather on a timescale of months and years, except in broad comparative 
trends, such as monthly average rainfall or temperature, the change of seasons, etc. This does 
not make our weather or solar systems random, only difficult to predict beyond a certain 
scale. 
 
The same is true of our political and economic lives. Whilst no one would bargain, for 
instance, on the current political system in France operating unchanged far into the future, 
there is at the same time enough stability in the near to medium-term for us to make plans 
with a certain level of confidence that they are likely to be meaningful – partly also because 
we are confident that we will be able to adapt those plans when circumstances change. 
However, enough events have also been witnessed in our known history, for instance in 
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France over the last 500 years, and experienced in our own lifetimes, for instance by those 
who may have lived through or witnessed the radical changes in South Africa, to know that 
totally unpredictable and unexpected changes may occur in a relatively short period of time. 
Thus, whilst change is a constant reality, and whilst we know that change is inevitable in the 
long term, we are generally still able to cope with the rate of change in the short- to medium-
term range. 
 
A number of complex system characteristics help us to understand why we experience this 
relative bubble of stability around us in the midst of the larger changes that are continuously 
under way. This chapter will not go deeply into the individual psychology at work, other than 
to recognise that we, as humans, have obviously developed a specific cognitive capacity that 
enables us to cope with our environment. This includes our ability, on the one hand, to create 
a sense of meaning and an understanding of the present and the past, while as the same time 
having a capacity to adapt to changes in our environment. Instead, the focus here will be on 
the systemic or social tools we have developed to manage change. 
 
Lemke (2000:183) argues that our studies of societies reveal that, however apparently free 
and independent these systems are when viewed on the scale of the individuals that make up 
the societies, from a broader perspective the systems repeat the same larger-scale patterns and 
cycles. This is because individual behaviour is influenced and constrained by larger-scale 
entities such as the family, the community, the culture, the environment, etc. (Lemke). We 
adapt to other entities that:  
… impinge upon us, and they still to others, in ramifying chains of reaction that bind us 
together as communities, ecosystems, societies, cultures. As we all strive to adapt to one 
another, only some self-consistent collective patterns are possible for the whole swarm…. 
Order forms because there are only a few solutions to the problem of correlated motions, and 
when contrasted with an ideal of randomness in which all possible states of motion are equally 
likely, those few solutions stand out as ‘orderly’. (Lemke, 2000:182)  
 
An individual in a crowd can theoretically move in any direction, but if the crowd moves in a 
certain direction, for instance out of a stadium after a sporting event, then the movement of 
the individual in reality would be facilitated if (s)he moves in the same direction, and 
constrained if (s)he does not. Mitleton-Kelly (2003:20) argues that the combination of 
constraints and non-linear dynamics are the “basic mechanisms involved in the emergence” of 
self-organising systems behaviour. This was also the point Morin (2005:11) made earlier 
when he explained that a system is not just more than the sum of its parts, but it is also less 
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than its parts, because the system also requires its parts to abide by certain constraints. For 
instance, the social contract implies that individuals voluntarily limit some of their freedoms 
in order to gain some common goods from the social system. Or, internationally, nation-states 
have to limit some of their sovereignty if they wish to gain some benefits from the 
international system. 
 
Jervis (1997:7) explains that Complexity does not imply an absence of regularities. He argues 
that a crucial stabilising factor in complex systems is that structures are powerful, i.e. that the 
characteristics of the elements matter less than their place in the system. He argues that this is 
why different kinds of countries often behave similarly, “why the Cold War resembled the 
rivalry between Athens and Sparta”.  
 
One of the ways in which complex systems use constraints to maintain themselves within 
certain parameters is through the use of feedback mechanisms. When certain thresholds are 
crossed, positive or negative feedback is used to correct the system back to within the 
parameters. While complex systems may thus theoretically be capable of a huge variety or 
range of actions, their behaviour is typically constrained within a fairly limited range of 
options (OECD, 2008:7). While individuals may thus be theoretically free to choose any 
action, their behaviour is typically constrained to within a fairly limited range of options by 
influences such as what would be regarded as legal, moral and appropriate by an individual’s 
society, family and friends. When an individual acts outside of these parameters, feedback is 
applied through a range of social sanctions that, in most cases, serve to direct the individual 
back to within the social norm.   
 
According to a deterministic notion of nature, order is the natural state but is constantly 
eroded through entropy. In contrast, according to Complexity, highly dynamic and non-linear 
change is the natural state. Order is pursued, but never fully attained, through self-organised 
and emergent complex systems. Change is thus the natural state, only temporarily constrained 
by order.  
 
A useful metaphor in this context perhaps is that of a river that appears stable from a distance, 
but is in fact in constant motion. The path of the river appears stable, but it, in fact, changes 
continuously over time. Faster parts of the river carve out the embankments whilst sediments 
settle in slower parts of the river to form new river banks. From time to time the river may 
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flood, and sometimes the flooding may be so severe that the river radically changes course. If 
one were to film a portion of a river over a hundred years and then play it back in a few 
minutes the river would appear to be in a continuous snake-like motion. Thus, what appears 
orderly from one perspective is constantly in motion from another. In this example, the river, 
and the dynamics that determine its flow do not change, the only aspect that changes is the 
scale of our perception. 
 
There may even be rare high impact events such as an earthquake, or volcano, or meteorite 
strike that change the landscape drastically with a radical impact on the river, e.g. it may 
become a lake. Rihani (2002:87) calls such major changes ‘gateway events’. Taleb 
(2010:xxii) refers to them as ‘Black Swan’ events, and he ascribes three attributes to such 
events, namely that they are rare, their impact is extreme and they can only be explained and 
‘predicted’ retrospectively. He argues that “a small number of Black Swans explain almost 
everything in our world, from the success of ideas and religions, to the dynamics of historical 
events, to elements of our personal lives” (Taleb, 2010:xxii). In other words, history emerges 
in non-linear jumps, and the small routine adaptations – the changes brought about by the 
sedimentation of the river – pale in comparison with the high-impact events. Taleb (2010) 
argues that the implication is that day-to-day adaptations and slow evolutionary 
developments, in both our official and private lives, have much less impact on our history 
than a handful of these Black Swan events. He argues that the only way to cope with Black 
Swan events is to ensure that your systems are as resilient as possible to cope with change. 
Resilience, in this context, does not mean the ability to withstand change, but rather the 
capacity to absorb change. In other words, the more our systems are able to anticipate, absorb 
and adjust to change, the more resilient they would be to events that signal change, regardless 
of whether it is gradual or radical. 
 
The 2007-2012 global financial crisis is a good example of another non-linear phenomenon in 
complex systems. Systems can change suddenly and dramatically when they reach a certain 
tipping point (Schelling, 2006:101). Two common examples in nature is when water changes 
to steam at boiling point and into ice at freezing point. In both these examples water changes 
instantly from a liquid into a gas or a solid when it crosses a certain threshold. Whilst the 
influence on the system may be gradual, e.g. the water is slowly brought to boiling point, the 
shift from a liquid to a gas occurs suddenly when the tipping point is reached.  In the global 
financial crisis, the tipping point came when the United States housing bubble burst in 2007, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 133 
which resulted in a liquidity shortfall in the banking system and the collapse of a number of 
large interconnected global financial institutions. Jervis (1997:12) offers another example of a 
social tipping point when he says that “women may thrive in a profession only after there are 
enough of them so that they do not feel like strangers”. 
 
In this section, non-linearity has been introduced and four of its characteristics have been 
discussed, namely that it is not proportional; that it does not follow a pre-determined cause-
and-effect path that can assist in predicting or replicating its behaviour in future; that it is not 
reducible to a formula or rule that can assist to manage or control it; and linear logic cannot be 
used to explain the behaviour of complex systems. That non-linearity should not be confused 
with disorder or randomness was also emphasised; in fact, it was argued that non-linearity is 
an essential ingredient in the processes of emergence and self-organisation that generate order 
in complex systems. The influence of constraints and Black Swan events was also touched 
upon. At this point, the first two complex-systems characteristics were introduced, namely the 
whole-of-systems approach and non-linearity. Let us turn now to the third characteristic, 
namely self-organisation. 
 
5.5 SELF-ORGANISATION 
 
Self-organisation refers to the ability of a complex system to organise, regulate and maintain 
itself without needing an external or internal managing or controlling agent. The principle of 
self-organisation has been widely accepted in our understanding of ecosystems, evolution and 
the development of language, to list a few diverse examples of systems that demonstrate the 
ability to organise themselves without a controlling agent. Ecosystems emerge and function 
without an external designer and without someone controlling the system. Evolution has 
shaped the emergence and development of biological life on our planet without an external 
designer or controlling agent.  It can also be seen that language develops, is maintained, and 
continuously adjusts and develops without any one person, or even a group of persons, being 
in overall control of the process. 
 
However, many still find it difficult to apply the principle of self-organisation to social 
systems because most of the management and organisational models they have been exposed 
to are based on deep-seated ideas about hierarchal forms of order and control that are based 
on leadership, authority and power. The conventional wisdom is that it is great leaders and the 
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structures, hierarchies and bureaucracies that they developed have produced great 
civilizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, many studies characterise societies on the basis of 
the degree or complexity of their formal political organisation (Morris, 2011; Tainter, 1988).  
 
Although formal patterns of organisation have certainly played an important part in the 
development of all societies and the formation of states, we are only now starting to 
understand – as insights from Complexity are starting to have an impact on these studies – 
how self-organisation has underpinned the emergence, refinement and maintenance of 
complex societies and how, in some cases, breakdown of self-organisation has contributed to 
the collapse of societies and civilizations (Morris, 2011; Diamond, 2006; Tainter, 1988). 
Through insights from the study of Complexity we realize that leadership, structure, hierarchy 
and bureaucracy do not create social order in and of themselves. Instead, they emerge from 
the way a society is self-organising; they are shaped by the history of the system, and are 
employed as instruments to generate, maintain and reproduce these societies and civilizations.  
 
For Cilliers (1998:89), structure refers to the internal mechanisms developed by the system to 
“receive, encode, transform and store information on the one hand, and to react to such 
information by some form of output on the other”. Self-organisation implies that “internal 
structure can evolve without the intervention of an external designer or the presence of some 
centralised form of internal control” (ibid.). Self-organisation refers to the spontaneous 
emergence of organisation and structure in complex systems. 
 
Take for example the economy of any reasonably open economic system, which in our 
contemporary world excludes perhaps only North Korea and Iran. An economic system is a 
self-organising system in that it continuously responds to a large number of factors without 
requiring a controlling agent (Cilliers, 1998:90). The economy is often discussed as if it were 
an organism, but we need to think of it more as an ecosystem because it is not the economic 
system as a whole but rather the individuals and organisations that constitute the economic 
system that individually consider and respond to the factors that matter to them. It is the 
cumulative and collective effect of their actions that determines the overall behaviour and 
state of the system. The state of the economy in any given country or region depends on a 
large number of dynamic factors. As these conditions vary, the individuals and organisations 
in the system continuously adjust their actions so that they can reap the most benefit from the 
prevailing conditions. Each individual or organisation acts in its own self-interest, but 
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sometimes their actions can have significant implications for the system as a whole, 
especially when a series of individual actions aggregate into swarm behaviour, e.g. where the 
actions of some trigger behaviour by others that result in large swarm-like fluctuations in the 
system as a large number of individual agents respond similarly in what appears to be 
coordinated behaviour. For instance, a large number of people may start fleeing when a 
rumour spreads that an attacking force may be approaching.  Or a large number of investors 
may start flocking to a certain market or stock as rumours spread of its good prospects. 
 
There are also some economic agents that are trying to influence the system in what they 
perceive to be in the best interest of their sub-system or even the system as a whole. 
Governments, central banks, and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund 
or the World Bank may, from time to time, try to act in ways that they perceive to be in the 
interest of the world economy or the economy of a region or a specific country. However, 
their actions also only constitute another input into the system, and they do not have control 
over how the system responds to their inputs. We can thus not regard them as controlling 
agents. At best they are some of the more influential agents in the system.  
 
The organisation of the economic system as a whole thus comes about as a result of the 
interaction between the various agents that constitute the system and its environment (Cilliers, 
1998:90). There is no single agent or groups of agents that controls the economic system, but 
there are many agents that try to influence the behaviour of the system, and there are many 
more who simply respond to what they perceive to be the current state or future direction of 
the economy. The economy self-organises spontaneously, and this is an emergent process that 
comes about as a result of the cumulative and collective interaction of all the agents in the 
system.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, this process is non-linear and dynamic and thus cannot 
be predicted or controlled. So many causal reactions are happening simultaneously that no 
one agent or group of agents working together can control the system. The economy is a 
useful example, because it is a sub-system of the complex social system that is the main focus 
of this dissertation, and, as discussed earlier, complex systems are scalable and many of the 
general properties of complex systems, such as self-organisation will operate at many 
different levels.  
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Although a complex system like the economy is too complex to model deterministically 
(Cilliers, 1998:90), it is possible to influence it at various levels. As mentioned earlier, many 
organisations, like central banks, exist explicitly for the purpose of trying to influence the 
economy. Non-linear causality generates asymmetrical relations, which implies that relatively 
powerless agents can sometimes have a disproportionate effect on the system. For instance, 
the 9/11 attacks in New York was an example of how a small group of terrorists could 
successfully attack the most powerful nation on earth and alter the direction of international 
relations. Despite the military, political and economic superiority of the USA over al-Qaeda, 
the organisation nevertheless found a way of dramatically striking America at the heart of its 
economic power. However, the effects of any such interventions, regardless of the relative 
power of the agent, usually only influence the system in the short to medium term because the 
rest of the agents in the system will respond to any new developments, and these responses 
will impact on each other and result in further waves of reactions. The cumulative and 
collective effect of these responses will result in the system as a whole responding in 
unpredictable ways. Even the influence of the 9/11 attacks, whilst they had a significant 
impact in the immediate aftermath of the attack, has waned significantly one decade later.  
 
Power, in this context, refers perhaps to the relative ability to maintain a sustained influence 
on the system. In other words, if an agent is able to sustain interference with a system over 
many generations or iterations, and is thus in a position to continuously interfere with the 
system through inputs into the system’s process of adjustment and evolution, then the agent 
can be said to have an powerful influence on the system’s evolution.  The impact of once-off 
inputs, such as the 9/11 attacks, regardless of how big they were at the time of impact, will 
diminish over time, but a sustained engagement with a system increases the likelihood of 
exerting an influence on it. For instance, a central bank may persistently raise interest rates in 
order to curb inflation, and this may result in a more stable growth pattern than would 
otherwise be the case. However, it is important to note that sustained influence is not the same 
as having control over the system. It is merely an example of a more effective influence on, or 
intervention in, a system.  The point is thus that a complex system cannot be controlled by 
any single agent or group of agents. At best, such agents can exert an influence on a system, 
but, as the system is self-organising and will respond to any intervention in a non-linear way, 
no interference—neither a Black Swan high-impact event, nor a sustained intervention—can 
result in the control of the complex system. This is a key finding of Complexity, and it has 
significant implications for how we are to deal with self-organised complex systems, 
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including, as will be seen in the remainder of this dissertation, for how we are to deal with 
peacebuilding systems. 
 
Most people will probably by now accept that the global economy is self-organising, 
especially after the global financial crisis that started in 2007 clearly demonstrated that no one 
agent, including the central banks of the major economic powers, was able to control the 
global financial markets. The financial crisis also showed that even the most experienced and 
knowledgeable bankers and economists were not able to understand, let alone predict, the 
complexities at play in the global financial markets.  
 
However, very few people seem to be willing, as yet, to agree to the notion that our national 
political systems are equally self-organising, and that in the final instance no one entity, such 
as the government, or parliament, is in control of the political system of a given country.  
Perhaps most will argue that if the government is not in control there will be anarchy and 
chaos. However, when we say that our social systems, including sub-systems like the 
economy and our political system, are self-organising, we are not saying that these systems 
are chaotic or random. It is only in extreme cases that our political systems become chaotic, 
and this occurs when there is a collapse of self-organisation not because of it. For the most 
part political systems are relatively stable. In fact, it is surprising how volatile political 
systems can be without collapsing into chaos. Complexity’s insight is that this relative 
stability is not due to the institutions of the state in and of themselves. This relative stability, 
rather, is an emergent product of the ability of the society to organise and maintain itself, and 
the institutions of state are the instruments that have evolved over time through which this 
self-organising process works. Individual leaders come and go, and the institutions are 
continuously undergoing reform, but the political system as a whole remains relatively stable. 
The change in leadership and the reform of the institutions are the outward signs of how the 
society as a whole is continuously adapting and evolving, without the need for an external or 
overall controlling agent.  
 
In the case of the political system, the point is that the form of government that has emerged 
in any given society is a product of the self-organising processes at play in that society, and 
that the continuous development and evolution of the political system is driven by that self-
organising process. The political model is a product of, and subject to, the society’s ability to 
self-organise. Contrary to our common-sense assumption that it is the political model that is 
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organising our society, it is our society that is self-organising the political model and using it 
as a tool to organise our politics. If our common-sense perceptions were correct, then our 
stability would depend on the stability of the political model. However, as we can see from 
even the recent Arab Spring developments in North Africa and the Middle East, political 
models, like the dictatorships in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt may appear stable for decades, but 
they are actually temporary, especially when seen in context of a greater span of history. The 
Arab Spring has reminded us that when these temporary and abnormal models of imposed 
stability inevitably collapse, their demise results in great social upheaval.  
 
In comparison, those societies that have relatively open political models that allow for greater 
flexibility and that are able to adjust and evolve over time, may seem to be more ‘unstable’ in 
the short-term, for instance in that there is regular change in governments, but they experience 
greater relative stability over time. From the perspective of those with a tradition of one 
family or elite group remaining in power for an extended period of time, a democratic model 
may appear rather unstable, as there are frequent changes of government. However, from the 
perspective of the citizen, a democratic model is more stable in the long run in that it is more 
predictable. Predictability in this context does not imply that anyone can predict, with 
certainty, who will be in power after the next election, but they can predict, with relative 
certainty, that there will be an election and that the system as a whole will maintain enough 
stability to allow its members the confidence to enter into contracts with the expectation that 
those contracts will be honoured and that they will have recourse to a fair legal system if this 
is not the case. Predictability does not refer to the specific events, but to the behaviour of the 
system as a whole. And whilst the system as a whole is also changing, i.e. the way we 
conduct elections and the way we manage and judge contracts evolve over time, these 
changes occur at a scale and pace that allows individuals to have sufficient predictability in 
their lifetimes to consider their political system ‘stable’.  The insight from Complexity is that 
the relative predictability does not derive from the fixity of the political model but from its 
flexibility, for example, the democratic model is better able to cope with change and to adapt 
with minimal disruption to the body politic. The relative long-term stability and predictability 
of a developed democracy can thus be explained by its ability to constantly change and adapt 
without losing its overall form or identity.  The success of the democratic system thus lies 
partly in its ability to manage uncertainty, because it is process based, rather than being 
dependent on a specific individual, dynasty or elite oligarchy. The primacy and legitimacy of 
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the democratic process gives it the resilience and robustness to survive shocks, crises and 
sudden high-impact events. 
 
This is one of the reasons why invading empires, with the recent American experience in Iraq 
being the latest example, have found it so difficult to impose an externally-designed political 
model on an existing society (Stewart, 2006). Most empires found that they could not just 
replace the local organisational model with their own, because the indigenous model is deeply 
embedded in the history, worldview, belief system, culture and value system of the society in 
question. The political model is not just dependent on these roots within the social system for 
its credibility, but also for its continuous maintenance, adaptation and development. Foreign 
empires, from the Romans in Britain to the Mongols in China, and including the more recent 
colonial experiences and contemporary interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, all found that 
local political leaders and administrators do not control the political system as much as they 
operate within it, because the local political system is part of, and embedded in, the local 
socio-cultural worldview. The political leaders are themselves subject to complex social 
processes that influence the values and parameters of their behaviour. Thus, when empires co-
opt local political leaders to man their new political model, they typically find that what they 
have achieved is merely a surface-level compliance with a new model, whilst some form of 
the pre-existing political model survives to manage the real day-to-day lives of the people 
(Hohe, 2002). The self-organising system survives despite the imposition of the new surface-
level model, because it is deeply embedded in the socio-cultural norms and values of the 
society. It is not possible to replace these in a short period of time by merely exchanging an 
old political model with a new model, because it is not the political model that orders society. 
It is the self-organising society that generates and sustains its own political model (Hohe, 
2002). This insight from Complexity has significant implications for peacebuilding, which are 
explored in the next two chapters. 
 
The history of a system, meaning everything that has gone into shaping it into its present 
form, thus is critical to understanding complex systems. Two similar systems placed in 
identical conditions may respond in vastly different ways if they have different histories. 
Imagine how different our contemporary world would have been if, in the American Civil 
War, instead of one side being victorious over the other, a UN-like body interposed a 
peacekeeping force and supervised a ceasefire and peace agreement that resulted in the 
northern and southern states each forming their own independent countries. However, the 
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history of a system should also not be seen as determining its future in such a locked-in way 
that knowing its history can result in being able to predict its future direction. The ‘effects’ of 
the history of the system are important in that they place certain constraints on the future 
development of the system, but these effects are continuously being transformed through the 
self-organising processes in the system (Cilliers, 1998:108).  
 
Complexity comes about as a result of the competition for scarce resources in the system and 
in the environment, and it results in the system seeking to optimise its organisation so as to 
avoid wasting resources (Cilliers, 1998:80). Self-organised criticality refers to the natural 
tendency of complex systems to seek out a balance between continuity and change far from 
equilibrium, as that is the state in which it can optimally adapt and self-organise. Complex 
systems operate under conditions far from equilibrium, i.e. there is a constant flow of energy 
and/or information through the system that ensures that it is continuously changing in 
response to developments in its environment, while at the same time maintaining the core-
organisation of the system. Complex systems maintain, through self-regulation, a delicate 
balance between enough continuity to remain organised as a system and enough change to be 
able to adapt to changes within the system and its environment. The theory of self-organised 
criticality tells us that a self-organising system will seek a critical point between order and 
chaos, because such a point would be optimal for efficiency and flexibility, i.e. it will 
combine a relatively stable state with the freedom to change its state with the least amount of 
effort when necessary (Cilliers, 97).  
 
A key characteristic of complex systems in general, and self-organisation in particular, is that 
there is recurrence in the interactions among the agents involved—the effect of any activity 
can feed back onto itself through loops in the interactions (Cilliers, 1998:4). As explained 
above, systems consist of a number of elements that are self-organised as a whole. These 
elements organise themselves through their interactions with each other. Interactions usually 
have a fairly short range in that information is exchanged primarily with immediate 
neighbours, but this does not preclude their having wide-ranging influence (ibid.). Each 
element responds to the information it exchanges with the other elements with which it is in 
touch. The influence becomes modulated along its route and can be enhanced, suppressed or 
altered in a number of ways (ibid.). 
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Feedback, meaning conveying information about the outcome of any process or activity to its 
source (Capra, 1997:57), plays a critical role in the process of self-organisation. The flow of 
information through the system in the form of positive and negative feedback loops, among 
other things, assists in the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of the Complexity of 
the system. This feedback can be positive (enhancing) or negative (inhibiting) and both kinds 
of feedback are necessary (Cilliers, 1998:4). Negative feedback is self-correcting and plays a 
regulating role that, like a thermostat in a heating system, maintains the stability in the system 
(Hendrick, 2009:6; Schelling, 2006:81). Positive feedback is self-reinforcing, and has an 
amplifying effect (Meadows, 1999:11).  
 
It is generally believed, for instance, that the implementation of a peace agreement has a 
better chance of success if the people affected by the conflict experience peace dividends, i.e. 
if they can see tangible positive results in their lives as a result of the implementation of the 
peace agreement. The positive attitude people are likely to have to the peace process as a 
result of the peace dividends is an example of a positive feedback loop where success begets 
further success. Activities thus reflect back on themselves after a number of intermediary 
steps (Cilliers, 1998:6). In complex systems, small-scale perturbations can, as a result of 
positive feedback modulation, produce large-scale effects (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984:xvi).  
 
It may be useful to introduce the concept of regulating a system by way of negative and 
positive feedback processes by using the example of the process of homeostasis. Perhaps the 
example most people would be familiar with is the thermostat device used in heating or 
cooling systems in buildings. We typically decide on an ideal temperature for our building 
environment, e.g. 19 degrees Celsius. In the case of a heating system, the thermostat will send 
a signal to switch on the furnace when it detects that the temperature in the building has fallen 
below the minimum parameter, so that the heat can be increased. It sends a further signal to 
switch off the furnace when it detects that the temperature in the building exceeds the 
maximum parameter. It is important to note that systems that adapt on the basis of an 
externally-controlled homeostatic process are not complex. Nevertheless, the example is still 
useful because the thermostat demonstrates how one can regulate a system within certain 
parameters by making use of use a relatively simple feedback process. In this context, 
homeostasis refers to the ability of adaptive systems to maintain certain governing variables 
within defined limits (Schelling, 2006:83; Chapman, 2002:42). If any of the governing 
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variables in a system approaches or exceeds the set parameters, the system responds by 
devoting resources to returning that variable to within the limits.  
 
Chapman (2002:43) explains how the concept of homeostasis can be applied to the social 
policy context:  
Thus if all objectives were being satisfied and a new threat arose in regard to, say social 
objectives, then the policy process would correctly prioritise social objectives until such time 
as they were safely within the boundaries or limits regarded as acceptable. In short the 
prioritisation of policy objectives is entirely determined by context, which is why the process 
of policy-making, and much else in government, is driven by events (i.e. changes in context or 
environment). It should be noted that in policy issues, the perception that an objective is close 
to limit depends on the perspective adopted.  
 
Complex systems differ from an externally-controlled homeostasis process in that they are 
self-organising and thus do not have an external controlling agent that manages the 
organisational process or determines the parameters or variables within which the system can 
operate. Complex systems do not need central control because their organisation comes about 
as a result of the interaction between the components of the system (Cilliers, 1998:2). Each 
element in the system responds only to the information that is available to it. None of the 
elements, including any potential controlling agent, can have all the knowledge that the 
system has as a whole, because if they could they would have to be as complex as the system 
itself (Cilliers, 1998:5).  
 
Cilliers (1998:10) argues that, when managing a changing environment, two of the 
indispensable capabilities of a complex system are the ability to store information about the 
environment and the ability to adapt its structures, i.e. to self-organise. Complex systems thus 
need to have the capacity to recall or somehow embody their history, i.e. to have memory. 
Memory is not located at a specific place; however, it is distributed throughout the system 
(Cilliers, 2000c:24).  
 
Complex systems may appear stable or constant, but they are in fact continuously in motion. 
This is because complex systems have a history that co-determines, together with the process 
of emergent and adaptive self-organisation in the context of a changing external environment, 
the future direction of the system (Cilliers, 2000c:24). For example, the human body retains 
its identity as an individual throughout its lifetime, both in terms of its personality and its 
physical form, but in actual fact the cells that make up the body are ageing, dying and being 
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replaced on a continuous basis. The whole system is able to retain its history whilst the cells 
are dying and being replaced. However, it maintains enough history to remain recognisable, 
both to itself and to external observers, as a unique individual throughout its life-time. The 
human body is thus an example of how a complex system makes use of self-organisation to 
regulate, maintain and regenerate itself. It adapts and changes, but at the same time it 
maintains its own vital characteristics.  
 
Complex systems adapt to problems and find ways to cope with and overcome or substitute 
limitations and constraints in creative ways that are not pre-programmed in the design of the 
system. This is what sets self-organising systems apart from externally designed and 
controlled systems. If a machine develops a problem, it stops functioning as intended. A self-
organising system, in contrast, can either fix such a problem itself or find ways of bypassing 
the problem. For instance, when the Occupy Wall Street movement
29
 was prohibited from 
using loudspeakers or megaphones they developed an alternative system for allowing a 
speaker to address a crowd. Those persons within earshot would pass the message on to the 
next group and this process would be repeated until the message reached the periphery. This 
was not necessarily a very effective means of public speaking, but it is an example of how 
complex social systems solve problems or find alternative ways of achieving the objective.  
 
It the beginning of this chapter the important role that the framing of the concept of 
autopoiesis played in the development of Complexity was referred to (Maturana & Varela, 
1980 and Luhmann, 1990). Whilst the notion of autopoiesis is associated with that of self-
organisation, it is important to note that an autopoietic system is autonomous and 
operationally closed, in the sense that every process within it directly helps to maintain the 
whole. Morin (2005:14) describes a closed system as one where “causes produces [sic] effects 
that are necessary for their own causation”. A social example of such a closed system would 
be a cult where the members are isolated from the greater society and where everything they 
need to function socially is controlled within the cult, by the cult members themselves. A 
complex system differs from a pure autopoietic system in that it is open, i.e. it interacts with 
its environment and influences from the environment help to shape its self-organisation 
process. It is this ability that enables complex systems to adapt to its environment and to 
change – to co-evolve - together with it. 
                                                 
29
 The Occupy Wall Street movement came into being in response to the financial crisis in 2011. For more see: 
http://occupywallst.org/about/ 
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Chapman (2002:41) applies the concept to the social policy context and argues that many 
organisations create internal processes that have the effect of reproducing their own 
organisation over time. He argues that an autopoietic organisation is a network of production 
processes in which the function of each component is to participate in the production or 
transformation of the other components of the network (ibid.). In this way, the entire network 
is continually re-producing itself. What is conserved is its internal organisation, core values 
and culture, and these are preserved by the ways in which ‘the right way to do things’ are 
internalised by the individuals within the institution” (ibid.). Most organisations and 
bureaucracies have some of these tendencies, but they are most easily identifiable in those 
organisations that have a very strong identity and ethos that needs to be continuously 
maintained, typically through organisational rituals, internal training, and strict adherence to 
organisational protocols. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is probably a 
good example in the humanitarian context, as one can predict the position of an ICRC 
delegate on a range of policy issues with a high likelihood of success, even if you have never 
met the individual before. This process is also somewhat similar to what Poincaré and 
Prigogine refer to as correlation (Prigogine, 1996:121). 
 
Another important property of Complexity in general, and self-organisation in particular, that 
has been referred to several times before is known as emergence. Emergence is an important 
concept for Complexity because it explains how the elements in the system are not just 
merely interacting with each other in order to maintain themselves, as in an autopoietic 
system. In complex systems, the interactions of the elements generate a new collective effect 
(or effects) that would not have occurred if the different agents acted on their own. New 
system characteristics ‘emerge’ through the process of interaction (Cilliers, 1998:106). Morel 
and Ramanujam (1999) explain self-organisation as a “process of spontaneous creation of 
complex structure that emerges due to the dynamics of the complex system”, which makes 
self-organisation an emergent phenomenon.  
 
The dynamic and non-linear relationships among the components in complex systems 
generate new emergent properties, i.e. properties that cannot be predicted merely by analysing 
the individual components of the system. Complicated systems do not have emergent 
properties, and the way in which they work can potentially be fully understood, and predicted, 
by analysing their components and the rules that govern their interactions (Cilliers, 2000a:41). 
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In a complicated system, disorder is understood as entropy, i.e. as the loss of energy in the 
system that, if unchecked, will result in the gradual collapse of the system into disorder. In 
contrast, non-linearity and dynamism play a critical role in creating and sustaining order in 
complex systems, i.e. in enabling order to emerge (Cilliers, 1998:118).  
 
Linear systems are the sum of their parts and thus do not have emergent behaviour. A bicycle 
has several components, and these function together as a system. Complex systems have 
several additional characteristics to this kind of system, but for the present discussion on 
emergence, we just focus on the non-linear interaction among the parts of a complex system. 
A bicycle can have many different shapes, but one essential structure – two wheels, seat, 
frame, steering and a propulsion mechanism. A designer may adapt a future design based on 
lessons learned from an earlier model, but any specific model is stuck with its design until a 
new model is developed. Change in this context thus occurs in the conscious design process 
and is reflected in the differences between generations.  
 
In contrast, complex systems can adapt and change in their own life-time, without the aid of 
an external designer. And complex systems can also adapt radically over many generations, 
without the aid of an external designer, as the evolution of life from basic cells to complex life 
forms demonstrates. This change over time – the way in which a system adapts on the basis of 
its own internal processes as well as its interaction with its environment and the way in which 
it generates new structures, forms and functions – is what is meant by emergence.   
 
Melanie Mitchell (2009:13) proposes a definition of complex systems that is indicative of 
how central the notions of self-organisation and emergence are to understanding Complexity. 
She says a system is complex when it “exhibits nontrivial emergent and self-organizing 
behaviours” (ibid.). A key characteristic of complex systems is thus that they emerge and 
maintain themselves spontaneously, i.e. without the intervention of an external designer or the 
presence of some form of internal or external controlling agent (Cilliers, 1998:89). This is 
why Complexity is potentially so relevant for complex peacebuilding systems, because, as 
stated in the introduction, one of the aspects of particular concern in this study of the 
coherence dilemma of peacebuilding systems is the observation that peacebuilding systems 
seem to lack a central command or management structure. 
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Three of the core characteristics of Complexity, namely a whole-of-systems approach, non-
linearity and self-organisation have now been introduced, and key concepts such as feedback 
and emergence have also been discussed. In the next section the focus is on the implications 
that non-linearity, self-organisation and emergence have for our understanding of 
epistemology. 
 
5.6 COMPLEXITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
This chapter commenced with a discussion about the context within which Complexity 
thinking has developed, and we mentioned that, when Europe came out of the Dark Ages, its 
science was dominated by an approach that favoured reductionist reasoning. The reductionist 
approach has been the dominant scientific approach since the 1600s (Mitchell, 2009:ix). This 
analytical approach holds that if something is too complex to be grasped as a whole, you 
identify and divide its constituent parts and study each separately (Cilliers, 1998:2). The 
process of sub-division is repeated until the problem is simple enough to be analysed and 
understood, and the original entity is then reconstructed by putting the parts together again. 
“Reductionism is the most natural thing in the world to grasp. It’s simply the belief that a 
whole can be understood completely if you understand its parts and the nature of their sum” 
(Hofstadter, 1979:312). René Descartes explains his reductionist approach as follows: 
… to divide all the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as many 
as were required to solve them in the best way. [And] … to conduct my thoughts in a given 
order, beginning with the simplest and most easily understood objects, and gradually 
ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of the most complex. (Descartes, 
1637:17)  
 
Whilst this reductionist approach has been very successful in advancing many aspects of 
science, others still remain a mystery. We understand how the brain and the rest of the body 
are physically connected, but we still do not know enough about how the brain and the body 
function together as a whole. We understand that the political, security and economic 
dimensions of a society are closely interlinked, but we have not with the methodologies 
available to us in the reductionist approach been able to generate enough understanding about 
how changes in one of these dimensions influence the others to predict or control these 
processes. 
 
Complexity requires a different approach. Chapman (2002:26) asks: 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 147 
What if the essential features of the entity are embedded not in the components but in the 
interconnections? What if its complexity arises from the ways in which its components 
actually relate to and interact with one another? The very act of simplifying by sub-division 
loses the interconnections and therefore cannot tackle this aspect of complexity. 
 
Cilliers (1998:2) argues that by “cutting-up” the system, the analytical method destroys what 
it seeks to understand. Morin (2005:10) points out that in order to understand complex 
systems, one needs to grasp the relations between the whole and the parts. Geyer and Rihani 
(2010:38) say that looking for regularities is useful but observing elements of the system 
individually, i.e. in isolation, does not help much in understanding how the whole system 
operates. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Aristotle formulated this core anti-
reductionist insight in his Metaphysics (1045a10) when he said: “The whole is more than the 
sum of its parts.”  
 
The reductionist method can be used to analyse complicated things like the International 
Space Station or the rockets and shuttles used to reach it. They can be taken apart and put 
back together again, and we can explain how the parts relate to each other through a series of 
laws or rules. Complex systems, on the other hand, cannot be understood by using only such 
an analytical method, because the behaviour of complex systems comes about as a result of 
the non-linear and dynamic relationships among their constituent parts (Cilliers, 2000a:41).  
 
Complex systems also have to be understood in the context of their history, the ever-changing 
present and the potential future. We cannot understand a complex system without taking the 
dimension of time into consideration. We cannot fully understand a complex system by 
analysing a frozen sample or by analysing a two-dimensional map of its structure; we have to 
study it in motion. Cilliers (1998:122) explains that “the history of a complex system is not an 
objectively given state, it is a collection of traces distributed over the system, and is always 
open to multiple interpretations”. 
 
One important distinction that needs to be made is that between Critical Complexity and 
Determined Complexity (Woermann, 2010:100). Mitchell (2009:22) notes that, even with 
today’s highly complex meteorological computer models, weather prediction can at best be 
reasonably accurate only for approximately a week into the future, and she states that “it is 
not yet known whether this limit is due to fundamental chaos in the weather, or how much 
this limit can be extended by collecting more data and building even better models”. The 
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Determined Complexity school believes that we should be able to increase our capacity to 
understand, predict and control complex phenomena with more data and computational 
capacity. The Critical Complexity school, on the other hand, believes that complex systems 
are fundamentally non-linear and dynamic, and therefore emergent in ways that are inherently 
unpredictable and uncontrollable, no matter how much relevant data or computational 
capacity we have. 
 
Determined Complexity thus refers to an approach that holds that the study of Complexity 
will improve our understanding of, and therefore our control over, complex systems (Cilliers, 
2001:136). Mitchell (2009:14) points out that “neither a single science of Complexity nor a 
single Complexity Theory exists, yet”. However, the Determined Complexity school 
continues to pursue a general theory of complex organisations and believes that such a theory 
is ultimately attainable (Mitchell, 2009:303). Critical Complexity differs from Determined 
Complexity in that it does not pursue a general theory of complexity. Paul Cilliers (2001:136) 
argues that, “[a]lthough we can say a lot of important things about complexity in general, it is 
not possible to develop a general model for complex systems”, because of the historical and 
radical contingent nature of complex systems. Furthermore, “[c]omplexity theory underscores 
the importance of contingent factors, of considering specific conditions in a specific context at 
a specific time. No general model can capture these singularities” (Cilliers, 2001:145). 
 
Critical Complexity thus holds that the study of complex systems may assist us in improving 
our understanding of complex systems, but it cannot help us to predict or control the 
behaviour of a specific complex system. Critical Complexity reminds us that any insights or 
knowledge that may have been gained about any given complex system is provisional, 
because the non-linear and highly-dynamical nature of complex systems implies that the 
system will continue to change in unpredictable ways.  
 
Complex systems exhibit so many simultaneous non-linear interactions among their 
constitutive elements at the micro-level that we are unable to keep track of all the causal 
relationships among the agents at the macro-level (Cilliers, 2001:138). This is because the 
complexity continuously emerges from the interaction among the various elements, and 
between them and the environment (Cilliers, 1998:ix). All our interpretations of what is 
happening in the system are contingent and provisional, and relate to a certain context and 
time frame (122). New feedback can arrive at any point and alter our understanding of the 
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system. Being continuously open to new feedback thus plays an important role in the process 
of generating knowledge, adjustment, adaptation and self-regulation in a critical approach to 
Complexity. 
 
The point is that, whilst the study of Complexity has been able to identify and describe some 
of the general characteristics of complex systems, it is not possible to reduce a specific 
complex system in a way that would allow us to predict its behaviour. With hindsight we may 
be able to connect the dots; however, we are not able to predict future events, even if the 
circumstances appear similar, because complex systems are non-linear and dynamic. In other 
words, we can trace causality looking back, but we cannot use it to project forward, or to 
predict the future, at least not beyond a very short horizon. This does not mean that there is no 
causality, but that we cannot predict where it will lead beyond a very short horizon. “The 
presence of emergent properties does not provide an argument against causality, only against 
deterministic forms of prediction” (Cilliers, 2000c:24). 
 
Kemp (2009:92) reminds us that “there is a range of levels of predictability, rather than a 
simple contrast between completely predictable and totally unpredictable”. Making the case 
for a complex systems approach thus does not imply a rejection of the value of the 
reductionist or analytical method. Certain types of problems are best addressed with the 
analytical method, whilst others are better suited to a complex systems approach. If the 
challenge is to electrify Monrovia, we could use the reductionist approach, but if the 
challenge is to assist Liberians with laying the foundations for sustainable peace, we have to 
turn to a complex systems approach.  
 
Geyer and Rihani (2010:7) argue that “if one accepts the conclusions of complexity, one must 
accept that the natural and social worlds are symbiotically intertwined and that they exhibit 
orderly, disorderly and complex phenomena”. In this context it may thus be more useful to 
think of order and disorder as representing two extreme but conceptually useful poles on the 
opposite ends of a spectrum, and to think of complex systems as existing somewhere on the 
spectrum between these two ideal states.
30
  
                                                 
30
 I am grateful to Prof. P.v.d. P. (Pierre) du Toit for suggesting that I present the difference between 
complicated and complex systems as “continuous variables, located at the opposite ends of a spectrum, each one 
representing an ideal model. Between these two points a variety of models may be located, each containing more 
or less of the attributes of each model, the closer or further it is located to each of the outliers”. See also Geyer 
and  Rihani (2010:8). 
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Chapman (2002:28) reminds us, that whilst it may be useful to improve our understanding of 
complex systems by contrasting it with complicated systems, this comparison should not be 
understood in a sense of these two approaches being in competition with one another. In fact, 
they are complementary. “In practice most problems lie between the two extremes . . . and 
some combination of holistic and reductionist thinking will prove most useful” (ibid.). Morin 
(2005:25) furthermore argues that our education  
. . . taught us much more to separate than to connect, our aptitude for connecting is 
underdeveloped and our aptitude for separating is overdeveloped… knowing is at the same 
time separating and connecting, it is to make analysis and synthesis. 
 
The complex systems approach may be better suited to helping us understand complex 
problems, but it is important to understand that Complexity does not generate problem-
solving solutions in the same way that the analytical method does.  
 
Complexity does not generate definitive answers to policy problems. In fact, it helps us to 
understand why, in the context of complex phenomena, the search for definitive answers and 
the pursuit of imagined definitive solutions are flawed. Geyer and Rihani (2010:7) argue that:  
 . . . adopting a complexity framework enables decision-makers to interpret what goes on in 
the social, economic and political arenas in a new way that recognizes the limits of knowledge 
and prediction and the consequent need to adjust policy-making and actions accordingly.  
 
In this context, Complexity can be understood as “an explanatory framework that helps us 
understand the behaviour of a complex social (human) system” (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003:2).   
 
A recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study that looked 
into how Complexity science can be applied to public policy argues that Complexity offers 
new ways of thinking about policy making: “It focuses attention on dynamic connections and 
evolution, not just on designing and building fixed institutions, laws, regulations and other 
traditional policy instruments” (OECD, 2008:13). The report suggests that, in addition to 
control and causation, Complexity highlights the importance of influence and likelihood. It 
argues that a complex systems approach focuses on identifying and analysing trends and 
probabilities, rather than seeking to predict specific events. In the context of control, which 
was traditionally understood to be achieved by identifying cause-and-effect chains and then 
manipulating the causes to achieve certain effects, the study argues that policymakers need to 
become comfortable with strategies that aim to influence rather than control (ibid.). 
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The point of this section was, firstly, to make the reader aware of the tension within 
Complexity between those that believe that Complexity is ultimately determined and those 
that maintain a critical approach to Complexity, and to note that this dissertation falls in the 
latter school. Secondly, the aim was to underscore that a complex systems approach is not an 
alternative problem-solving method. Complexity problematises the status of the findings that 
may result from the use of any method. In other words, Complexity reminds us to be sceptical 
of results and findings regardless of the method used to obtain them, because all methods are 
limited when considering highly dynamic and non-linear phenomena. 
 
5.7 THE ETHICS OF COMPLEXITY 
 
Our general understanding of how complex systems function has important ethical 
implications for our interventions in social systems. Complexity reminds us of the limits of 
our ability to completely know or predict the behaviour of complex systems. Woermann 
(2010:121) argues that our models of complex systems are always incomplete, and may 
introduce further uncertainties. This means that we cannot make the case that a particular 
model will result in or guarantee a particular outcome. Complexity suggests that we need to 
be more humble about our claims about the degree to which it is possible to apply general 
deterministic models to specific contexts. This insight has significant implications for any 
model that claims to have ‘the solution’ to a problem and implies that the only way in which a 
particular model can be known to have value is after the fact, i.e. in its results.  
 
It also implies that the degree to which such knowledge is transferable is severely limited 
because the fact that it has worked in a certain context does not guarantee that it will have the 
same effect in another.  One insight from Complexity thus suggests that we should apply an 
evolutionary approach to knowing, i.e. generate, refine and adapt what we know in an 
iterative and ongoing process, without ever expecting to arrive at definitive conclusions. This 
also means that our focus should be on ‘a process’ of generating knowledge, rather than on 
seeking definitive solutions or answers, i.e. a specific theory, scientific law or solution that, 
once and for all, is the definitive answer to a complex problem. The history of science is 
scattered with the corpses of solutions that were once thought to be definitive, until new 
insights exposed their limits and shortcomings.  
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Critical Complexity holds that our ability to fully know complex phenomena and thus to fully 
solve complex problems is inherently and fundamentally limited. Not only because our 
abilities are lacking—because, if that were the only limitation, we should be able to increase 
our knowledge of complex phenomena in proportion to the improvement in our methods and 
computational power—but because complex phenomena are non-linear and dynamic, and 
thus inherently unpredictable, unknowable and unsolvable.  
 
Critical Complexity does not claim that we cannot generate meaningful knowledge, but it 
does claim that we cannot generate ultimate knowledge, i.e. a grand theory that explains 
everything. Critical Complexity holds that we cannot predict the future and therefore cannot 
control future behaviour, but it also argues that this does not mean that we are somehow 
powerless or without agency. Woermann (2010:121) explains that a Critical Complexity 
approach implies a shift away from trying to discover the truth to a process of making choices 
and developing strategies for living and for dealing with the often unexpected outcomes of 
these strategies. We can meaningfully anticipate, influence, adapt and engage with an 
uncertain future, but such engagement needs to be informed by an awareness of the limits of 
our ability to ultimately fully know and that awareness has important implications for the 
ethical status of our interventions.  
 
Because we know that we cannot, beyond a short horizon, predict what the effects of our 
intervention in a given context will be, there is an important ethical dimension to our 
interventions, namely that we have to take responsibility for the consequences of our 
interventions (Cilliers, 2000c:29). We cannot claim moral superiority on the basis of absolute 
scientific knowledge; nor can we hide behind ignorance, because we do know that complex 
systems are non-linear and dynamic. We therefore need to be careful, cautious and self-
critical when we consider and reflect on the choices we make, because the actions we take 
may have negative consequences for the people affected by our decisions and actions (Preiser 
& Cilliers, 2010:274; Woermann, 2010:124; Aoi, De Coning & Thakur, 2007). 
 
Cilliers (2000c:29) argues that ethics, in this context, “refers to the inevitability of choices 
that cannot be backed up scientifically or objectively”. All knowledge claims must be 
accepted as provisional claims because, as formulated by Preiser and Cilliers (2010:270), 
“[w]e know that we cannot get it right”. We thus have an ethical duty to proceed with caution, 
and to monitor carefully the effects that our experimentation with our theories of change are 
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having in any given situation. To make this point explicit, Woermann (2010:124) quotes 
Morin (2007:28), who argues that the problematic of complexity necessitates “an autonomous 
strategy” which obliges us “in the field of action . . . to reconsider our decisions like bets and 
incites us to develop an adequate strategy to more or less control the action”.  
 
Woermann (2010:127) identifies three implications of a Critical Complexity position for 
ethics, as formulated by Preiser and Cilliers (2010:283): 
 A critical position informed by complexity will have to be transgressive. It can never 
simply re-enforce that which is current. Transformation takes place continually, 
despite all efforts to contain it.  
 A critical position will, in the most positive sense of the word, be an ironical position. 
There is no final truth which operationalises our actions in an objective way. Irony 
also implies, in a very systemic way, a self-critical position. 
 In the third place, a central role for the imagination is indispensable when we deal 
with complex things. Since we cannot calculate what will or should happen, we have 
to make a creative leap in order to imagine what things could be like.  
 
Acknowledging that international actors do not necessarily have a known and proven solution 
to a given peacebuilding problem, and that the ‘solutions’ they offer, such as the liberal peace 
model discussed in Chapter 2, may not, in fact, have any claim to superiority, has important 
ethical implications for the relationship between international and local actors in such 
situations. Critical Complexity suggests that competing theories of change cannot be rejected 
on the basis that one theory of change can be proven to be the best in all contexts or in any 
given one (although it may be possible to challenge some of the claims made by competing 
theories of change). The dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems implies that 
competing theories of change need to be contextualised before their validity and applicability 
can be judged. Choices will thus have to be made by taking a range of factors into account, 
and the selection of a given approach ultimately would need to be a local and context-specific 
informed choice.  
 
The acknowledgement that the decisions we make when choosing a given peacebuilding 
model is the product of a deliberate local choice, as opposed to a choice based solely on an 
objectively scientifically-proven model, represents a significant shift in locating ethical 
responsibility squarely with those exercising such a choice. Political choices are generally 
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acknowledged to be influenced by what is perceived to be in the best interest of the agents 
making the choices, and it is generally accepted that the preferences of those who hold the 
most power in a given context typically are the preferences that prevail. Political choices thus 
are generally acknowledged as not necessarily being based on what is perceived to be in the 
best interest of those who will be directly affected by such choices, or on whose behalf such 
choices are made, but by what is in the best interest of those who have the power and 
influence to hold sway over such decision-making processes. The ethical responsibility thus 
clearly shifts from the perceived objective virtue of a scientifically-proven model or theory of 
choice to those that have the agency to choose which model or theory of change will be 
applied in a given context. 
 
Some, like Feldman (2004:69), argue that the local actors should have the right to choose and 
control the experiment, as they would have to live with the consequences of the intervention. 
Feldman (ibid.) argues that “one of the critical elements of any argument for autonomy is that 
people tend to know themselves, better than others, how they ought best to live their lives”. 
One can add that, as they have to live with the consequences, they are in the best position to 
assume ethical responsibility for their own choices. As discussed in Chapter 4, the notion of 
local ownership also raises several concerns, such as that local societies are not necessarily 
well informed about their options and that there seem to be persistent and challenging 
questions about who can legitimately speak on behalf of these local societies (Donais, 2012 & 
Ishizuka, 2012:12). Some of these issues have been discussed in the earlier chapters, and 
these dilemmas will also be addressed in the remaining chapters. The point here, however, is 
that despite these difficulties the ethical implication derived from a Complexity perspective 
remains. The fact that it is challenging to apply the principle of local ownership does not 
reduce the relevance of the ethical implication that it is the local society, not international 
actors, that should have the agency to take decisions about their own future. This does not 
exclude the internationals from having a role in assisting local societies with understanding 
their choices and otherwise supporting and facilitating their transition, but it does imply that 
such international actors offering assistance should stop short of taking decisions on behalf of 
local societies on the basis of superior claims to knowledge about what is in the best interest 
of those societies.  
 
Critical Complexity thus implies that the peacebuilders, local and international, have to take 
responsibility – ethically – for their choices and actions. Taking responsibility means that 
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peacebuilders need to think through the ethical implications of both their macro theories of 
peacebuilding and their specific choices and actions in any given context. They cannot base 
their decisions on the claimed superiority of one or other theory of change, because no one 
model, e.g. the liberal peace model, can necessarily argue that it is superior. They have to 
understand the choices they make and the potential consequences of their actions, and take 
responsibility for them. Paul Cilliers (2000c:30) argues that “the ethical position is not 
something imposed on an organization . . . it is an inevitable result of the inability of a theory 
of complexity to provide a complete description of all aspects of the system”.   
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter was set out to introduce Complexity. First, Complexity was situated in the 
history of science and some of the general characteristics of complex systems were explained. 
Three of these characteristics were focused on in particular, namely a whole-of-systems 
approach, non-linearity and self-organisation. In the process, concepts such as emergence and 
feedback were also discussed. 
 
The implications of Complexity for epistemology and ethics were also considered. It was 
shown that the non-linear and dynamic nature of complex systems places inherent limitations 
on our ability to know, predict and control complex systems. It also limits our ability to 
generate knowledge that is transferable from one context to another.  
 
Complexity thus reminds us to be sceptical of results and findings, regardless of the method 
used to obtain them, because all methods are limited when considering highly dynamic and 
non-linear phenomena. From an ethical perspective, this implies that we have to acknowledge 
that we are acting on the basis of our own chosen theories of change, not on the basis of some 
ultimate form of scientifically-proven knowledge. We thus have an ethical duty to proceed 
with caution and to carefully monitor the effects that our experimentation with our chosen 
theories of change is having in any given situation, especially because we know that these 
experiments will affect the lives and livelihoods of people. 
 
In Chapter 6 the question of whether peacebuilding systems are in fact complex will be 
addressed, and in Chapter 7 the general characteristics of complex systems introduced in this 
chapter will be applied to the peacebuilding context. The expectation is that this process will 
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generate insights that will help us to improve our understanding of the coherence dilemma of 
peacebuilding systems.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 PEACEBUILDING AND COMPLEXITY 
 
 
 
As post-modern philosophy illustrates, knowledge never exists independently of the observer 
but always in relation to the context in which the observing subject itself is situated … social 
systems do not exist per se but are the results of processes of description. (Foucault, 2000 in 
Körppen, Ropers & Giessmann, 2011:77) 
 
Interveners and intervened upon are bound together by complex relationships that extend 
beyond the temporal limits of any particular intervention. (Gelot & Söderbaum, 2011:80) 
 
Problems arise in the peacebuilding world when we use a linear mind-set to address a 
systemic problem. (Ricigliano, 2012:24) 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Part I of the dissertation dealt with peacebuilding in Chapter 2, coherence in Chapter 3, and 
the factors that constrain coherence in Chapter 4. In Part II of the dissertation, Complexity 
was introduced in Chapter 5. Chapters 6 and 7 will be devoted to the consideration of the 
relevance of Complexity for peacebuilding, including the coherence dilemma. The overall 
aim of the study is to explore the utility of using Complexity to gain insights into the 
coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. It was argued in Chapter 1 that, if 
peacebuilding is indeed complex, then it should be possible to use some of the knowledge 
generated by the study of Complexity to further increase our understanding of peacebuilding. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to establish whether peacebuilding can be considered to be 
complex in the same way that this concept is understood in the study of Complexity. 
 
It is known that many, if not most, social scientists would regard all social systems, including 
peacebuilding systems, as complex. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, common-sense 
understanding of complexity differs from how Complexity is understood among those that 
study complex systems. Complexity was introduced in Chapter 5 by using the characteristics 
of complex systems formulated by Paul Cilliers (1998). Referring to these characteristics 
again each one will now be discussed in the context of peacebuilding. To recapitulate, Cilliers 
(1998:3-5) described Complexity according to the following characteristics: 
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 A complex system consists of a large number of elements. 
 These elements interact on the basis of information available to them locally (none of 
the elements are able to comprehend the complexity of the system as a whole). 
 At least some of the elements also interact with the environment (it is an open 
system). 
 The interactions are rich, non-linear, dynamic and they feed back on each other 
(recurrence). 
 The conditions under which such a system operates are far from equilibrium, i.e. the 
elements are under sustained pressure. 
 The combined result causes such a system to spontaneously organise itself, maintain 
itself, and adapt (there is no external, controlling agent). 
 Over time, this process develops a history, i.e. complex systems evolve over time and 
the past is co-responsible for the present behaviour of the system. 
 
The present objective is to consider whether these general characteristics of Complexity can 
be meaningfully applied to peacebuilding systems. If they can, it will be assumed that 
peacebuilding systems are indeed complex in the way this concept is used and understood in 
the study of Complexity. Such a finding would facilitate generating new insights on the 
peacebuilding coherence dilemma by applying some of what is known about Complexity to 
the peacebuilding context. Peacebuilding systems will now be viewed by considering each of 
the characteristics suggested by Cilliers (1998) individually. 
 
 
6.2 LARGE NUMBER OF ELEMENTS 
 
One of the reasons why peacebuilding is widely regarded to be complex, in the common-
sense use of the word, is because peacebuilding involves so many different actors. Not only 
are they numerous, but they are also involved in a wide range of activities that span several 
different dimensions. One way in which scientists have distinguished between social systems 
that are more complex and those that are less complex is by comparing the number of 
elements in a system. For Tainter (1988), an archaeologist who studied why complex societies 
collapse, 
[c]omplexity is generally understood to refer to such things as the size of a society, the number 
and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialised roles that it incorporates, the number of 
distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a 
coherent, functioning whole. (Tainter, 1998:23) 
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In the context of Tainter’s (1988) description, a specific peacebuilding system can be 
considered complex if it involves many different actors, if these actors perform a large variety 
of specialised roles, and if there is a variety of mechanisms being employed to organise the 
overall effort. Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the wide variety of actors that are involved in 
peacebuilding systems and the range of specialised roles they perform. Some of the 
mechanisms that are employed to coordinate and organise the actors in an attempt to generate 
a coherent approach among them were also discussed. 
 
In Chapter 2, a number of dimensions were introduced according to which the work the 
various actors engage in can be classified and organised, and these were summarised in Table 
2.1.  Each of those dimensions requires the involvement of people from a wide range of 
professional disciplines. Because peacebuilding requires us to work with almost every aspect 
of a society, it requires the involvement, in one or other form, of expertise from many of the 
major academic and professional disciplines. The coherence dilemma that this study is 
focused on derives, in part, from different perceptions about how these roles, dimensions and 
disciplines relate to one another, as discussed in Chapter 4 in section 4.3 on conflicting 
values, principles and mandates. 
  
It is possible to distinguish between peacebuilding agents—i.e. those that are part of the 
peacebuilding system—and other actors in the larger environment by considering whether 
they share a common peacebuilding purpose. It was stated in Chapter 2 that all activities and 
programmes that contribute to peace consolidation in a given context can be understood as 
being part of a peacebuilding system, which is tied to that context. Therefore, all the 
organisations, in the broadest possible understanding that this concept implies, that pursue 
peace consolidation in a given context can be regarded as peacebuilding agents.  
 
The notion of agents is important in the sense that they represent the smallest identifiable 
elements in the system that have independent agency. Social agents can be compared to 
elements in complex systems because they can act independently from one another. They 
have authority and control, and thus ‘agency’, over how they use their own resources and they 
control their own actions. This does not mean that they are not influenced and constrained by 
others and the environment, but it means that they ultimately have the agency to make 
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decisions about how they act, including about how they will respond to the influence exerted 
by others and the environment. 
 
Organisations in the peacebuilding context typically refer to various United Nations agencies, 
including a peacekeeping mission or a special political mission, development agencies like 
UNDP, humanitarian agencies like UNHCR; regional organisations, such as the African 
Union; governments, including neighbours or others that have a special interest in a given 
peace process, including donors; international and local non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs); and local community organisations, including organised traditional societies 
represented by traditional leaders and more modern civic organisations such as trade unions, 
and women’s organisations.  
 
In the peacebuilding context, which is dominated by organisations like the United Nations 
and prominent NGOs like Word Vision or Oxfam, individuals would not normally be thought 
of as peacebuilding agents. Specific individuals may be very important in a given context. In 
some cases a specific mediator, like Richard Holbrooke, Martti Ahtisaari or Kofi Annan, may 
play a major role. Or a specific leader, may make a significant contribution to the outcome of 
a specific peace process, as was the case with Nelson Mandela and the transition from 
Apartheid to democracy in South Africa in the early 1990s. However, in this study the focus 
is on how such individuals play a role in mobilising groups of people, in the form of 
communities or organisations, and in that sense the study is more interested in the overall 
behaviour of the community or organisation than in individual leaders. In some cases, 
however, it is very hard to make this distinction, for instance in communities where 
influential individuals have amassed enough power and resources to have established a 
patrimonial system (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). In other contexts there may be communities that 
are under the protection and patronage of a ‘warlord’ who has amassed the political, 
economic and security means to control a certain territory (De Waal, 2009). There have been 
some cases where entire societies or countries are organised around powerful or influential 
individuals. Hussein’s Iraq or Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya were contemporary examples. 
Thus, while it may be important to take individuals into consideration when developing an 
understanding of all the actors or agents involved in a particular peacebuilding system in 
some contexts, organizations, understood in the broadest possible terms, are generally 
regarded as the main elements in peacebuilding systems.  
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As introduced in Chapter 2, two large groupings of peacebuilding agents, namely internal and 
external agents, can be broadly distinguished. ‘Internal agents’ here refer to the local 
communities, government, political parties and political movements, civil society, private 
sector, the media, and other parties that are embedded in the conflict system. In contrast 
‘external agents’ comprise all those actors that are foreign from the perspective of the local 
actors in a given peacebuilding context, and these typically include interested states, 
international and regional organisations, international NGOs, the International Financial 
Institutions, i.e. the World Bank, the IMF and the relevant regional financial institutions, e.g. 
the African Development Bank in the African context. The external peacebuilding agents 
intend to help the internal agents to prevent a relapse into violent conflict, i.e. what is referred 
to in Chapter 2 as peace consolidation.  
 
As discussed under the topic of boundaries and borders in Chapter 5, making categorisations 
such as ‘external’ and ‘internal’ when dealing with complex systems needs to be understood 
as in the specific context within which such a categorisation is meant to have meaning and 
should not be thought of as real or hard categories that exist in some objective, material or 
static sense. Complex social systems are framed by the observer. There are many potential 
agents at different levels, from local to international, that one may consider as part of a 
particular peacebuilding system, depending on the way one chooses to frame a particular 
peacebuilding system. Most observers will probably agree on who the agents are at the core of 
a particular peacebuilding system. However, the identification of agents on the periphery is 
likely to depend on one’s particular perspective. It is thus possible to have many different 
perspectives on the boundaries of a particular peacebuilding system. For instance, the list of 
invitees to a peacebuilding coordination meeting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
will differ depending on whether it is the government, the UN, the EU, the AU or the donor 
community that is organising and hosting the meeting. The core group is likely to be the 
same, but beyond that the constellation of participants is likely to differ considerably. For 
instance, the AU is likely to have an African perspective and will make a point of inviting 
African Ambassadors, African NGOs, etc. The EU is likely to do the same from a European 
perspective. Or a particular meeting may be called by a minister responsible for development 
and will thus mainly involve agents working in that dimension or discipline.  
 
As also discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are some actors that may prefer not to be 
associated with peacebuilding, such as many in the humanitarian community. And there are 
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other international and local actors who may not share the peace consolidation objective, e.g. 
warlords or conflict entrepreneurs who profit from the conflict and instability, and the identity 
of some of these may not immediately be apparent. For instance, you may have a local official 
or an international company that appears to be supportive of the peace process but who, at the 
same time, is actively undermining it.  
 
The agents, and the ways in which they are organised, will also be continuously in flux. Over 
time several different international agents may be deployed and withdrawn. The humanitarian 
actors may only be active during the humanitarian emergency and recovery phases. An initial 
military intervention may be withdrawn once a certain level of stability has been achieved and 
replaced with a UN peacekeeping mission. Those specialising in elections may only be 
present in the run-up to and during the election. In such a highly dynamic environment, it 
would thus not be possible to have one definitive description of who all the agents in a 
particular peacebuilding system are. 
 
It has already been established that these peacebuilding agents act independently, i.e. they 
have ‘agency’. However, they are at the same time also interdependent, as they can only 
achieve the peace-consolidation objective collectively. It is not possible for any one of the 
internal or external peacebuilding agents to achieve the peacebuilding objective on their own. 
It is their collective and cumulative actions that contribute to the peacebuilding system 
developing its ability to manage and maintain its own peace process. It is this 
interdependency that informs the framing or the boundary of the peacebuilding system, 
because without it these agents may act without regard for each other. In other words, if an 
agent shares the peace-consolidation objective, and if it is mutually dependent on others to 
achieve that objective, then it can be thought of as part of a particular peacebuilding system. It 
can thus be said that peacebuilding systems consist of a large and diverse number of agents – 
the elements in the system – that are part of a common system because they are all ultimately 
pursuing the same peacebuilding objective, namely consolidating the peace. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many of the agents that we, from this perspective, would frame as 
peacebuilding agents may not be aware that they are part of a peacebuilding system, nor 
would they necessarily identify themselves as such. The ‘peacebuilding system’ is a frame 
imposed by us, the observers, from the perspective of how we understand peacebuilding and, 
in particular, in the context of how peacebuilding, coherence and complexity are being 
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presented in this study. It is not necessary for agents to be self-aware of their role in a system 
or even of their interdependence on others for them to contribute to achieving the overall 
objective of the system, or for them to be regarded as being part of the system. They merely 
have to have an active role in the collective functioning of the system and thus contribute to 
its emergent behaviour. 
 
It is also important to note, especially in the peacebuilding context, that the agents that make 
up a particular peacebuilding system are not determined by a common geographical space. 
For instance, the Sudan peacebuilding system does not consist of all those agents that are 
physically present in Sudan, but rather by all the agents that contribute to its peace 
consolidation regardless of where they may be located geographically. There are many 
Sudanese who live outside Sudan, but who nevertheless have an active interest in, and 
influence on, what happens in Sudan.  Sudan is also a good example of how several different 
sub-systems can co-exist within a larger conflict system, e.g. South-North, intra-South, 
Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, etc. (De Waal, 2009). Many of these conflict systems overlap 
and most are interconnected. The Sudan conflict system and the constellation of agents that 
make up the different peacebuilding systems involved would look somewhat different from 
the perspective of someone embedded deeply in each one of these sub-systems.  
 
However, whilst they are all contributing to the overall peacebuilding objective in a given 
context, each agent can only have a limited effect. These peacebuilding agents are thus both 
independent, because they act according to their own mandates, resources and decision-
making processes, and interdependent, because they depend on one another and the system as 
a whole to achieve their respective and collective peacebuilding objectives. This tension 
between the independence and interdependence of peacebuilding agents contributes to the 
Complexity of peacebuilding systems, and it will be revisited often throughout the rest of this 
discussion. 
 
6.3 DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS  
 
The peacebuilding agents interact with one another and their interaction is dynamic. A system 
is dynamic if its states or behaviours change with time (Samoilenko, 2008: 39). The 
peacebuilding agents interact with one another in a number of ways, and the ways they 
interact change over time. Some are formal, for instance via meetings of their principals or 
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through formally participating in joint assessments, joint planning or other coordination 
forums. Others are informal in that the agents communicate and exchange information with 
those within their personal networks.  
 
Physical systems are dynamic when energy flows through them, and in social systems the 
same dynamic effect can be observed, but these systems are dynamic when information 
instead of energy flows through them (Cilliers, 1998:3). Both formal and informal 
interactions consist of the transfer of information. In this sense the agents in a peacebuilding 
system can be thought of as nodes in an information system. The study of Complexity is not 
interested in analysing the role of nodes per se, but rather in the patterns of their 
interconnections and how that generates meaning (120).  
 
The way in which the flow of information is organised conveys meaning. The structure and 
hierarchies in the system influences what kind of information is shared with whom, who are 
included and excluded, and what kind of narrative is created—in other words what kind of 
‘history’ is being constructed. The way in which the flow of information is managed in any 
system is thus an indication of the power relations within that system. This is why 
coordination is usually a controversial subject in humanitarian, development and 
peacebuilding systems. Whilst some see coordination as a means to improve the overall 
functioning of the system, others see it as a means of imposing the will of the core, which is 
typically political and security driven, over the periphery. Some of the criticism against the 
UN’s integrated approach derived specifically out of these kinds of concerns. Whilst those in 
power find it difficult to understand the reluctance of others to be integrated, those on the 
periphery have a clear sense that the coordination system – what in Complexity terms can be 
referred to as the patterns of interconnections – that is imposed on them via the integrated 
mission structure generates a certain meaning in the system that gives primacy to the peace 
consolidation objective. In other words, the structure of the interrelationship among the agents 
contributes to how humanitarian, development and other interests become secondary to the 
peacebuilding objective (Metcalfe, Giffen & Elhawary, 2011:55). For instance, under the 
UN’s integrated approach, the Secretary-General’s special representative, who is typically 
tasked to take the lead on the political aspects of the peace process in question, also has the 
authority to convene and coordinate the whole UN system. From a peacebuilding perspective, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the aim is to ensure that all the dimensions of the peacebuilding 
process are pursuing a common set of objectives. However, from the perspective of some of 
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the humanitarian actors this arrangement may be seen as giving the political dimension 
precedence over the humanitarian dimension. In Chapters 2 and 3 some specific examples 
were given of where conflicting values, mandates and principles have served to undermine the 
scope for coherence. The point here is that the relationships between peacebuilding agents are 
highly dynamic. Peacebuilding systems are not static or in equilibrium; they are highly 
dynamic and constantly in flux. 
 
The relationships between the agents are asymmetrical and this further contributes to the 
highly dynamical and non-linear nature of peacebuilding systems. Agents are vastly different 
in size, identity and structure, but their role and influence in the system is not directly related 
to their relative size, status or resources. The role and influence of the agents also change over 
time, depending on how important their specific contributions to the peace consolidation 
objective may be at any given point. Because of the non-linear nature of complex systems and 
the dynamic interaction among agents, a small local organisation, like Viva Rio in Haiti or the 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), may have a considerable impact on how 
a large international agency, like a UN peacekeeping operation, acts in a particular context. 
For instance, a small but credible organisation like the AREU may release a report that 
analyses the role of the UN in overseeing a specific election in Afghanistan that may be 
highly damaging to the UN and thus result in it changing the way it operates in that and other 
contexts. Similarly, relatively small (compared to the UN) NGOs, like Viva Rio in a context 
like Haiti, may be critical for the success of the UN in that they are able to engage with local 
communities in ways which the larger UN agencies seem unable to achieve. The point is that 
all these agents, large and small, have important contributions to make and that any of them 
may, at a critical moment, make a crucial contribution to achieving the peacebuilding 
objective. This further explains why they are all interdependent on one another. Some may 
seem more powerful or influential than others at first, e.g. donors as opposed to recipients. 
However, you cannot be a donor without implementing partners and without recipients and 
your success as a donor depends on the success of your implementing partners and on the 
experience of the recipients. The dependency is thus mutual, and over time it is the 
cumulative and collective effect of this dynamic interaction among the agents that builds 
momentum towards the peace consolidation objective. 
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6.4 RICH INTERACTIONS 
 
The interactions among the different actors in a peacebuilding system are rich in that they 
influence, and are influenced by, many others in a vast array of different capacities and 
contexts (Cilliers, 1998:120). The same agent, for instance the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), is connected to several different networks. For instance, through the 
Deputy SRSG RC/HC that is responsible for development and humanitarian coordination, the 
mission interacts with the local and international humanitarian community, international 
donors and development agencies. At the same time, UNMIL, for instance through the 
Deputy SRSG Rule of Law and Governance, interacts with the Government of Liberia’s 
criminal justice system at various levels and is also connected to Liberian civil society, 
political parties, traditional leaders and local communities.  UNMIL thus participates in, and 
may in fact lead, various coordination processes at many different levels. A peacekeeping 
mission like UNMIL thus has a rich degree of interaction with a large range of agents in, and 
beyond, Liberia. Not all the peacebuilding agents in Liberia have such a wide network of 
interactions as UNMIL does, but they all have their own respective networks that ensure that 
they have a rich interaction with the other agents in their networks (McCandless, 2008).  
 
In any social or peacebuilding system, some agents are more densely interconnected than 
others. Some process more information or are more richly connected than others. This is 
partly because some peacebuilding agents are highly specialised. Compare for instance an 
NGO such as MERLIN, which specialises in medical care and is likely to operate in only a 
few hospitals or clinics in a given country, with a UN agency like UNICEF, which operates 
throughout the same country and across various disciplines. The medical NGO in this 
example is likely to participate only in the local health cluster coordination process, whilst 
UNICEF, which operates nationally, will be connected at many different levels, from the 
national to the local and across several disciplines. This explains why some agents have a 
larger effect on the flow of information through the system than others.  
 
Although all the agents are interconnected, some are more richly connected than others, and 
those that are can be very influential in the system because they can become conduits for 
information among many other small networks or subsystems. They can modulate the 
information and can exercise some choice about what information to pass on. However, as 
was stressed in the previous section, all these agents in a peacebuilding system are ultimately 
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interdependent and their relationships are asymmetrical, so even a richly-interconnected agent 
like UNICEF may, at times, be critically dependent on an NGO like MERLIN to provide it 
with information on a specific situation, such as an outbreak of cholera in an IDP camp, for 
example.  
 
Some agents will be poorly connected; for instance, local communities and rural-based or 
small local NGOs may be marginalised because they do not have the resources or connections 
to invest in networking, and as a result they remain on the periphery of the system. Whilst this 
may be of concern to the marginalised agent, it is not necessarily a concern for the 
functioning of the system as a whole because the system is not dependent on all agents being 
equally densely connected. The non-linear nature of the system results in asymmetrical 
dynamics that could see an otherwise marginalised agent having a disproportionate influence 
on a specific decision or process.  
 
If a system loses the overall richness of its interactions it breaks into smaller networks or 
subsystems where such rich connections remain intact. This is what happens when societies 
lapse into violent conflict—the primacy of the larger cohesive identity is lost to, or replaced 
by, a smaller group identity where a sufficient level of rich interactions have survived. Tainter 
(1988:31) refers to this process as a decline in complexity. People may fall back to smaller 
ethnic, language, religious or clan networks. One of the ways in which peacebuilding can be 
framed thus is to think about it as a process aimed at facilitating the re-establishment or the 
emergence of new complex or composite networks. In other words, the aim is to reconnect 
these smaller networks and re-establish the rich interactions among different groups of agents 
so that they can once again regain their former levels of interconnectedness. Alternatively, the 
aim may be to establish new patterns of rich interactions that will allow the self-organisation 
to emerge and thus provide these systems with the internal capacity to manage their own 
peace consolidation. Peacebuilding systems, like other complex systems, thus emerge and are 
maintained as a result of the rich interactions among the agents within the system. 
 
6.5 NON-LINEAR INTERACTIONS 
 
The interactions among the agents in peacebuilding systems are non-linear and asymmetrical. 
The relationships among agents in peacebuilding systems and their ability to influence each 
other are not necessarily dependent on their size, resources or position in the international or 
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local system. The UN does not necessarily lead the other external agents, nor is any given 
government always the most influential voice among the internal agents. Whilst some agents 
may appear to have more power than others because of their mandates, size and resources, 
this does not mean that the smaller agents will always follow their lead or that the more 
powerful agents will always be more influential regarding the outcome in a given context.  
 
Sometimes smaller agents have a comparative advantage and are able to achieve objectives 
that some of the larger agents are unable to achieve. This could be related to their ability to 
specialise and focus on a specific issue, or their ability to be more flexible and thus to be able 
to adapt more quickly than a larger, more bureaucratic counterparts. Perhaps the most stark 
contemporary reminder of the non-linearity in peacebuilding systems, and the asymmetric 
relationships that can come about as a result, is the billion-dollar-a-week stabilisation 
campaign in Afghanistan where more than 130,000 of the best trained, equipped and 
supported NATO and American soldiers supported by millions of dollars of foreign assistance 
were unable to pacify a loosely organised and low-tech insurgency (Suhrke, 2011:226).  
 
Non-linearity also explains why it is impossible to predict, and therefore control, the 
behaviour of complex systems. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, non-linearity does not 
imply randomness or chaos. Complex systems are ordered but not necessarily in a predictable 
way. Instead, the order emerges from the dynamic and non-linear interaction among the 
elements in the system. Causation can only be traced in hindsight. Thus it cannot be predicted 
how a complex system like a particular peacebuilding system will develop into the future, at 
least not beyond a very short horizon. For instance, we may know that lowering the interest 
rate will inject cash into the economy, and we may anticipate that it will stimulate growth, but 
we have no way of knowing exactly how a specific economy in a specific context will 
respond, nor can we know before-hand which effect, including negative or side-effects, such 
an interference with the system will generate. Similarly, in the peacebuilding context we may 
anticipate that broadening political participation may stimulate the democratic process, but we 
cannot know if, in a particular context, this will lead to the further consolidation of the peace 
process, or to a greater risk of political instability. In other words, the non-linearity of 
complex systems means that we cannot assume that the cause-and-effect relationship we have 
observed in one context can be replicated in another context. This insight has profound 
implications for peacebuilding, and our perceived ability to design, plan and execute 
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peacebuilding interventions, and this will also be revisited often in the remainder of the 
dissertation. 
 
6.6 SHORT-RANGE INTERACTIONS 
 
The interactions among the agents in a peacebuilding system usually have a fairly short range, 
in that information is exchanged primarily with ‘neighbours’ in the immediate range of the 
agent. In today’s highly connected and social-networked world, however, one should not 
think in terms of physical or geographic ‘neighbours’ only but also in terms of social and 
institutional proximity. Agents will primarily exchange information with other agents that 
share the same geographical, institutional, thematic and functional spaces.  
 
A humanitarian agent, for instance, is more likely to be exposed to information passing 
through the humanitarian network and is thus more likely to be informed about developments 
in their immediate environment generated by a another humanitarian agency, even from 
further away, than through interactions with agents from another professional grouping in the 
same location.  They may be located within a few hundred yards of, for instance, their 
peacekeeping counterparts or the local political actors, drive past each other daily, meet 
socially occasionally, and interact with the same local community, but their information 
networks, and thus their perception of the situation they find themselves in, are likely to differ 
considerably.  
 
This also implies that the information they are most exposed to, via their e-mail, websites, 
social and professional networks and daily interactions, will be pre-filtered to select the kind 
of information the humanitarian community is likely to be interested in. This also implies that 
a lot of information on other aspects of the situation never reaches the average member of the 
humanitarian community. The information is also likely to be presented and framed according 
to the humanitarian culture, using the language and concepts and framed in the values and 
ethos of that particular group. This will further enhance the group identity and their separate 
sub-culture and make it less likely that they will be exposed to the views and perspectives of 
other such groupings.  Thus there is a certain echo-chamber effect that results in the pre-
selection and re-framing of information within like-minded groups and that results in most of 
the information being exchanged among them because of being within a relatively narrow 
range. 
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However, complex systems are also open systems, and this means that networks interact with 
each other and individuals tend to belong to several networks simultaneously. Another 
network link may imply, for instance, that those working in the same functional area, e.g. 
water and sanitation, may be more richly connected with each other, even if they are from 
different organisations, than with others working in a completely different field, e.g. de-
mining, even if they are working for the same organisation. In other words, a water and 
sanitation expert in Oxfam may be more closely linked to a water and sanitation expert in 
UNICEF, with whom there is frequent contact, than to a colleague in Oxfam, with whom an 
office location is shared, but who works in a completely different field, such as de-mining. 
Such connections that cut across the formal hierarchy of organisations allow information to 
pass among peacebuilding agents in multiple ways and create resilience in the system. It 
means that even when information is not formally shared among organisations, or where the 
formal structure may result in such information taking long to be disseminated, such informal 
connections usually result in the information being shared among critical nodes in these 
organisations anyway. Cross-cutting connections like these also create new flows of feedback, 
further enriching the quality and representativeness of the information that finds its way back 
to the source. 
 
While most interactions among agents in complex systems thus occur within a relatively short 
range, there are multiple networks that interact with each other at any given time, including 
cross-cutting, small group-network connections, that add additional layers of rich and non-
linear inter-linkages among networks in complex systems. This complex network of 
connections results in information flowing not just according to the formal or designed 
hierarchies in the system but also informally across their boundaries. Such un-designed, 
small-world network connections allow short-range information to be exchanged between 
networks, and this kind of information flow is probably as important for the overall 
functioning of the system as the formal or designed hierarchies in the system. This is because 
it creates additional opportunities to obtain feedback and to do so from outside the limitations 
of the relatively ‘predictable’ flow of information within a specific network. It may thus lead 
to new insights or generate new opportunities that the network may not have been exposed to 
otherwise. Furthermore, at times when the system is under pressure and when the normal 
channels of communication may have broken down or are overwhelmed, such cross-cutting 
connections may be useful to open up alternative routes of communication. For instance, 
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during the Arab Spring uprising in Egypt, the ‘informal’ communications between generals in 
the United States and Egypt, who knew each other because they had been together on the 
same training courses, were perhaps as important as the official communication via 
diplomatic channels, for exchanging information between Cairo and Washington D.C. about 
what was happening, and how the two formal systems were likely to react to each other 
during this critical period.     
 
However, whilst such crisis periods may help to expose such phenomena and provide us with 
a momentary insight into their importance, what may be more interesting for us is the 
‘normal’ but unintended effects that such interconnections have on our daily work and lives; 
'normal’ because all of us have many such multiple-network and informal cross-cutting 
connections that inform our daily lives and work, and ‘unintended’, because those 
connections are not part of the acknowledged hierarchies and flow charts and thus usually are 
not taken into consideration when peacebuilding interventions are designed, planned and 
executed. We tend not to be aware of them, and we may think that we act mostly on the basis 
of the information we exchange within our formal or designed hierarchies, but in reality our 
informal information-sharing networks and unintended spur-of-the-moment information 
exchanges with persons representing other networks may turn out to be as important to us as 
our formal networks.  
 
It is this potential for a wide combination of mostly short-range connections that generates the 
asymmetrical and non-linear flow of information in complex peacebuilding systems. 
Peacebuilding agents often generate organisational charts that reflect how they think 
information flows through their organisations or between organisations, but real information 
flows rarely follow these artificial two-dimensional representations. The real flow of 
information takes place across multiple tracks and is much more informal, dynamic, non-
linear and asymmetrical than can be represented in any two-dimensional official hierarchal 
plan or flow-chart. In fact, very few agents would even be aware of, or would be able to 
explain, all the ways in which they send and receive information, even if such an enquiry 
were to be focused on a specific incident.  
 
The point is that the informal, cross-cutting and multiple-network aspects of our information 
exchange experience are all critically important aspects of coping with Complexity.  It may 
thus be ‘abnormal’ from the perspective of someone who thinks that information will and 
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should only flow according to the designed hierarchy, but it is ‘normal’ for someone who 
grasps the functional creativity of non-linearity in complex systems. The influence of the 
information shared in these ways is modulated along the route and it can be enhanced, 
suppressed or altered in a number of ways. This creates an important opportunity for 
coordination, because it implies that the flow and content of the information can be 
potentially influenced along the route. 
 
6.7 FEEDBACK  
 
There are various forms of feedback in complex peacebuilding systems. Positive and negative 
feedback processes, as discussed in Chapter 5, play a critical role in enabling and empowering 
positive drivers or in limiting and inhibiting negative drivers. Some feedback processes are 
formal or conscious efforts to obtain or generate feedback, but most are unconsciously part of 
our day-to-day interaction with peers. Feedback takes place at all levels, and it plays a 
critically important role in adjusting both the most specialised programme and the overall 
peace process or peacebuilding intervention itself. 
 
Many external agencies will undertake some form of needs assessment before they launch 
activities in an attempt to obtain information from the internal agents on their needs, and this 
is often one of the first opportunities, in the context of a specific programme, for the internal 
agents to provide feedback on the expectations and future planning of the external agents. 
 
Once activities or programmes are under way, a monitoring process would typically be in 
place with the aim of collecting and analysing information that can assist those managing the 
programme with assessing what effects the programme is having on the intended 
beneficiaries. This thus is a further example of feedback, i.e. information on the effects that 
the programme is having and that can be used to adjust the programme.  
 
Most donor-funded programmes are normally externally evaluated, either roughly in the 
middle of the programme period or at the end, or both. Peacekeeping missions are regularly 
reviewed by the UN Security Council, and the Secretary-General may also from time to time 
commission a specific evaluation of a mission, for instance to determine whether it is still 
warranted in its current form. These kinds of major evaluations are opportunities to obtain 
feedback on the purpose and value of the programme or mission.  
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Feedback, of course, is also shared much more informally through the daily interactions 
among peacebuilding agents. There are frequent management meetings within organisations 
and coordination meetings among agents, and all of this activity is further supported by a 
range of informal social exchanges, both in person, via e-mail or other forms of 
communication or via social-networking sites. Reports, studies, evaluations and a whole 
range of written or electronic information further serves as means to generate feedback in the 
peacebuilding system. Thus many forms of feedback are simultaneously at work in any 
peacebuilding system. 
 
Feedback is also one of the major tools used by external peacebuilding agents when trying to 
influence the behaviour of societies emerging out of conflict. Most peacebuilding activities 
are feedback-generating activities that are intended to steer or influence the behaviour of the 
society emerging out of conflict. Negative feedback is used to sanction undesirable behaviour, 
whilst positive feedback is used to encourage desirable behaviour. The goal of the 
peacebuilding system is to consolidate the peace process, and the theory of change is that 
peacebuilding activities or programmes contribute to this process by encouraging and 
supporting those forces or drivers in communities that consolidate peace, such as the Rule of 
Law, Security Sector Reform (SSR), democratisation and good governance, whilst 
discouraging those forces and drivers that may result in a resumption of violent conflict, such 
as armed groups, organised crime, corruption, and so forth.   
 
From this perspective, the external peacebuilding intervention acts like a giant thermostat in 
that it uses feedback to regulate the behaviour of the local society within certain parameters. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, systems that are externally controlled are not complex. 
For a system to become self-sustainable it needs to be able to self-organise. External 
peacebuilders should thus guard against interfering so much in the local societies that they 
undermine the ability of such societies to self-organise. Another way to frame peacebuilding 
is thus to think about it as being about stimulating the creation of local institutions and 
processes that enable local feedback to be modulated so that it can become meaningful inputs 
for local self-organising societal processes. Feedback is thus one of the primary tools that 
enable one system to influence another, as well as a critical ingredient in self-organisation, 
and this discussion on how complex systems can be influenced will be addressed in Chapter 
8. 
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6.8 OPEN SYSTEMS 
 
Peacebuilding systems are open systems in that they interact with other systems and their 
environment. In fact, the purpose of the peacebuilding system is to interact with and influence 
the local society with the aim of assisting the society in developing the robustness and 
resilience needed to enable them to withstand pressures, shocks and crises that would 
otherwise result in a (re)lapse into violent conflict. 
 
It is impossible, however, as discussed in Chapter 5, to draw neat boundaries between systems 
that interact with one another. In some contexts it may be useful to think in terms of an 
external peacebuilding system and the local social system it is trying to influence, and many 
forms of analysis do use these terms. However, the international and local systems in reality 
are intertwined, e.g. with local staff working for international organisations or international 
advisors embedded in local ministries, or jointly managed common strategic frameworks, or a 
globalised economy.  
 
Peacebuilding systems can be seen as a conduit for international interaction, in the peace-
development-security context, with local communities, and vice versa. It is open both to the 
local, on one end of the spectrum, and to the wider regional and international communities, on 
the other end of the spectrum, and information flows both ways through the peacebuilding 
system. Peacebuilding systems are thus open systems. 
 
Whilst most system analyses are framed in terms of a system and its environment, this study 
is interested in the interaction between two systems (the internal and external peacebuilding 
systems) that are closely coupled and interconnected, yet also distinct, depending on the 
purpose of the description and analysis presented at a specific point in time and the larger 
environment within which these two systems operate.  
 
The environment can also be scoped to fit the analysis. At times the environment is referred to 
from the perspective of the local system, and from this perspective local and regional factors 
loom larger than global considerations like climate change or global trade. At other times, the 
international context that drives and shapes the behaviour of the external peacebuilding agents 
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is of more interest. The framing of the system, and its environment, is thus determined by the 
observer and the purpose of the observation.  
 
This study frames the peacebuilding system in such a way that it includes all agents that share 
the peace-consolidation objective, regardless of whether they are internal or external. 
However, at the beginning and towards the end of a peacebuilding system’s life cycle, there is 
a need to be able to identify the separate internal and external parts of the system. For 
instance, we say that the success of a peacebuilding intervention is ultimately measured in 
terms of self-sustainability, i.e. the ability of the local system to withstand pressures and 
shocks that threaten relapse into violent conflict on its own strength. Thus, at some point in 
the process there is a need to be able to separately identify what is internal and what is 
external and to design the intervention in such a way that the influence of the external 
becomes less and less critical to the stability of the system.  
 
As discussed earlier, the framing of the peacebuilding system and what is regarded as external 
and internal to the system will depend on the context and the purpose of the framing. The 
openness of the system therefore is one of those aspects that make peacebuilding systems 
complex. It would have been much easier if it were possible to make clear distinctions, draw 
neat boundaries around the various parts of the peacebuilding system, and plan and act 
according to these. In fact, many do, but when they do the imposition of such artificial 
distinctions will have consequences, many of which are likely to be unintended, and they are 
likely to further contribute to the complexity of peacebuilding systems. 
 
6.9 FAR FROM EQUILIBRIUM 
 
Peacebuilding systems are likely to operate under conditions characterised by a high degree of 
turbulence in the system. The local social system is likely to be under pressure as a result of 
the conflict, and it could potentially develop along many different potential future paths. The 
aim of the peacebuilding system is to help the local social system to reduce the number of 
paths it is able to take, so that the range of options ultimately is reduced to a relatively safer 
range of options. The primary aim is to help the local system to avoid those options that may 
lead to a (re)lapse into violent conflict.  
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However, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, and as further explored in this chapter, the aim of 
the peacebuilding system is not to achieve order, if order is understood, in complex-systems 
terms, to mean a stable state or equilibrium. A stable state in this context would imply a 
system where all the agents are locked into specific roles and where all are in agreement with 
one another about the function of the overall system and their place in it. Although it is 
possible to think about such a rule-based or mathematical system as a thought experiment, 
such a stable state cannot exist in any social or biological system. For complex social systems 
to survive and thrive without (re)lapsing into violent conflict, they need to be vibrant, robust, 
resilient, flexible and adaptive. They need to be vibrant in the sense that they need to generate 
multiple options for responding to emerging challenges. They need to be robust in 
withstanding such challenges and flexible in responding to them. And they need to be able to 
adapt to changes in their environment. Peacebuilding systems, and the social systems they are 
meant to assist, operate in highly dynamic and non-linear environments.  
 
External peacebuilding systems aim to assist local social systems to develop the capacity to 
survive and thrive in such environments, and this implies a capacity to self-organise, and to 
continuously adapt, adjust and co-evolve, in response to how their peers are developing, and 
to changes in the larger environment within which the local conflict system exists.  The aim is 
thus not to develop stability if that is understood to mean static or a controlled-stable-state 
system, but rather to develop a system that can adapt and respond to the complexity it is 
anticipated to face, so that its stability is derived from its ability to adapt to change without 
losing its essential form, and without collapsing into violent conflict.  
 
The peacebuilding system itself is also constantly in flux. It is by definition temporary in that 
the system is brought about for the specific purpose of consolidating the peace in a given 
context, and it will at some point cease to exist – once that purpose has been achieved. New 
agents join or leave the system depending on the perceived phase of the process. There may, 
for instance, be an emphasis on the security and humanitarian dimensions in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, but the emphasis is likely to shift to state building and economic and 
social recovery once the situation has been sufficiently stabilised. Different peacebuilding 
agents come and go over time, and new agents may take the lead in different phases. Many 
peacebuilding interventions may experience a time period dominated by preoccupation with 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. In another time 
period all the agents may be preoccupied with preparing for an election. During the build-up 
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to these periods new agents flow into the system, and once these periods have passed, they 
leave again. 
 
The point is that these peace processes are fluid, and the result is that those that are engaged 
with them are also continuously adjusting and adapting to the changing situation. This has 
implications not only for the various organisations that are involved, but also for the 
conceptual and theoretical tools that are used to interpret each of these phases, as well as the 
process as a whole.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there will always be some tension between local and international 
agents about who should lead specific aspects of the peacebuilding activities or programmes 
and among the local agents there will be a political process under way to determine who, at 
any time, should be the leading local political agents. The external peacebuilding system, the 
local social conflict system and the local, regional and international environments within 
which they all function are all highly dynamic, non-linear and far from equilibrium. This 
dynamic environment has important implications for coherence, some of which have already 
been highlighted in Chapter 3, and this chapter returns to and considers these implications 
from various additional perspectives. 
 
6.10 HISTORY 
 
In the peacebuilding context we not only have to take the specific history of the country or 
region into account, but also the history of the international engagement with the particular 
social system affected by conflict. Although the recent history may have brought about a 
specific peacebuilding intervention, there is likely to be a longer history of pre-conflict 
international engagement with the specific social system, and there may even have been 
previous peacekeeping or peacebuilding interventions. The current conflict cycle may not 
have come about as the result of a new, unique set of circumstances; there may have been a 
history of violent conflict, and the current outbreak may be a relapse following an earlier 
peace agreement. Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone are recent examples of countries that have 
gone through several cycles of conflict, followed by international intervention, followed by a 
relapse of conflict, and by yet further interventions (UN, 2000b, 2001d, 2003b, 2004b, 2008a 
& 2009).  
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The peacebuilding system is also defined by the potential futures of the post-conflict social 
system, because it is the ideas or theories of what potential future peaceful social systems may 
look like and how they could come about that informs the design and operations of the 
peacebuilding system. The peacebuilding system thus continuously experiences the ever-
changing present, as informed by its past and its potential future.  
 
Peacebuilding is ultimately about social systems, and social systems need to have a history for 
them to generate a commonly shared identity and to have developed common norms, values 
and cultural processes. This implies that time is required for change to emerge, and this has 
implications for the speed at which any social change process can take hold. At a minimum it 
is probable that meaningful social change will require several iterations – several evolutionary 
cycles of adjustment – in order to generate a new state that can be said to be embedded in the 
shared social norms and behaviour of a society. The shorter this period, the more unstable, in 
terms of the likelihood of reversal or relapse, the change is likely to be, because the new 
norms would have had less time to be deeply embedded in the social fabric of the society. It 
would have had less time to be widely disseminated through society. It would have had less 
time to become embedded in the institutions of the society, and the society would have had 
less time to build up a rich body of precedents, experience and established practices with the 
new norms. In other words, for new norms and values to be established, a society must build 
up a rich experience of engagement with such norms. It is only when a body of knowledge 
about how such norms have been useful in a wide range of scenarios have been developed and 
integrated into the common history of the society that one can regard such norms as being an 
integral part of the culture. The longer this period of change is sustained the more lasting and 
self-sustainable it is likely to be, because the new norms, values, structures and processes will 
have had more time to become deeply embedded into the social fabric of the society. For 
instance, although South Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996, it will most likely take 
several decades for it to be fully reflected in the laws of the country and in the culture of the 
society, as these new norms and values have to be lived, tested and contested (in the 
Constitutional Court and in the public debate), for the body of laws and the country’s 
institutions to adapt accordingly. This perspective on the need for history and on the time it 
takes for social change to take hold is an important factor to take into consideration when 
analysing complex peacebuilding systems. It will be revisited often.  
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At the same time, peacebuilding as an internationally agreed-upon form of action to 
consolidate peace in countries emerging from conflict has a history, a current set of 
experiences, and an envisioned future to which this study aims to contribute. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, peacebuilding as a practice is constantly undergoing change and the history of its 
past experiences, including its successes and failures, influences what it is able to do, and how 
it is perceived in any given context. 
 
6.11 LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
Each peacebuilding agent responds only to the information that is available to it locally. As 
discussed earlier, many of the agents in a peacebuilding system may not be aware that they 
are regarded as being part of a peacebuilding system and that the successful achievement of 
their objectives depends on others also making their respective contributions so that the 
overall peacebuilding effect can be achieved. They thus act only on the basis of their own 
context and perspective and in their own interest.  
 
Herbert Simon (1962) has coined the term ‘bounded rationality’ to explain that although 
agents may act rationally, that rationality is based on their own cognitive space. This means 
that their actions may be rational from their own perspectives, but may not be rational from 
the perspective of the commons or the wider system. For instance, a local contractor engaged 
in a World Bank road building project will not necessarily be conscious of the fact that he is 
making a critical contribution to consolidating the peace in a country emerging out of conflict. 
Such contractors will probably perceive their own action purely in the context of a profit-
seeking commercial venture. Some of those working for the World Bank agency responsible 
for funding the road-building project may also not necessarily see the project as part of a 
larger peacebuilding system. They may approach it purely in the context of investing in the 
infrastructure necessary for long-term, pro-poor development. Those World Bank planners 
and managers participating in the development of the integrated strategic peacebuilding 
framework for the country in question, probably in the form of a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS), are more likely to see the various programmes and activities supported by the World 
Bank as contributing to such an overall peacebuilding system.  
 
As this example demonstrates, it is not necessary for an agent to be aware of the system of 
which they are part in order to be considered part of it. It is enough for them to act on their 
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local knowledge, because the self-organisation of the system as a whole comes about as a 
result of the overall effect of the dynamic and non-linear inter-relationships among the 
peacebuilding agents.  
 
Those engaged in peacebuilding interventions are generally impatient, so they try to modulate 
specific change processes so as to achieve the fastest possible change. One way in which this 
is done is to facilitate the exchange of information among the agents by increasing coherence. 
The theory of change is that the more the agents are aware of the common undertaking and 
their respective roles in it, the more they will adapt their respective actions to each other and 
to the perceived change of the system as a whole. The idea is that this should ultimately result 
in the whole change process taking place faster than if it were just left to its own natural 
cycles of mutual influence. Some of the limitations inherent in this coherence theory have 
already been pointed out in Chapter 3, and the implications of complexity for coherence will 
be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
The application of Cilliers’ ten characteristics of complex systems to the peacebuilding 
context has now been discussed. On the basis of the issues considered and presented in this 
section, it is found that peacebuilding systems can indeed be considered to be complex in the 
way this concept is understood in Complexity science.  
 
6.12 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it was suggested that peacebuilding systems are complex in the way 
Complexity is understood in the study of complex systems. The characteristics of 
Complexity, as introduced in Chapter 5, were applied to the peacebuilding context  , and it 
was concluded that peacebuilding systems are indeed complex in the way this concept is 
understood in Complexity.  
 
In this study the aim is to explore whether using a complex-systems approach will be useful 
for generating new insights into  the peacebuilding coherence dilemma and so improve our 
understanding of how to cope with complex peacebuilding systems. In order to do so, it was 
necessary to establish whether peacebuilding is indeed complex. Having done so, the 
implications of Complexity for peacebuilding in general, and the coherence dilemma in 
particular, will be explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY FOR PEACEBUILDING 
 
 
 
Creating the conditions for sustainable peace and economic growth in a country that lacks 
such conditions is one of the most difficult intellectual and policy puzzles imaginable. It has 
all the features of a “wicked problem,” too complex and indeterminate to be modelled in its 
entirety and therefore defying straightforward solutions. Indeed, the greatest danger for 
peacebuilding practitioners and academics alike may be a hubristic combination of 
overconfidence plus insufficient or unreliable knowledge. (Paris, 2011c) 
 
For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat and wrong. Attributed to 
H.L. Menken. (Berdal & Wennmann, 2010:7) 
 
The idea of a universal and common history of mankind, with European societies as a 
benchmark, can be traced back to the Enlightenment. It was shaped by Descartes’ rationalistic 
philosophy and the separation of mind and matter. As a consequence, this so-called ‘modern 
view’ considers social processes as being measurable and controllable. (Körppen, Ropers & 
Giessmann, 2011:82) 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
At this juncture it may be useful to summarize the argument up to this point. So far in this 
thesis peacebuilding, coherence and the factors that hinder coherence were discussed, 
Complexity was introduced, and it was established that peacebuilding is Complex. In this 
chapter, a number of implications of Complexity for peacebuilding will be considered. 
Methodologically, these implications will be generated by comparing the prevalent, dominant 
approach to peacebuilding – what will be termed the ‘deterministic-design’ approach – with a 
‘complex-systems’ approach. ‘Deterministic-design’ will be used to refer to the theory of 
change most widely used and applied by the contemporary peacebuilding policy community, 
namely one where policy makers and practitioners are confident in: 
(i) their ability to analyse and identify ‘the problem’ in a given situation;  
(ii) their ability to design an intervention in response, i.e. ‘the solution’ that will solve the 
problem; and  
(iii) their ability to implement remedial programmes that administer these solutions with a 
view to solving these problems.  
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Susskind (2010:367) refers to this approach as “instrumental rationality”, as it reflects the 
belief that the conflict systems we are dealing with are rule-based linear systems that are open 
to manipulation once the causes of the conflict have been identified.  
 
The ‘complex-systems’ approach differs from the ‘determined-design’ approach in that it 
questions the linear assumptions underlying the problem-solving approach when dealing with 
complex peacebuilding systems. This scepticism is based on what has been learnt about 
complex systems in Chapter 5, namely that the behaviour of a complex system cannot be 
predicted beyond a very short horizon because the behaviour of a complex system emerges as 
a result of the nonlinear and dynamic interactions among the agents in the system. In complex 
systems, causality is emergent, rather than determined.  
 
The implications of Complexity for peacebuilding will be discussed under four different 
themes. The first looks at the implications of a complex systems approach for approaching 
peace from a problem-solving perspective. The second considers the implications of 
approaching conflict with a stabilisation bias. The third looks at considerations of time, pace 
and positioning from a Complexity perspective, and the fourth  looks at the implications of a 
complex systems approach for coherence.  
 
7.2 RELEVANCE OF COMPLEXITY FOR PEACEBUILDING SYSTEMS 
 
As explained in Chapter 2 and discussed in the preceding chapters, the dominant 
peacebuilding theory among the contemporary peacebuilding policy community is the liberal 
peace theory that posits that societies achieve sustainable peace once they have arrived at a 
level of development where their norms and institutions reflect and maintain multiparty 
democracy, a free-market economy, individual human rights and the rule of law.  Donais 
(2012:5) describes the liberal peace model not only “as the gold standard of good governance, 
but also as the most secure foundation for sustainable peace”.  
 
Those that support a liberal peace theory of change believe that societies that have not yet 
reached this level of development can be assisted through peacebuilding interventions to 
adopt these norms and to build these institutions (Lidén, 2009:617). Eriksen (2009:662) 
points out that the liberal peace theory is a ‘deterministic-design’ model, i.e. a causal model 
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where the outcome is more or less guaranteed if the design is followed, and Körppen et al. 
(2011:82) elaborate: 
It is assumed that social change is a linear process based on a set of certain developmental 
stages aligned on a linear timeline. The development of a society is seen as a chronological 
procedure in which specific criteria need to be fulfilled . . . . It is assumed that the more 
developed and civilized a society is, the less violence will be used for solving problems . . . . 
Conflict-prone societies are characterized by chaos and disorder, while the democracies in the 
West are symbols for order and stability. 
 
Liberal-peace policy makers are confident in their agency to diagnose the problems affecting 
a society emerging from conflict, and currently it is popular for that diagnosis to essentially 
boil down to finding that states are fragile because their institutions are weak (World Bank, 
2011).  Frauke de Weijer (2011) argues that “the field of international development is still 
based on the presumption that institutional change can be planned, directed and managed 
according to a predetermined plan.”  Astri Suhrke (2011:118) agrees and adds that the liberal 
peace advocates had developed a hubristic sense of confidence:  
The international aid community had by this time developed significant confidence in its ability 
to assist statebuilding in post-war situations. It had, after all, been done before, most 
ambitiously and recently in the Balkans and East Timor. A professional cadre of international 
civil servants with experience from earlier post-conflict situations and a large number of NGO 
workers had developed. Their role was enhanced by a growing body of empirically based 
statebuilding literature which extolled the possibilities of social engineering. 
 
In fact, the very concept of peace ‘building’ suggest an engineering model—it suggests that 
peace is something that can be ‘built’, which implies that it can be designed, engineered and 
planned. The assumption is that such a plan can then be executed with a reasonable 
expectation that the end product will look like the original design, in the same way that an 
architect can design a building and oversee its construction according to the design. The 
creativity resides in the design; the rest is just logistics – the process of matching resources 
and capacities: 
The international community is assumed to be highly likely to succeed, provided only that it has 
the right strategy, resources, and confidence. In the words of an eminent British general, 
intervention “is doable, if we get the formula right and it is properly resourced” (Stewart & 
Knaus, 2011:xviii). 
 
It is thus also not surprising, as discussed in Chapter 3, that when things go wrong the 
problems are most often considered to be due to shortcomings in the implementation of the 
design or plan. The problem is most often assumed to lie with the technical aspects or the 
‘logistics’ of the implementation (De Coning, 2011). The solution offered is most often a 
redoubling of efforts to make the design work, hence the emphasis on coherence as a critical 
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tool to ensure that the effort to execute the design is coordinated, sequenced and 
synchronized, as planned. The following quote from Gelot & Söderbaum (2011:77) is 
illustrative of this approach:  
The literature on intervention from the outside often focus on the constraints on strategy or 
implementation, be they the lack of political will, the under-financing of missions, insufficient 
force, poor logistics, coordination problems between actors, or the dilemma of civil and military 
forces interacting, which in turn lead to legitimacy and authority problems, and undesirable 
outcomes. Good outcomes, it is assumed, follow from getting the technical or operational side 
of things right…. By focusing on cases, typologies or mission-specific operational and 
institutional constrains, the analysis is rarely embedded in the local and national context and 
rarely considers those intervened upon as acting subjects. The aims are to explain what went 
well or less well and to improve the instruments for intervention. 
 
 
What, then, is the alternative to the determined-design approach? The remainder of this 
chapter, and indeed of the dissertation, is dedicated to answering this question by providing 
one possible alternative approach, namely a complex-systems approach. In the previous 
chapter it was established that peacebuilding systems are complex. In this chapter, some of 
the characteristics of Complexity will be applied to the peacebuilding context and the 
implications discussed.  
 
The complex-systems approach rejects the notion that a peacebuilding intervention can set in 
motion and control to any degree of certainty a causal sequence of events that will result in a 
predetermined outcome. A complex system continuously evolves in response to both external 
interferences and feedback generated by the system itself. The way the system will respond to 
external interference can thus not be predetermined with any certainty beyond a very short 
horizon. The creativity of the system, i.e. the ability of the system to respond in ways that 
cannot be predicted or controlled, resides in the ability of the system to self-organise. It is 
therefore able to adapt and evolve on its own in response to changes elsewhere in the system 
and its environment.  
 
The critical difference between these two approaches lies in the locus of the agency in each 
system. In the determined-design model the agency resides in the design process and thus 
with the external designer. In the complex-systems approach, the agency resides in the self-
organising capacity of the local system. When the interactions among the agents achieve a 
certain level of intensity and interconnectedness, self-organisation starts to emerge and 
through this process local context-specific institutions and social processes emerge that help 
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the society to maintain itself through adaptation to and co-evolution with its environment. 
From the perspective of the internal agents, the external agents are part of the environment 
with which they are in continuous interaction. They are stimulated and constrained by various 
influences in their environment.  
 
Before proceeding, a note on the use of the concept ‘interference’: This concept is introduced 
at this stage because the comparison between a deterministic-design model and a complex-
systems approach is essentially about two different theories of interference. By using the 
word ‘interference’, the fact is highlighted that the theory of change adopted in the 
peacebuilding context assumes that there is a ‘local’ or ‘internal’ system that is the subject of 
an intervention by an ‘international’ or ‘external’ system. As discussed in Chapter 2, the aim 
of a peacebuilding process is peace consolidation, i.e. the purpose of the interference is to 
manipulate the internal system so that it does not relapse into violent conflict.  
 
Using the term ‘interference’ also reminds us of the moral and ethical dimensions of 
peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is about purposefully interfering in the social system of a 
society emerging out of conflict. It takes place in an international system that values 
sovereignty and the right to self-determination, and such interventions thus need to be 
recognised as extraordinary. As discussed in Chapter 2, these interventions are controversial 
because many in the Global South argue that the North is manipulating the UN and other 
institutions, through their donor assistance, research and technical expertise, to promote a 
specific Western agenda, namely the liberal peace theory (Lidén, Mac Ginty & Richmond, 
2009; Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009).  In addition, there has also been a ‘do no harm’ 
debate within the peacebuilding community (Anderson, 1999), as well as an argument that 
peacebuilding interventions can generate perverse and unintended consequences (Aoi, De 
Coning & Thakur, 1997; De Weijer, 2011). By using the term ‘interference’ we are thus 
reminding ourselves of the moral concerns and ethical responsibilities that taking on this 
extraordinary task imposes on the peacebuilders. The ethical dimension of peacebuilding is 
addressed in Chapter 9. 
 
For now, the implications of Complexity for peacebuilding are explored by discussing the 
four themes introduced earlier, and the first theme to be considered is the relevance of the 
problem-solving approach when dealing with complex peacebuilding systems. 
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7.3 SOLVING THE PEACE PROBLEM 
 
Chapman (2002:26) differentiates between two types of social problems, namely ‘difficult’ 
ones and ‘messy’ ones. Problems in the ‘difficult’ category have some similarity to the 
characteristics of the kind of problems referred to in Chapter 4 as ‘complicated’, whilst 
problems in the ‘messy’ category can, for the purpose of this comparison, be regarded as 
similar to what is meant with ‘complex’ phenomena in this dissertation. With ‘difficult’ 
problems, there is usually broad agreement on the nature of the problem and some shared 
understanding of what a solution to the problem would look like, and the problem-solving 
process is bounded in terms of the time and resources required for its solution. Problems in 
the ‘messy’ category, on the other hand, are characterised by a lack of clarity or agreement as 
to what exactly the problem is and by uncertainty as to what any solution may look like. For 
example, establishing and maintaining an electricity grid in Monrovia is ‘difficult’, but 
building sustainable peace in Liberia is ‘messy’.  
 
What Chapman refers to as ‘messy’ problems is also known in the public policy planning 
literature as ‘wicked’ problems. Innes and Booher (2010:9) explain that wicked problems are 
problems that have no right or best solution. Rittel and Webber (1973) first coined the term in 
the context of social policy planning and have suggested ten characteristics of wicked 
problems. Jeff Conklin (2005) and Kenneth Menkhaus (2010) further refined this list of 
characteristics. A combination of these, using descriptions that the writer regards as best to 
illustrate how wicked problems can be understood in the peacebuilding context, follows: 
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. The problem is not understood 
until after it has been resolved, if ever. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. A 
stopping rule refers to a specified limit of options in probability theory. In this case, 
since there is no definitive ‘problem’ there can be no definitive ‘solution’. Thus the 
problem solving never stops. Some analysts have, however, suggested what amounts to 
a new stopping rule for wicked problems, namely ‘good enough’ outcomes. (‘Good 
enough’ options were introduced in Chapter 2 and are discussed in more detail again 
later.) 
2. Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, but they may have better or worse 
outcomes. It is difficult to objectively determine what is better or worse, as these are 
judgements made in a social context and differences in values and goals will lead to 
different choices (Menkhaus, 2010:86). (This phenomenon is discussed in Chapter 4 in 
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the context of the inherent limitations to coherence caused by competing values and 
goals.) 
3. There is no immediate, and no ultimate, test of a solution to a wicked problem. 
4. Every wicked problem is novel and unique, and every solution to a wicked problem is 
a‘one-shot operation’, i.e. it only works in that particular context and there is thus no 
opportunity to learn by trial and error. This has specific implications for the ‘lessons 
learned’ and ‘best practices’ approaches that are commonly followed in the 
peacebuilding community to assist in organisational learning processes and will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
5. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. 
6. A wicked problem can be explained (analysed) in numerous ways – there is no one 
correct way of explaining or assessing it. The choice of explanation determines the 
nature of the problem. 
 
The purpose of identifying and recognising some problems as messy is not to suggest that 
they cannot be meaningfully addressed. The purpose is to make policy makers, planners and 
practitioners aware of the pitfalls of the determined-design model when dealing with complex 
problems. It is meant to caution them to not treat complex phenomena with the same tools 
they use to treat difficult problems. The message is that, to meaningfully address complex 
situations, they need to develop policy responses that are appropriate for the context 
(Chapman, 2002:26). Hughes (2012) argues, however, that the international community 
“continues to plan, implement and evaluate peace operations as though they were about tame 
problems – somehow afforded with well-defined stopping points, solutions that could be 
‘objectively’ arrived at and evaluated, and existing in stable and thus predictable 
environments” (110).   
 
Kenneth J. Menkhaus (2010) specifically applies the concept of wicked problems to fragile 
states. For him the opposite of ‘wicked’ problems are ‘tame’ problems, and his description of 
what constitutes a ‘tame’ problem also serves as a good description of what is referred to as 
the ‘deterministic-design’ model:  
Contrast this (wicked problem) inventory with a portrait of a tame problem, which possesses a 
well-defined and stable problem statement; has a well-defined stopping point, where the 
solution has been reached; has a solution that can be objectively evaluated as right or wrong; 
belongs to a class of similar problems that are all solved in a similar way; offers solutions that 
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are easily tried and abandoned; and comes with a limited set of alternative solutions (Menkhaus, 
2010:86).
31
 
 
Chapman (2002:27) states that when a problem is difficult, “an individual claiming to have 
the solution is an asset, but when the problem is a mess that individual is usually a large part 
of the problem.” Chapman is referring here to one of the first important implications for 
peacebuilding we can draw from Complexity and the work that has been done on messy and 
wicked problems, namely an awareness of the limits of our ability to fully understand 
complex systems (De Coning, 2011; De Weijer, 2010).
32
 This is what Michael Barnett, 
quoted in Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann (2011:225), refers to as cultivating “a spirit of 
epistemological uncertainty”. Hughes expands on this notion and specifically applies it to the 
peacebuilding context when he says: 
An explicit, reflexive awareness of the incompleteness of our understanding is therefore vital so 
that decisions are taken with a large degree of caution (and humility) while at the same time 
demanding that we think through the possible ramifications (Hughes, 2012:116). 
 
Popolo (2011:209) places particular emphasis on uncertainty being an intrinsic quality of 
nature. He argues that Foucault, Bergson and Prigogine sought to offer an epistemic-based 
understanding of Complexity as a knowledge framework that relies on time irreversibility 
(thus undermining one of the axes of modernity, that is, linear time) and on a notion of open 
systems (thus undermining the other axis, that is, analytical finitude) in order to produce 
‘uncertain knowledge’, where uncertainty is regarded and accepted as an intrinsic quality of 
nature, and not as a result of imperfect knowledge. 
 
Innes and Booher (2010:10) argue that, because “causality cannot be definitively established 
and because the system is constantly subject to unanticipated change, the idea of a best 
solution is a mirage.” It is not possible to find the ‘right’, ‘true’, or ‘correct’ solution to a 
complex problem. In fact, the very use of the terms ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ is problematic in 
the context of complex systems. While Chapman, Rittel, Webber, Conklin and Menkhaus 
chose to use these concepts in their descriptions of messy and wicked problems, the aim in 
this dissertation is to go beyond the problem-solving trap. In order to truly transcend the 
                                                 
31
 It should be stressed that identifying some problems as messy, wicked or complex does not give policy 
planners the right to be wrong. As discussed in Chapter 5, Complexity is not an excuse for the policy choices 
being made to address wicked and messy problems. Planners should be accountable for the consequences of 
their designs, and the purpose of identifying some problems as messy or wicked is to alert planners to the nature 
of these problems so that they can adjust their policy responses accordingly. 
32
 The implications of Complexity for our ability to fully know or understand complex phenomena was 
introduced in Chapter 5, and specifically discussed in section 5.6 on Complexity and epistemology 
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determined-design paradigm and its underlying assumptions, including its problem-solving 
approach, one must make a conscious choice to use alternative concepts when describing the 
phenomena addressed in a complex systems approach to peacebuilding.  
 
In effect, one should not see peace as a problem to solve. It is necessary to recognise that 
peace is not something in the tame or difficult category. Beyond negative peace, i.e. beyond 
the absence of violent conflict, there is no right or wrong peace. Positive peace does not, in 
any given context, have a stopping rule. From a complex-systems perspective the argument 
will be that peace is emergent and thus has to be context specific. Making choices about a 
‘good enough’ peace, about whether specific policy choices have resulted in better or worse 
outcomes, can thus ultimately only be made by those that are embedded in that context.   
 
From a subjective policy perspective, i.e. from the perspective of a self-interested 
peacebuilding agent, one can perhaps talk about an undesirable state, based on the negative 
impact such a state is perceived to have on, for instance, a society or parts of that society. One 
can also talk about better or worse approaches, i.e. a scale of policy responses that range from 
having improved the situation from the perspective of what the policy set out to achieve on 
the one end of the scale, to policy approaches that made things worse on the other end. But 
one cannot talk about problems and solutions as if there are right, correct or best solutions to a 
problem that are just waiting to be discovered. The second implication for peacebuilding from 
Complexity is thus that one cannot have a definitive ‘problem’ or ‘solution’ in a complex 
peacebuilding system, and one should thus not attempt to ‘solve’ it with design 
methodologies aimed at identifying and applying such problems and solutions.  
 
The complex-systems approach is sensitive to how complex systems process information, 
self-organise and adapt. In contrast to the reductionist approach, a complex-systems approach 
needs to be systemic, i.e. its analysis of the causes and triggers of the conflict should aim to 
be comprehensive and holistic. The reductionist approach seeks to reduce all possible causal 
influences to a few most significant causes that can then be prioritised, given assumptions 
regarding time and resource constraints. A complex-systems approach seeks to understand 
how various conflict factors are interconnected and interrelated.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the argument is not that the reductionist approach is redundant, but 
rather that it is not sufficient. In addition to analysing the most significant elements, it is also 
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necessary to understand how the elements are interconnected when dealing with complex 
systems and to be particularly interested in their emergent behaviour. As discussed 
previously, emergence and self-organising behaviour cannot be detected, considered or 
understood by analysing the elements of a system in isolation from one another and the 
system of which they form part. Thus, the reductionist approach needs to be complemented 
and augmented with methods that seek to understand the patterns, trends and processes that 
indicate how the system works as a whole, as well as with recognition of our inability to 
comprehend the complexity of the system. And this implies that we can never generate one 
definitive analysis of a situation. Instead, the analysis needs to be a continuous and iterative 
cyclical process of analysis, adjustment, experimentation, feedback, analysis, readjustment, 
etc.  Bryn Hughes (2012:108) refers to Peter Coleman who says that the main contribution of 
a complex-systems approach is “that it shifts our understanding away from static, simplified 
views of conflict” and helps us to appreciate the “complex, multilevel, dynamic, and cyclical 
nature of these phenomena.” 
 
Owen Barber (2011) argues that wicked problems are solved by evolution, not by design and 
that a complex system continuously adapts, through experimentation and feedback. It is a 
never-ending process of adaptation to a dynamic environment. In contrast with the 
deterministic-design model, the complex -ystems approach recognises that change is an 
emergent process. If one wishes to influence a complex system one needs to work with its 
ability to adapt by trying to stimulate the system, and this requires an evolutionary and 
experimental approach. Instead of trying to design a problem-solution causal chain, the 
complex-systems approach may experiment with multiple parallel interventions so that it can 
consider which of these works better. This is essentially the way natural selection works in 
evolution and, as Owen Barber (2011) points out, the two key factors are variation and 
selection. There needs to be variation among the multiple parallel interventions, and there 
needs to be a selection process that replicates and multiplies successful interventions and 
discontinues those that do not work. For instance, a donor may choose to support a number of 
programmes that have more or less the same aim, such as reintegration, for instance, but each 
programme may have a different approach as to how the aim can be achieved.  The donor 
may also recognise that, as the system will constantly change and adapt to the programmes, it 
may be necessary to invest in a capacity to proactively monitor for feedback and adapt the 
interventions that are supported accordingly. The donor needs to have a process for 
abandoning those programmes that have no effect or negative effects and a process for 
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modulating those that seem to generate the better outcomes. Those that appear to have the 
desired effects should be replicated, but also varied so that there is a continuous process of 
experimentation with a range of options, coupled with a continuous process of selection and 
refinement. This is an iterative process that never ends. It can never arrive at ‘the best’ or ‘the 
correct’ solution, because the conflict system is constantly changing and adapting to its 
environment, including to the interventions.  
 
A complex-systems approach also needs to cultivate an awareness that those interventions 
that are showing results today will not continue to do so indefinitely, and it thus needs to be 
sensitive to signs that indicate that these interventions are no longer having the desired effect. 
A complex-systems approach also needs to be aware that complex systems will not only 
respond in predictable ways to external interventions, but they will also respond in many 
unpredictable ways. One thus needs to monitor for unintended consequences and be ready to 
take steps to try to deal with the perverse effects that may come about as a result of the 
intervention.  
 
This is a significantly different approach from the deterministic-design model, where the aim 
is to monitor whether the intervention is having the desired effect, i.e. one knows what effect 
one intends to stimulate with the intervention, and one focuses the monitoring effort on 
determining whether that effect is achieved. The determined-design model tends to be blind to 
unintended consequences or emergent behaviour that may be totally unrelated to the intended 
effect of the intervention. The determined-design model also tends to create false feedback in 
that agents, once they know how their results will be monitored, tend to alter their 
programming so that they can ‘hit the targets’, i.e. alter their activities in such a way that they 
can best influence the measurements that will be used to monitor the results. The focus thus 
shifts from trying to achieve a desired goal to trying to influence the way the results will be 
measured. In some cases this may be the same thing, but in others such a shift in focus is 
likely to generate unintended consequences (De Coning & Romita, 2009). The third 
implication for peacebuilding from Complexity is that the reductionist approach needs to be 
complemented and augmented with a complex-systems approach that seeks to understand the 
patterns, trends and processes that hint at how the system works as a whole. It does so, in part, 
by experimenting with multiple parallel interventions and by being open to a broad spectrum 
of feedback.  
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Strand (2007:196) suggests another useful perspective on the tension between complex and 
complicated problems in the governance context. He distinguishes between ‘practical 
problems’ defined in terms of ultimate purpose questions such as how best to stimulate 
human welfare, and ‘technical problems’ defined in terms of specifications, such as 
measuring growth in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). He argues that modern 
societies are characterised by the strategy of trying to reduce practical problems to technical 
problems.  
 
The pattern Strand describes can be clearly observed in the peacebuilding context, as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, where the focus has shifted away from nation building, 
national reconciliation and support of constitutional processes, towards ‘technical problems’ 
such as Security Sector Reform, Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and 
Rule of Law (De Coning, 2011). This is probably because policy makers have started to 
realise that their ability to shape practical problems, by using the deterministic-design model 
is limited. In response, they have chosen rather to refocus on those aspects that they have 
more agency over when using the determined-design model, namely the technical aspects of 
their own interventions (Hughes, 2012). This shift in the focus of the policy-planning 
community has meant that, instead of concentrating on understanding the system they are 
trying to influence, the policy planners have chosen to direct their efforts to the tactics, 
techniques and practices of how they undertake their own interventions (De Coning, 2011).  
 
For instance, instead of working with a society to assist them in the process of developing an 
indigenous judicial system that is based on local culture, custom and institutions, 
contemporary peacebuilding interventions have been focused on reforming local judicial 
systems and police functions through providing advice on the formal structure, management 
processes, training and equipment of the ministries of justice and the police services. Strand 
(2007) refers to the former as ‘practical’ problems, and to the latter as ‘technical’ problems, 
because contemporary peacebuilders are primarily concerned about the logistics of delivering 
training and consultancy services. They regard the substance of their advice as value-free, or 
technical.  He and others, such as Hughes (2012), argue that the technical solutions the 
peacebuilders offer have little or no practical value for the ordinary people. The ordinary 
people observe lots of activity, but it does not seem to affect their daily practical experience. 
Donais (2012:149) refers to this point when he draws attention to the relationship between 
contemporary peacebuilding practice and “the everyday”:  
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The inability of the liberal peacebuilding project to deliver on its promises of stability and 
prosperity is felt most acutely – and most bitterly – by the citizens of war-torn states, many of 
whose lived experiences continue to be marred by chronic insecurity, grinding poverty, and 
diminishing hopes for the future. 
 
The ‘technical’ approach seems to have resulted in a closed-loop or eco-chamber effect where 
the policy makers, planners and practitioners have become preoccupied with the constant 
redesigning of their own planning and monitoring techniques, and with trying to monitor 
whether their plans have been implemented in accordance with their own standards. Oliver 
Richmond (2009:558) agrees and points out that local perceptions of the liberal peace project 
in many post-war environments “indicate it to be ethically bankrupt, subject to double 
standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling 
and insensitive towards its subjects”.  
 
It thus seems that when the external actors realized that they are not able to generate the kind 
of short- to medium-term tangible change in the societies that they were working with, they 
shifted their attention to those aspects they could change – using the determined-design 
model, namely their own organisational structure, mechanisms, tools, tactics, techniques and 
practices. By constantly reorganising themselves and the way they operated, they created a 
sense of meaningful engagement that matched the determined-design model, i.e. they could 
identify problems within their own organisational structures or practices, design solutions, 
and implement those solutions and show real results over time in the form of new structures, 
policies, tools, handbooks, guidelines, and so forth.  
 
The ‘technical problem’ approach has gone so far that some external actors have all but given 
up on trying to monitor the impact they are having on the societies they are trying to influence 
(De Coning & Romita, 2009). Instead, they are focusing on those things they have agency 
over, such as monitoring whether their outputs are delivered against standards and 
specifications. The underlying theory of change remains unchanged, but the focus is now on 
perfecting the implementation of the design, with the belief that the more accurately the 
implementation matches the design specifications, the more effective the intervention will be. 
Monitoring standards and trying to ensure and improve the quality of outputs are meaningful, 
but not sufficient. Peacebuilding is essentially about influencing the behaviour of the internal 
actors, and that is where the focus has to be. Bryn Hughes argues that: 
Effective and sustainable peace support operations do not come from imparting the ‘right’ 
institutions, mustering the ‘appropriate’ level of resources, or honing the technical and 
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managerial skills of the interveners and recipients alike. The key, rather, is that the thinking and 
practices of intervening actors stem from an engagement with the ‘political’. (Hughes, 
2012:100) 
 
The ‘political’ has a specific meaning for Hughes in this context. He is not referring here to 
the formal workings of government. He is referring “to the sociocultural value systems that 
determine which behaviour, arguments, and actions are legitimate” (ibid.). He argues that the 
international community should recognise that meaningful interventions entail working with 
existing sources of power and legitimacy, with the aim of achieving ‘socially generative’ 
change (ibid.). His point is that, currently, the “political has been circumvented by those who 
have maintained that there is only one set of universal values (liberal, Western)” (103): 
The overwhelming tendency of external actors to date has instead been to contemplate local 
societies through the reductionist lens bereft of the rich, multi-layered, dynamic interaction that 
makes up any social context (Hughes, 2012:100). 
 
From a complex-systems perspective, the ‘technical problem’ aspects of the external 
intervention, i.e. its tactics, techniques and practices, are of peripheral interest, because they 
are not critical to achieving self-sustainable peace consolidation. If the goal is self-sustainable 
peace, then the core focus has to be on what Hughes refers to as the ‘political’, i.e. on how the 
internal system is able to generate and maintain its own capacity to self-organise, and how it 
can develop the resilience to adapt and evolve in the face of shocks and crises without lapsing 
into violent conflict. The external intervention is only of value to the degree that it is able to 
support this self-organisation process. The fourth implication from Complexity is that the 
focus of a peacebuilding intervention has to be on the political dynamics of the internal 
system that one is trying to influence, not on the technical aspects of the external intervention.    
 
In this section the relevance of Complexity for the problem-solving assumption in 
peacebuilding has been explored and four implications of Complexity for peacebuilding were 
identified: 
 The highly dynamic and nonlinear nature of complex systems constrains our ability to 
fully understand complex peacebuilding systems, and thus we are inherently limited in 
our ability to design predetermined outcomes. 
 One cannot have a definitive ‘problem’ or ‘solution’ in a complex peacebuilding 
system. Peace, in fact, is not a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’. Peace is an emergent property 
of a complex system that is able to self-organise without lapsing into violent conflict. 
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 The highly dynamic and nonlinear nature of complex systems results in the 
reductionist approach being limited in its application. It needs to be complemented 
and augmented with a complex systems approach that seeks to understand the 
patterns, trends and processes that provide clues as to how the system works as a 
whole. 
 The focus of a peacebuilding intervention has to be on the internal political dynamics 
of the system experiencing change, not on the technical aspects of the external 
intervention.    
 
7.4 STABILISING CONFLICT 
 
Understanding and coping with change and instability has been an important subject of 
philosophy and science since the earliest recorded history. Chapman (2002:50) quotes Schön 
(1971) who argues that we tend to “presume that the disruptions and change currently causing 
distress will settle down at some point in future”, to make the point that we assume that the 
world is inherently orderly, but we actually never arrive at this ‘stable’ state. Under the 
influence of the determined-design approach, we tend to train and educate people by 
providing them with ideal models, standards and specifications, and we instil in them the 
belief that they have the agency to design and execute programmes that will result in these 
models and standards being achieved. They then pursue these models in their careers with the 
expectation that they will actually arrive at these ideal states at some point in the future.  
 
When they are unable to replicate the ideal models and fail to achieve the standards, they are 
frustrated and disappointed. In the face of failure, our first reaction typically is to redouble our 
efforts, as our initial reaction is to assume that there was something wrong with how the 
design was implemented. Later we may consider that there may be something wrong with the 
design itself. It often takes us half a lifetime of trying to improve the implementation before 
we start challenging the ideal-order assumptions underlying the determined-design model 
itself. These beliefs and assumptions have a significant influence on our policy expectations 
of what peacebuilding can achieve. Astri Suhrke (2011:220-221) describes how these ‘ideal 
model’ expectations have influenced the international community’s policies towards the 
intervention in Afghanistan and how it sustained their commitment to continue their 
approach, and in fact intensify it, long after they should have become aware that it was not 
having the effect intended in its design: 
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Its promise of peace and security, human rights and representative government, relief assistance 
and economic reconstruction had a powerful legitimizing effect in Afghanistan . . . The idealist 
element of peacebuilding was particularly potent because it contrasted so starkly with 
Afghanistan’s recent history . . .  It was buoyed by a solid dose of confidence in social 
engineering, and sustained by fears and hopes. 
 
The determined-design model thus assumes that our social world is stable and peaceful and 
views conflict as a deviation from the norm. Hence peacebuilding is used as a tool to restore 
societies to their ‘normal’ peaceful and orderly state.  The value of Complexity is that it offers 
an alternative perspective through which we can view the same conflict-peace phenomenon, 
and this alternative view helps us to see aspects of it that we would not otherwise have 
considered. Complexity recognises that complex systems are dynamic and nonlinear and 
therefore always in a process of transformation. Change is not a ‘rough’ period that has to be 
traversed in order to arrive at some better stable state in future. Change is the ‘normal’ state 
that we always find ourselves in. Change, in this sense, refers to what is meant when we say 
that complex systems are dynamic, i.e. energy and/or information flow through them 
constantly and they are thus continuously in flux. The implication for peacebuilding from 
Complexity is thus the recognition that change and conflict is normal and necessary and that 
peacebuilding should not be so much about restoring order and stability, as it should be about 
facilitating and stimulating particular aspects of the change process. 
 
If complex systems reach a state of stability – which is referred to as equilibrium in the 
Complexity literature (Cilliers 1998) – they are no longer dynamic, and thus no longer 
complex. If it had been a living system, then this loss of Complexity would have implied 
death. However, as also discussed in Chapter 5, the fact that complex systems are highly 
dynamic does not imply that they are chaotic, because being dynamic is just one part of their 
character. There are also other characteristics at play that ensure that the dynamism of a 
complex system does not spin out of control. Complexity refers to a particular type of system 
that is emergent as a result of the dynamic and nonlinear interactions of its elements with one 
another and the environment, but it regulates and maintains itself through a process of self-
organisation. 
 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter 5, Complexity suggests that there is an optimal mix of change 
and order, namely enough dynamism to drive the system to the edge of chaos and enough 
self-organisation to prevent it from tipping into chaos. This state is optimal because it means 
that, when a system is ‘far from equilibrium’ it is under heightened pressure to survive, and in 
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this state it is stimulated to be sensitive to changes in its environment and to be alert to its 
own performance in relation to the environment. The various elements of the system are 
responding in multiple ways to what it perceives as changes in the environment, and the 
accumulated effects of the feedback generated in the process, coupled with the nonlinear ways 
in which this information is processed, generate a process of self-organisation that 
continuously optimally positions the system to take full advantage of the current conditions in 
its environment. Self-organisation thus emerges from and is at the same time driven by the 
need to continuously adapt the system so that it strives to be optimally positioned to gain the 
most from its environment, i.e. the most gain for the least expenditure of energy. This is also 
recognisable as the primordial driver in economics and evolution, and both indeed are also 
examples of complex systems.  
 
From a determined-design perspective, order is the steady state, and peace and harmony 
suggest the ideal. For any system to be in harmony, i.e. perfectly balanced like a Swiss 
timepiece, it would have to be locked into a completely predictable order, which implies that 
it has to be an externally controlled mechanism. It would have to be externally designed and 
manufactured, and it would have to depend on an externally supplied source of energy, like a 
battery. Even then entropy implies that it would be necessary to intervene from time to time to 
replace or repair parts of the system. It would thus, per definition, exclude any living 
organism or complex system. For peacebuilding, the implication from Complexity is that a 
harmonious stable or orderly state is an ideal model that cannot exist in real or material terms. 
It is an idea that cannot be operationalised.  
 
From a Complexity perspective, peace, in a social context, is brought about by a continuous 
process of social evolution and adaptation, i.e. a process of optimising social justice by 
continuously adapting our cultural concepts and practices of what we regard as social justice 
to serve the needs of the society in the context of its changing environment. What we interpret 
as peace, i.e. the absence of violent conflict and the presence of social justice, is not a result of 
an ordered or harmonious state, but of a continuous process of interaction, adaptation and 
convolution.  
 
A peaceful society is constantly at odds with itself; there is lively debate and people and 
institutions are continuously competing for power and resources. Societies that have been able 
to organise themselves in such a way that these internal dynamics do not result in violent 
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conflict or otherwise threaten the survival of the system, have developed norms, values and 
practices – and the social institutions to manage them – that self-regulate these disputes, e.g. 
through arbitration, mediation, the justice system and elections. What makes such a society 
‘peaceful’ is the fact that it is able to self-regulate its internal conflicts so that they do not turn 
violent or manifest in other ways that are so negative for the society that it breaks down its 
ability to maintain itself.  
 
We may thus look at a ‘peaceful’ society, or at what appears to be a well-balanced ecosystem 
in nature, and we may get a sense of peace and harmony. But if we consider how such a 
‘peaceful’ society functions from a complex systems perspective, we will recognise that the 
‘peace’ and ‘harmony’ that are observed are not a ‘solid’ or ‘final’ state that can be arrived at, 
and which then remains in that ‘static’ state forever. Peace and harmony are mental concepts 
that encapsulate an understanding that the peace and balance that are observed comprise a 
whole-of-system effect perspective. It is a ‘snapshot’ or frozen impression, of an otherwise 
highly dynamic system. A complex-systems approach grasps that, in order to maintain a 
‘peaceful’ society, thousands of processes are hard at work to self-regulate and self-organise 
what is, in reality, a system in which the elements are continuously in conflict with 
themselves and their environment.
33
  
 
A complex-systems approach will also recognise that this self-organisation process may be 
fragile. It may take only a relatively small loss of self-regulating capacity or perhaps a 
significant change in environment, like a Black Swan event (Taleb, 2010), for a society to be 
overwhelmed and to lose its ability to self-organise. As the studies of the collapse of complex 
societies referred to earlier demonstrate, none of the major civilizations or particular forms of 
government that have emerged in human history has endured indefinitely (Diamond 2006; 
Morris 2011; Tainter 1988). Their findings thus suggest that all political systems collapse 
sooner or later, and this further underlines the Complexity insight that the essential nature of 
complex systems is that they are continuously in flux.  
 
However, as McAnamy and Yoffee (2010) argue, the history of man is not so much about 
social collapse as it is about social resilience and survival. Particular forms of social order 
                                                 
33
 The way in which ‘conflict’ is used here refers to the tensions and disputes among different stakeholders and 
constituencies in society that have to compete with each other in order to pursue their own best interest. It does 
not imply violent conflict. 
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come and go, but human culture is resilient. They argue that most of the stories that are 
typically associated with collapse can also be interpreted as stories of resilience and 
adaptation. For instance, they point to the influence the Greek and Roman civilizations had, 
and still have, on Western culture, language and philosophy and argue that, despite the fact 
that these civilizations collapsed, their culture has survived and lives on into our present 
times:  
An important part of the “science of the long view” is the concept of resilience, or “the ability 
of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function and structure”, albeit in a 
altered form… Resilience means that some kinds of change, especially political change, can be 
quick and episodic, whereas other kinds of change, for example, changes in kinship structures 
and belief systems, can be slower moving. Also, both kinds and different paces of change can 
coexist. (McAnamy & Yoffee, 2010:10)  
 
Thus there is a fundamental philosophical difference in approach here between a school of 
thought, which in this dissertation is associated with the determined-design model, that sees 
nature and society as fundamentally or ideally ordered and regards instability as a deviation or 
interruption of the ideal, and a school of thought, which is associated with the complex-
systems approach, that presents an alternative or opposite thesis, namely that the ‘normal’ and 
in fact optimal state of nature and society is that of being complex, highly dynamic, nonlinear. 
The implication for peacebuilding from Complexity, therefore, is that the ‘normal’ and in fact 
optimal state of societies is to be complex, i.e. highly dynamic, nonlinear and inherently 
competitive. 
 
Whilst complex systems are highly dynamic, their self-organisation processes transform this 
energy into a process of evolutionary adaptation. At times, this process may unfold so slowly, 
or it may go through periods of such near repetitive cycles that it may give the illusion of 
being in a stable or ordered state. Such patterns are explained in Complexity as pockets of 
stability (see Cilliers 1998 & 2001, as discussed in Chapter 5). However, these patterns are 
not permanent or predictable in the way in which order could be understood to imply a 
determined pattern. These pockets of stability are temporary, context specific, and always 
subject to change.  
 
The illusion of stability is often caused by significantly different scales in the pace of change 
in the systems that are being compared to each other. In order to measure change we need to 
have a baseline or a benchmark; we need to compare it with something else. As humans we 
tend to think in terms of change as measured in terms of how it affects our lives, including the 
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pace at which the human experience unfolds. Some may use a further level of abstraction, e.g. 
change in terms of what we know about human history. Others may go even further and think 
of change in terms of what we know about the history of our planet and the universe. The 
point is that it is these time and space comparisons between change indicators in different 
systems that often result in the illusion of one system being stable in contrast to the perception 
or timescale of the other. For instance, the paths of the planets in our solar system are slowly 
changing, but from a human perspective the scale of this change has been so slow that the 
path of the planets was thought to be predetermined and orderly for centuries. In fact, the sun 
and other forces exert influences on our solar system that limit the degree of change to within 
a certain pocket of stability, and that makes our solar system appear relatively stable from a 
human time perspective. However, the mass of the sun is changing and the universe is 
expanding and, therefore, what may appear to us as stable, may, from the perspective of 
another timescale, represent a system undergoing radical change.  
 
Political systems may similarly appear stable and lasting from one perspective, and as 
changing radically from another. One can imagine that there were times when the people of 
ancient Egypt and Rome or contemporary America (Fukuyama, 1989) thought their political 
systems would last forever. However, sooner or later the dynamics in any complex system 
change significantly enough to disturb any given pocket of stability. Once disturbed, such 
systems seem to go through a period of instability until a new (temporary) pattern emerges. 
Climate change and planetary-scale environmental sustainability are contemporary examples 
of how something that takes place slowly over thousands of years, and that has been not been 
a major element in human politics until fairly recently, has now rather suddenly emerged as a 
major issue in international relations and domestic politics. 
 
In our common-sense view we tend to think of democracies as stable, and in the relatively 
short period of human history in which we have been able to observe democratic political 
systems, they do seem to be more lasting than comparable political systems, because they, in 
macro terms, appear to settle into more lasting pockets of stability. However, whilst they may 
appear stable at the surface, i.e. whilst their overall effect may create a sense of enduring and 
predictable stability, they are in fact highly-dynamic and nonlinear complex systems that are 
self-regulating a large number of simultaneous and interlinked change processes, such as the 
economy (nationally and internationally), politics (domestic and international relations), rule 
of law, security, social-cultural, and so forth. Politically speaking, for instance, democracies 
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change governments more often than most other forms of political organisation, and this 
comes at a considerable cost to the system, at least as seen from a short- to medium-term 
perspective.  
 
For instance, many contemporary democracies shift between major theories of governance 
every eight to ten years, most often in the West between social-welfare approaches (such as 
represented by most Social-Democratic parties in Europe, the Labour Party in the UK or 
Democratic Party in the USA) and liberal approaches (such as the Christian-Democratic 
parties in Europe, the Conservative Party in the UK or Republican Party in the USA). Such 
frequent and fundamental changes would be unthinkable in less complex systems, and 
although the adaptation costs are high, these changes are rarely so fundamental that they 
threaten the overall stability and survival of the system as a whole. This is because they have 
developed complex systems of self-organised negative and positive feedback processes that 
ensure that the overall system is maintained, even as specific political, social and economic 
experiments come and go. Complex social systems thus represent an intricate combination of 
processes, typically in the form of institutions that endure whilst at the same time having the 
capacity to handle a high degree of change, usually in the form of information and patterns of 
social organisation. The constitutional order endures, e.g. the way political parties are elected 
and the patterns of governance are predictable, but the programmes they introduce and the 
policies they implement change. 
 
The point is that, from a complexity perspective, change and competition are normal, even 
optimal, but we sometimes need a different time-scale perspective in order to understand the 
context within which that change has meaning. Looking back, we can appreciate the 
important changes that were brought about by periods of instability in Europe, such as the 
Reformation and the French revolution, but these, of course, were brutal times for the people 
who lived through them (Tilly, 1992).  
 
Thus the distinction we need to draw is not between stability and change, but between 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of conflict. In our contemporary international system 
violent conflict is not recognized as a legitimate means of affecting political change. Conflict, 
perhaps better described as competition, is accepted as part of the natural change processes in 
domestic and international politics, but violent conflict is not. Our public and parliamentary 
debates can at times by quite conflictual, and it is accepted that workers can strike or that 
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people can protest. However, when protests become violent it is seen as legitimate for the 
state to step in to restore public order. There are domestic and international standards and 
norms governing both legitimate protests and legitimate law enforcement. As the recent 
events in the Middle East have demonstrated, peaceful protest can topple even strong 
dictatorial regimes, but we have also seen that suppressing peaceful change with 
disproportionate violence results in loss of international legitimacy. In both Libya and Syria 
the violent suppression of peaceful protest has resulted in violent rebellions and civil war.  
The resulting international debate about what constitutes legitimate forms of political and 
social change and the role that the international community should play when such internal 
conflicts become violent, reminds us that these questions are never fully resolved. Each 
specific case requires a reappraisal of the validity of our assumed standards, norms and 
practices. 
 
International peace interventions are mandated to prevent violent conflict or to try to stop 
violent conflict where it has occurred. However, it is not meant to stop or prevent conflict and 
change per se, i.e. we need to recognise the difference between violent conflict that is not 
acceptable, and ‘normal’ conflict, e.g. peaceful public protests, strikes, civil disobedience, etc. 
which is a necessary or normal part of change and development. Peacebuilding is about 
facilitating the change process that a country emerging out of conflict has to go through. 
Change generates conflict, and the process will result in winners and losers. The core peace 
consolidation mandate discussed in Chapter 2 is aimed at preventing such change from 
resulting in a lapse into violent conflict. This does not only imply ‘negative peace’, i.e. the 
use of external or internal security means to prevent violent conflict, but also ‘positive peace’, 
i.e. the full spectrum of complex social processes employed by a society to self-organise itself 
in such a way that conflicts are absorbed without lapsing into violent conflict (Galtung, 1985).  
 
In an established complex society various interest groups compete with each other in order to 
have their interests satisfied, but these conflicts are managed on a continuous basis by a wide 
range of formal and informal self-regulating processes. These can range from the formal legal 
system that can be used to enforce contracts or seek redress of wrongs, to political 
representation, to informal norms and standards upheld by social custom and practice. The 
presence and active engagement of all these processes and institutions in managing the 
competition among interested groups is what brings about positive peace and prevents a lapse 
into violent conflict in established complex societies. It is the presence and active interaction 
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between all these competing interests that create the vibrancy in these societies, and it is the 
ability of the system to self-organise that prevents such competition from becoming negative, 
or resulting in violent conflict.  
 
One can thus think of societies that do lapse into violent conflict as societies that have 
experienced a loss of complexity, or as societies that have experienced a regression in their 
ability to self-organise. For some reason, the level of internal tension and conflict in those 
societies has overwhelmed their ability to self-organise and self-regulate, and this has resulted 
in these conflicts spiralling out of control and eventually into violent conflict. In this context, 
peacebuilding can thus be understood as a process of assisting societies to regain the capacity 
to organise themselves, i.e. as a process of developing the capacity to manage a higher degree 
of Complexity.  
 
In most cases, however, such a loss of complexity is not total. It is more typical for systems to 
lose control – the ability to self-organise – over part of a system whilst still maintaining 
control over others. Stewart and Knaus point out that: 
[e]ven the poorest, most fragmented and traumatized nations – such as postwar Kosovo or even 
more dramatically Afghanistan – are densely patterned with functioning local forms of security, 
administration, and dispute resolution. (2011:xxiii) 
 
A political or security system may collapse, but the social cultural system may still be in place 
(McAnamy & Yoffee, 2010:10). In Timor-Leste, for instance, the political and security system 
that Indonesia imposed during the occupation of East Timor may have collapsed totally in 
1999, but the societies remain organised around traditional leadership and kinship structures 
and have used those parts of the system to regroup and cope with the aftermath of the violent 
conflict (Hohe, 2002). A complex system experiencing a regression in its ability to self-
organise is thus likely to shed control over parts of its system, typically first on its peripheries. 
As it regains the ability to self-organise, this is likewise likely to be an outward expansive 
process, whereby more and more parts of the system on the periphery are brought into the 
self-organising influence of the core of the complex system. These dynamics have 
implications for both how complex societies lapse into violent conflict and how they recover 
from violent conflict.  
 
An approach to peacebuilding that is based on a conflict-stabilising theory of change, and that 
is aimed at ‘restoring order’, such as the US occupation of Iraq and the NATO-led 
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counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan, is likely to lack sensitivity towards the need for 
societies to experience ‘positive’ conflict and change. Their preoccupation with stabilisation 
is likely to result in them also wanting to control the political process. As seen in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the preoccupation with stabilisation has resulted in policy choices that 
interfere with the internal political system in order to achieve short-term security gains. 
These, however, have turned out to be short-sighted gains because they have undermined the 
ability of these societies to self-organise. In both these recent examples, it has resulted in the 
occupying forces having to remain much longer than they planned to, and ultimately failing in 
their overall stabilisation objectives, because they failed to allow enough room for these 
societies to develop their own self-organised systems of social and political governance. If 
peacebuilding does not allow enough space for self-organisation to emerge, it will fail to 
achieve its objective of bringing about a self-sustainable outcome.  
 
In both Iraq and Afghanistan the occupying forces believed, under the influence of the 
determined-design model, that they would be able to control the outcome, i.e. that by taking 
certain planned actions they would achieve a specific predesigned end result. In both cases 
these actions resulted in a level of interference that left the local systems dependent on 
external political and security guarantees (Suhrke, 2011; Stewart & Knaus, 2011). From these 
experiences, the core lesson for intervention is that an external system cannot aim to achieve 
self-sustainable peace and stability and wish to remain in control of the internal system at the 
same time. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan represent a thermostat-style model of 
interference – they attempted to regulate the internal system with a high degree of external 
control.  In contrast, a complex-systems approach would be sensitive to the need for societies 
to self-evolve and this necessarily includes processes that entail ‘positive’ conflict and 
competition. A complex-systems approach would need to invest in helping such societies to 
develop the resilient self-organisation capacities they need to self-regulate their own change 
processes and to manage their own conflicts. 
 
If we accept that change is normal, even optimal, in complex systems, it would make sense to 
invest in developing improved capacities to cope with change and to make adaptation and 
evolution integral to our systems, our institutions and ourselves (Chapman, 2002:50). Change 
is feared when we are not able to cope with it. In the peacebuilding context, the determined-
design interference approach attempts to cope with change by trying to improve our ability to 
control change through external intervention, i.e. our ability to predict and manage the 
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outcome of change. In contrast, the complex-systems approach attempts to cope with change 
by developing the system’s ability to self-organise. In anticipation of change and in 
recognition of its necessity and positive potential, the complex-systems approach invests in 
building robust and resilient capacities to self-regulate, i.e. the internal capacity to cope with 
change.  
 
A complex-systems approach accepts that there will be change, including change that comes 
rapidly in the form of shocks and crises and prepares for it by investing in robustness and 
resilience. A successful post-conflict society is a society that has weathered several such 
shocks and crises without relapsing into large-scale violent conflict. A sustainable post-
conflict society is one that has demonstrated its ability to do so without, or with less and less 
external support. 
 
A key insight from Complexity for peacebuilding is thus that there is a meaningful difference 
between thinking of change and conflict as an abnormal problem that needs to be stabilised, 
so that the system can return to its ideal steady state and thinking about change as something 
normal and optimal that needs to be encouraged and facilitated. This difference in approach 
has important implications for how we think about influencing and interfering in 
peacebuilding systems.  
 
In this second section the relevance of Complexity for the stabilising conflict assumption in 
peacebuilding has been explored and a further eight implications of Complexity for 
peacebuilding identified: 
 Change and conflict are normal and necessary, and peacebuilding should thus not only 
be about restoring order and stability, but also about stimulating change and 
facilitating constructive conflict.  
 Peacebuilding is about peace consolidation, and whilst avoiding a lapse into violent 
conflict is important, it should be recognised that a preoccupation with controlling the 
political and social space in order to ensure security and stability is likely to constrain 
the space and pace for the emergence of self-organisation. The best way to ensure 
sustainable peace consolidation is to encourage and facilitate the capacity of a society 
to organise itself.  
 A harmonious stable or orderly state is a conceptual construct, i.e. it is an ideal model 
that cannot exist in real or material terms. It is an idea that cannot be operationalised. 
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 The ‘normal’, and in fact optimal, state of states and societies is to be complex, i.e. 
highly dynamic, nonlinear and inherently conflictual. 
 An international intervention cannot aim to achieve self-sustainable peace and 
stability, and wish to remain in control of an internal system at the same time.  
 A complex-systems approach needs to be sensitive to the need for societies to self-
evolve, including through conflict and competition.  
 If we accept that change is normal, even optimal, in complex systems, it would make 
sense to invest in developing improved capacities to cope with change and to make 
adaptation and evolution integral to our social systems. 
 This represents a shift in focus from trying to ensure that you arrive at a predetermined 
result, to trying to ensure that the system has the robustness and resilience, i.e. the 
capacity and processing ability, to manage its own emerging outcomes without lapsing 
into violent conflict.  
 
7.5 TIME, PACE AND POSITIONING 
 
In this section, the relevance of Complexity for three aspects of peacebuilding, namely time, 
pace and positioning will be considered. ‘Time’ refers mostly to the pace of change and the 
implications of different approaches to what are considered desirable rates of change are 
considered. With positioning the reference is to the relationship between internal and external 
agents, and in this section this relationship is related to the different perspectives that internal 
and external agents have about the timing and pace of social change processes. Time, pace 
and positioning are closely interrelated, and the discussion of the one often requires reference 
to the others, and this is why they are being discussed together in this section. 
 
The potential pace of change that has to be coped with is closely linked to our approach to 
time. One can perhaps think of this rate of change as a scale of possibilities, where what 
would be considered a normal rate of change would determine the middle or anticipated range 
against which the likelihood of also having to cope, from time to time, with faster or slower 
rates of change could be contemplated. Whilst managing change at the ‘normal’ level may be 
anticipated most of the time, we also have to be prepared to manage faster or slower rates of 
change. It is necessary to develop the capacity to deal with those possible heightened or 
reduced levels of change, including occasional high-impact events that bring with them 
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radical change (Taleb, 2010). Robustness, in this context, refers to the ability of the system to 
deal with a broad set of possible rates of change. 
 
Under the determined-design approach, peacebuilding programmes are typically designed to 
be relatively short, fast-paced events. The sense of urgency is linked to external, often 
domestic, political and budgetary time pressures. Donor funds have to be spent according to 
externally determined budget cycles and levels of interest, and certain milestones have to be 
reached in the interest of, for instance, the domestic election cycles of the external actors. 
These external or supply-side considerations generate a sense of urgency. They create a policy 
environment in which there is a sense that these interventions need to achieve as much as 
possible in the shortest period possible. This stress is caused, in part, because there is a policy 
perception that international and domestic attention will soon wane or move on to the next 
new crisis, and this implies that there will then be less funding available for a particular crisis. 
This is also referred to as the so-called ‘CNN-effect’, namely that media attention creates 
public interest and thus, in democracies, pressure on politicians to be seen to be responsive to 
the crisis. However, the downside of the CNN-effect is that public, and thus political, 
attention shifts away from the crisis in question as soon as the media’s attention moves to the 
next major media event. Whilst the CNN-effect could probably be seen to be at work when it, 
for instance, comes to press statements issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a given 
donor country, those engaged with policy responses to a given conflict are less likely to have 
such an extremely temporary focus. The point is, however, that the overall effect that is 
created in the process is one in which there is a premium on speed of delivery, matched with 
an expectation to effect equally rapid change. Some peacebuilding experts will readily admit 
amongst themselves that such rapid change is not possible. However, they equally believe that 
it is not possible to convince the external media, public and politicians of the need to have a 
more patient approach, so their approach is to try to get the most out of the system while the 
going is good.  
 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter 2, in the context of the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission, one of the peacebuilding meta-narratives was the need for longer-term 
engagement in post-conflict interventions. One can argue that the work of the Peacebuilding 
Commission to date has, in fact, resulted in a more sustained international engagement with 
those countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda (De Coning, 2010b). However, 
the degree to which the sense that peacebuilding is understood as something urgent has 
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persevered can be seen again in the focus of the 2009 UN Secretary-General report on 
peacebuilding, in which the UN Secretariat seems to focus its main attention on the two to 
three years in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UN, 2009).  
 
Military units that are deployed as part of peacekeeping missions are under even tighter 
pressures. They are typically deployed for six-month periods, and they tend to have an 
intensive programme aimed at achieving as much as possible during the short time that they 
are deployed. All in all, there is a range of pressures and stresses in the determined-design 
interference context that results in these missions and programmes being assessed, planned 
and executed at a fast pace and under stress. The point is that the rate of change is 
predetermined by the design. It is externally determined on the basis of the theory of change 
of those that came up with the design, and the factors that influenced the anticipated rate of 
change during the design were mostly external factors, i.e. time factors that matter for those 
that did the design, not time factors that are necessarily relevant for the system that is being 
engaged. The pace is thus dictated and informed by supply-side stresses, not by the dynamics 
of the societies affected by conflict. As a result, the external actors have an inappropriate 
influence on the pace of the conflict transformation process – inappropriate because it is not 
informed by the dynamics of the conflict system itself but by external considerations.  
 
Although conflict systems are typically in need of assistance, the scale of the need does not 
automatically require a fast-paced, urgent and large-scale intervention, i.e. there is not 
necessarily a linear relationship between the scale of the need and the pace with which those 
needs can be met. If the objective is positive and lasting change, a more important 
consideration may be the ability of the local community to absorb the assistance. Any 
assistance being delivered that cannot be absorbed meaningfully by the society – in terms of 
both the rate of absorption and the degree to which that offered is relevant to the need and 
compatible with local systems – will overflow, i.e. it will be wasted, or worse, it will feed 
dysfunctional forces like corruption and organised crime (Stewart & Knaus, 2011; Suhrke & 
Berdal, 2012).  Thus the point is that, if your consideration is to affect sustainable change in a 
recipient society, the pace of your assistance should be determined by the rate of change that 
can be absorbed by the community in question. Veit and Schlichte make a similar argument:  
External statebuilding cannot replace state-formation. While the former suggests that modern 
rational statehood can be installed by huge investments within a few years, the latter concept, 
derived from historical sociology, stresses that often century-long processes of centralization of 
power means the later encroachment of state domination into every nook and cranny of the 
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social space. Statehood as it is embodied in modern capitalist states is the late result of century-
long social conflicts. (Alex Veit and Klaus Schlichte quoted in Bliesemann de Guevara, 
2012:168) 
 
Societies need social institutions that can absorb their change processes in order to create 
sustainable outcomes. Without such local interpretation, the external assistance just passes 
through without being integrated into the local society. A society emerging from conflict 
typically has an oversupply of undesirable institutions, e.g. armed groups and criminal gangs, 
and an undersupply of desirable institutions, such as civil-society organisations committed to 
facilitating social justice, community development, and so forth. At a minimum, the pace of 
delivery should thus be influenced by the capacity of the desirable institutions to absorb the 
assistance offered. The undesirable institutions will gladly absorb the overflow. Part of the 
assistance should, in fact, be aimed at facilitating the development of the desirable social 
institutions or should be directed at the expansion of their capacities, where they exist. Earlier 
assistance should thus be invested in building the capacities necessary to absorb later flows of 
assistance. In other words, apart from emergency assistance, early recovery should ideally be 
aimed at assisting in the development of the kind of social institutions that would be needed 
to facilitate the integration of downstream peacebuilding assistance. This suggests a model 
that slowly develops the capacity to absorb greater flows of assistance, like a person rescued 
from a desert that needs to take in small amounts of water first, even if the thirst is great.  
 
Social institutions develop through an evolutionary process; they cannot be imported and they 
are not developed overnight or fully formed. The inherent dynamics that are present require 
social change to take place at a pace related to the rate of change the society can absorb. The 
dynamics of the assistance offered by the determined-design approach, which is to pour in as 
much assistance as possible whilst there is international political attention on the problem, 
thus seem to be in direct contrast with the dynamics of systems emerging from conflict, where 
the capacity to absorb more assistance is a gradual and incremental process and thus requires 
a slow build-up in the scale of assistance offered.  
 
A critical lesson that needs to be learnt in the peacebuilding context is that consolidating the 
peace is not only about dealing with dramatic change, it is also about dealing with change that 
takes place at a much slower rate. Rihani (2002:95), in the context of development, argues 
that culture, society, economics and policies evolve towards increasing Complexity and that it 
takes time for that build-up to occur: 
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Many layers of interconnections and adaptations have to come into being at a pace that cannot 
be accelerated appreciably . . . there are no shortcuts to sustainable evolution (Rihani, 2002:95).  
 
The 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2011:10), based on the research of 
Pritchett and De Weijer (2010:09), argues that the 20 fastest-transforming societies have 
taken between 20 and 30 years to raise their institutional performance from, for instance, the 
levels of Haiti to those of Ghana in 2011. And these represent the exceptional cases; the 
average is anticipated to take approximately 116 years (10).  
 
Another consideration is that the rush-against-time approach fails to take into account that, for 
progress in any one sector of society to be sustainable, other aspects of society need to be 
simultaneously developed so that the system as a whole matures together. If not, such uneven 
developments tend to distort the system and maintain or further weaken its fragility and thus 
make it less, not more, sustainable. For instance, under the determined-design approach it is 
typical to prioritise reforming and rebuilding the security sector in an attempt to first ensure 
stability. The security sector is often perceived to be one of the ‘difficult’ rather than ‘messy’ 
areas of peacebuilding, because the process of identifying, training and equipping soldiers and 
police officers in a given timeframe and budget is seen as more or less a technical and 
logistics exercise, given enough resources. In contrast, facilitating the development of a new 
social contract or stimulating national reconciliation is ‘messy’, because success is not based 
on your resources, planning and effort but on the political will and mood of the local society 
and its leaders.  
 
The result in an otherwise still fragile conflict-prone society thus is often that the security 
sectors are the first to be reorganised and they end up being the element in the society in 
transition that has the most capacity. The obvious danger, as the history of military coups in 
Latin America and Africa suggests, is that the security sector, if developed disproportionately 
to other sectors, is likely to become the primary source of governance. Or worse, that the 
security agencies in a system that lacks adequate checks and balances may use their newly 
developed capacity negatively, by becoming a source of predation on society, through 
corruption for instance. This is the kind of side effect that peacebuilders should be highly 
sensitive to. However, it seems that their bounded rationality (Simon, 1962) results in them 
being driven by the devil they know (the need to address instability, and the pressure to 
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reduce their own external security presence and cost), rather than the devil they do not (the 
potential for side effects and unintended consequences).  
 
One does not need to have above normal foresight to understand that it may not be a good 
thing to make your military the central focus of external capacity building, or for it to become 
the most organised part of the executive arm of government in a fragile society emerging out 
of violent conflict. The legacy of military coups in the post-colonial era is probably in part 
related to this imbalance, and if current peacebuilding practice perpetuates this imbalance, we 
may end up with a new legacy of statebuilding coups, such as seem to have recently been the 
case again in West Africa.    
 
Often these external institution-building programmes are rushed and thus generate what 
seems to be, for instance, a functioning police force, because they have the external trappings 
(uniforms, cars, ranks, buildings, badges, bullets, budgets) of what is recognisable, typically 
from a Western perspective, as a police force. Pritchett and De Weijer (2010:15) refer to this 
phenomenon as ‘isomorphic mimicry’. In reality, however, such institutions typically are 
created and sustained by donors outside the regular budget and political process. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, they therefore often are more accountable to the external donors than to their 
own society (Barber, 2011).  
 
Perhaps a useful metaphor is organ transplantation. The new institutions are foreign to the 
local social immune system, because they have not been generated out of processes embedded 
in local social norms, values and state formation. They have not emerged in relation to the 
local society’s needs for stability and security or their expectations of the role and function of 
a police service that is meant to serve their needs. Instead, these institutions have emerged out 
of the expectations and theories of change that the external peacebuilders hold regarding the 
role that a police force may play in generating rule of law in the local society. They have been 
externally designed, as a result of the predetermined neo-liberal assumptions of what is best 
for the local society and then imposed on, or implanted into, the local social system.   
 
In the same way that a local biological system may reject an organ transplant, the local social 
system may reject such implanted institutions. However, in post-conflict peacebuilding 
systems the rejection is much more subtle and takes place over a longer period of time. There 
are many other reasons, as discussed earlier, why local elites want to maintain good relations 
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with the external actors and why such foreign institutions are tolerated but not integrated into 
the local social system. In general terms, one can say that the internal elites, and the local 
society in general, want to maintain the patronage of the external peacebuilding actors 
because they acquire resources from the external actors that they can use to further maintain 
and expand their own patronage networks (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).  
 
When it comes to the security sector in particular, one can say that those in government 
benefit from a strong security sector because it helps to maintain the status quo and absorbs a 
lot of ex-combatants. In the absence of any alternatives, it is in their interest to support the 
reformed police and armed forces.  As a result, they tolerate the foreign models, probably 
with the belief that they will, in time, transform these institutions to better serve their local 
needs. In the short- to medium-term they are probably concerned with ensuring that these new 
institutions do not interfere with their own domestic political and social institutions, and in so 
doing they are perhaps more active in isolating and quarantining the new institutions than 
they are in integrating and accommodating them. Some researchers argue that a new kind of 
hybrid institution emerges in these contexts (Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011). They argue 
that institutions that accommodate both international expectations and standards and local 
needs, identities and culture, come about when external actors have influence but are forced to 
take local ownership into account.  
 
The 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2010:41) defines institutions: 
…as the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’, which include formal rules, written laws, 
organizations, informal norms of behaviour, and shared beliefs – as well as the organizational 
forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms.  
 
It is obvious from this definition that external agents cannot ‘build’ local institutions, or that 
this is not something that can take place in the space of a few short years. External actors can 
impose formal ‘rules of the game’, but only local societies can generate the informal norms of 
behaviour and shared beliefs that are essential for institutions to be locally owned and 
embedded. Societies need time to develop, absorb, test, adapt and integrate their own formal 
and informal norms and shared beliefs and to build trust in their own institutions that are 
developed in the process.  
 
For institutions to be self-sustainable, they have to be generated by local social processes, and 
these processes take time to produce, test, refine and develop institutions. Each context is 
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different, and an important factor would be the degree of collapse or disruption of the 
complex social system that existed prior to violent conflict. If a completely new social system 
needs to emerge, the process is likely to take several generations. It is rare for societies to 
completely collapse, however. In most cases some aspects of the culture, norms and social 
identity survive (McAnany & Yoffee, 2010). If so, it would make sense for peacebuilding to 
capitalise on existing social resilience and to use that as a springboard for accelerated 
peacebuilding. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Most contemporary peacebuilding 
programmes assume that local social norms and practices are part of the problem, and work 
actively to de-legitimize local institutions and advocate their replacement with new central 
government controlled liberal peace model institutions. The insights from Complexity 
discussed in this chapter suggest instead that peacebuilding should be the catalyst that 
facilitates the re-emergence of the informal norms of behaviour and shared beliefs that are 
essential for institutions to be locally owned and embedded. 
 
Despite the WDR definition for institutions cited above, and despite the various other ways in 
which the 2011 WDR report tries to accommodate the fact that institution-building takes time 
and tries to be sensitive to the fact that institutions tend to be externally imposed, the 2011 
WDR report remains trapped in the determined-design paradigm and is written from a 
perspective in which peacebuilding ultimately is something the internationals do to the locals. 
The 2011 WDR report and contemporary liberal peacebuilding in general try to accommodate 
the local ownership imperative without giving up ultimate control over the outcome of the 
peacebuilding process. Stewart & Knaus (2011:xxi) argues that: 
The international policy-makers seem often unable to recognize or use the real strengths in local 
society and, therefore, are reluctant to delegate. They underestimate the intelligence and 
competence of local politicians and overlook their ability to compromise with their armed 
opponents. A sustained intervention, therefore, often prevents local leaders from taking 
responsibility; it does not put pressure on politicians to settle with their enemies, or broaden the 
kinds of deals they could offer.  
 
Contemporary liberal peacebuilding best practice is to be seen to be trying to accommodate 
local elites by pushing them to the front, for instance, by pretending to others, and partly to 
yourself, that by having certain local elites prominently displayed in visible roles, one is 
genuine about local ownership. This occurs, for instance, by asking them to co-chair 
peacebuilding coordination mechanisms and by making a show of entering into framework 
agreements with them, so that they can become the face – the poster child – of local 
ownership. In reality, however, the core neo-liberal features of peacebuilding interventions 
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(democracy, human rights, the free-market economic system) are externally designed before 
the locals are consulted about their implementation, driven ultimately by external 
considerations of pace and time, and the external actors still maintain control over the core 
outcome of the process. Even if they allow some degree of hybridity for the sake of local 
ownership, they still maintain enough influence to intervene if the process does not produce 
the liberal peace outcomes they expect. Pressure is brought to bear on elites and others when 
they stray too far off the path, and as the externals often represent a significant resource for 
patronage, this pressure is usually sufficient to maintain control.  
 
Those countries that have a significant local source of revenue, for instance oil, present a 
slightly different case. Whilst they are still sensitive, especially to Western pressure when it 
comes to international recognition and roles in the international state system, they usually 
show much more autonomy when it comes to choosing local models. In such cases, like 
Angola, where the country represents a significant supply to the West, or where they have a 
prominent client relationship with a major power such as China, even the international 
recognition card seems to have very little power of influence. Western nations also seem 
much less enthusiastic to insist on the liberal peace model in their relations with countries that 
effectively control resources that these nations are keenly in need off. Their actions thus 
undermine their own arguments about the universal applicability of human rights and the 
liberal peace model in general and gives rise to criticisms about the hypocrisy and 
selectiveness in their foreign policies. 
 
Even where contemporary peacebuilding does make an effort to achieve what it perceives as 
‘local ownership’, it usually comprises an attempt to co-opt the locals to accept an externally 
designed solution, i.e. an attempt to convince the locals to be enthusiastic implementers of the 
liberal peace model. Donais (2012:4) argues that local ownership, from this perspective, 
exists “when they do what we want them to do, but they do so voluntary [sic]”. The locals are 
allowed to introduce some hybridity to the periphery of the model, but the core liberal-peace 
tenants are sacrosanct, i.e. free markets and some semblance of democracy and human rights.  
 
However, from a Complexity perspective one can argue that accommodating the local is not 
enough. Only systems that are truly free to self-organise can develop self-sustainability. 
Systems that are regulated by external feedback interventions cannot develop the internal 
complexity necessary to self-regulate. It is not enough to get the locals to take ownership of 
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an externally-designed model. A radical repositioning of the local-international relationship is 
necessary, with the local agents clearly in a position to take responsibility for both identifying 
their own needs and deciding on what they want to do about it, including taking the 
responsibility for the outcomes of their decisions. A complex-systems approach requires a 
radical repositioning of our understanding of peacebuilding, namely as something that needs 
to be essentially local. Peacebuilding needs to be reframed not as something done for them, 
but as something they have to do for themselves. The essential ingredient for self-sufficiency 
and self-sustainability is local emergent self-organised complexity, i.e. the society needs to 
develop its own capacity to manage itself without lapsing into violent conflict. 
 
Donais (2012:5) refers to this kind of argument for a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding as 
a ‘communitarian approach’. Such approaches normally “stress the importance of tradition 
and social context in determining the legitimacy and appropriateness of particular visions of 
political order, justice, or ethics (ibid.). Donais refers to Bell (2009), who argues that 
legitimacy must “derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people 
living in specific times and places”. Brown (1992) similarly argues that “the ultimate source 
of moral value lies within specific political communities.” Donais (2012:5) thus concludes 
that “peacebuilding communitarians uphold, consequently, the right of societies to make their 
own choices, regardless of the degree to which such choices correspond with emerging 
international norms, which are viewed from this perspective as more Western than universal.” 
 
These insights from Complexity also speak to the appropriate positioning of the internal and 
external agents in the process. The prevalent peacebuilding narrative places the international 
agents at the core, and the local people are relegated to being the object of the intervention or, 
at best, having a peripheral role. Concepts like ‘host population’ and ‘beneficiaries’ identify 
the internal actors in terms of their relationship with the external actors. However, if the aim 
of peacebuilding is to generate self-sustainable peace consolidation, and if Complexity 
implies that the local society needs to be able to self-organise, the local system has to be at the 
centre or core of a complex systems approach to peacebuilding. This implies a radical 
repositioning of the international peacebuilding agents from the centre to a supporting role.  
 
The role of the external actors may be necessary in some cases, but their role is not sufficient 
to achieve self-sustainable peace consolidation. In those cases where external actors could 
make a useful contribution, their role should be limited to providing an initial safe and secure 
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environment and/or to act as a catalyst by stimulating and facilitating processes that generate 
social regeneration. The external agents need to support, complement and augment the 
internal system, in such a way that they do not undermine the local society’s present, or 
future, capacity to self-organise. This obviously requires a delicate balance.  
 
The determined-designed peacebuilding approach acknowledges this dilemma, and has tried 
to find ways to address this tension, hence the focus on local ownership (Donais, 2012). 
However, despite all the rhetoric, contemporary peacebuilding efforts have been unable to 
enact the local ownership principle, because in the determined-design model the power to lead 
the design process lies with the international peacebuilding agents. The complex-systems 
approach provides the peacebuilding community with the theoretical rationale for 
understanding why this repositioning of local and international roles is critical for achieving 
self-sustainable peacebuilding and why it is ultimately also in the best interest of a more 
stable international system. 
 
It may seem obvious to a detached observer that the internal actors need to be given the space 
and time necessary for their own internal institutions to develop and evolve, but this is not 
recognised in the contemporary peacebuilding experience. Institutions are created by external 
design and under pressure from donors, and then often prematurely operationalised. Pritchett 
and De Weijer (2010:15) refer to this as ‘premature load bearing’.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the context of local ownership, local context and local 
capacities, finding the right balance between external support and local ownership is 
extremely tricky. What is clear, however, both from a Complexity perspective and from the 
logic of sustainability, is that complex systems need to be free from external control to 
develop the ability to self-organise. There is thus a degree of interference and intervention 
that is incompatible with self-organisation and sustainability. External peacebuilding 
interventions need to develop a much more refined understanding of how to limit and 
minimise interference for self-organisation to develop in those areas that are critical, whilst at 
the same time providing technical assistance and support in areas where it is needed. Such 
support furthermore must stop short of substituting the capacities the locals need to develop 
themselves in order to self-organise. 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 217 
Most external actors, and donors in particular, seem to be blind to how their decisions 
regarding the timing and pace of their interventions and programmes, and their own position 
at the core of the process, have the perverse effect of undermining self-sustainable peace 
consolidation (Aoi, De Coning & Thakur, 2007). Whilst they are often, with hindsight, able to 
identify the perverse effects others have generated, they seem especially blind to how their 
own decisions to prioritise certain of their own domestic driven themes impact negatively on 
the institutions they are trying to generate. The critical liberal peace literature contains 
countless examples and case studies of such perverse effects. In Liberia, for instance, one 
donor’s well-intentioned attempt to address the high levels of sexual violence resulted in well-
equipped specialised police units set up to deal with violent sex crimes. However, it caused 
systemic distortions that would, for instance, result in a police station where the small 
specialised violent sex crimes unit has a car and an air-conditioned office container, whilst the 
station commander and the rest of the police officers have to operate without either. The 
ensuing tensions and distortions seem obvious in hindsight, but it did not seem to occur to the 
donors during the design process that building up a specialised unit that is much better 
resourced than the rest of the police force, of which it is an integral and interdependent part, 
would have negative unintended consequences.
34
 
 
External donors do not always consider the degree to which the coherence of the formal and 
informal norms of behaviour and shared beliefs of, for instance, a police service, is dependent 
on the degree to which it emerges out of a process owned, controlled and financed by the 
society itself and how important it is for such processes to coevolve with other institutions, in 
the context of the larger systems, for instance the larger criminal-justice subsystem of which it 
is part. They seem to think that the ‘formal’ institution can be created first and the ‘informal’ 
wiring-up to the norms and culture of the larger social system in which the institution is 
meant to be embedded is something that can be done later, when there is time. They do not 
seem to grasp that they are in fact imposing a foreign institution by trying to short-circuit 
emergence and that, in so doing, they are perpetuating dependency and fragility, thus 
generating the very instability they are trying to address.  
 
This is not how the liberal state and its institutions emerged in the West (Tilly, 1992). In fact, 
it seems that a part of the reason why these perverse effects occur is that the external actors, 
                                                 
34
 Interview with Kari Marie Kjellstad, Norwegian UN Police Officer deployed to Liberia, 13 January 2011. 
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and Western donors in particular, have forgotten their own state-formation history, i.e. how 
their own institutions emerged through years of bottom-up evolution, revolution, adaptation, 
trial and error. Perhaps they do not realise that their own institutions are still emerging, and 
the sense that they have already arrived at the ideal state (Fukuyama, 1989) blinds them to the 
option that the liberal peace model is just one paradigm among many. The European 
experiment and the global financial crisis are contemporary reminders that the liberal peace 
model is still very much under construction. If the Western history can give us any clues, it is 
likely to suggest that the liberal peace norms and institutions that are so highly regarded today 
will someday be looked upon as outdated and uncivilized, in the same way that we look back 
today at the political models of the past. Being able to see the liberal peace model as one 
paradigm among many requires recognition that it has developed in a specific context, within 
a specific history, and that this specificity limits it transferability to other contexts. Perhaps 
there was a greater degree of a shared cultural and historic paradigm that made the liberal 
peace model more transferable to Eastern Europe and the Balkans. However, the further away 
societies and cultures are form the Western core, the more unlikely it is that the context-
specific models generated by the Western experience can be transferred meaningfully into 
these local contexts.   
 
If ignorance cannot be a defence, then a more cynical argument would be that external 
peacebuilding agents, especially those from the West with a liberal peace agenda, may be 
aware of how long and arduous their own state-formation and institution-building processes 
were, but this knowledge is inconvenient because it does not fit the expectations of their 
contemporary domestic political context. The perception has been created over several 
decades that the West has the responsibility to export peace and development to the rest of the 
global community. In order to maintain the perception, it is necessary to demonstrate the 
agency to do so at a pace that can be clearly observable for domestic political consumption. 
Why has this perceptions been created and why it is necessary to maintain it? What goals or 
interests are being served? These critical questions lead to a consideration of the larger or 
deeper motives behind the willingness of Western states to invest resources and blood in 
peacebuilding interventions, but that debate is beyond the scope of this study. The point is 
that peacebuilding is driven by external domestic political expediency. The tragedy is that the 
cost is borne by the already vulnerable and fragile societies emerging out of conflict, and this 
amounts to a double burden—the combined cost of their own crisis and the cost of the 
Western peacebuilding intervention (Pritchett & De Weijer, 2010). 
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The international peacebuilding community’s ability to reform the physical aspects of, for 
instance, the security sector—e.g. by training and equipping police and military forces—has 
outpaced their ability to understand how such capacities need to be embedded in local social, 
cultural and political systems. The ability to effect technical influence has thus outpaced the 
ability of these same actors to fully understand the implications of their interventions. The 
development of such sensitive institutions, when poorly linked with the social, cultural and 
political elements of the societies they are meant to serve, results in a dysfunctional security 
sector that adds risk, rather than stability, to a society emerging out of conflict. In other 
words, the perverse effect is that, although the motive of the intervention was to counter 
fragility, the way in which it was carried out has increased fragility and vulnerability. 
 
In the contemporary peacebuilding experience, external peacebuilders have prioritised 
security sector reform because they are motivated by a determined-design theory of change, 
which holds that the sooner there is internal security capacity, the sooner the external security 
forces can be reduced and eventually withdrawn, and this is an obviously attractive prospect 
to those responsible for the treasury (Suhrke, 2011). However, it seems more likely that the 
imbalance introduced in the local system by developing strong security forces without 
developing the counter-balancing civilian institutions is likely to require the external 
peacebuilders to provide that counter-balancing guarantees themselves. As the need to return 
and intervene again and again in Haiti, Liberia, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone has 
demonstrated, such actions are likely to result in perverse outcomes that actually prolong the 
duration of the external intervention and thus the cost. The determined-design approach to 
peacebuilding thus results in delaying, inhibiting or blocking a locally-owned and self-
sustainable outcome.  
 
The dilemma is caused, in part, by the fact that the cost of future interventions will be borne 
by future governments, whilst the decisions on current interventions are made by the 
government of the day, based on the immediate concerns and interests in that given context, 
including domestic considerations. The long-term argument, i.e. looking back and calculating 
the total number of years, and the total cost of, for instance, America’s peacebuilding efforts 
in Haiti over the last 30 years, may make sense from a systemic perspective, but the decisions 
to intervene in reality are political and will be driven by the politics of the day. Every 
administration is only responsible for the decisions it takes during its relatively short term in 
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office. There is no incentive to take a long-term view. The democratic process incentivises 
decisions that discount the cost of taking action in the present against short- to medium-term 
political gain. No one takes responsibility for the longer-term impact a country like America 
may have on a country like Haiti. This tension between long-term impact and short-term, 
more pressing immediate political considerations is, as discussed in Chapter 3, an inherent 
tension in peacebuilding systems. It is also a further argument as to why peacebuilding has to 
be local, because no external system can be expected to genuinely act in the best long-term 
interest of the local.  
 
External peacebuilders recognise that the ultimate goal is self-sustainable local systems, and 
their theory of change argues that they should reduce and withdraw their interference as this 
internal capacity develops, until they eventually are no longer needed. However, Complexity 
leads us to understand that this sequence is illogical, because the local system will not be able 
to develop the capacity to self-organise for as long as the external peacebuilders occupy the 
space, i.e. provide external support to sustain critical sectors and processes, and as long as 
they externally control the parameters within which the system can exercise choice.  
International agents will need to reduce their influence and withdraw at a pace that 
anticipates, not waits for, the emergence of the internal system’s self-organising processes. 
The last few steps to true self-sustainability can only develop in the absence of external 
control. Therefore the external actors should not benchmark their own drawdown and exit on 
the degree to which full self-sustainability has been achieved, but rather on the capacity that 
exists for self-sustainability to take hold after external support has been withdrawn. 
 
Another way of thinking about complex societies that have experienced serious conflict is to 
think of them as complex systems that have gone over the edge into chaos, losing their ability 
to self-organise in the process. When complex societies collapse, they experience a decline in 
complexity, and they often break up into pre-existing subsystems, for instance, ethnic, 
language or religious subsystems (Tainter, 1988:31).  In this context, the post-conflict 
transformation phase can be considered to be a period during which a society is reconstructing 
or more likely building up a new complex system, i.e. it is re-establishing, or newly 
establishing the connections and networks needed for self-organisation to (re)emerge within 
the larger national or country-level reconstituted social system. As discussed earlier, this 
process may require a considerable period of time. National-level social organisation may, for 
instance, collapse into regional and ethnic social formations and in the post-conflict period 
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need to be reconstituted at the national level. As discussed earlier, such a process requires 
time for the new national social system to evolve, for a new national identity to form, for new 
national institutions to be tested, to adapt, and to further evolve through several iterative 
cycles until the new national social system has arrived at a level of social organisation 
sufficiently complex to constitute a self-organising system that is resilient enough to manage 
its own societal change processes without lapsing into violent conflict. Many of the perverse 
effects described earlier will have the effect of undermining and delaying such a delicate 
process.  
 
In fact, when considering the magnitude of the undertaking, we may have to recognise that 
many of today’s most fragile and least-developed countries may never regain, or in those 
cases where it had not developed it in the first place, gain, the ability to become self-
sustainable ‘states’ in the contemporary global political and economic system, because they 
simply lack sufficient internal socio-economic capacity to sustain themselves as national state 
systems. In Complexity terms, too many of the factors necessary for such a state to develop 
into a self-organising complex social system are determined externally – in this context by the 
global political and economic system – for these countries to be able to develop self-
sustainable self-organising systems. Countries like Haiti, the Central African Republic, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea Bissau may need indefinite international support to maintain the minimum 
levels of stability and development that can be tolerated by the international system, so as to 
prevent them from lapsing into violent conflict. They may continue to exist, for the 
foreseeable future, as a collection of communities that exist in the same geographical space 
externally recognised as a state but that are internally unable to reach the level of complexity 
necessary to self-organise into a nation. If so, this observation, based on the implications of 
Complexity for peacebuilding and International Relations, would seriously challenge the 
prevailing peacebuilding model and development ideology (Easterly, 2007) and especially its 
premise that the international community is made up of self-governing sovereign states. It 
would suggest that there is a certain category of ‘states’ not currently recognised as such in 
the international system, which are sub-sovereign—they are unable to achieve sovereign 
statehood measured in terms of their capacity to self-organise. These sub-sovereign states are 
dependent on a larger regional or international system.  
 
For these countries, at least, we have already arrived at a form of global governance. The 
implications are that we have a part of the international system made up of sovereign states 
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that relate to one another and voluntarily cooperate to manage a global system, and others that 
are sub-sovereign and are, at least in part, regulated and maintained by the same global 
system. In this context, peacebuilding is a tool of the global system that assists countries that 
have lapsed into violent conflict to re-establish self-organised sovereignty, or failing that, to 
sustain them at a level necessary for them to participate as a quasi part of the global system of 
governance.  
 
In this section the argument has stated that it is necessary, from a Complexity perspective, to 
recognise that social change processes take time – typically generations – and that trying to 
compress the social learning and adaptation process into a short, intense period of time is 
likely to fail (Rihani, 2009). Complex social processes cannot be compressed beyond a certain 
minimum period. They require time for their iterative feedback processes to generate 
emergent behaviour, and they need time to adapt, evolve and learn.  
 
In this sense, peacebuilding is metaphorically closer to an intervention in a biological 
ecosystem, e.g. gardening, than to an engineering process like building. For instance, trees 
and plants take a certain number of years to grow to maturity and the process cannot be 
hastened beyond a certain minimum period determined by the internal biological function of 
the trees and plants in question. The gardener can, at best, try to ensure optimal conditions in 
terms of water and nutrition, but the biological process unfolds at its own pace. Similarly, 
social systems need time to develop new or adapt existing institutions. The post-conflict 
transformation process typically requires that societies have to change how they are structured 
and how resources and power are distributed among different sub-parts of that social 
community. Such changes are fraught with tensions and require adjustments in the collective 
identity and culture of the society. Therefore, they typically require change measured in 
generational cycles for it to truly take hold.  
 
The generations that were in conflict with one another may accept and tolerate a new post-
conflict dispensation, but they typically struggle to internalise such change completely and 
continue to harbour some of the prejudices, identities and cultural values that contributed to 
the conflict in the first place. Typically, it is only when the generation born after the conflict 
has ended, has grown to maturity and has taken over the leadership in society that such a 
society has adapted sufficiently for it to have transformed itself into a new reality, by 
integrating new post-conflict values, identities and culture. Even then, as demonstrated by the 
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South African and other experiences,
35
 some of the economic and geo-spatial structural 
inequalities in that society are likely to remain and may require several generations to be 
transformed. In the meantime these inequalities will continue to cause tensions in the system, 
although such tensions are likely to be different and to generate different outcomes compared 
to during the period of violent conflict. In the interim, the society may have developed more 
resilient processes for dealing with those stresses than those that were in place before. 
 
The overall implication of the discussion in this section is that there is a certain virtue of 
slowness related to the time and pace of change that is needed for societies emerging out of 
conflict to develop new processes of self-organisation (Cilliers, 2006). Social systems need 
time and space to process the information generated by the interactions among their agents 
and to distil from it a new, common, shared identity. Societies, like the complex systems they 
are, need time to develop a history. It takes time for a system to build up a collective memory 
and for such a common knowledge to be processed into new, agreed-upon norms and values.  
 
Based on what we know about how complex systems emerge, what is suggested in this study 
is a new complex systems approach to peacebuilding that values slow-maturing, long-term 
engagement and that is aimed at allowing societies the time and space they need for internal, 
home-grown self-organising processes to emerge and to mature. In the complex systems 
approach, progress is measured over the long-term in the ability of a system to withstand a 
number of serious challenges without a lapse into violent conflict.  
 
From the insights gained from applying a Complexity perspective to the time, pace and 
positioning considerations of peacebuilding, we can thus find that: 
 When the determined-design interference approach to peacebuilding results in 
situations where communities are under pressure to adapt faster than their collective 
ability to absorb change, the external peacebuilders are in effect delaying the ability of 
such communities to become self-sustainable. 
                                                 
35
 Although the end of apartheid has brought about political equality, South Africa still suffers from deep-rooted 
socio-economic inequality. It was possible, literally overnight with the adoption of a new constitution, to make 
all South Africans legally and politically equal, but it will take generations to change the socio-economic 
inequalities in the society. This inequality also has spatial dimensions, both rural-urban, as well as township-city 
tensions, and although there are no longer laws that keep people of different races from living together legally, 
people do not uproot themselves and move at a whim. The changes that do occur in the socio-economic sphere 
thus take place at a much slower pace than those in the political and legal spheres.  
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 The rate of change has to be matched to the society’s capacity to absorb change for it 
to be sustainable. Imposing more change than can be absorbed results, at best, in 
overflow and waste and, at worst, in pollution (corruption, breakdown of social 
systems and values, a culture of winner-takes-all, short-term self-enrichment, and so 
forth.).  
 A complex-systems approach requires a radical repositioning of our understanding of 
peacebuilding as something that needs to be essentially local.  
 The role of the external actors may be necessary, for instance, to provide an initial safe 
and secure environment and to act as a catalyst by stimulating and facilitating the 
processes necessary for social regeneration, but it is not sufficient to achieve self-
sustainable peace consolidation. International agents thus may have a role to play, but 
need to position themselves in such a way that they do not harm or delay the internal 
system’s self-organising processes. 
 The essential ingredient is local, emergent, self-organised complexity, i.e. the society 
needs to develop its own capacity to manage itself without lapsing into violent 
conflict. 
 The external actors should not benchmark their own drawdown and exit on the degree 
to which full self-sustainability has been achieved, but rather on the capacity that 
exists for self-sustainability to take hold after external support has been withdrawn. 
 
7.6 IMPLICATIONS OF COMPLEXITY FOR COHERENCE 
 
From what has been discussed thus far in Chapters 5 and 6, it is clear that, from a Complexity 
perspective, diversity contributes to the resilience and robustness that systems need in order to 
be able to evolve and adapt to highly dynamic change processes in the environment in which 
they exist. In contrast, the most common understanding of coherence in the peacebuilding 
context drives in the opposite direction – it is an attempt to get a diverse set of peacebuilding 
agents, each with an own set of interests and mandates, to cohere around at least a common 
objective, but preferably also around a common strategic framework that speaks to a division 
of tasks, an agreed set of priorities and perhaps even an agreed work plan. There, thus, seems 
to be some tension between the stated objectives of the coherence imperative and the 
important role that some level of diversity plays in complex systems, and this inherent tension 
may explain why the coherence dilemma has proven to be such a persistent feature of the 
peacebuilding experience. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, Paul Cilliers (2002:77) argues that the study of complex dynamic 
systems confronts us with the limits of human understanding. His position is not that there is 
not much to be learned and new advances to be made, but that our knowledge will always be 
contextually and historically framed. Cilliers (1998:114), using Lyotard’s post-modern 
narrative approach, for instance argues that there are many equally valid local narratives that 
co-exist, and this makes it impossible for one grand narrative that unifies all knowledge to 
emerge. These narratives or discourses are in constant interaction, battling with each other for 
territory (Cilliers, 1998:116; Lyotard, 1984:16-17). A key attribute of this philosophy of 
knowledge is that it is based on the recognition of the virtue of dissent as opposed to 
consensus (Cilliers, 1998:118). The relevance of the dissenting voices is determined 
dynamically through competition and cooperation in terms of the history, as well as the 
changing needs and goals of the system (Cilliers, 1998:119). Lyotard refers to this process as 
the ‘agonistics of the network’ (Lyotard, 1984:61). The implications for coherence in 
peacebuilding systems are that variation and diversity are critically important for the 
‘agonistics of the network’, i.e. for the health, fitness, robustness and resilience of the 
system’s ability to cope with the complexity of its environment. 
 
Rihani (2002:81) makes a related and important point, namely that in complex adaptive 
system simulations, “selection pressures for adaptation came from activities by other 
coevolving entities. The physical environment . . . was the junior partner in that struggle”. In 
other words, it is not only adapting to changes in the environment that is important, but what 
seems especially important is adapting to changes in the behaviour of your peers and 
competitors, as you all co-evolve in an overall changing environment. Interestingly, this is 
also something Tilly (1992:7) stresses in his analysis of state formation in Europe, namely 
that the influence of other coevolving states and societies was a critical influence on how 
specific states in Europe developed.  
 
In a highly dynamic and nonlinear environment it may thus be important to create 
opportunities for exchanging information among peers and, to the extent possible in a given 
context, among competitors so that the peacebuilding system has access to the widest possible 
range or variety of options from among which it can choose, on the basis of the best available 
information, its preferred course of action. Systems that over-emphasise the importance of 
coherence may be limiting their choices. By blinding itself to the information options 
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generated by a likeminded network of peers, it risks limiting the variation or robustness of the 
system, thus isolating it from potentially critically important information about alternative 
options that could otherwise have assisted it in adapting, or adapting more optimally, to 
changes in the environment. 
 
Chapman (2002:31) points out that a key feature of messy policy problems is that “there are 
valid different perspectives on the issue or situation, which interpret information quite 
differently . . . because the precise formulation of the whole depends upon the perspective of 
the person making the observation.” Another way of stating this is that different people will 
have different perspectives on ‘the system’ and this will result in the system being attributed 
with different boundaries, different purposes and perhaps even different properties, none of 
which can be said to be wrong, as they all coexist as valid narratives, given the unique 
perspective of each of these agents. In fact, as Chapman (2002:33) points out, the existence of 
significantly different perspectives on a problem is a key characteristic of a policy mess.  
 
One of the structural causes of intractable policy dilemmas, like the coherence dilemma, is the 
existence of different frameworks or discourses used by different policymakers to make sense 
of the world. In conflict negotiations, one can often observe that evidence that one party 
regards as devastating to a second party’s argument, is dismissed by that party as irrelevant 
(Schön & Rein, 1994, quoted in Chapman, 2002:33). This shows how very difficult, if not 
impossible, it is to establish an objective rational model of decision making or analysis that 
would satisfy all frames of reference or all the possible narratives and discourses (Lyotard, 
1984:16). Thus employing an approach that recognises that different perspectives and 
different frameworks can co-exist “is not a luxury; it is essential if the proposals that emerge 
are to have anything approaching widespread support” (Chapman, 2002:33).  
 
This description would be familiar to anyone who has had to deal with the way in which 
different networks of peacebuilding agents, for instance those who have specialised in 
security sector reform, pro-poor development and good governance, to name a few examples, 
use different narratives to describe the same phenomenon, for instance, the conflict in 
Afghanistan. The security agents are likely to frame the situation as a counter-insurgency war; 
the development agents may frame it as a problem caused by poverty; whilst those in the 
governance dimension may frame it in terms of state fragility (De Coning, Lurås, Schia & 
Ulriksen, 2009). And all these views differ from the multiple ways in which ordinary Afghans 
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would make sense of their own situation. None is necessarily wrong, and consensus, or a 
unifying grand narrative, is probably not possible. Instead, these narratives have to 
continuously compete with each other for policy space, resources and political support. At 
various points in the process specific decisions have to be taken and compromises are 
negotiated or transacted on the basis of the perceived needs or stresses of the system and the 
respective strengths of the various narratives or interests at that specific point in the history of 
the system.  
 
Stepputat (2010) argues that “. . . security, development, and other means, such as 
conciliatory measures and local conflict mediation, should be managed to allow for a situation 
to emerge in which differences, including the irreducible ones, are dealt with by discursive 
means.” The difficulty raised in Chapters 3 and 4, which was discussed again in the previous 
section, is that most peacebuilding agents only act locally and from a short-term perspective 
and thus tend to be unaware of their interdependence on others and their role in and 
contribution to the larger and longer-term system of which they are part. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, this is not a problem for Complexity per se, because agents do not need to be 
conscious of their part in a larger system for that system to exist and function, but the 
recognition that most peacebuilding agents only act locally and from a short-term perspective 
does help to explain why the coherence dilemma has been, and will remain, such a persistent 
part of the peacebuilding experience.  
 
However, in social systems there are many contexts in which it is beneficial for people to 
cooperate with each other. And there are instances where it may be harmful to the self-
interests of peacebuilding agents if they fail to take into account how achieving their own 
interests is interdependent on others achieving theirs and on the system as whole making 
progress towards achieving its overall objectives (Ramalingam & Barnett, 2010:6). For 
instance, for a specific programme, like a voter registration programme, to be successful, 
other programmes aimed at improving livelihoods, for instance, need to be successful enough 
for voters to remain in the districts in which they need to be registered, as opposed to moving 
to cities where they cannot be registered or vote (assuming, for the sake of this example, that 
the electoral law requires people to be registered in the constituency where they are legally 
domiciled). And the system as a whole needs to be making sufficient progress for people to 
feel confident enough in the future to feel safe to participate in such a voter registration 
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progress and to see it as meaningful, in other words, that investing time and effort into the 
process would have a reasonable chance of success and would improve their lives. 
 
In some contexts, it may thus be beneficial for the overall functioning of the system to make 
agents aware of their interdependence on others and of their role in and contribution to the 
larger system. Robert Axelrod (1984 & 2006) studied cooperation, using game theory, and he 
proposes various ways in which cooperation among agents can be encouraged. One way is to 
‘enlarge the shadow of the future’, i.e. making the future cost of not cooperating in the present 
more apparent. Another is to change the reward system, i.e. reversing the pay-offs by creating 
incentives for long-term cooperation and disincentives for going it alone. Some of these 
options for manipulating cooperation will be discussed again in Chapter 8 when we discuss 
influencing complex systems. 
 
Social systems are held together by asymmetrical relationships of power, and therefore the 
solutions to social challenges – such as those posed by a system emerging out of conflict – do 
not lie in a potential harmonious or symmetrical space where power is balanced evenly 
(Cilliers, 1998:120). The hope that such spaces can be created is false (ibid.). It is not possible 
for all the agents in the peacebuilding system to have one common understanding of the 
challenges faced or how best to address them. Each agent’s understanding is framed by his or 
her own history, perspective, interests, needs and goals.  
 
Closely related is the insight from Complexity that dissent, competition for resources, and the 
tension between different approaches and policy choices are not only normal, but necessary in 
order to ensure the optimal functioning of a complex system. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, for evolutionary adaptation to take place we need variation and selection. An 
approach to coherence that reduces variety is harmful to the ability of a complex system to 
cope with Complexity, but the kind of coherence that helps to share information about 
selection, i.e. that modulates feedback and learning, facilitates adaptation.  
 
Rihani (2002:81) states that average complexity increases in complex systems, and the 
highest complexity stands to gain the most. The implication is that the kind of coherence that 
encourages and supports the development of higher levels of Complexity is desirable, whilst 
those that do not are not. In other words, those systems that can accommodate a higher degree 
of diversity and can invest in a greater degree of robustness and resilience, should be better 
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off than those that can accommodate less. Such a statement obviously would need to be 
qualified because it is likely that there will be a certain threshold where an even greater 
investment in resilience does not yield any further benefits, and if one were to simply increase 
diversity without taking any other considerations into account, one would ultimately end up 
with a chaotic or random system. One should thus take a range of cost-benefit and other 
functional considerations into account, but the core point is that pursuing the kind of 
coherence that modulates a diverse range of feedback, and thus organisational learning 
facilitates adaptation. 
 
On the other hand, coherence that seeks equilibrium and  reduces complexity is not desirable 
in a highly dynamic and nonlinear environment. When this kind of coherence results in a 
suppression of dissenting views and reduces the variation in the system, the overall 
effectiveness of the system – its ability to identify and adapt to changes in the environment – 
will decrease.  
 
When the pressure to cohere develops into a culture of agreement, it leads to groupthink or a 
herd mentality, e.g. decision-making cultures where disagreement is discouraged and where 
conformity is rewarded. This results in a closed positive feedback loop, where the 
participating agents convince each other that they are on the right track. In fact, in such 
circumstances the group is closing themselves off from feedback, and they are thus dumbing 
down and limiting their own ability to learn and adapt, i.e. they are self-inhibiting the 
collective intelligence of the group.  
 
Such a group would be poorly attuned to changes elsewhere in the system and the 
environment; they would be slow to adapt and would thus be likely to become more and more 
isolated from the rest of the system. When this kind of herd mentality exists among a 
particularly influential subsystem or among the core members of a particular peacebuilding 
system, it is likely to negatively affect the whole system as well as the peacebuilding process, 
with negative consequences for the society emerging out of conflict. These insights will have 
important implications for how the relationships among peacebuilding agents are managed 
and for how coordination and coherence are valued, and thus for the design of our internal 
management and coordination structures and processes and external interface mechanisms 
and tools. 
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Another perspective on this negative dimension of coherence is to think of it as a system that 
is so tightly connected that it almost becomes a closed system. Such a closed system has at 
least two negative characteristics. The first was touched on in the previous paragraph, namely 
that without sufficient variety, and thus negative feedback, the group is likely to be trapped 
into a groupthink or herd-mentality mode. Rihani (2002:83) and Taleb (2010:316) both 
express concern about this kind of overzealous coherence and explain that when systems shed 
variety, they become fit for just one set of conditions. “Studies have repeatedly shown that 
excessive connectivity often leads to Complexity catastrophe, at which point progress grinds 
to a halt due to repeated local failures” (Rihani, 2002:83). Unchecked or overzealous 
coherence can thus lead to a system shedding variety, and this implies that it becomes more 
and more specialised in one specific approach or one specific environment. If that 
environment changes, which is bound to happen sooner or later in complex systems, the 
system will be slow or unable to adapt.  
 
For instance, the NATO military alliance’s strength lies in the fact that the various members 
of NATO have invested considerable time over the years to standardise procedures and 
equipment, and this means that the various member nations are able to be highly interoperable 
with each other. The negative aspect of this standardisation has been the loss of variety that 
has, for instance in Afghanistan, resulted in the NATO forces being unable to adapt fast 
enough to local conditions. The NATO herd mentality meant that all its elements needed to 
have a common understanding of the situation they were facing, and this meant a common 
enemy and a common narrative to make sense of the enemy’s motivation. NATO needed to 
simplify it all down to one problem, a Taliban insurgency, with one solution, a counter-
insurgency (COIN) operation. The result was that the various member nations of NATO were 
so closely connected to the collective narrative about the phenomenon they were facing that 
they were unable to make sense of the local behaviour of the various communities and groups 
they were encountering on a daily basis. Everything they experienced was influenced by the 
common narrative of the group, even if that meant ignoring the feedback generated by their 
own local observations and experiences at times. This kind of highly connected group think 
thus tends to impose such a strong common narrative on its elements that they are unable to 
make sense of the local variations of, or discrepancies with, the common narrative. The group 
tends to become only interested in observations that reinforce the common narrative. New 
information that does not fit the narrative, or that challenges it, is likely to be ignored.  
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The second negative characteristic of overzealous coherence is that too little variety implies a 
vulnerability to contagious events. If the system is very closely connected, that same 
connectedness can result in the system being vulnerable to negative contagious events. Just as 
we tend to view coherence as inherently positive, a systems approach also tends to view 
connectedness as inherently positive. However, as Rihani (2002) and Taleb (2010) point out, 
this is not necessarily the case. Another characteristic of system resilience and robustness thus 
is the ability of a system to withstand and survive negative contagious events. 
 
An important insight from Complexity thus is that achieving an ideal type of coherence, as 
defined in Chapter 1, is not achievable, nor desirable in a complex context. In Chapter 1, 
coherence is defined as the effort to ensure that the political, security and development 
dimensions of a peacebuilding system in a particular crisis are directed towards a common 
objective. In this chapter, however, the argument is that it is not possible to establish one 
meta-narrative that can accommodate all the different perspectives that the different 
peacebuilding agents bring to the table. Nor is it desirable, because there is virtue in 
maintaining some level of diversity, robustness and resilience when coping with complex 
systems.  
 
This does not mean that pursuing some degree of coherence does not have value. On the 
contrary, pursuing coherence does have value to the degree that it stimulates the discourse 
among narratives and facilitates self-organisation. However, it is important to recognise the 
limits of coherence, and it is important to recognise that pursuing overzealous or ideal type 
coherence can have perverse effects.  
 
A more realistic understanding of coherence in the peacebuilding context would thus be one 
where coherence is understood as an aspiration towards a degree of interdependency or self-
organisation that is optimal for the given context. In some contexts more coherence may be 
appropriate, in others less, thus there is a scale or range of possible states of coherence that is 
context specific (De Coning & Friis, 2011). For instance, and as discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4, in a peacebuilding context that is still highly volatile and where violent 
conflict is still occurring, such as in Darfur or the eastern DRC, less coherence may be likely 
and indeed desirable, whilst in other peacebuilding contexts where violent conflict has come 
to an end and where the risk of relapse is low, such as in Liberia, more coherence may be 
likely and desirable. In highly volatile situations, peacebuilding agents want to retain a greater 
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degree of independence so that they can adapt their behaviour rapidly without the transaction 
costs associated with first having to get the agreement of a large number of other agents. In 
less volatile situations, agents can rely more on cooperation because the cost and risk of 
cooperation is lower and the benefits derived out of burden sharing, coordination and accrual 
are higher than the benefits of independent action.  
 
Coherence is thus not necessarily a good in and of itself, and more coherence is not always 
better. There is a tipping point where more coherence does not result in improved system 
performance. In fact, beyond such a tipping point the system may start losing variety, 
resilience and robustness, and overzealous coherence may result in perverse effects, 
ultimately affecting the overall performance of the system negatively. 
 
Interrelatedness should also not be confused with sameness. The fact that we recognise that 
the peacebuilding agents are interconnected does not imply that all the peacebuilding agents 
involved have the same objectives, mandates, principles and values. Nor does it follow from 
having interrelated problems that it is necessary to have one common understanding, common 
objective and common response. Interconnected problems call for interconnected responses, 
not necessarily for one common response. This implies that the different agents, and 
subsystems, need to interact with each other and inform and educate each other about their 
respective understanding of the situation, as well as their respective theories of change, plans 
and actions. They should not do so under pressure to conform to one commonly agreed-upon 
approach, but they should be encouraged to engage with each other and to exchange 
information with each other, so that each of them can act on the best possible knowledge of 
how the other agents in the system view the situation and how they intend to act.  
 
Higher levels of information flow among agents should lead to more optimal co-evolutionary 
adaptation and self-organisation in the system. In this sense, coherence is about facilitating 
the interdependencies and thus self-organisation of the system. It is important, however, to 
also recognise that Complexity values the role of dissent, competition for resources, and the 
tension between different approaches and policy choices. It sees these tensions not only as 
normal, but as necessary to ensure the optimal functioning of the system.  
 
Based on these insights from Complexity for peacebuilding, coherence could be redefined as 
a process aimed at achieving an optimal level of self-organisation among interdependent 
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agents in a given context. Coherence, in this context, can be understood as a process whereby 
agents engage each other with a view to understanding each other and the environment better. 
The degree of coherence in a given context can be enhanced by facilitating the exchange of 
information and modulating feedback among the agents so that the decisions that the various 
agents take independently are better informed and can thus contribute to more effective 
system-level adaptation and self-organisation. In this new definition, coherence is aimed at 
pursuing the most effective and efficient level of self-organisation, taking into account the 
nature of the participating agents and the environmental context, including the pace at which 
the system is likely to have to cope with, and adapt to, change.  
 
The definition requires an understanding that an optimal solution implies the need to take the 
specific context into account and that what is thus regarded as optimal will differ from context 
to context. Each context is also subject to change and an optimal state is thus never a final, 
ideal state, but rather the outcome of the totality of transactions among agents up to that point 
in time, given that the system remains dynamic and nonlinear. ‘Optimal’ does not refer to a 
preconceived or determined-design idea of what is ideal given an imagined future context. 
‘Optimal’ refers to an emergent property, generated by the system’s interactions and 
influenced by its environment. It cannot be known in advance, but it can be encouraged, 
facilitated and pursued by modulating the exchange of information among the agents, with a 
view to trying to ensure that as many of the agents as possible have access to information 
about what is happening in the environment and elsewhere in the system itself. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The relevance of Complexity to the peacebuilding context has been considered in this chapter 
and the prevalent ‘deterministic-design’ approach to peacebuilding was contrasted with a 
‘complex systems’ approach. The ‘deterministic-design’ concept was used to refer to the 
basic theory of change most widely used and applied by the peacebuilding policy and 
practitioner communities, namely one in which the policy makers and practitioners are 
confident in:  
(i) Their ability to analyse and identify ‘the problem’ that they have to address;  
(ii) Their ability to design an intervention in response, i.e. ‘the solution’ that will solve 
this problem; and  
(iii) Their ability to implement remedial programmes which administer these solutions.  
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In contrast, a complex-systems approach is based on an understanding of complex systems in 
which change processes are evolutionary in nature, i.e. the system adapts to its environment 
and its own emergent behaviour through a continuous process of adaptation regulated by its 
own self-organising processes.  
 
In the context of peacebuilding systems problem solving, stabilisation, time, pace and 
positioning, and coherence were considered. With regard to problem solving it was found that 
when something is complex it cannot have one definitive ‘solution’ and there should thus not 
be an attempt to ‘solve’ it with reductionist design methodologies aimed at identifying and 
applying such solutions.  In contrast, a complex-systems approach adopts an evolutionary 
model that experiments with multiple parallel interventions that generate variation and then 
selects and further refines those interventions that work better than the others in a continuous 
iterative process. 
 
With regard to stabilisation, it was found that that there is a difference between thinking of 
change and conflict as abnormal problems that need to be stabilised so that the system can 
return to its ideal steady state and thinking about change as something normal and optimal 
and that this difference has important implications for how we think about influencing and 
interfering in peacebuilding systems. 
 
With regard to time, pace and positioning, it was found that it is important to factor in the 
time it takes for social change to emerge and that the pace of change needs to be matched with 
a society’s capacity to absorb it. International agents have a critically important role to play, 
but they need to position themselves in such a way that they do not harm or delay the internal 
system’s self-organising processes. 
 
A complex-systems approach thus requires a radical repositioning of our understanding of 
peacebuilding as something that needs to be essentially local – it is something a society has to 
do for itself. The role of the external actors may be necessary to provide an initial safe and 
secure environment and to act as a catalyst by stimulating and facilitating the processes 
necessary for social regeneration, but it is not sufficient to achieve self-sustainable peace 
consolidation. The essential ingredient is local, emergent, self-organised complexity; the 
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society needs to develop its own capacity to manage itself without lapsing into violent 
conflict. 
 
With regard to coherence, what was found was that there seems to be a tension between the 
stated objectives of the coherence imperative on the one hand and the role that diversity plays 
in complex systems on the other, and this inherent tension may explain why the coherence 
dilemma has proven to be such a persistent feature of the peacebuilding experience. It was 
argued that it is not possible to establish one meta-narrative that can accommodate all the 
different perspectives that the different peacebuilding agents bring to the table. Nor is it 
desirable, because there is virtue in maintaining some level of diversity, robustness and 
resilience when coping with complex systems. 
 
Based on these insights from Complexity for peacebuilding, coherence should be redefined as 
a process aimed at achieving an optimal level of self-organisation among interdependent 
agents in a given context. The definition should include an understanding that ‘optimal’ here 
implies the need to take the specific context into account and that what is thus regarded as 
optimal will differ from context to context. ‘Optimal’ does not refer to a preconceived or a 
determined-design idea of what is ideal given an imagined future context. Optimal refers to an 
emergent property, generated by the system’s interactions and influenced by its environment. 
It cannot be known in advance, but coherence can be encouraged, facilitated and pursued by 
modulating the exchange of information among the agents. 
 
In the next chapter the question to be addressed concerns whether it is possible to manipulate 
or direct complex systems. This is an important question for peacebuilding because it seems 
to be an underlying assumption that the international or external system has the agency to 
intervene and direct a local or internal system. However, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
Complexity seems to suggest that the capacity to intervene in complex systems is much more 
limited than assumed in the peacebuilding policy community.  
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CHAPTER 8 
INFLUENCING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
All interventions are intrinsically unpredictable, chaotic, and uncertain and will rapidly 
confound well-laid plans and careful predictions. The uncertainty in intervention is much 
more profound than the uncertainty in domestic policy. (Stewart & Knaus, 2011:xx) 
 
An explicit, reflexive awareness of the incompleteness of our understanding is therefore vital 
so that decisions are taken with a large degree of caution (and humility) while at the same time 
demanding that we think through the possible ramifications. A big part of the challenge for the 
international community is to accept that what eventuates may not approximate the Western 
liberal democratic model. (Hughes, 2012:116) 
 
Interventions are necessarily linked to the notion of ‘intention’ since their shared motivating 
perspective is a desire to bring about change or solve a ‘problem’. The notion of intention 
presupposes that social entities can be steered, guided, managed and corrected…indeed, 
interference by ‘outsiders’ in the affairs of ‘insiders’ is emerging as a structural characteristic 
of today’s international system. (Gelot & Söderbaum, 2011:75-76) 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall aim of this study is to explore the utility of using Complexity to gain insights into 
the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. Peacebuilding and coherence were 
introduced in Part I and the factors that constrain coherence were discussed. In Part II, 
Complexity was introduced; it was established that peacebuilding is complex, and some of the 
implications of Complexity for peacebuilding were considered. In the process, insights were 
gained about how self-sustainable peace consolidation can potentially be influenced by 
facilitating and encouraging local self-organisation and by mitigating the perverse effects of 
external interference in local social change processes. In Part III, guidelines for complex 
peacebuilding will be generated. In this chapter, the discussion will focus on influencing 
complex systems. Recommendations for coping with complex peacebuilding systems will be 
presented in Chapter 9. 
 
In the preceding chapters, peacebuilding was presented as a system that can be understood as 
an instrument used by the international community to stabilise and assist a country emerging 
out of conflict to rejoin the international system. In this context, peacebuilding is framed as a 
tool used by the international community to influence a specific society emerging out of 
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conflict to adopt a pattern of behaviour desired by the international system. In the short term, 
the tool is intended to assist the society in preventing a relapse into violent conflict. In the 
medium to longer term it is meant to support the society on its path to recovery as it develops 
the systems and subsystems necessary to regulate itself, internally as well as in relation to the 
regional and international systems within which it is embedded. In this sense, the 
peacebuilding tool is intended to facilitate the normalisation of a country’s position in the 
international community as a member in good standing, at peace with itself and its 
neighbours. Peacebuilding thus is seen as a tool for influencing a society to adopt norms and 
behaviour compatible with the international rules and standards, as agreed among the member 
states and institutions that make up the international community.  
 
The prominent verb in this description is ‘influence’, and in this context peacebuilding is 
framed as an activity that is essentially about one system – the international community – 
interfering with another – the local society – with the purpose of trying to influence it to 
behave within certain parameters. Two qualifications need to be added: The first relates to the 
fuzziness of borders and boundaries in complex systems, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
and what is understood here as the ‘international community’ and the ‘local society’ thus need 
to be understood very loosely. We have already discussed, for instance, how the government 
of South Sudan is both a member of the international community as well as part of the local 
society. The second relates to our understanding of peacebuilding as inclusive of all agents 
that pursue the common peace consolidation objective, regardless of whether they are external 
or internal agents. Thus when this study broadly refers to the influence of the international 
community on the local society, the reader needs to take these nuances into account, but 
understand that the study is simplifying for the sake of drawing attention to those aspects 
related to one system attempting to interfere with another. The insights that can be gained 
from Complexity when it comes to this act of ‘interfering’ with complex systems are 
considered in this chapter.  Twelve leverage points for intervening in complex systems as 
conceptualised by Donella Meadows (1999 & 2008), in particular, will be discussed and 
considered.  
 
The purpose of this chapter on influencing complex systems is to improve our understanding 
of how one complex system can influence another in the peacebuilding context. What is 
known about how systems respond under pressure from other systems? And what are the 
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implications of understanding peacebuilding as one system trying to influence or manipulate 
the behaviour of another? 
 
8.2 INFLUENCING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
 
In Chapter 2, peacebuilding was described as a concerted effort by a group of international 
and local actors to consolidate a peace process. The argument concerned a general theory of 
change in peacebuilding that holds that it is possible for the international community to 
consolidate a peace process by assisting the parties in the conflict through facilitating conflict 
resolution, supporting national reconciliation and nation building, and by undertaking state-
building activities in support of establishing rule of law, good governance and democracy. 
This theory of change is built on the assumption that it is possible for one system – broadly 
referred to here for our purposes as ‘the international’ – to influence or manipulate another 
system – ‘the local’.  What is considered in this chapter is whether it is indeed possible for 
one complex system to influence another and, if so, how this process works.  
 
A useful metaphor to remind ourselves of the differences between manipulating a complicated 
versus complex systems has been suggested by Plsek (Chapman, 2002:40), who compares 
throwing a stone with throwing a live bird: 
The trajectory of a stone can be calculated quite precisely using the laws of mechanics, and it is 
possible to ensure that the stone reaches a specific destination. However, it is not possible to 
predict the outcome of throwing the live bird in the same way, even though the same laws of 
physics ultimately govern the bird’s motion through the air. (Plsek quoted in Chapman, 
2002:40)  
 
As Plsek points out, “one approach is to tie the bird’s wings, weight it with a rock and then 
throw it. This will make the trajectory (nearly) as predictable as that of the stone, but in the 
process the capability of the bird is completely destroyed” (Chapman, 2002:40). Plsek argues 
that “this is more or less what policy makers try to do when using a linear approach, based on 
a mechanical model, to try to control the behaviour of a complex system for which they are 
devising policy” (ibid.).   
 
The insight that can be gained from Plsek’s bird-throwing metaphor is that if there is a desire 
to influence a complex system, interventions that take account of the properties of the system 
would have to be designed. For instance, in the bird metaphor Plsek points out “that a more 
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successful strategy for getting the bird to a desired end-point might be to place food at the 
destination” (ibid.).  
 
Plsek’s bird example emphasises the differences between influencing complicated and 
complex systems. Others, such as Byrne (1998:16), question whether it is at all possible to 
influence a highly dynamic and nonlinear complex system. Paul Cilliers (2001:145) makes 
the point that Complexity can help us to improve our understanding of complex systems in 
general, but it cannot help us to predict or control the behaviour of a particular complex 
system. In the context of an economic system, Cilliers (1998:90) argues that, although the 
interactions of a large number of factors (e.g. money supply, growth rate, employment, and so 
forth) is too complex to allow for the design of a deterministic model, some degree of 
intervention is possible (e.g. adjustment of interest rates, stimulus packages, regulation, and 
so forth). Cilliers (ibid.) makes the point, however, that the effects of these interventions will 
only be predictable in the short term since the spontaneous adjustment and self-organisation 
of the system involves the complex interaction of many factors, most of which fall outside the 
scope of the intervention and cannot be controlled at all.  
 
Cloete (2004:15) argues that a complexity-science approach shifts our focus from the control 
of behaviour in order to achieve a specific outcome, to the facilitation and encouragement of 
dynamic and non-linear system processes that modulate self-organisation to achieve desired 
objectives. Traditional policymaking is ineffective in complex systems because control and 
prediction are impossible to achieve (ibid.). In other words, if with ‘influence’ we mean 
control the outcome of the behaviour of a complex system, then the short answer from a 
Complexity perspective is that it is not possible for one complex system to influence another.  
 
However, if with ‘influence’ we mean to stimulate changes in the behaviour of a complex 
system, and if we accept that it is not possible to control the outcome of such interference, the 
short answer is that it is possible for one complex system to influence another. However, as 
the behaviour of a complex system can only be stimulated, not controlled—. Maintaining the 
behaviour of a system within certain parameters (in the peacebuilding context such 
parameters could be identified as indicators that are indicative of a high risk of relapse into 
violent conflict) cannot be achieved with a once-off intervention. Trying to influence a system 
with the aim of maintaining it within certain parameters will have to be a continuous process 
of interference, where the intervention takes the form of a series of relatively short-term 
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corrective stimuli, where each successive stimulus provides positive or negative feedback on 
the way the local system has responded to the previous stimuli.  
 
A useful metaphor for this kind of influence is the kind of corrective adjustments a steersman 
continuously has to make to the direction of a ship. The ship is continuously influenced by the 
wind and currents, and the steersman, in order to follow a general course, has to continuously 
make adjustments to the rudder to keep the ship on course. For the steersman it is a process 
that stops when the ship docks at its destination, but for a society it is a never-ending process. 
 
The first insight gained from Complexity for influencing societies in the peacebuilding 
context is thus that, whilst an external intervention may be able to influence a local social 
system, this should not be confused with controlling the system. A complex system regulates 
itself through its own processes of self-organisation. If an external intervention were to reach 
a point where it is able to control the local system, the local system would no longer be self-
sustainable. It would become dependent on and, in effect, a subsystem of the external system. 
In such a case, the intervention would radically alter the local systems’ character. A recent 
example would be the occupation of Iraq. However, if the aim of the intervention is to 
generate self-sustainable peace consolidation, then the intervening agency needs to accept that 
it cannot control the outcome or behaviour of the local system; it can merely try to influence it 
to behave in certain ways.  
 
Sergey Samoilenko (2008:41) suggests that one way in which one may be able to influence 
complex systems is by modulating the relations between the agents of the system. He argues 
that the “complexity of the process of organizational transformation can be controlled by 
means of altering the internal parameters of the system”.  What he is suggesting, building on 
the concept of fitness landscapes (Kauffman, 1993 & 1995), is that by manipulating the 
distance and connections, whether social and/or geographic, among actors, one should be able 
to influence their “interdependencies” (Samoilenko, 2008:43). 
 
Samoilenko’s argument implies that we may be able to influence the behaviour among 
conflicting parties by making sure the agents are better informed of each other’s interests and 
motivations for acting in a particular way. It may be possible to influence the capacity of a 
society emerging out of conflict to cope with future tensions by improving the connections 
among different interest groups in the society, for instance by ensuring that there are multiple 
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and robust mechanisms that exist in the society that can detect tensions, manage disputes 
before they may lead to violent conflict, facilitate dialogue, and absorb and resolve such 
tensions peacefully. In the peacebuilding context, this can be attempted by stimulating the 
development of a range of governmental institutions, as well as through encouraging the 
development of civil society organisations.   
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Robert Axelrod’s (2006) work on game theory36 
suggests that there are various ways in which cooperation among agents can be encouraged. 
Both Samoilenko and Axelrod thus suggest that one way of influencing the behaviour of a 
complex social system is to modulate the interdependencies among the agents in the system 
by influencing the flow of information among the agents, so as to strengthen the connections 
among them and, in so doing, improve the ability of the system to self-organise, or self-
coordinate. This brings the discussion to the leverage points that Meadows has developed for 
influencing complex systems.  
 
Donella Meadows (1999 & 2008) has specifically studied influencing complex systems, and 
she is particularly interested in the leverage points that can be used to influence complex 
systems. Meadows (1999:4) understands influencing a system as moving it from a perceived 
current state to a future goal state. She has a term for the difference between the current state 
and the goal state, namely ‘the discrepancy’. She perceives a system as containing stock, with 
inflows and outflows, and at any given time, based on the amount of stock in the system, one 
can consider the system to be in a certain ‘state’. The ‘state of the system’ thus refers to any 
standing stock of importance. Meadows gives examples of stock such as the amount of water 
in a dam or the amount of money in a bank, but in the peacebuilding context, it is suggested to 
think of stock in terms of information. For this discussion on the leverage points for 
influencing complex systems in particular, it is suggested that the degree of confidence that a 
given community has in a peace process should be understood as the standing stock that 
Meadows refers to.  
 
The World Development Report 2011 stresses the role that restoring confidence plays in 
breaking the cycles of violence (World Bank, 2011). The Report argues that “Confidence-
                                                 
36
 Game Theory refers to en extensive body of literature (see Poundstone, 1992; Axelrod, 1984, 1997 & 2006) 
on which strategies will generate the best results in situations where persons or organisations are confronted with 
having a choice between cooperation and competition, in order to pursue a given interest.  
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building…is a prelude to more permanent institutional change . . . because low trust means 
that stakeholders who need to contribute political, financial, or technical support will not 
collaborate until they believe that a positive outcome is possible” (World Bank, 2011:12). 
When people believe a positive outcome is possible, it results in them taking individual 
actions, such as returning home, planting crops, sending their children to school, starting a 
business, and so forth. Such decisions have a positive feedback loop effect that generates 
confidence in others, and as more and more people view the future positively and act on that 
perception, the cumulative effect is to encourage and bolster the peace process itself. If 
enough people have confidence in the peace process, one may reach a tipping point where, 
bar some kind of major set-back, the confidence may become a self-fulfilling attitude that 
fuels the positive momentum of the peace process. One can thus think in terms of more or less 
confidence, and there is thus an understandable interest in influencing the levels of confidence 
in any given peace process. That is why it is suggested that the level of confidence in a peace 
process in a given society be used as the ‘standing stock’ when discussing the relevance of 
Meadows’ leverage points for peacebuilding systems.  
 
Meadows argues that what she terms ‘inflows’ increase the stock and ‘outflows’ decrease it. 
In our example, certain events, for instance, the release of political prisoners, rivals coming to 
an agreement, or a speech by a prominent politician can increase a community’s hope that a 
peace process will be successful and thus increase the confidence stock. Other acts, for 
instance, increasingly negative or insulting rhetoric among politicians and an increase in 
lawlessness or a prominent murder that is rumoured to be politically motivated, would 
decrease the community’s trust in the ability of the peace process to succeed and thus reduce 
the confidence stock. Meadows (1999:4) argues that there are basic laws of conservation and 
accumulation that govern the amount of stock in a system. If the inflow rate is higher than the 
outflow rate, the amount of stock will increase. If the rate of the flow is fairly small and the 
standing stock is large, the system will be sluggish to respond. Meadows gives the example of 
a small amount of water flowing into a big stock of water, and she uses it to explain why 
“policy changes take time to accumulate their effects” (ibid.).    
 
She does not, however, take account of the fact that in nonlinear systems, as seen in Chapter 
5, some flows or events have the asymmetrical potential to trigger large reactions in the 
system. For instance, in our peacebuilding example, a sense that there is a steady increase in 
politically motivated murders may slowly increase a community’s concern for the future 
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stability of the system, but the murder of a single prominent politician could result in a major 
loss of confidence in the future stability of the system in a very short time. Because of the 
nonlinear nature of Complexity, the reverse can also occur; a major event or announcement 
intended to have a high impact on the confidence levels in the community may turn out to 
have no or little impact.  
 
However, in reality, such high-impact events are rare, and her basic point helps us to 
understand why most normal policy interventions take time to have an effect or only have a 
small or short-term effect. The concept of a standing stock and the impact that inflows or 
outflows may have on the standing stock also helps one to develop an understanding of the 
proportional relationship between a given intervention and the size of the standing stock on 
which such an intervention is meant to have an influence. Similarly, it can help one to 
consider the complexity that derives from multiple simultaneous inflows and outflows and 
how that would complicate determining the effect of any one of those interventions on the 
standing stock, or of the complex task of somehow coordinating those multiple inflows and 
outflows with a view to achieving a desired future goal state. 
  
The kind of inflow-outflow model that Meadows (1999:4) suggests is manipulated by two 
negative feedback, or correcting, processes, the one controlling the inflow and the other the 
outflow. If you want to increase the stock, you increase the inflow and/or decrease the 
outflow. If you have too much stock you increase the outflow and/or decrease the inflow. 
Meadows (ibid.) points out that neither the goal of the system, nor the feedback connections 
are necessarily visible or obvious to an external observer. The complexity derives from the 
fact that each of these systems is connected to many others and the number of causal effects is 
so many, and so interconnected, that it is not possible to track what causes, or controls, a 
particular flow. There is not one single inflow or outflow mechanism with which we can 
control the confidence of the society in a given peace process.  
 
It was mentioned earlier that one high-profile political murder can, for instance, have an 
asymmetrical affect on a peace process. Imagine being in South Africa on 10 April 1993 and 
being Nelson Mandela or FW de Klerk and hearing that Chris Hani had been murdered.
37
 
                                                 
37
 Chris Hani was a prominent member of the African National Congress (ANC). He led the South African 
Communist Party and headed the armed wing of the ANC. His murder came at a highly sensitive time in the 
South African transition, and it brought the country to the brink of disaster. It was an attempt by right-wing 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 245 
Imagine all the potential different directions in which the South African peace process could 
have gone at that point. And imagine that, despite that tragedy, you had to design an 
intervention aimed at maintaining the society’s confidence in the peace process. What steps 
could be taken to prevent large-scale violence breaking out, and what could be done to keep 
the peace process on track? How could the outflow of trust in the peace process be contained, 
and how could the inflow of hope be increased?  
 
Chris Hani’s assassination is an interesting example of how one group of right-wing plotters 
tried to radically influence the South African conflict system, how the system reacted in part 
as they intended (positive feedback), and how the intervention by Mandela and others 
managed to check the system (negative feedback), and to then direct it instead to increase the 
intensity of the peace process (positive feedback). The first democratic elections in South 
Africa took place just over a year later on 27 April 1994. This particular example will be 
discussed again because the outcome of the South African peace process is fairly well known, 
and it can thus serve as a useful example to illustrate Meadows’ leverage points, as well as 
our consideration of them. For now, the attention is on Meadows’ (1999) twelve leverage 
points. These twelve points (Meadows, 1999:3), in order of increasing effectiveness, are: 
12. Constants, parameters, numbers, 
11. The sizes of buffers and other stabilizing stocks, relative to flows, 
10. The structure of material stocks and flows, 
9. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system change, 
8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to 
correct against, 
7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops, 
6. The structure of information flows, 
5. The rules of the system, 
4. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organise system structure, 
3. The goals of the system, 
2. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system – its goals, structure, rules, 
 delays, parameters – arises; and 
1. The power to transcend paradigms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
politicians to derail the process leading to the end of apartheid. Nelson Mandela made an impassioned call for 
calm during a national television broadcast. His message emphasised reconciliation and the rule of law, and his 
plea, together with similar views expressed by many other South African leaders at all levels of society, 
managed to contain the unrest and violence that followed in the wake of Hani’s assassination.  
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Although she does not suggest a specific model for using the twelve leverage points other 
than differentiating between the degrees to which each influences a system, the implication is 
that these twelve leverage points should be pursued, more or less simultaneously. As this 
twelve-leverage-point approach may be a useful way to think of influencing complex systems 
in the peacebuilding context, each of the twelve leverage points suggested by Meadows are 
introduced next, describing each in her terms, and then attempting to contextualise them in a 
peacebuilding setting.  
 
8.3 CONSTANTS, PARAMETERS AND NUMBERS 
 
Meadows (1999:5) understands parameters and numbers as indicators of discrepancy. They 
tell us about the state of a system, for instance the size of the population, the number of 
unemployed, the crime rate, and so forth. Some of these numbers may be physically locked in 
and are unchangeable, but most are popular intervention points. We tend to focus on things 
such as the crime rate, the number of people that are unemployed, and the rate of economic 
growth. This is because these parameters offer quantifiable indicators for tracking and 
managing change. Meadows (6) argues, however, that these are the points of least leverage. 
She says it is like re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Although most of our attention 
is focused on parameters, there is not much leverage in them (ibid.). That does not mean they 
are not important. She argues that they can be important and that people do care deeply 
enough about them to become engaged in fierce battles about parameters. However, merely 
changing a specific parameter rarely changes the behaviour of the system.  
 
What she means is that spending more on policing, for example, does not address the 
socioeconomic reasons why some people engage in crime. The increased spending may, or 
may not, actually be linked to a reduction in the crime rate, but mostly it is an affirmation to 
ourselves that we are doing something about the problem, i.e. in this example, a government 
can show that it is responding to rising crime by spending more on the police, i.e. the 
government can show a positive change in a parameter.
38
  A parameter on its own does not 
have much leverage, and intervening in a system in order to influence a parameter, is not 
likely to have much effect on the system itself. However, parameters can be useful in tracking 
                                                 
38
 In this example the parameter is the amount spent on policing, for instance, an increase or decrease in the 
annual budget. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 247 
leverage points when they reflect changes related to the leverage points lower down on her 
list (Meadows,1999:6).  
 
This is an important insight, especially because the results-based management approach has 
received a lot of attention in the peacebuilding and development field, and this has resulted in 
a lot of focus on developing and tracking indicators of progress. There is a danger that when 
indicators of progress are pre-determined, people will tend to design activities aimed at hitting 
the targets, instead of pursuing the goals and interventions of the programmes, and this is 
likely to cause all kinds of side-effects and distortions in the system. The net effect is likely to 
be a loss of system effectiveness (De Coning & Romita, 2009).   
 
8.4 BUFFERS AND OTHER STABILISING STOCKS 
 
A buffer is the ability of a standing stock to stabilise a system. For instance, when the amount 
of stock is much bigger that the amount of inflows and outflows, the standing stock acts as a 
buffer against the change caused by the flows. “You can stabilize a system by increasing the 
capacity of a buffer” (Meadows, 1999:7). There is leverage in changing the size of buffers, 
but buffers are not easy to change. Big buffers make systems inflexible and can be costly to 
maintain. 
 
In the peacebuilding context, a buffer can be something as intangible as confidence. It can be 
argued that, in the example of the Chris Hani assassination, and despite all the uncertainty and 
instability, the vast majority of people in the South African community were at that point 
confident and hopeful enough to persevere with the peace process, i.e. their expectations and 
wish for a better future sufficiently outweighed their pessimism and fears, and this acted as a 
sufficient buffer against the potentially devastating negative effects of the assassination; it 
therefore only took a certain amount of reassurance for the system to overcome that 
challenge. That being said, it would also have taken only a few more similar events to have 
eroded that confidence, but the point is that, in this case, the size of the buffer prevented the 
system from lapsing into violent conflict on a scale that would have resulted in the breakdown 
of the peace processes. Many other peace processes would have lapsed into violent conflict 
under similar pressure, because they do not have such buffers or standing stock of goodwill or 
hope. 
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Meadows does not mention the negative effects of buffers on systems change, although it is 
implied, but in peacebuilding systems there are often many buffers that complicate and slow 
down the system’s ability to change. Examples include high numbers of people that are 
unskilled, illiterate and uneducated, which implies that it will take generations to improve the 
overall education rate of affected communities. Societies in transition are typically faced with 
population growth, mixed with low economic growth and, thus, a high and increasing number 
of people unemployed, especially the youth. The size of a country’s population is a slow-
changing buffer, and it is extremely difficult to have an effect on such buffers in the short 
term. It may thus be important to focus on ways to cope with the effect of such buffers, as any 
interventions aimed at the buffer itself will require time to have an effect.  The concept of 
buffers and their effects when contemplating system change is thus a useful concept to bear in 
mind, both in terms of their positive and their negative effects. It should also serve as an 
additional insight that cautions those that think rapid change is possible. 
 
8.5 THE STRUCTURE OF MATERIAL STOCKS AND FLOWS 
 
The structure of a system – and its stocks and flows – has a major effect on how the system 
functions. Structure is an important consideration for understanding how systems operate, but 
it is not a good leverage point because changing structure is time consuming, costly and 
difficult. Meadows (1999:8) states that “the leverage point is in proper design in the first 
place. After the structure is built, the leverage is in understanding its limitations and 
bottlenecks and refraining from fluctuations or expansions that strain its capacity.”  
 
Meadows is thinking here about physical structure systems designed by humans, such as road 
networks or water drainage systems (1999:8). In the peacebuilding context, several relevant 
examples illustrate her point. Population structure and flows are important system structures 
to contend with. A useful example of a structure in the peacebuilding context is a constitution. 
Many peace processes require changes in existing constitutions, or the drafting of new ones. 
Meadows’ point is that it is difficult, and politically costly, to change a constitution once it 
has been adopted. The best point at which to influence a constitution is when it is drafted. 
 
Another example, unique in many ways to the peacebuilding context, is the way the 
international peacebuilding community in general, and the UN in particular, are structured. 
The most obvious example perhaps is the composition of the UN Security Council. Another 
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could be the way UN peacekeeping is funded by the assessed contribution budget whilst 
Special Political Mission is funded by the regular budget and voluntary contributions. As 
Meadows points out, trying to change this kind of structure and flow dynamics is extremely 
difficult, costly and usually highly contested and resisted, especially by those that are 
benefiting from the existing arrangement. The leverage lies in understanding these structures 
and working with and around them, avoiding, as she points out, the bottlenecks or strains on 
capacity that the existing structure of the stocks, and their flows, may cause. In the 
peacebuilding context, a relevant example can be understanding how to use the peacekeeping 
budget to achieve peacebuilding effects, and how to ensure that the transition from assessed to 
voluntary funding does not result in gaps in peacebuilding programming. Coping with 
Complexity in this context is thus about understanding the structural constraints of a given 
situation and working with and around them. 
 
8.6 DELAYS AND THE RATE OF SYSTEM CHANGES  
 
Meadows (1999:8) argues that “a delay in a feedback process is critical relative to rates of 
change in the system state that the feedback loop is trying to control.” She explains that, if 
you are trying to influence a system towards your goal but the information you receive about 
the state of the system is delayed, you will tend to over- or under-adjust the corrections. 
Influencing a complex peacebuilding system is like steering a huge oil tanker that is slow to 
respond to the rudder. One has to learn to make small changes and to plan any changes in 
direction far in advance, because any sudden movements will be slow to register, will 
eventually have a large effect, and will be equally slow to correct.  
 
Meadows (1999:9) explains that she would have listed delay lengths as a high leverage point, 
but she did not because the reason for delays is often structural and thus difficult to change. 
She argues that “things take as long as they take” and gives the example of the time it takes 
for a child to mature or the growth rate of a forest (ibid.). She argues that it is easier to slow 
down a change rate than to speed up a process, and slowing down a process, e.g. economic 
growth, may help “so that the inevitable feedback delays won’t cause so much trouble” 
(ibid.).  This point is an important check on models that call for speeding up the rate of 
adjustment in the system. Any system will have limitations as to how fast it can change its 
structures and stocks in the face of change, and this is especially true for social systems. The 
argument in Chapter 7, and elsewhere, is that social systems need time to process change, and 
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a model that anticipates the system to adjust faster than is possible will cause feedback delays 
that could cause collapse. 
 
Meadows (1999:9) points out that if there is a delay in the system that can be changed, 
changing it can have big effects. She gives the example of the push for further reducing 
information and money transfer delays in financial markets, and warns that it is likely to 
result in wild gyrations because the system will react automatically to changes faster than 
traders or regulators can make sense of their impacts. In general, she seems to favour trying to 
slow down change processes, rather than speeding them up, so that the system has time to 
‘think’, i.e. to process feedback and absorb the effects of the changes that have been 
occurring. This is an important point for coping with Complexity that we will return to later in 
this chapter. 
 
System delays also imply that when we identify a certain phenomenon and decide to 
intervene, the cause of that phenomenon is likely to still have a delayed effect for a time, and 
we should thus not be too hasty in dismissing the effectiveness of our intervention. For 
instance, when a thermostat detects that a room has reached its desired heat and switches off 
the heating element, the heating process is likely to have been at its peak, and the system will 
continue to distribute the warmth already generated before the heating element was switched 
off. The temperature of the room will thus continue to increase and will overshoot the 
temperature at which the thermostat intervened. A more sophisticated type of feedback 
system will start to reduce the rate of increase as the temperature starts to approach the target.  
 
The effects of feedback delays are critical in several aspects of peacebuilding systems. The 
most strategic effect relates to the overall theory of change driving most peacebuilding 
systems. Most state-building interventions attempt to engineer radical changes in the structure 
and composition of the state’s institutions over a three- to five-year period. It is possible to 
change the vision, mission and structure of an institution in a relatively short period of time, 
but it takes much longer to change the attitude, educational profile, and organisational culture 
of the staff. It takes even longer for the relationship between the institution and the society 
within which it is meant to be embedded, to adapt to such changes (World Bank, 2011:13).  
 
The speed within which it is possible to change organisational structures far outpaces the time 
it takes for a society to adjust to these new structures, including the time it takes to develop 
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the managerial and other skill sets necessary to run these institutions.  These differences cause 
important feedback delays and, as a result, these kinds of state-building interventions often 
contribute to the very weak governance, corruption and state failure that they were intended to 
prevent and redress. For instance, a country in transition may develop, with the assistance of 
external peacebuilders, a relatively sophisticated public finance management system. 
However, due to brain drain and poor education before and during the conflict, the relevant 
ministry may be unable to hire people with the necessary financial management education and 
experience to staff key positions; it may take several years before developments in the 
education system result in an adequate supply of people with the necessary educational 
qualifications. In the meantime, the newly-designed public finance management system will 
require a high level of international support, perhaps via consultants, to maintain, and the 
overall result thus is increased dependency and delayed self-sustainability. The same kind of 
feedback delays and negative side effects can be identified at all levels in the system where 
the pace of change outstrips the ability of the community to absorb and adjust to these 
changes. As Meadows points out, the best way to manage these situations is to slow down the 
pace of change, so as to avoid or limit the side effects that will be caused by the feedback 
delays. 
 
This kind of delay factor is also an important consideration when it comes to the withdrawal 
of an intervention. An unsophisticated, thermostat-type intervention will maintain the 
intervention, perhaps even increase it, right up to the moment a certain benchmark is reached 
and then withdraw it. A more sophisticated intervention would slowly reduce the intensity of 
the intervention in relation to, for instance, anticipated increases in the capacity of the local 
system.  
 
An important consideration in the context of self-sustainability is that a system cannot be 
expected to be self-organised and externally controlled at the same time. Those waiting for 
the system to self-organise before the removal of the external controls are thus in it for a long 
haul. The external controls need to be removed, and one needs to allow for delayed effects 
before a system will be able to develop the full ability to self-organise. The more intense the 
intervention, the longer it will take for the system to wean itself of its dependency, and the 
more one can anticipate delayed impacts.  
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This list of twelve leverage points is being presented in increasing order of effectiveness.  The 
first four leverage points have dealt with the physical attributes of the system, such as 
structures, stocks and flows. As seen, these physical aspects are difficult to influence, and 
costly and slow to change. The next few leverage points deal with the movement of 
information in a system, and these processes provide more opportunities for leverage 
(Meadows, 1999:9). 
 
8.7 NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS 
 
Negative feedback loops slow down a process and are used to correct system behaviour, so 
that a system state can be kept within certain parameters, e.g. to promote stability. They occur 
naturally in all physical, chemical, biological and social systems and humans design them in 
engineering and organisational systems for the same purpose (Meadows, 1999:9). The 
classical example is the thermostat loop. It is designed to keep room temperature at a desired 
level (goal). The thermostat contains a monitoring device to keep track of the temperature in 
the room, as well as a signalling device so that it can communicate corrective instructions to 
the heating source (ibid.). 
 
A complex system will have many negative feedback loops that serve to self-correct many 
aspects of the system’s behaviour. Most are not visible or obvious, and some only come into 
effect when certain critical thresholds are at risk, but the role of all these negative feedback 
loops is critical to the robustness and fitness of the system (Meadows, 1999:9). Meadows (10) 
argues that the strength of a negative feedback loop, namely “its ability to keep its appointed 
stock at or near its goal”, depends on the combination of many parameters and links, and 
these are all potential leverage points. They include the “accuracy and rapidity of monitoring, 
the quickness and power of response, [and] the directness and size of corrective flows” (ibid.). 
She points out that “the strength of a negative feedback loop is important relative to the 
impact it is designed to correct” (9). If the size or scope of the impact increases, the feedback 
loop would have to be adjusted as well. 
 
Negative feedback loops, of course, are very important for peacebuilding systems as well. 
They relate to all the sanctions that exist in the conflict system to keep it from lapsing into 
violent conflict, as well as all the sanctions that the peacebuilding system, in addition, brings 
to bear on the conflict system with the same purpose. Most conspicuous is the peacekeeping 
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force that is typically part of the stabilisation and transition phases of a peacebuilding system 
and that provides the system with the capacity to sanction any physical security threats. In 
most cases, the mere presence of the force is enough to dissuade those that may otherwise 
have considered violent means of achieving their objectives.  
 
In addition, there is a whole range of more subtle negative feedback processes at play. The 
agents in the peacebuilding system are continuously in communication with their counterparts 
in the conflict system, and they have numerous ways of signalling and communicating 
negative feedback, when deemed necessary. In some cases these are in the form of sanctions, 
such as withholding benefits, but mostly it comes in the form of corrective advice. For 
instance, a UN police advisor who acts as a mentor and adviser to a local counterpart will, in 
many different ways, influence and guide the behaviour of the local police officer, but is only 
likely to report the behaviour, and recommend disciplinary actions, of the local police officer 
to superior officers in exceptional cases.  
 
8.8 POSITIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS  
 
Meadows (1999:11) says that a negative feedback loop is self-correcting, whilst a positive 
feedback loop is self-reinforcing. A positive feedback loop speeds up a process by 
encouraging it to repeat the same behaviour. “Positive feedback loops are sources of growth, 
explosion, erosion, and collapse in systems. A system with an unchecked positive loop 
ultimately will destroy itself” (ibid.). That is why systems also have negative feedback 
processes, and both negative and positive feedback processes are thus used to maintain the 
system state near or at its goal. Meadows (ibid.) argues that, in most cases, it is preferable to 
slow down a positive loop rather than speeding up a negative one, because “slowing them 
gives the many negative loops . . . all of which have limits and delays – time to function.” For 
example, it is advisable to drive slower, and thus have more time to react in an emergency. In 
other words, it is advisable for peacebuilding interventions to unfold more slowly so that the 
society is better able to absorb and integrate all the programmes and activities that it is 
experiencing, and has time to develop the norms and institutions it needs to manage its own 
change processes sustainably. 
 
In the peacebuilding context, positive feedback is used in our theory of change to encourage 
desired behaviour. It usually comes in the form of incentives and rewards, for instance, 
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incentives may be offered to a displaced community if they return home, or rewards are offer 
to a combatant if a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme is 
successfully completed. Many examples of the negative effects positive feedback loops can 
have are also seen, for instance when hate speech and violence spirals out of control. Hate 
speech can become part of a positive feedback loop when it encourages others to also engage 
in hate speech, i.e. the breaking of one taboo results in more people feeling emboldened to 
also break the taboo until a tipping point is reached and it is no longer a taboo. Outbreaks of 
violence often spiral out of control in this way. One act results in a counter act and soon 
communities arm themselves in defence, and because they anticipate violent attacks, they are 
likely to react to a much wider series of stimuli with violence than they would under normal 
circumstances. 
 
Whilst both positive and negative feedback loops are thus present and extensively used in 
peacebuilding systems, they, surprisingly, are not considered actively in the design of plans 
and programmes as conscious leverage points. It is hoped that this study may make 
practitioners more aware of the way in which they are using, or relying, on feedback effects in 
their interventions, and that a more conscious and thus considered approach will result in a 
more sensitive application of feedback loops. 
 
8.9 THE STRUCTURE OF INFORMATION FLOWS 
 
The structure of information flows determines who does, and does not, have access to certain 
information. This structure can be changed so that the flow of information can change. 
Changing the structure of information flows is easier and cheaper than changing the structure 
of organisations. Meadows (1999:13) argues that missing feedback is the most common cause 
for system malfunction. By adding new loops, i.e. delivering information to a place where it 
was not going before, and therefore causing the system to behave differently, the system can 
be helped to function more effectively. 
 
Sergey Samoilenko (2008:41), who suggested that one way in which it may be possible to 
influence complex systems is by modulating the relations between the agents of the system, 
was introduced earlier. He suggested that this can be done by manipulating the flow of 
information among the agents. Axelrod (2006) has also been introduced; he suggested making 
agents aware of the future costs of not cooperating or of the potential benefits they may lose if 
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they choose not to cooperate.  Meadows, Samoilenko and Axelrod thus all consider 
influencing the way information flows in a system as a critical leverage point in complex 
systems. 
 
Meadows (1999:13) suggests that self-organisation can be facilitated by increasing the flow 
of information among certain agents. This is also what Cloete (2004:15) referred to when he 
said that process is more important than mechanisms, and the flow of information is more 
important that operating procedures. However, Meadows presents the flow of information as a 
kind of structure, and this is of help in thinking about how that structure can be manipulated.  
 
In the peacebuilding context, the flow of information, for instance the dissemination of an 
important new strategy or policy, can be influenced in a number of ways, including by 
increasing the overall number of connections, increasing the amount or volume of the 
information flow and directing the information. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
peacebuilding agents tend to operate independently, because they are evaluated and rewarded 
for their independent action. However, those who have an interest in pursuing a system-wide 
or holistic peacebuilding effect, for instance a UN Special Representative or a Resident 
Coordinator, can use various coordination mechanisms to make these agents more aware of 
their interdependencies.  
 
Coordination is a way of making sure independent agents are made aware of what others are 
doing and of overall whole-of-system progress, so that they become more aware of their own 
position and their own contributions and role in the larger peacebuilding system. Coordination 
can range from exchanging information to actively taking decisions together about division of 
tasks, joint actions, joint planning, etc. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the context 
determines what type of coordination may be appropriate in a given situation, and too much 
coordination can have perverse effects. The point being made here is that coordination, 
understood broadly to incorporate a wide range of options and approaches, is a tool for 
manipulating or stimulating the flow of information in the peacebuilding system and thus also 
the key to stimulating self-organisation. By making some parts of the system more aware of 
what is happening elsewhere, more agents would be enabled to take better-informed 
decisions, and we, in effect, will be modulating the feedback effect in the system, thus 
increasing the overall effect of the flow of information in the system.  
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One way in which this is done in the peacebuilding context is by facilitating the participation 
of otherwise independent agents in an integrated or joint action, such as joint assessments, 
integrated planning, joint monitoring and evaluation, and so forth. As a result of their 
participation in these processes, agents are exposed to more information and they achieve a 
higher level of understanding of how the situation is unfolding as a whole. Their perspective 
is broadened beyond their own concerns, and they gain insight into what others are doing, 
how others perceive developments in the system, and how the system as a whole is changing. 
By manipulating the connections among agents and by increasing the volume of information 
among them, independent agents are better enabled to adjust their own actions, i.e. make more 
informed decisions, and the overall effect, at the system-level, is more effective self-
organisation. 
 
Modulating the flow of information is not just about volume and connections but also about 
direction. Simply increasing the volume of information can easily result in peacebuilding 
agents being overwhelmed by information. Directing information – by using various 
coordination nodes that sort through and redirect or push information to those who can 
potentially make the most effective use of it – is thus another way of changing the structure of 
information flows in a system. A useful example is the humanitarian cluster system, where 
those working on certain specialised areas, such as water and sanitation or protection, group 
together and share information relevant to their area of specialisation.  
 
Another, more recent, innovation is the increased use of ‘communities of practice’ that group 
together those performing similar tasks or those who work on a common theme, thus creating 
an information exchange platform that people can access, regardless of the context in which 
they are performing their function. For instance, in 2012 approximately 900 Civil Affairs 
officers serving in 15 different peacekeeping missions are linked together through the Civil 
Affairs community of practice, which is a website and e-mail group-type social network that 
allows the members to exchange information, ask each other questions and access documents 
and reports.
39
 There are similar communities of practice for planning, training, etc. All of 
these bring together people who share a particular interest, allowing them direct contact with 
each other via a social-media type platform and thus creating the opportunity for a more in-
                                                 
39
 The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) facilitates several such communities of practice, for 
instance, apart from the one for Civil Affairs officers. There are also communities of practice for officers 
responsible for planning, best practices, protection of civilians, etc. 
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depth and specialised exchange of information than would have been possible in a broader 
discussion group. Specialised coordination is thus a way of directing information to those 
who can make the best use of it, and it also creates a concentration of expertise that helps with 
the processing of that information, so that once it is passed on to other more general 
coordination mechanisms, the information has been distilled and processed. 
 
This study is about the lack of coherence in peacebuilding systems and how that coherence 
deficit can be addressed. All twelve leverage points suggested by Meadows can be used to 
influence peacebuilding systems, but the last three leverage points that relate to information 
flows specifically address the information dimension of the coherence deficit and, as such, 
have special relevance to this study. These insights are therefore reconsidered in the next 
chapter when more detail about how to cope with peacebuilding complexity is presented. 
 
8.10 THE RULES OF THE SYSTEM 
 
As explained earlier, the list of twelve leverage points are presented in order of increasing 
effectiveness.  The first four leverage points (12-9) dealt with the physical aspects, and the 
next three leverage points (8-6) dealt with the flow of information. The last five points deal 
with the rules, the governing structure of a system, its goals, and the underlying worldviews 
that determine the overall purpose and aim of the system. 
 
Meadows’ (1999:14) advice is to pay close attention to the rules of a system. She argues that 
“if you want to understand the deepest malfunctions of systems, pay attention to the rules, and 
to who has power over them”. She says that rules define the scope of the system, its 
constraints and degrees of freedom (13).  Rules are high leverage points because the system 
can be changed radically by changing the rules. Power over rules is real power (14). 
 
In the peacebuilding context, the rules that are central to the peace consolidation process are 
those that govern access to and control over political and economic power. In most cases, the 
inequalities in these relations have contributed to the conflict in the first place, and those 
power relationships would need to change for the risk of relapse into violent conflict to be 
successfully addressed.  This is why peacebuilding is so political. The change process is 
meant to change the existing political and economic order and to facilitate a process that 
results in a new order taking shape. This means that those who are benefiting from the current 
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system may lose some of the privileges they have enjoyed under the old system and, even if 
they are likely to gain others, they are likely to resist change and some may try to undermine 
the process.  
 
Peacebuilding is thus essentially about changing the rules of the conflict system. This 
obviously is a very delicate process. One can distinguish between different layers of rules. 
There are surface level rules, i.e. those that are the most apparent and symbolic, and thus often 
also very emotive, and by changing these one can give the most obvious impression that 
change is taking place. There are also tacit or underlying rules, and these are often more 
difficult to identify and change because there typically are powerful vested interests that resist 
change at this level. In the South African case, for example, it was possible to give all people 
equal political rights with the adoption of a new constitution in 1996, but the underlying 
economic inequalities will take several generations to be addressed. There is tension between 
those who believe that it is in the best interest of long-term peace consolidation to speed up 
and bring about the necessary changes in the short to medium term, and those who believe 
that it is in the best interest of the system to bring those changes about in the medium to long 
term. This kind of tension exists in all systems that are undergoing change, and they have to 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, taking the specific context into account. The overall 
point is thus to emphasise the potential impact that can be achieved by focusing on the rules 
of the system to bring about change, but also to point out how sensitive changing these rules 
can be and the negative side effects that such changes can bring about. 
 
Rapid change at these levels requires a radical restructuring of the rules of the system. Whilst 
revolutions do bring about rapid change, they also bring about decades of uncertainty, 
volatility and, often, violence, and most societies thus seem to prefer more gradual change. 
Forcing through change at too fast a pace is widely seen as undesirable, because of the extent 
of the disruption and change that it may bring about. Rules, especially underlying rules, 
evolve slowly and cumulatively as a result of the socio-cultural evolution of a society. Too 
much external interference implies the foreign imposition of new rules and is likely to result 
in the society resisting such interference. Too little interference may result in no or only 
artificial changes taking place. Finding the right balance is therefore critical, if the aim is self-
sustainability. This also explains why some elements of a peace process can make relatively 
rapid progress whilst others may take generations to change. The art of peacebuilding lies in 
being able to make these distinctions and in being able to make judgements about the level 
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and pace of change that a conflict system can handle without risking a relapse into violent 
conflict.  
 
It is also important to consider the implications of these insights in the context of self-
sustainable and self-organising systems. True self-sustainability comes from a process in a 
society that has ownership of the rules because it has generated those rules as a result of its 
own history. The degree to which the rules are perceived to be foreign or imposed may thus 
have an effect on the degree to which the system is self-sustainable. It takes time for a society 
to develop its own rules, as it will require several iterations of experimentation, feedback and 
adaptation for such rules to gain legitimacy and credibility in the culture of a given society. 
Such processes can be modulated and intensified, but at the end of the day they do require the 
passage of time.  
 
Some rule-generating processes that have taken hundreds of years to unfold in the West may 
generate similar results in the peacebuilding context over several decades, but what is 
common to all these types of processes is that they require several generations or iterations for 
them to become integrated bottom-up processes. Peacebuilding, thus, essentially is a process 
whereby these rule-generating activities are facilitated and modulated with a view to 
shortening the overall period necessary for them to unfold naturally. Thus there is scope in 
peacebuilding systems to both stimulate the rule-generating process and to influence specific 
rules, but at the end of the day the self-sustainability of the rules process will depend on the 
degree to which the rules that are generated are perceived to be credibly and legitimately self-
generated. Too rapid a process will fail to generate the sense that the rule-generating activities 
are home grown. To slow a process may cause such a build-up of frustrations that it may lead 
to a relapse into violent conflict. Change thus has to be fast enough to create a sense of hope 
for a better future, but slow enough to ensure that the society is able to absorb, re-interpret, 
evolve, and integrate the change into its own social fabric so that it generates new rules that 
are home grown and thus have the legitimacy and credibility that only local owned processes 
can generate. 
 
Peacebuilding is itself also governed by a loose set of rules that determines what the 
international community regards as legitimate or appropriate peacebuilding actions. Some 
have a high degree of commonality and can be regarded as the core rules and others are 
contested and can be thought of as peripheral. Those on the periphery are not unimportant, but 
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they are not widely agreed upon. Examples of peacebuilding rules currently being contested 
are the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ and the notion of neo-liberal peacebuilding, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Both are seen by the Global South as too interventionist and as 
potential or actual Trojan horses for neo-imperialism by the North. The North, on the other 
hand, protests that both are needed to ensure greater global stability and prosperity. The North 
sees both as being in the long-term interest of humankind and regard opposition to both as 
acts of self-preservation by those currently in power, without any regard for the wellbeing of 
the people they govern. The South sees both as hypocritical, capitalist-expansionist 
programmes masked in high ethics, but with the ultimate aim of Western cultural and 
economic domination in the interest of the North.  
 
What is clear from these differences is that the rules that govern how we undertake 
peacebuilding have major implications for the systems that are targeted and are themselves 
indicative of the major paradigms that are being contested in the international arena. This 
dissertation engages in the discourse on changing the rules of the peacebuilding systems and 
argues for a significant restructuring of the focus of peacebuilding as a whole. It argues for 
shifting the aims of peacebuilding from being something that the international community 
does to assist local societies, to a new approach that is essentially local. It argues for a re-
centring of the locus and agency of peacebuilding from the international to the local – and for 
a shift from the essential act of peacebuilding being in the design, to one where peacebuilding 
is understood as emergent from the local. 
 
8.11 SELF-ORGANISATION 
 
Meadows (1999:14) sees in self-organisation the possibility of changing any of the lower 
leverage points on her list, i.e. the power to change the rules, the flows of information, to add 
feedback loops, to change the rate of system change, and so forth. The ability to self-organise 
thus is the strongest form of system resilience (15).  
 
Meadows does not explain how self-organisation is a leverage point for system change, but 
one can assume that she means that self-organisation is, in and of itself, a change agent of a 
higher order than those discussed earlier. Although she does not say so herself, at least not as 
part of her own discussion on self-organisation as a leverage point, some, if not all, of the 
leverage points discussed earlier can be used to stimulate and influence self-organisation. 
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This is an extremely important point for this discussion on peacebuilding systems because it 
implies that stimulating the ability of the society to self-organise will be a more effective 
leverage point than any of the lower-order leverage points introduced earlier. Emergent self-
organisation implies local ownership and context-relevant organisation, and the degree of 
self-organisation is thus, in itself, an indication of the robustness and fitness of the new 
emerging system and its ability to sustain itself (Kauffman, 1995:208).  
 
The more the external peacebuilding system intervenes, the less the conflict system will be 
able to self-organise. The internal-external relationship thus requires a careful balancing act. 
The external peacebuilding system needs to decrease and withdraw its influence on the 
conflict system so that, in its later stages, it acts only as an emergency thermostat that kicks in 
when certain outer parameters or thresholds are crossed, for instance a relapse into violent 
conflict. Eventually, even those outer thresholds need to be managed by the new system itself.   
 
The same, of course, is also true for peacebuilding-system coherence, namely that stimulating 
the ability of the peacebuilding system to self-organise will generate more effective system 
coherence than any of the other forms of leverage discussed earlier. This is because, when the 
system is managing itself, that process of self-organisation will be the result of the interaction 
of all the elements of that society, and the emergent self-organising behaviour of the system 
will reflect the inherent capacities of the system. It will rely on and make use of the internal 
robustness and resilience that exists in the society to manage both internal tensions, as well as 
any crises that may come about as a result of the system’s interaction with its environment.   
 
More effective system coherence, in this context, does not necessarily imply quantity, but 
rather an increase in appropriate effectiveness. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, more 
coherence is not a good in and of itself. The level of coherence needs to be appropriate to the 
situation, and self-organisation is the most effective process for generating the appropriate 
level of coherence. The level of coherence that can be sustained by the system itself will be 
the optimal or appropriate level of coherence in that given context. 
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8.12 SYSTEM GOALS 
 
Meadows (1999:16) states that the goals of the system is a leverage point that is even more 
influential than the self-organising ability of a system. Every leverage point lower down on 
the list will conform to the system’s goals. For example, negative feedback loops have a goal, 
namely to maintain a system state at a certain level or within certain parameters, but the 
higher-order system goal will provide the reason for the negative feedback loop to maintain 
that part of the system within those parameters – the higher system goals are served by the 
negative feedback loop.  
 
Whole-of-system goals are usually not obvious but can be deduced from what the system as a 
whole does, and these are typically goals such as survival, expansion, growth, maintaining 
and increasing power and evolution (Meadows, 1999:16). Many, if not most, agents in a 
system are not aware of the whole-of-system goal(s) because they are driven by lower-order 
goals. The concept of the goal of a system as a leverage point is very useful in the 
peacebuilding coherence context because, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, most 
peacebuilding agents are not aware of the fact that they are part of a larger system or of their 
role in and contributions to the larger peacebuilding system. Whilst it is not a prerequisite that 
actors understand their role in the system, it may, in some cases, stimulate self-organisation. 
In would be helpful if some of the peacebuilding agents understood that by working together 
they are contributing to achieving larger whole-of-system goals. And that working together 
with others towards the whole-of-system goals also help them to achieve their own individual 
goals. This will make them more aware of the need to coordinate some aspects of the overall 
sequencing of developments, for instance to invest in capacity building first and to delay 
some initiatives until more capacity is in place, and make them more willing to slow down 
some of their own ambitions to allow other parts of the system to develop sufficiently, to 
avoid the kind of perverse side effects that can develop if, for instance, the security sector is 
developed at a pace that undermines civilian oversight.  
 
As discussed earlier, Robert Axelrod (2006) has suggested that one of the ways in which 
cooperation among agents can be encouraged is to ‘enlarge the shadow of the future’, i.e. to 
make agents aware of the possible outcomes of their decisions to cooperate or not. In the 
peacebuilding context, this may imply making agents aware of how the achievement of their 
specific programme goals are dependent on developments elsewhere in the system and how 
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cooperating with others may increase the likelihood that those developments will take place, 
thus also enabling the environment that will make it possible for their specific goals to be 
achieved. Increasing the number of agents that share this insight, i.e. the awareness of their 
interdependence and thus the larger common peacebuilding goal that they share, is the key to 
enhancing appropriate coherence in a complex-system context.  
 
It also follows that one of the key leverage points for peacebuilding systems when attempting 
to influence conflict systems is to assist the agents in the conflict system to articulate their 
own whole-of-system goals and to increase the number of agents in the system that adopt the 
whole-of-system goal as their own, i.e. to increase the number of agents that have an interest 
in achieving the whole-of-system system goal, to grow the core, and to absorb more and more 
of the periphery into the core.  
 
In the local or conflict system context this means increasing the number of agents that realise 
that an overall successful peace process is a better means of achieving their individual goals 
than pursuing those goals through violent conflict or confrontational tribal, ethnic or factional 
rivalry. For most individuals and groups emerging out of conflict, this is a significant shift in 
thinking. During the conflict, their security and social wellbeing were most probably served 
by allegiance to their tribe or ethnic group, and they are now being asked to re-align 
themselves with a larger, perhaps more abstract, national identity, political process and social 
contract. The degree to which the peace process manages to convince people to make this 
shift will determine the sustainability of the process. The insight that Meadows contributes is 
that focusing on the system goal, in this context, is more effective than any of the preceding 
leverage points in achieving this objective. 
 
8.13 SYSTEM PARADIGM 
 
Meadows (1999:17) explains that the shared ideas in the mindset of a society, its unstated 
assumptions, constitute that society’s paradigm or deepest set of beliefs about how the world 
works. To illustrate the point, she gives the following example: 
It doesn't matter how the tax law of a country is written. There is a shared idea in the minds of 
the society about what a 'fair' distribution of the tax load is. Whatever the rules say, by fair 
means or foul, by complications, cheating, exemptions or deductions, by constant sniping at the 
rules, actual tax payments will push right up against the accepted idea of 'fairness’. (Meadows, 
1999:17) 
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Meadows (1999:17) says that paradigms are the sources of social systems. “From them, from 
shared social agreements about the nature of reality, come system goals and information 
flows, feedbacks, stocks, flows and everything else about systems” (ibid.). If you manage to 
intervene in a system at the level of paradigm, you are using a leverage point that has the 
power to totally transform a system (ibid.).   
 
However, Meadows cautions that paradigms are harder to change than anything else about a 
system. Societies resist challenges to their paradigm more than they resist anything else 
(Meadows, 1999:17). To show how paradigm change can be approached, Meadows (ibid.) 
refers to the advice of Thomas Kuhn (1962), who argues that in order to replace an old 
paradigm with a new one you have to keep pointing out the anomalies and failures of the old 
paradigm. You have to give assurances from the new paradigm, and you have to insert people 
representing the new paradigm in places of public visibility and power. Instead of wasting 
time on reactionaries, you work with active change agents and with the vast middle-ground of 
people that are open-minded (ibid.).  
 
When it comes to paradigms as leverage points in the peacebuilding context, two things are 
worth emphasising at this point: The first is that there typically is a big difference between the 
paradigm informing the peacebuilding system and the paradigm informing the conflict 
system. Whilst this tension will always be present and needs to be carefully managed, it can, 
at times, become the main source of tension, and in these cases it tends to undermine the 
whole peacebuilding effort. In Iraq and Afghanistan there has been a number of interventions 
in the early 21
st
 century, especially in the wake of the pivotal so-called 9/11 terrorist attack on 
the United States, which illustrate this point. In both of these cases the presence of large 
numbers of American and Western soldiers, and the way in which these interventions were 
managed, resulted in these interventions being strongly identified with Western cultural and 
social imperialism. In other words, in both these cases, the contrast between the paradigms 
represented by the external intervention and the local society became so prominent that it 
totally dominated the intervention. All attempts to influence the societies with the aim of 
building local institutions and fostering local capacity were interpreted and perceived as 
attempts to impose and embed Western cultural and social values on those societies and thus 
rejected. In both these cases the interventions themselves, and the history that generated these 
interventions, became so problematic that they became a major, if not the primary, cause of 
continued instability and thus a major peace consolidation risk in and of themselves. 
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The second point is that, whilst interventions that aim to save lives, alleviate suffering and 
stabilise security are generally welcome, those that aim to change a local paradigm are usually 
resisted. As Meadows points out, societies tend to defend their own paradigm vigorously and, 
as the discussion in Chapter 2 on the differences between the way in which the Global South 
and North view peacebuilding illustrates, peacebuilding systems lose their international 
legitimacy when they are perceived to be a Trojan horse for replacing the local paradigm with 
the international/Western, neo-liberal paradigm. Both these points have important 
implications for the coherence dilemma in international peacebuilding systems. 
 
It follows that peacebuilding interventions that are perceived to be attempting to change the 
core values and norms of a society are likely to be fiercely resisted. Those transformations 
that are the most likely to succeed and to be self-sustainable are those that are perceived to 
have been self-generated. Peacebuilding interventions that stimulate change processes that 
result in self-generated change are thus more likely to become self-sustainable than those that 
attempt to directly influence and manipulate change and that try to control the outcome.  
 
Another way to look at the importance of paradigm shifts in the peacebuilding context is to 
note that peace processes that have failed to change the paradigm of a society emerging out of 
conflict, for instance when a peace agreement among the parties has merely resulted in elite 
accommodation, are likely to be unsustainable. A number of ‘governments of national unity’-
type agreements can be cited as examples, for instance in the cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe. In other words, in these agreements, the needs of the competing elites may 
have been temporarily accommodated, but, as the underlying paradigm that caused the 
conflict in the first place has not been sufficiently addressed, those conflicts are likely to 
relapse into violent conflict.   
 
Influencing the paradigm itself is thus potentially the most lasting approach but also requires 
the most subtle approach. The external intervention should be limited to setting the process in 
motion, after which it has to be an indigenous and self-organising change process. However, 
some aspects of the original design may well have a lasting impact. The starting point of any 
intervention is critical, and planting the right seeds may result in the system adopting some of 
the characteristics intended. What is important from a sustainability perspective is that those 
seeds develop in such a way that the system perceives them to be home grown, as opposed to 
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being imposed from the outside. The outcome cannot be predicted or controlled, and attempts 
to control or inappropriately influence the process are likely to have perverse effects.  
 
The point is not that the way to influence the paradigm of a society emerging out of conflict is 
to plant certain values or norms as seeds, although this what is being attempted in the neo-
liberal approach to peacebuilding. The point is rather that peacebuilding should facilitate 
processes of change that stimulate the widest possible social participation, and that such 
processes should be encouraged and nurtured so that self-organisation can emerge. When it 
does, a new social paradigm may evolve that has the potential to transform the society and 
result in the society achieving the robustness and resilience that will enable it to manage its 
own disputes and tensions peacefully. Self-organisation is encouraged by facilitating 
processes in which agents become aware of their interdependency on one another. Such 
processes need to evolve over several generations or iterations, and the common identities, 
norms and values that emerge as a result need to adapt and refine until a new culture, or a 
shared worldview, has emerged in the process, and when that has happened the conflict-
paradigm of the society would have been transformed. 
 
8.14 TRANSCENDING PARADIGMS 
 
The final leverage point is the power to transcend paradigms, which derives from the 
understanding that there are paradigms (Meadows, 1999:18). Meadows says one has the 
power  
to keep oneself unattached in the arena of paradigms, to stay flexible, to realize that no 
paradigm is ‘true’, that every one, including the one that shapes your own worldview, is a 
tremendously limited understanding of an immense and amazing universe that is far beyond 
human comprehension. (18) 
 
 
In the peacebuilding context, this insight is linked to the ability to understand that the 
international peacebuilding system is informed by a certain paradigm, as is the conflict 
system, and to see the differences and tensions between the two in that context. Those 
favouring the neo-liberal peacebuilding model, for instance, would argue that for the local 
system to achieve sustainable peace, it would need to adopt the neo-liberal paradigm (multi-
party democracy, free market economy and individual freedoms). Therefore, the international 
paradigm should inform and shape the local paradigm, in the same way that the missionaries 
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and colonisers of the past argued that they have an obligation to bring ‘civilization’ to the 
‘savages’.  
 
Those favouring a local peacebuilding model would argue that for peace to be sustainable, the 
local system has to find its own home-grown solutions that are appropriate to its own context 
and that the role of international interventions is to restore order and save lives, but not to try 
to change local paradigms. This study sees a fusion between these paradigms as inevitable, 
but with the specifics wide open for application on a case-by-case basis. In other words, and 
as will be elaborated further in the next section, this dissertation presents the argument that, 
whilst local ownership is critical to self-sustainable peacebuilding and needs to become much 
more central to the overall process than is currently practiced, this does not imply that 
international support is not also a critically important aspect of the change process. Both are 
necessary, and the art of peacebuilding lies in finding the appropriate balance in every given 
context. 
 
The point has been made that for peace consolidation to be sustainable societies need to 
develop their own self-organised capacities to manage their own peace process. However, in 
many cases, societies that have collapsed into violent conflict need external assistance to 
regain stability, and they can benefit from the facilitated change management services that 
external peacebuilders can offer. Appropriate peacebuilding can help to modulate the change 
processes and can assist in these processes taking less time, and being less violent or costly in 
other ways, than may be the case if there were to be no external peacebuilding facilitation.  
 
However, the word ‘appropriate’ is key here. As seen, many peacebuilding processes have 
had perverse effects and have served to slow-down or otherwise undermine, rather than 
facilitate, sustainable peace. It is posited that ‘appropriate’ essentially refers to finding the 
right balance between manipulation and facilitation. Manipulation refers to intervening in the 
system to impose a desired outcome, for instance using force to prevent an outbreak of violent 
conflict. Facilitation refers to encouraging the system to go in a certain direction, for instance 
by stimulating a change process service, but stopping short of actually trying to determine the 
outcome of the process. In other words, allowing or trusting the process to generate its own 
optimal, context-specific outcome.  
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8.15 CONCLUSION 
 
Ways and means of influencing complex systems were discussed in this chapter. In the first 
section of the chapter, the focus has been on influencing complex systems. Peacebuilding was 
framed as an activity that is essentially about one system trying to influence another, and 
insights that might be gained from Complexity when it comes to interfering with or 
manipulating complex systems were considered.  The conclusion was reached that one of the 
ways in which the behaviour of complex social systems can be influenced is by modulating 
the interdependencies among the agents in the system. This can be achieved by manipulating 
the flow of information among the agents with the aim of strengthening the interconnections 
among them, and in so doing improving the ability of the system to self-organise. 
 
Twelve leverage points that Meadows suggests can be used to influence a complex system 
were discussed. As her contribution showed, it is possible to influence a complex system at all 
levels from the most conceptual (paradigms and system goals) to the most material (structure 
and flow of stocks). The most effective peacebuilding interventions will make use of all 
possible levels of influence simultaneously. Meadows also helped us to understand that 
focussing on higher order leverages, such as rules, goals and paradigms, has a much higher 
impact value.  
 
On the basis of the insights gained from applying Complexity to peacebuilding, and further 
informed by the discussion of the twelve leverage points for influencing complex systems 
suggested by Meadows, this dissertation argues for a significant shift in the peacebuilding 
paradigm away from it being seen as something that the international community does to 
assist local societies in transition to a new approach that frames peacebuilding as something 
that is essentially local. This would include a shift from the essential act of peacebuilding 
being in the design to one where peacebuilding is understood as emergent from the local. 
Peacebuilding interventions that stimulate change processes that result in self-generated 
change are thereby more likely to become self-sustainable than those that attempt to directly 
influence and manipulate change, and that try to control the outcome.  
 
In the next chapter, the dissertation is focused on using these findings to generate a set of 
recommendations for coping with peacebuilding Complexity.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 269 
CHAPTER 9 
COPING WITH COMPLEXITY 
 
Rather than searching for better policy or commissioning more detailed forms of analysis, the 
real task is reforming the institutions and networks of global governance to address 
complexity . . . Reform would require turning rule-based bureaucracies into adaptive, learning 
and networked organisations. (Duffield, 2001:264-265) 
 
Compromised peacebuilding, if done right, might be the best of all possible worlds. (Paris & 
Sisk, 2009:49) 
 
The high-failure rate (of peacebuilding) strongly supports the basic intuition that we do not 
know what we are doing – and one of the critical elements of any argument for autonomy is 
that people tend to know themselves, better than others how they ought best to live their lives. 
(Feldman, 2004:69) 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is interested in exploring the utility of Complexity for gaining insights into 
the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. In Part I, peacebuilding and coherence were 
introduced. Complexity was introduced in Part II and some of its implications for 
peacebuilding were considered. Part III concerns generating guidelines for managing complex 
peacebuilding. In the previous chapter, the discussion involved influencing complex systems 
and in this chapter, the focus is on generating recommendations for coping with complex 
peacebuilding systems. 
 
A complex systems approach is essentially a critical approach, one that checks the self-
confidence and inherent hubris of the determined-design approach to peacebuilding and that 
encourages self-doubt, caution and humility. A complex systems approach is also an ethical 
approach that reminds the policy maker and practitioner of the ethical implications of their 
actions and the fact that they are responsible for the effects and impacts of their acts and 
omissions.  
 
The fifteen recommendations for coping with complexity generated by this dissertation will 
be discussed under the following headings:  
(1) integrating an awareness of our limitations in understanding complex systems,  
(2) accepting the Complexity of peacebuilding;  
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(3) the primacy of the agency of the local society;  
(4) self-organisation as the principal vehicle for self-sustainable peacebuilding;  
(5) the link between peace consolidation and self-sustainability;  
(6) the evolutionary experimentation approach;  
(7) framing peacebuilding as process facilitation;  
(8) moving from preoccupation with stability to embracing change;  
(9) on being sensitive to the ambiguity of borders and boundaries;  
(10) accepting that social change processes take time;  
(11) matching the pace of delivery with the rate of absorption;  
(12) robustness and resilience;  
(13) prioritisation and comprehensiveness;  
(14) on the assumption that all systems are complex; and  
(15) optimal levels of coherence. 
 
These fifteen recommendations are closely interconnected. They are mutually reinforcing and 
together represent a comprehensive complex systems approach to peacebuilding. No claim is 
made in this dissertation that by following these recommendations one is guaranteed to 
generate a more effective and efficient peacebuilding intervention. This set of 
recommendations does not constitute a model that can be replicated in any context. The 
recommendations serve as a summary and categorisation of the insights gained through this 
study by applying the general characteristics of Complexity to peacebuilding in general, and 
the coherence dilemma in particular. As such, they suggest what a complex-systems approach 
to peacebuilding would consist of and are offered as a general guideline for coping with 
peacebuilding Complexity. 
 
9.2 INTEGRATING AN AWARENESS OF OUR LIMITS IN UNDERSTANDING 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
 
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 the discussion was centred on why our ability to gain knowledge of the 
complex social systems we deal with in the peacebuilding context is inherently limited. In 
Chapter 5 it was argued that complex social systems are dynamic and nonlinear, and this 
implies that we cannot predict or control the future behaviour of a society on the basis of a 
general law or on what we know about how this system, or others, behaved in the past. 
Accepting and recognising that our ability to understand complex social systems with the use 
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of a rule-based approach is limited, is the foundation of a complex systems approach to 
coping with Complexity. The alternative to a deductive rule-based approach to engaging with 
social systems is to follow an inductive methodology of exploration and experimentation. 
This method consists of probing or exploring possibilities, monitoring for feedback, and 
continuously adjusting and expanding the current understanding of a situation on the basis of 
new information that becomes available as a result of the explorative probing and feedback 
processes this method engages in. The method should be recognised as a continuous process 
of discovery and experimentation that generates an emergent understanding of the system as it 
evolves. A complex-systems approach to knowledge generation recognises that because the 
larger environment and the particular social system that is our subject are changing 
continuously, our understanding of the social system has to continuously co-evolve with it.   
 
This method thus does not have a start or an end, where the start represents a question or 
problem statement and the end represents a definitive answer or solution. A complex-systems 
approach would rather be interested in trying to understand the processes that generate change 
in the system and the interlinkages between the various elements of the system. One approach 
could consist of probing the subject social system using the twelve leverage points for 
influencing complex systems suggested by Meadows (1999) discussed in the previous 
chapter. Such an approach would seek to identify some of the underlying ‘rules’ of the 
system, what feedback processes are at work, and how the paradigm on which the system is 
based can be framed in relation to the paradigm of the observer. The complex-systems 
approach is thus aimed at generating the kind of knowledge that would be useful for the 
potential manipulation or modulation of certain effects in the system, i.e. for influencing the 
system.  
 
Such an approach has to be critical and sceptical. It is necessary to be sceptical about the 
knowledge we think we have gained and to be critical about what others present as knowledge 
that has been gained on a particular social system. It is necessary to recognise that the 
understanding that might have been gained up to a certain point remains provisional and to 
remain open to continuous adjustment and refinement of our understanding as new 
information becomes available. It is necessary to guard against falling into the trap of arriving 
at a certain ‘picture’ or ‘narrative’ of the system and then judging further inputs and feedback, 
and accepting or rejecting them, to the extent that they match a pre-assumed picture or 
narrative. The dynamic, non-linear and emergent nature of complex systems imply that one 
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needs to remain open to the possibility of, at any point, becoming aware of new information 
that completely alters a previously held understanding of the system. 
 
The first recommendation is thus that the way in which knowledge about any particular 
complex social system is generated needs to be based on the recognition of an inherently 
limited ability to fully understand complex systems.  
 
9.3 ACCEPTING THE COMPLEXITY OF PEACEBUILDING 
 
It was established in Chapter 6 that peacebuilding is complex in the way this concept is 
understood in the study of Complexity. It is not just the conflict system that we are engaging 
with that is complex; peacebuilding itself is also a complex system. This recognition has 
several important implications for the way we undertake peacebuilding. It implies that we 
should not expect any particular peacebuilding system to be organised as if it has been 
externally designed or as if it is subject to central control. There can be no one controlling 
agent in charge of a particular peacebuilding system. Each peacebuilding agent’s perception 
and understanding of the larger system of which it is a part, including those with specific 
responsibility for coordinating the system such as a Special Representative of the UN’s 
Secretary-General (SRSG), will be inherently limited. Even those that have responsibility for 
the system will, at best, be able to act as process facilitators that can attempt to modulate the 
flow of information between the other agents in the system, for instance by manipulating the 
structure of the interconnections among some of the agents. A peacebuilding system thus is a 
self-organised system that relies on adaptation and evolution to arrive at the optimal 
interaction and engagement with the local system. 
 
Such recognition also implies that none of the peacebuilding agents can have a superior claim 
to understanding transitions from conflict to peace. There are no off-the-shelf solutions and no 
single theory of change that can work better than others in all possible contexts. Neither the 
neo-liberal peacebuilding doctrine, nor any other predetermined or rule-based model can 
claim universal relevance.  
 
The second recommendation is that peacebuilding itself needs to be understood as complex, 
and that this implies that it is necessary to recognise that any particular peacebuilding system 
will be self-organised, and emergent. This has implications for how assessments are 
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undertaken and specific peacebuilding interventions are planned, coordinated, led, and 
evaluated.  
 
9.4 THE PRIMACY OF THE AGENCY OF THE LOCAL SOCIETY 
 
It was argued in Chapter 7 that local societies, who have to live with the consequences and 
pay the cost of any lapse into violent conflict, should have the primary agency to make 
decisions about their future. However, it was also pointed out that the local system is part of 
the international system and, as such, does not exist in isolation. The international system has 
agreed on certain norms and values and have an interest in seeing that a responsible 
government comes into being to manage the local system in such a way that it lives at peace 
with itself and its neighbours and that it carries out its international obligations. Whilst the 
international system is concerned with maintaining international peace and security to the 
extent that it would authorise and assume the cost of a peacebuilding intervention, it is not 
prepared to take on the cost of indefinitely managing the local system.  
 
The aim of peacebuilding thus is to assist local social systems to regain the capacity to 
manage themselves so that the international community’s peacebuilding intervention can be 
withdrawn as soon as it can reasonably be done without risking relapse. Peacebuilding is 
aimed at facilitating local ownership and its success depends on the degree to which local 
societies can self-sustainably manage their own peace consolidation process. Whilst these 
aims and assumptions are built into the peacebuilding theory of change, international 
peacebuilding efforts in most, if not all, current and recent cases have been undertaken at such 
a pace and with such a scope that they have overwhelmed the capacity of the local society to 
meaningfully engage with the peacebuilding intervention.  
 
The result is that most peacebuilding interventions, for instance those recently undertaken in 
Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia, have generated institutions that mirror international 
expectations but lack genuine indigenous home-grown identity, norms and culture. These 
countries have police forces or justice ministries that could have existed anywhere. There is 
little that makes them uniquely suited to their context and even less that genuinely connects 
them to local socio-cultural values, norms and histories. This lack of local ownership 
undermines the ability of these societies to self-organise, and thus ultimately to become self-
sustainable. 
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The role that external peacebuilders can play, for instance by providing security guarantees 
that prevent genocide, war crimes and human rights abuses, may be necessary in some cases, 
but it is never sufficient to generate sustainable peace. The most important dimensions of any 
peacebuilding effort is stimulating and facilitating the development of those local social 
system attributes that, taken together, allow self-organisation to emerge. Self-organisation, in 
this context, refers to the ability of the local social system to manage its own tensions and 
disputes without relapsing into violent conflict.  
 
The third recommendation thus is that it should be recognised that the local society have the 
ethical right and duty to control their own future, but that their freedom to choose future paths 
are constrained by the international parameters set for the responsible behaviour of states in 
the international system.  
 
9.5 SELF-ORGANISATION AS THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE FOR SELF-
SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING 
 
Peacebuilding essentially is about stimulating and facilitating the capacity of societies to self-
organise. Self-organisation in this context refers to the various processes and mechanisms a 
society makes use of to manage its own peace consolidation process, i.e. the ability to manage 
its own tensions, pressures, disputes, crisis and shocks without relapsing into conflict. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, a peaceful society is not a society without tensions, disputes and 
crises, but rather a society that has developed the robustness and resilience needed to manage 
its own conflicts without violence.  
 
In contrast, a society that has lapsed into violent conflict or civil war is an indication that its 
internal conflict-management systems have been overwhelmed and that its ability to self-
organise has been seriously weakened by the conflict. An outbreak of violent conflict can be 
understood as a symptom of a serious loss of social complexity. From this perspective, 
peacebuilding can be said to be about helping such a society to regain its ability to self-
organise. This is a very delicate and inherently contradictory process fraught with built-in 
tensions. There is an inherent tension in the act of interfering in a local system when that very 
interference is meant to assist the local system with gaining, or regaining the ability to self-
organise.  
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Many international peacebuilding interventions make the mistake of interfering so much that 
they end up undermining the ability of the local system to self-organise. This inherent tension 
requires a very delicate balancing act that comes down to limiting the external interference to 
the minimum necessary to prevent a relapse into conflict, so that the society being influenced 
can have the maximum space needed for its own self-organisation to emerge. 
 
If a system is able, without external support, to manage several generations of change and the 
shocks and crises that such change implies on its own, it means that a sufficient degree of 
self-organisation has emerged for the external agents to declare that such a system has 
attained the capacity to be self-sustainable and to conclude that the peacebuilding intervention 
has come to a successful end. 
 
The key to—some would say, the art of—successful peacebuilding thus lies in finding the 
appropriate balance between external security guarantees and support on the one hand, and 
the degree to which the local system has the freedom to develop its own self-organisation, on 
the other. What is appropriate has to be determined in each context specific case, and as these 
processes are dynamic—what is appropriate will be continuously changing.  
 
This implies caution, sensitivity and self-awareness when it comes to managing the role and 
position of the international peacebuilding intervention. The success of the peacebuilding 
intervention will be determined by the degree to which it can limit itself to stimulating and 
facilitating self-organisation. External peacebuilders thus need to find the balance between 
stimulating the change process without harming or inhibiting it through doing more than is 
absolutely necessary, and in the process creating dependencies that undermine and delay the 
emergence of self-organisation and self-sustainability. 
 
The purpose of the feedback processes employed by the peacebuilding system is thus not just 
to seek information on how the system is responding in ways intended, but also to be sensitive 
and self-aware to the unintended consequences and perverse effects the interference can have 
on the local society, and to mitigate against and limit those effects whenever they are 
detected.  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 276 
The fourth recommendation is that the aim of peacebuilding interventions needs to be 
focussed on, and limited to, stimulating the capacity of local societies to self-organise. 
 
9.6 THE LINK BETWEEN PEACE CONSOLIDATION AND SELF-
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Peace consolidation, i.e. avoiding a (re)lapse into violent conflict, has been used throughout 
this dissertation as the benchmark for self-sustainable peace. However, it should not be 
understood as only a negative-peace indicator. Peace consolidation is not understood here as 
merely the absence of violence. In order for a social system to avoid lapsing into violent 
conflict, it has to have at its disposal a rich, robust and resilient variety of positive-peace 
attributes that enable it to process shocks and crises without lapsing into violent conflict.  
 
In Chapter 8 the  assassination of Chris Hani in the period leading up to South Africa’s 
historical election in 1994 was used as an example of the kind of stresses societies emerging 
out of conflict have to be able to manage if they are to avoid relapsing into violent conflict. In 
this case, it can be argued that South Africa had the necessary positive-peace attributes to 
prevent it from lapsing into civil war. It had high-quality leadership shaped through years of 
experience; it had well-organised political parties and organisations that could exercise 
sufficient control over their constituencies; it had enough of an independent legal system that 
resulted in both the leaders and the people trusting the formal justice system to investigate and 
prosecute the person(s) that were arrested; it had a free press that acted as a neutral guarantor 
and that people trusted to uncover any conspiracies, and a national broadcasting infrastructure 
that enabled Nelson Mandela, although he was not the President at the time, to address the 
nation to call for calm. It also had sufficient security (negative peace) capacity to contain and 
control the limited violent conflict that did break out as a result of the assassination. Therefore 
enough positive-peace attributes – enough robustness and resilience in the system – were 
present to generate an overall negative-peace effect, i.e. the absence of widespread violence. 
 
When a social system has developed the capacity to self-organise to the extent that it is able to 
manage shocks and crises without lapsing into violent conflict, it reflects that it has developed 
enough positive-peace capacity to be able to sustainably self-organise, even in the face of 
severe or radical high-impact change events.  
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Seen from the perspective of the total period of engagement, only a small portion of the 
overall peacebuilding effort should be dedicated to negative peace capacity, i.e. to physically 
preventing local social systems from lapsing into conflict, by initially providing external 
security guarantees and later by developing internal physical security capacities. The bulk of 
the peacebuilding system’s effort should be devoted to assisting the local society with 
developing the positive-peace social capacities it needs to ensure sustainable self-
organisation. 
 
The focus on peace consolidation as the ultimate aim of peacebuilding should thus not be 
misunderstood as a focus on negative-peace, because, as has been argued here, a range of 
positive-peace attributes is necessary to prevent a relapse into violent conflict. A self-
sustainable peace process is one that has acquired those positive-peace attributes it needs to 
manage its own peace process, taking into account the shocks and crises it is likely to be 
exposed to. 
 
The fifth recommendation is thus that the focus on peace consolidation as a benchmark for 
self-sustainable peace should not be misunderstood as a prioritization of security. In order for 
a social system to avoid lapsing into violent conflict it has to have at its disposal a rich, robust 
and resilient variety of attributes that enable it to process shocks and crises without lapsing 
into violent conflict.  
 
9.7 THE EVOLUTIONARY-EXPERIMENTATION APPROACH 
 
As emphasised earlier, complex systems are not predetermined; they are emergent, and this 
implies that we cannot predict or control the future behaviour of the system on the basis of a 
general law or a set of predetermined rules about how the system functions. How, in the face 
of such uncertainty, is enough knowledge of the social systems being dealt with developed, so 
that meaningful engagement with them is possible? 
 
A process aimed at generating knowledge of a complex system needs to be based on an 
approach that continuously probes, questions and adjusts the knowledge it generates, based on 
the feedback generated by the method. The evolutionary-experimentation approach thus 
makes use of feedback to generate a knowledge development process that continuously 
interacts with the system it is trying to comprehend. As a result, the knowledge it develops is 
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continuously refined and adapted. Although it is possible to generate snapshots of our 
understanding of the system’s status at various stages, it is important to understand that the 
system itself is dynamic and non-linear and that our knowledge of the system therefore needs 
to continuously co-evolve with the system itself.  
 
The utility of the evolutionary-experimentation approach is not limited to knowledge 
development; it is also an approach that can be used to inform the way programmes and 
activities are undertaken and managed. The peacebuilding system attempts to influence the 
society in question by employing a range of programmes, projects and activities that 
collectively and cumulatively support, stimulate and assist the society to arrive at a point 
where it has sustainably consolidated its peace process.  
 
Each programme, project or activity can be designed and implemented in such a way that the 
overall process resembles an evolutionary-experimentation process, i.e. it should generate a 
variety of options; implement some of them; obtain feedback on how the system is 
responding to these interventions; identify those approaches that show results and those that 
do not; discontinue or adjust those that do not work, and replicate a variety of those that do. 
This process should be repeated over and over again until the purpose of a given programme 
has been achieved or the system as a whole has transformed to such an extent that the purpose 
is no longer relevant.  
 
This evolutionary-experimentation approach is scalable at all levels – the same basic approach 
can be applied for individual programmes, for projects, for campaigns, for strategic 
frameworks, and so forth. The evolutionary-experimentation approach is an iterative process 
that never arrives at an optimal ‘solution’ because the internal system is constantly changing 
and adapting to both its own internal dynamics and the influences of its environment, 
including those of the specific peacebuilding interventions aimed at manipulating its 
behaviour.  
 
The peacebuilding intervention is simultaneously under way at multiple levels and in various 
subsystems with the intent of generating a system-wide effect. Some programmes are highly 
specialised; others are meant to impact large subsystems such as the security dimension. The 
feedback generated by these various interventions at different levels should be shared and 
modulated as widely as possible throughout the system so that as broad a spectrum of 
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programmes as possible can act, self-adjust, and co-evolve, on the basis of the information 
generated in the process.  
 
The sixth recommendation is thus that it is necessary to be sensitive to how complex systems 
process information, self-organise and adapt, and suggest that the evolutionary 
experimentation methodology can assist in purposefully co-evolving with the systems we are 
attempting to influence. 
 
9.8 FRAMING PEACEBUILDING AS PROCESS FACILITATION  
 
As discussed earlier, a complex-systems approach recognises that peacebuilding is also a 
complex and self-organising system. As such, it is possible to pursue processes within both 
the peacebuilding system and the society it is trying to influence, which seek to optimise the 
self-organising behaviour of these complex systems. As discussed in Chapter 8, by 
stimulating and modulating feedback it becomes possible to increase the quantity and quality 
of information available to the agents in these systems and increase their awareness of the 
overall behaviour or progress of the system and their role in it.  
 
Thus the ability of the agents to take informed decisions can be influenced by manipulating 
the interconnections among them, and in so doing, stimulating the flow of information 
between them. This kind of intervention encourages the self-organisation processes in the 
system and increases the overall robustness and resilience of the distributed nature of the 
intelligence in these systems, as well as the Complexity of the systems themselves.  
 
Note that it is not a specific outcome that is manipulated, but the process that generates 
outcomes. In the complex systems approach, the essential or core activity of a peacebuilding 
intervention is one of process facilitation. Peacebuilding is about stimulating the processes in 
a society that will lead to change and that will enable self-organisation. It is impossible to 
direct or control self-organisation from the outside. It has to emerge from within, but external 
peacebuilding agents can assist a society by facilitating and stimulating the processes that 
enable self-organisation to emerge. 
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The seventh recommendation is that peacebuilding should not be understood as an activity 
that generates a specific outcome, but as an activity that facilitates and stimulates the 
processes that enable local self-organisation to emerge. 
 
9.9 MOVING FROM PRE-OCCUPATION WITH STABILITY TO EMBRACING 
CHANGE 
 
In Chapter 7 we argued that the determined-design approach tend to perceive conflict as 
disorder and that it therefore frames peacebuilding as a tool utilised to stabilise a system, i.e. 
that returns it to order. In the determined-design context, peacebuilding is a tool that 
maintains the international system by correcting and returning the behaviour of errant states to 
their orderly place in a stable international system.  
 
The determined-design approach was contrasted with the complex-systems approach that sees 
peacebuilding as a process working with – not against – change, i.e. it aims to work with and 
use the natural dynamic and non-linear processes that characterise conflict systems to 
stimulate feedback and facilitate the natural ability of complex systems to self-organise.  
 
It implies modulating change, facilitating the flow of information and generating processes, 
both within the peacebuilding system itself and within the society that is being influenced that 
can self-regulate the change processes necessary to organise complex systems. In this context 
the complex systems approach is about helping societies to develop the resilience and 
robustness they need to cope with and adapt to change. Peacebuilding is about making 
adaptation and evolution integral to our systems. From a complex systems perspective, 
peacebuilding agents engage with a complex society in a process of constructive interference. 
The peacebuilding agents attempt to influence the behaviour of the society emerging out of 
conflict by limiting its ability to lapse into violent conflict, whilst at the same time attempting 
to stimulate it to develop the capabilities and processes such a society needs to self-organise.  
 
The eighth recommendation is thus that peacebuilding should embrace change as normal and 
optimal and that it should seek to manipulate and modulate the dynamics of the change 
processes of the social systems it is trying to influence. 
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9.10 BEING SENSITIVE TO THE AMBIGUITY OF BORDERS AND 
BOUNDARIES 
 
It has been suggested that the aim of peacebuilding should be to assist and support a society 
emerging out of conflict to regain the ability to act within the internationally agreed 
parameters for responsible state behaviour in the international system, i.e. to become a state 
that is at peace with its neighbours and itself and that respects and participates in the 
international system according to the norms and standards governing that system. Societies 
emerging out of conflict thus not only regain direct sovereignty over their own affairs, but 
also regain the right to help shape the international system.  
 
A new country like South Sudan, which joined the international system for the first time in 
July 2011, is thus not only the subject of an international peacebuilding intervention, but it is 
also a party to its own intervention as a member of the United Nations. At the same time, the 
Government of South Sudan is also an important internal peacebuilding agent. From a 
complex systems perspective it is thus possible for an element or agent in the system, like the 
Government of South Sudan, to be both subject and object at the same time.  
 
The point is that a complex-systems approach does not lend itself to clear and neat borders 
and boundaries. As discussed in Chapter 5, the framing of the system depends on the 
perspective of the observer. A complex systems approach thus reminds us to be cautious and 
critical of neat internal-external and international-local categories.  
 
However, the concept of self-sustainability in peacebuilding theory depends on us being able 
to distinguish between internal and external agents, because it holds that the external and 
internal agents have to be identified and separated at some point, so that the external agents 
can withdraw and allow the internal agents, in their identity as members of the local society, 
to manage their own peace consolidation process.  
 
There is thus a tension between the need to be able to distinguish between internal and 
external actors on the one hand, and the recognition, on the other, that the internal and 
external systems are deeply interconnected. Whilst it may be possible to identify some of the 
kind of obvious or overt external system behaviours that need to be withheld to allow the 
local society to self-organise on the one hand, the systems, on the other hand, are so 
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interconnected as part of the globalised economy and international governance system that it 
may be impossible for them to be fully independent from each other. A more realistic 
approach would be to try to identify a kind of tipping point where the balance of power and 
influence shifts from mostly externally controlled and influenced to mostly internally 
controlled and influenced. The extent to which local societies can fully self-organise and be 
self-sustainable then becomes a question of degree, rather than an absolute category. 
 
The point is that a complex-systems approach reminds us to be very cautious of the 
assumptions that are made about the framing of borders and boundaries. There is utility in 
categorisations when that process helps us to better understand the identity, roles and 
relationships of the various agents involved in a system, but it is also necessary to take into 
account the degree to which these agents are interconnected and interdependent. We should 
thus continuously question our own framing of borders and boundaries and be aware of how 
the categorisations that we impose on our understanding of complex systems may blind us to 
critically important interdependencies and interconnections. 
 
The ninth recommendation is thus a reminder to be very cautious of the assumptions that are 
made about the framing of borders and boundaries, and that the extent to which local societies 
can be judged to be fully self-organised and self-sustainable in a highly globalised and 
interconnected world involves matter of degree, rather than absolute categories. 
 
9.11 ACCEPTING THAT SOCIAL-CHANGE PROCESSES TAKE TIME 
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, one of the most perverse aspects of external peacebuilding 
interventions often is their perception of time. Peacebuilding interventions are typically 
conceptualised, planned and implemented according to a timescale that is primarily 
influenced by external considerations (e.g. donor budget cycles) and supply-side dynamics 
(e.g. competition among external agents) or the election schedule of a particularly influential 
agent. The common wisdom is that peacebuilding should achieve as much as possible in as 
short a period as possible, before international attention evaporates and before local patience 
with the international presence runs out. 
 
It has been argued that peacebuilding has achieved sustainability when self-organisation had 
been achieved and sustained over time. Self-sustainability implies that a society has prevented 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 283 
itself from lapsing into violent conflict without external support over a period of time during 
which it had the opportunity to be exposed to various tensions, shocks and crises. In other 
words, a peacebuilding process needs to allow a sufficient passage of time for these processes 
to accumulate a meaningful history – a collective memory and experience of how its norms, 
values and institutions have performed under various stresses, which will inform how the 
society responds to future stresses it may be confronted with. 
 
The society emerging from conflict thus needs time to develop a collective experience, to 
develop, test, select and adapt its own new norms and to generate its own new institutions. 
The World Bank’s 2011 Word Development Report makes the point that “creating legitimate 
institutions that can prevent repeated violence is, in plain language, slow” (2011:10). And it 
goes on to argue that “a repeated process enables space for collaborative norms and capacities 
to develop, and for success to build on success in a virtuous cycle” (12). The point is that 
peacebuilding needs to unfold at a pace that allows self-organisation to emerge.  
 
A complex-systems approach recognises that robust social systems that are resilient enough to 
cope with major political and social change, without relapsing into violent conflict, cannot 
develop in a few short years. Societies need time to generate, absorb, adapt and refine new 
social norms, and to integrate these into new institutions grounded in and interlinked with the 
network of indigenous systems. A complex-systems approach will therefore need a longer-
term approach to stimulating change. Progress will be evaluated not on how fast change is 
being achieved, but on how sustainably the local society is absorbing change and the effects 
such change is having on the peace consolidation objective. A complex-systems approach will 
also be sensitive to the unintended consequences that can result from too much external 
pressure, and actively monitor for feedback to this effect, so that programming can be 
adjusted accordingly. 
 
The tenth recommendation is thus that peacebuilding takes time, typically several decades and 
generations, and trying to rush or compact the process may have perverse effects.  
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9.12 MATCHING THE PACE OF DELIVERY WITH THE RATE OF 
ABSORPTION 
 
Our perception of pace is closely related to our perceptions of time. This study has argued that 
the rate and volume of the influence the peacebuilding system is aiming to exert on a given 
society needs to be paced so that it matches the ability of that society to absorb the influence. 
Too much stimulation will overwhelm the local system, and the excess or surplus, the support 
it cannot absorb, will be wasted.  
 
In some cases the redundant support may have perverse effects, i.e. it will stimulate black 
markets and corruption that can ultimately undermine the overall process. In other cases, the 
competition among elites to gain access and control over the surplus can become more 
important than the peace process itself, because it gives them the leverage to exert influence 
and gain support in their patrimonial systems.    
 
The art of peacebuilding is thus closely related to the timing and pace of the influence being 
exerted. Too much, too fast will overwhelm the society, whilst too little, too slowly will not 
generate enough stimulus for change. The ability of a peacebuilding agent to judge the time 
and pace of its interference will depend on the degree of sensitivity that it has been able to 
achieve in its feedback processes. The higher the degree of feedback complexity, i.e. the 
degree to which the agent is able to generate and respond to feedback, the more sophisticated 
it will be in its ability to time and pace its influence.  
 
The eleventh recommendation is thus that the rate of change and the level of external 
assistance have to be determined by the capacity of the local society to absorb change. 
 
9.13 THE IMPORTANCE OF INVESTING IN ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE  
 
The argument has been made that it is necessary to invest in robust and resilient systems, 
because that improves our capacity to cope with Complexity. Our consideration of the degree 
of robustness and resilience that may be needed in a particular system needs to be informed 
by the potential of that system to change. We have argued that the potential cost associated 
with investing in robustness and resilience needs to be discounted against the potential costs 
of system failure.  
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However, robustness and resilience cannot be pursued as a goal free from considerations of 
cost. The internal system obviously needs to be able to sustainably afford the costs associated 
with maintaining such robust and resilience capacities. Costs depend on design. Robustness 
and resilience typically are associated with investing in duplicate systems. However, in 
complex social systems, robustness and resilience can also be achieved by distributing 
intelligence, information processing, decision making and related capacities throughout the 
society. In the peacebuilding context, the implication is thus not to concentrate capacity 
building in only a few select sectors, for instance in state capacities such as the security 
sector, but to distribute these capacities widely and deeply into the society as a whole. The 
more the society as a whole is engaged in making decisions about, for instance, security, the 
more robust and resilient the society will be. 
 
The implications run contrary to the kind of approach favoured by the deterministic-design 
approach, namely to prioritise its assistance on a few key state-building sectors, typically the 
executive, the security sector and the criminal-justice sector. The World Bank’s World 
Development Report (2011:41) defines institutions as “the formal and informal ‘rules of the 
game’, which include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behaviour 
and shared beliefs.” Most state-building activities have been limited to the formal and 
externally visible aspects of institutional development (people, uniforms, cars and 
equipment), and too little attention has been directed to the informal ‘rules of the game’ and 
informal norms of behaviour and shared beliefs. Institutions are developed top-down and are 
imposed on the societies they are intended to serve, instead of them emerging out of the 
societies themselves.  
 
Such embedded robustness and resilience do not necessarily have a higher price tag, but they 
do require a greater investment in time and a slower pace. External agents need to be more 
sensitive to the side effects of top-down institutional development. Statebuilding that 
generates institutions that meet external expectations but that are not embedded in their own 
local social history do not contribute to self-sustainable peace consolidation. In fact, they may 
very well undermine the ability of the society to self-organise. External peacebuilding agents 
need to learn to trust the ability of the self-organisation process to generate an appropriate 
context-specific outcome.  
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If, on the other hand, the aim of peacebuilding should be to generate institutions that meet 
some internationally set standard, then the international community needs to accept that, in 
that context, self-sustainability can no longer be a realistic aim, and that such systems will 
need to be externally supported and manipulated for as long as is necessary to maintain the 
international standard.  
 
The twelfth recommendation thus is that, in complex social systems, robustness and resilience 
can be achieved by distributing intelligence, information processing, decision making and 
related capacities throughout the society. This implies that more effort needs to be invested in 
the relationship between formal institutions and their societal roots, as that is where the 
potential for robustness and resilience resides. 
 
9.14 THE LIMITS OF PRIORITIZATION AND THE NEED FOR 
COMPREHENSIVENESS 
 
Another important concept in the context of self-sustainable peace consolidation is 
comprehensiveness. Under time and resource pressures, policy makers naturally need to 
prioritise. However, prioritising only certain aspects of a complex system will generate side 
effects elsewhere in the system. Often this basically amounts to externalising or shifting the 
costs. For instance, increasing police presence in one area does not necessarily reduce overall 
crime; it usually simply results in shifting the problem to somewhere else in the system. In 
order to address crime, a more comprehensive approach is necessary.  
 
Comprehensiveness is about recognising that the complexity of the interconnections among 
the various dimensions is as important, if not more so, than the individual dimensions. 
Addressing only some of them, through narrowly informed and often externally-designed 
processes of prioritisation, is likely to generate negative side effects in the system. For 
instance, prioritising the security sector without at the same time giving sufficient attention to 
related aspects of civilian control is likely to generate a number of medium- and longer-term 
negative side effects. Another example discussed earlier was that of giving disproportionately 
more attention to one aspect of policing, e.g. gender-based violence, can negatively affect the 
overall cohesion and effectiveness of the police force.   
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Comprehensiveness is thus about recognising that we cannot assess the value of efficiency in 
isolation from related and interconnected considerations such as robustness, resilience, 
sustainability, local ownership and organisational learning.  
 
The thirteenth recommendation thus concerns the need to recognise that the interconnections 
among the various dimensions in a complex social system are as important, if not more so, 
than the individual dimensions. Prioritising only some sectors of a society may generate 
perverse side effects. A complex-systems approach requires a comprehensive approach that is 
concerned about ensuring overall system performance. 
 
9.15 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL SYSTEMS ARE COMPLEX 
 
Some societies or states may not be self-sustainable, i.e. they may not be able to have 
sufficient internal Complexity to self-organise. Such societies or states may need to form a 
class of their own – perhaps occupying a kind of ‘suspended sovereignty’ category – and they 
may require indefinite support from the international system. The point is that it should not be 
assumed that all societies or states are able to achieve self-sustainable peace consolidation.  
 
This realisation challenges the broad assumption that dominates the current approach to 
peacebuilding. The international community intervenes in all violent conflicts under the same 
assumption, namely that it is possible for those societies to achieve self-sustainable peace if 
only they receive the necessary catalytic support. As a result, the international community 
imposes the same theories of change on all the countries in which it intervenes.  
 
Similarly, the international community assumes that all societies can be developed to the 
point where they can become self-sustainable states that participate as sovereign but 
interdependent members of the world economy.  However, it is apparent that some states are 
politically, socially and economically dependent on larger regional systems and networks. 
Such societies will require a different support system, one that recognises their dependence on 
the larger systems or subsystems of which they form part.  
 
The fourteenth recommendation is a reminder that not all societies have the internal 
Complexity to achieve self-sustainable peace.  The complex-systems approach should thus 
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only be applied to those societies that are, or have the potential to, become self-organised 
complex social systems.  
 
9.16 OPTIMAL LEVELS OF COHERENCE 
 
The relevance of Complexity for coherence was considered in Chapter 7. It became clear that 
coherence should be understood as a process aimed at achieving an optimal level of 
cooperation among interdependent agents in a given context. In this new understanding, 
coherence is a process that strives towards achieving the most effective and efficient level of 
self-organisation, taking into account the specific combination of participating agents and the 
environmental context, including the pace at which the system is likely to have to cope with, 
and adapt to, change. 
 
Coherence is thus not about seeking agreement for a common approach among peacebuilding 
agents. It is not about seeking consensus or harmony as an end in and of itself. Coherence, 
rather, is about seeking the optimal level of cooperation among agents in a given context. In a 
complex-systems context, the concept thus recognises that the appropriate level of coherence 
will be determined by the specific context within which the system is operating. The concept 
also recognises the inherent value of diversity, and that is why it is qualified with a 
requirement to determine the ‘appropriate’ level.  
 
Some systems operate in more volatile environments than others, and such systems need to 
accommodate more diversity than others, because the range of options such a system needs to 
manage is broader than a system that operates in a more stable environment, where fewer 
changes, and thus fewer diverse options, are likely to be required. Thus the optimal balance 
between coherence and diversity, or dependence and interdependence, needs to be negotiated 
on a case-by-case basis.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in situations where violent conflict is still likely to disrupt the 
peace process, for instance in the eastern DRC, Afghanistan and Darfur, the conflict system 
itself, as well as the peacebuilding system that supports the peace process, needs to be able to 
respond to a wide range of possible futures. These situations are highly dynamic and they are 
likely to experience a high degree of change in the short to medium term. As a result, the 
agents need a high degree of freedom and independence so that they may be able to respond 
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quickly to changes in the system, without having to first seek consensus, or agreement from a 
wider group, on which actions to take. This does not apply to all agents in these contexts, but 
there typically are enough agents in such contexts who require a high degree of independence 
to result in a situational context in which there is less room for coherence than in situations 
where the risk of a relapse into violent conflict is less acute, such as in contemporary Liberia 
or Sierra Leone. 
 
The level of coherence that is possible in any given situation is thus influenced by the context, 
but a system that achieves and maintains close to optimal levels of coherence is likely to be 
more effective and efficient in pursuing or achieving its aims than a system that struggles to 
find its balance. This principle applies to all contexts, i.e. also to contexts where less 
coherence is appropriate. Pursuing more coherence than appropriate in situations like the 
eastern DRC, Afghanistan or South Sudan, where outbreaks of violent conflict are more 
likely, will result in the system being less effective and efficient than when pursuing a more 
appropriate level of coherence.  
 
In other words, trying to force agents in a highly volatile situation to have a common analysis 
of the situation and to plan together is likely to cause even more tension among the agents. In 
response, they may be forced into adopting clearer or official positions regarding the types of 
cooperation they are willing to engage in, and this is likely to hinder the level of unofficial 
and informal exchange of information and tactical cooperation that would otherwise have 
taken place. The net result may thus actually be less cooperation and coherence.  
 
However, if a more appropriate level of coherence is pursued, one that is designed to 
recognise the need for the agents to be independent and one that is limited to modulating the 
exchange of information, the result may be that the agents, whilst acting independently, will 
nevertheless have more information about the actions the other agents in the system are 
taking, and this will enable them to adjust their own actions accordingly. The overall system 
will thus be able to self-organise more optimally at a level appropriate for that context.  
 
Pursuing more coherence than is optimal thus leads to a decrease in overall effectiveness, 
because agents are likely to respond to the pressure to coordinate by taking steps to emphasise 
their independence, and this will result in even less sharing of information in the system than 
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was the case before greater coherence was pursued. A complex systems approach thus favours 
pursuing optimal levels of coherence, where what is optimal is determined by the context.  
 
The fifteenth recommendation is thus that coherence should be understood to pursue an 
optimal level of cooperation among agents in a given context. In a complex-systems context, 
the concept thus recognises that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context 
within which the system is operating.  
 
 
9.17 CONCLUSION 
 
The primary objective of this study was to explore the utility of using Complexity to gain 
insights into the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. Fifteen recommendations for 
coping with peacebuilding Complexity have been generated and listed in this chapter. These 
are as follows:  
 
The first recommendation is that the way in which knowledge about any particular complex 
social system is generated needs to be based on the recognition that our ability to fully 
understand complex systems is inherently limited.  
 
The second recommendation is that peacebuilding itself needs to be understood as complex, 
and that this implies that we need to recognise that any particular peacebuilding system will 
be self-organised, and emergent. This has implications for how assessments, planning, 
coordination, leading, and evaluating specific peacebuilding interventions are undertaken.  
 
The third recommendation is that it should be recognised that the local society has the ethical 
right and duty to control their own future, but that their freedom to choose future paths is 
constrained by international parameters set for the responsible behaviour of states in the 
international system.  
 
The fourth recommendations is that the aim of peacebuilding interventions needs to be 
focused on, and limited to, stimulating the capacity of local societies to self-organise. 
 
The fifth recommendation is that the focus on peace consolidation as a benchmark for self-
sustainable peace should not be misunderstood as a prioritisation of security. For a social 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 291 
system to avoid lapsing into violent conflict it has to have at its disposal a rich, robust and 
resilient variety of attributes that enable it to process shocks and crises without lapsing into 
violent conflict.  
 
The sixth recommendation is that we have to be sensitive to how complex systems process 
information, self-organise and adapt, and suggests that evolutionary experimentation 
methodology can assist in purposefully co-evolving with the systems we are attempting to 
influence. 
 
The seventh recommendation is that peacebuilding should not be understood as an activity 
that generates a specific outcome, but as an activity that facilitates and stimulates the 
processes that enable local self-organisation to emerge. 
 
The eighth recommendation is that peacebuilding should embrace change as normal and 
optimal and that it should seek to manipulate and modulate the dynamics of the change 
processes of the social systems it is trying to influence. 
 
The ninth recommendation is a reminder to be very cautious of the assumptions that are made 
about the framing of borders and boundaries, and that the extent to which local societies can 
be judged to be fully self-organised and self-sustainable in a highly globalised and 
interconnected world is matter of degree, rather than of absolute categories. 
 
The tenth recommendation is that peacebuilding takes time, typically several decades and 
generations, and trying to rush or compact the process has perverse effects.  
 
The eleventh recommendation is that the rate of change and the level of external assistance 
have to be determined by the capacity of the local society to absorb change. 
 
The twelfth recommendation is that robustness and resilience can be achieved in complex 
social systems by distributing intelligence, information processing, decision making and 
related capacities throughout the society. This implies that more effort needs to be invested in 
the relationship between formal institutions and their societal roots, as that is where the 
potential for robustness and resilience resides. 
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The thirteenth recommendation concerns the need to recognise that the interconnections 
among the various dimensions in a complex social system is as important, if not more so, than 
the individual dimensions. Prioritising only some sectors of a society may generate perverse 
side effects. A complex systems approach thus requires a comprehensive approach that is 
concerned about ensuring overall system performance. 
 
The fourteenth recommendation is a reminder that not all societies have the internal 
Complexity to achieve self-sustainable peace.  The complex systems approach should thus 
only be applied to those societies that are, or have the potential to become, self-organised 
complex social systems.  
 
The fifteenth recommendation is that coherence should be understood to pursue an optimal 
level of cooperation among agents in a given context. In a complex-systems context, the 
concept thus recognises that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context within 
which the system is operating.  
 
The next and final chapter of the dissertation presents a summary of the findings of this study 
and reflects on the degree to which the research questions posed in the introduction have been 
addressed. 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 293 
CHAPTER 10  
CONCLUSION 
 
Crucially, Complexity re-opens the question of what exactly should be the role of Reason after 
the Enlightenment, suggesting that Reason should be that which enables us to cope with 
uncertainty (which is a fundamental and objective property of nature, in both the natural and 
social worlds), rather than that which encourages us – as if by automatic reflex - to look for 
certainty-based explanatory models. (Popolo, 2011:213) 
 
It is inappropriate for international peacebuilders to engineer electoral outcomes or even 
impose a specific voting system on a conflict country. The risks of subverting the 
development of a sustainable indigenous brand of democracy are too high – and if mistakes 
are made, they should be local mistakes as this is an inherent part of democratization. (Ponzio, 
2011:247) 
 
I share with a growing number of practitioners and academics the belief that the international 
community’s underlying role should be about creating the space in which the political can 
evolve in productive ways. (Hughes, 2012:117) 
 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Peacebuilding is said to be complex, and this study investigated what that implies and asked 
whether Complexity could be of use in improving our understanding of the assumed causal 
link between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability in the context of peacebuilding 
systems. Coherence, or rather the lack of coherence, has been identified as one of the most 
critical shortcomings in international peacebuilding interventions to date. Consequently, there 
is a widely-held assumption in the peacebuilding policy community that improving coherence 
among peacebuilding agents will result in more effective peacebuilding action. More effective 
peacebuilding is, in turn, anticipated to result in more sustainable impact.  
 
In this dissertation the assumed causal link between coherence, effectiveness and 
sustainability was questioned and explored. In the Introduction it was argued that, if there is 
such a link, we should be able to influence effectiveness and sustainability by improving our 
understanding of the ways in which we can increase coherence. However, if such a link does 
not exist, it will have significant implications for one of the core assumptions in 
peacebuilding theory and for the amount of energy and time devoted to trying to increase 
coherence in peacebuilding practice. To explore this question, the focus was directed to the 
study of Complexity. When systems become so dynamic that it is no longer possible to keep 
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track of the effects of specific initiatives, they are commonly refered  to as ‘complex’. This 
dissertation asked, what does it mean when we say a particular conflict, or the international 
response to it, is complex?  
 
An attempt was made to answer this question by exploring how the study of Complexity, a 
field of research dedicated to studying complex systems, may assist us in gaining new insights 
into the dynamics of peacebuilding systems. The aim was to determine what can be learned 
from applying the knowledge generated by the study of Complexity to the peacebuilding 
context. Could insights from the study of Complexity assist us in improving our 
understanding of some of the core challenges experienced by peacebuilding systems?  
 
These questions were approached in three parts. The first introduced and discussed 
peacebuilding, coherence and the factors that constrain coherence. Thus, the context was 
specified and the dilemma introduced in Part I. Part II  introduced Complexity, established 
that peacebuilding is complex, and considered the relevance and implications of Complexity 
for peacebuilding in general and the coherence dilemma in particular. In Part III consideration 
was given to how complex systems can be influenced and a set of recommendations for 
coping with peacebuilding complexity was generated on the basis of the findings of Part I and 
II. The main findings of these three parts of the dissertation are summarised below. 
 
10.2 PEACEBUILDING AND COHERENCE 
 
Peacebuilding is a collective term used to refer to all actions undertaken by the international 
community and local actors to consolidate the peace in a given conflict-prone system, i.e. 
inclusive of the whole range of political, security and development actions taken to prevent a 
(re)lapse into violent conflict. The nexus between development, governance, politics and 
security has become a central focus of the international effort to manage transitions, and 
peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which these diverse 
dimensions of conflict management can be brought together under one common framework. 
 
Peacebuilding is still emerging as a distinct form of international cooperation, but thus far its 
record has been mixed.  Paul Collier and his colleagues (2003) found that about half of all 
peace agreements fail in the first ten years after being signed. There are many reasons why 
some peace processes are not sustainable — some relate to the role of spoilers and the 
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dynamics of post-conflict settlements, whilst others are associated with shortcomings in the 
support provided by the international community. In this dissertation, the focus has been on 
the complex interrelationships among peacebuilding agents and specifically on the problems 
associated with the lack of coherence among them. Throughout this dissertation this challenge 
has been referred to as the ‘coherence dilemma’. 
 
The liberal peace debate discussed in Chapter 2 reminds us that our understanding of the 
contemporary peacebuilding system has been deeply influenced by the way peacebuilding has 
been conceptualised, theorised and debated over the last few decades. These debates, and the 
competing theories of change that influence them, thus need to be taken into consideration 
when trying to understand how peacebuilding has been practiced and how it has been 
perceived by the different stakeholders and agents that have been engaged in some or other 
way in pursuing coherence while undertaking peacebuilding programmes and activities. 
 
In Chapter 3, the dissertation adopted a working definition for coherence in the peacebuilding 
context. It was stated that coherence refers to the effort to ensure that the political, security 
and development dimensions of a peacebuilding system in a particular crisis are directed 
towards a common objective.  
 
The coherence dilemma refers to the persistent gap between policy level assumptions about 
the value and causal role of coherence in peacebuilding effectiveness and empirical evidence 
from peacebuilding practice to the contrary. It was argued that there is a widely-held and 
acted-upon assumption in the peacebuilding policy community that improved coherence leads 
to (causes) greater efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the Joint Utstein Study (Smith, 
2004) of peacebuilding in which 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway were analysed, identified a lack of coherence 
at the strategic level – what was termed a strategic deficit – as the most significant obstacle to 
sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55% of the programmes 
evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.  
 
In Chapter 4 of the dissertation, the aim was to identify and consider some of those factors 
that limit, inhibit or constrain our ability to achieve coherence. Four factors were discussed, 
namely the tension between long-term impact and short-term output; conflicting values, 
principles and mandates; the context-specific scope for coherence; and the power imbalance 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 296 
between local and international peacebuilding agents. It was posited that persistent evidence-
based feedback from the field indicates that, at the operational and tactical levels, many of the 
assumptions about coherence are contestable at best, and flawed, at worst. Peacebuilding 
efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted tensions and inherent 
contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different 
peacebuilding agents.  
 
The argument stated that the tension between impact and output, between what is good for the 
system as a whole as measured over the long term, and what is in the best interest of the 
individual agent as measured in the short to medium term, consistently undermines 
coherence. It was pointed out that some peacebuilding agents have inherently contradictory 
values, principles and mandates and that these typically manifest in fundamentally different 
theories of change and result in disagreements with regard to, for instance, prioritisation and 
how to measure progress. The context within which peacebuilding unfolds, and especially the 
degree of volatility in the system, was shown to determine the possible scope for coherence. 
Lastly, it was also argued that there are fundamental and inherent tensions in peacebuilding 
systems because of the inherent power imbalance between the external and the internal 
agents.  
 
Based on these observations, it was concluded that there are inherent limits and constraints 
regarding the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding context. The 
exact limits are context specific and have to be transacted on a case-by-case basis. But not 
recognising and addressing the fact that these limits exist, by for instance blindly pursuing an 
idealised or maximum level of coherence, regardless of context, is likely to result in such 
efforts ultimately generating perverse effects for the society in question. 
 
The overall finding in this chapter was that, whilst pursuing coherence is an integral part of 
peacebuilding, the commonly held causal assumption that more coherence will automatically 
result in more efficient, and thus more sustainable peacebuilding operations, is flawed. There 
seems to be a threshold beyond which, at first, pursuing more coherence seems to yield little 
additional benefit and, beyond that, pursuing even more coherence starts to have perverse 
effects.  
 
On the basis of these findings, it was argued that the apparent correlation between coherence 
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and effective peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been a result of 
misinterpretation. The correlation does not imply that there is a causal relationship between 
coherence, effectiveness and sustainability, but rather that the systems that have achieved 
greater levels of peace consolidation, and that we may thus associate with effective and 
sustainable peacebuilding, are at the same time also conducive to greater coherence.  
 
It can thus be concluded that there are inherent dynamics in peacebuilding systems that limit, 
inhibit and constrain the degree of coherence that can be achieved. In practice, these 
constraints are not sufficiently recognised and discounted at the policy level (De Coning & 
Friis, 2011:20). The result is that the policy debate is setting itself overly ambitious targets for 
coherence, which are impossible to achieve in reality. A more realistic understanding of the 
limitations of coherence and the inherent contradictions in the system will allow the 
international community to adopt a more sober approach to coherence and to set itself more 
humble goals (Paris & Sisk, 2009:64).  
 
The argument was made that considering the degree to which coherence is attainable in a 
given context and adjusting expectations and models accordingly, should result in more 
efficient operations, and such an approach should also generate greater sensitivity to potential 
unintended consequences of pursuing coherence beyond its limits (De Coning & Friis, 
2011:21).  
 
10.3 PEACEBUILDING AND COMPLEXITY 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, Complexity was described in Chapter 5 as a property of 
a complex system that has the ability to adapt, that demonstrates emergent properties 
(including self-organising behaviour) and that comes about and is maintained as a result of 
the dynamic and non-linear interactions of a large number of its elements (based on the 
information available to them locally) and of their interaction with the environment, as well as 
from the modulated feedback they receive from the other elements in the system. Complexity 
was situated in the history of science and some of the general characteristics of complex 
systems was explained. Three of these were focused on in particular, namely a whole-of-
systems approach, non-linearity and self-organisation. In the process the importance of 
concepts such as emergence and feedback was discussed. 
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The implications of Complexity for epistemology and ethics were also considered. It was 
argued that the non-linear and dynamic nature of complex systems places inherent limitations 
on our ability to know, predict and control complex systems. It also limits our ability to 
generate knowledge that is transferable from one context to another. Complexity thus reminds 
us to be sceptical in principle of results and findings, regardless of the method used to obtain 
them, because all methods are limited when considering highly dynamic and non-linear 
phenomena. From an ethical perspective this implies that it is necessary to acknowledge that 
as peacebuilders, we are acting on the basis of our own provisional understanding of a social 
system, not on the basis of scientifically proven knowledge that makes it possible to predict 
and control such complex systems. Peacebuilders thus have an ethical duty to proceed with 
caution and to monitor carefully the effects (intended and unintended) that peacebuilding 
interventions will have on the societies they are trying to influence, because their actions 
impact on  the everyday lives and livelihoods of real people. 
 
In Chapter 6, the characteristics of Complexity formulated by Cilliers (1998) were applied to 
peacebuilding, and the conclusion was reached that peacebuilding systems are indeed 
complex in the way this concept is understood in Complexity theory. This characterisation 
opened the way for exploring the relevance of some of the findings generated by the study of 
Complexity for peacebuilding systems. 
 
In Chapter 7 the prevalent ‘deterministic-design’ approach to peacebuilding was contrasted 
with a ‘complex systems’ approach. The deterministic-design concept was used to refer to the 
basic theory of change most widely used and applied by the contemporary peacebuilding 
policy and practitioner communities; namely one in which the policy makers and practitioners 
have confidence in their ability to analyse and identify ‘the problem’ that they have to 
address; their ability to design an intervention in response, i.e. ‘the solution’ that will solve 
this problem; and their ability to implement remedial programmes with which to administer 
these solutions.  
 
In contrast, a complex-systems approach is based on an understanding of complex systems in 
which change processes are evolutionary in nature, i.e. the system adapts to its environment 
and its own emergent behaviour through a continuous process of inductive adaptation, 
regulated by its own self-organising processes.  
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The dissertation explored the relevance of Complexity for the problem-solving assumption, 
the stabilising conflict assumption, and the time, pace and positioning considerations 
prevalent in contemporary peacebuilding theory. When it comes to the relevance of 
Complexity for the problem-solving assumption in peacebuilding, four implications of 
Complexity for peacebuilding were identified: 
 The highly dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems constrains our ability 
to fully understand complex peacebuilding systems, and peacebuilders are thus 
inherently limited in their ability to design pre-determined outcomes. 
 One cannot have a definitive ‘problem’ or ‘solution’ in a complex peacebuilding 
system. Peace can thus not be framed as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’. Peace needs to be 
understood as an emergent property of a complex system that is able to self-organise 
without lapsing into violent conflict.  
 The highly dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems results in the 
reductionist approach being limited in its application. It needs to be complemented 
and augmented with a complex-systems approach that seeks to understand the 
patterns, trends and processes that give us clues as to how the system works as a 
whole. 
 The focus of a peacebuilding intervention has to be on the internal political dynamics 
of the system experiencing change, not on the technical aspects of the external 
intervention.    
 
In the context of the stabilising conflict assumption, a further eight implications of 
Complexity for peacebuilding were identified: 
 Change and conflict are normal and necessary, and peacebuilding should thus not be 
so much about restoring order and stability, as it should be about stimulating change 
and facilitating constructive conflict.
40
  
 Peacebuilding is about peace consolidation, and whilst avoiding a lapse into violent 
conflict is important, it should be recognised that a preoccupation with controlling the 
political and social space in order to ensure security and stability is likely to constrain 
the space and pace for the emergence of self-organisation. The best way to ensure 
                                                 
40
 An important distinction was made here between violent conflict that is undesirable and constructive conflict, 
which refers to the tensions and competition among people pursuing different interests, and that is normal for 
any vibrant society. 
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sustainable peace consolidation is to encourage and facilitate the capacity of a society 
to organise itself.  
 A perfectly harmonious stable or orderly state is a conceptual construct, i.e. it is an 
ideal model that cannot exist in real or material terms. It is an idea that cannot be 
operationalised. 
 The ‘normal’ and, in fact, optimal state of societies is to be complex, i.e. highly 
dynamic and non-linear. 
 An international intervention cannot aim to achieve self-sustainable peace and stability 
and wish to remain in control of an internal system at the same time.  
 A complex-systems approach needs to be sensitive to the need for societies to self-
evolve, including through constructive conflict and competition.  
 If we accept that in complex systems change is normal, even optimal, then it would 
make sense to invest in developing improved capacities to facilitate and cope with 
change. 
 This represents a shift in focus from trying to ensure that you arrive at a pre-
determined, ideal end-result, to trying to ensure that the system has the robustness and 
resilience to manage its own emerging outcomes without lapsing into violent conflict.  
 
From the insights gained from applying a Complexity perspective to the time, pace and 
positioning considerations of peacebuilding, it was found that: 
 When the ‘determined-design’ interference approach to peacebuilding results in 
situations where communities are under pressure to adapt faster than they can 
collectively absorb change, the peacebuilders are in effect delaying the ability of such 
communities to become self-sustainable.  
 The rate of change has to be matched to the society’s capacity to absorb change for it 
to be sustainable. Imposing more change than can be absorbed results, at best, in 
overflow and waste and, at worst, in pollution (corruption, breakdown of social 
systems and values, a culture of winner-takes-all short-term self-enrichment, and so 
forth).  
 A complex-systems approach requires a radical re-positioning of our understanding of 
peacebuilding as something that needs to be essentially local.  
 The role of the external actors may be necessary, for instance, to provide an initial safe 
and secure environment and to act as a catalyst by stimulating and facilitating the 
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processes necessary for social regeneration, but it is not sufficient to achieve self-
sustainable peace consolidation. International agents thus may have a role to play, but 
need to position themselves in such a way that they do not harm or delay the internal 
system’s self-organising processes. 
 The essential ingredient is local emergent self-organised complexity, i.e. the society 
needs to develop its own capacity to manage itself without lapsing into violent 
conflict. 
 The external actors should not benchmark their own drawdown and exit on the degree 
to which full self-sustainability seems to have been achieved, but rather on the 
capacity that exists for self-sustainability to take hold and continue after external 
support has been withdrawn. 
 
10.3.1 Implications for the coherence dilemma 
 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the causal assumption common in peacebuilding policy 
circles, namely that more coherence will result in more efficient, and thus more sustainable 
peacebuilding operations, is flawed. The empirical evidence suggests that there seems to be a 
threshold beyond which pursuing more coherence seems to yield little additional benefit. In 
fact, it seems that when more coherence is imposed than what emerged naturally, perverse 
effects are likely to be generated. The further argument was that the degree to which a certain 
level of coherence is likely to be achieved appears to be highly context specific, i.e. the 
degree to which the system is conducive to coherence seems to be much more important that 
the type of coherence model or the degree of inter-connectivity among peacebuilding agents.  
 
In Chapter 7 these findings were further augmented with insights from Complexity that 
provided a theoretical explanation for what appears to be a contradiction, namely that 
coherence can be both necessary and yet unattainable. The dissertation argued that seeking 
coherence has utility because it drives processes that stimulate the exchange of information, 
connectivity and self-organisation. However, the resilience and robustness of complex 
systems start to be negatively affected when coherence ranges beyond a certain optimal level. 
Beyond that optimal level, coherence decreases diversity, i.e. the number of possible 
responses available to a system, and inhibits competition among agents, and in so doing, starts 
to undermine the ability of the system to self-organise and adapt to changes in its 
environment. In other words pursuing coherence is a desirable activity when it contributes to 
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the Complexity of the system by connecting agents and stimulating the flow of information, 
but it becomes undesirable when the systems becomes too closely connected that its starts to 
negatively affect the ability of the system to cope with diversity, i.e. when it starts to constrain 
Complexity.   
 
Complex systems self-organise around the optimal level of coherence. The optimal level of 
coherence is case or context specific, and attempts to impose more coherence than optimal in 
a given context are not sustainable, nor desirable, in complex systems. This finding 
challenges the prevailing conventional wisdom in peacebuilding policy circles (see Chapter 
4), which holds that coherence is attainable and that increased coherence leads to more 
effective peacebuilding. 
 
Based on these insights gained from applying Complexity to peacebuilding, the dissertation 
redefined coherence as a process aimed at achieving an optimal level of self-organisation 
among interdependent agents in a given context. The degree of coherence in a given context 
can be enhanced by facilitating the exchange of information and modulating feedback among 
the agents so that the decisions that the various agents take independently are better informed 
and can thus contribute to more effective system-level adaptation and self-organisation. In 
this new definition, coherence is aimed at pursuing the most effective and efficient level of 
self-organisation taking into account the nature of the participating agents and the 
environmental context, including the pace at which the system is likely to have to cope with, 
and adapt to, change.  
 
The definition requires an understanding that ‘optimal’ here implies the need to take the 
specific context into account and that what is thus regarded as optimal cannot be universal, 
i.e. it will differ from context to context. Each context is also subject to change, and what is 
optimal can thus never be a pre-determined ideal state. “Optimal” refers to the outcome of the 
totality of transactions among agents up to that point in time, given that the system remains 
dynamic and non-linear.  Optimality does not refer to a preconceived or ‘determined-
designed’ idea of what is ideal given an imagined future context. Optimality refers to an 
emergent property, generated by the system’s interactions, and influenced by its environment. 
It cannot be determined in advance, but it can be encouraged, facilitated and pursued by 
modulating the exchange of information among the agents, with a view to trying to ensure 
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that as many of the agents as possible have access to information about what is happening in 
the environment and elsewhere in the system itself. 
 
10.4 GUIDELINES FOR COMPLEX PEACEBUILDING 
 
The dissertation argued that, from a systems perspective, peacebuilding can be understood as 
a concerted effort by a group of international and local actors to influence or manipulate a 
complex system with a view to consolidating a peace process. Based on the findings on the 
role of coherence in complex peacebuilding systems, an attempt was made to determine 
whether it is indeed possible, from a Complexity perspective, to influence and direct a 
complex system. In other words, if the scope for coherence is largely determined by the 
context, to what degree is it possible to influence the context itself?  
 
In peacebuilding, the general theory of change is a peace process can be consolidated by 
assisting the parties to the conflict and peace process through facilitating conflict resolution, 
supporting national reconciliation and nationbuilding and by undertaking statebuilding 
activities in support of establishing rule of law, good governance and democracy. The general 
theory of change behind peacebuilding is thus built on the assumption that it is possible for 
one system (external or international) to influence or manipulate another complex system 
(internal or local).  The researcher was interested in exploring whether this is indeed possible, 
and if so, how? The question, from a Complexity perspective, was what do we know about 
influencing complex systems?  
 
The literature concerning influencing complex systems was considered in Chapter 8 of the 
dissertation, and it was found that one of the ways in which the behaviour of complex social 
systems can be influenced is by modulating the interdependencies among the agents in the 
system. This is achieved by manipulating the flow of information among the agents with the 
aim of strengthening the interconnections among them and, in so doing, improving the ability 
of the system to self-organise. However, influence should not be confused with control 
because, although complex systems can be stimulated, the way that they respond may be non-
linear and can thus not be predicted or controlled. 
 
In this regard, the twelve leverage points for influencing complex systems developed by 
Meadows (1999 & 2008) were found to be especially insightful for the purposes of the 
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dissertation.  Meadows argues that it is possible to influence a complex system at all levels, 
from the most conceptual (paradigms and system goals) to the most material (structure and 
flow of stocks). The argument that developed from this is that the most effective 
peacebuilding interventions will make use of the widest possible range of leverage points 
simultaneously, but that higher-order leverages, such as rules, goals and paradigms, will have 
much higher impact value than the lower-order leverages.  
 
Based on the implications generated by the application of the general characteristics of 
Complexity to peacebuilding and what was learned about how complex systems can be 
influenced, fifteen recommendations for coping with Complexity were formulated in Chapter 
9. 
 
The first recommendation was that the way in which knowledge about any particular complex 
social system is generated needs to be based on the recognition that our ability to fully 
understand complex systems is inherently limited.  
 
The second recommendation was that peacebuilding itself needs to be understood as complex, 
and that this implies that we need to recognise that any particular peacebuilding system will 
be self-organised and emergent. This has implications for how assessments, planning, 
coordination, leadership, and evaluating specific peacebuilding interventions are undertaken.  
 
The third recommendation was that it should be recognised that the local society has the 
ethical right and duty to control their own future, but that their freedom to choose future paths 
is constrained by international parameters set for the responsible behaviour of states in the 
international system.  
 
The fourth recommendations was that the aim of peacebuilding interventions needs to be 
focused on, and limited to, stimulating the capacity of local societies to self-organise. 
 
The fifth recommendation was that the focus on peace consolidation as a benchmark for self-
sustainable peace should not be misunderstood as a prioritisation of security. For a social 
system to avoid lapsing into violent conflict it has to have at its disposal a rich, robust and 
resilient variety of attributes that enable it to process shocks and crises without lapsing into 
violent conflict.  
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The sixth recommendation was that we have to be sensitive to how complex systems process 
information, self-organise and adapt, and this dissertation suggests that the evolutionary 
experimentation methodology can assist us in purposefully co-evolving with the systems we 
are attempting to influence. 
 
The seventh recommendation was that peacebuilding should not be understood as an activity 
that generates a specific outcome, but as an activity that facilitates and stimulates the 
processes that enable local self-organisation to emerge. 
 
The eighth recommendation was that peacebuilding should embrace change as normal and 
optimal and that it should seek to manipulate and modulate the dynamics of the change 
processes of the social systems it is trying to influence. 
 
The ninth recommendation was a reminder to be very cautious of the assumptions that are 
made about the framing of borders and boundaries, and that the extent to which local societies 
can be judged to be fully self-organised and self-sustainable in a highly globalised and 
interconnected world is matter of degree, rather than of absolute categories. 
 
The tenth recommendation was that peacebuilding takes time, typically several decades and 
generations, and trying to rush or compact the process has perverse effects.  
 
The eleventh recommendation was that the rate of change and the level of external assistance 
have to be determined by the capacity of the local society to absorb change. 
 
The twelfth recommendation was that robustness and resilience can be achieved in complex 
social systems by distributing intelligence, information processing, decision making and 
related capacities throughout the society. This implies that more effort needs to be invested in 
the relationship between formal institutions and their societal roots, as that is where the 
potential for robustness and resilience resides. 
 
The thirteenth recommendation concerned the need to recognise that the interconnections 
among the various dimensions in a complex social system are as important, if not more so, 
than the individual dimensions. Prioritising only some sectors of a society may generate 
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perverse side effects. A complex-systems approach thus requires a comprehensive approach 
that is concerned about ensuring overall system performance. 
 
The fourteenth recommendation was a reminder that not all states have the internal 
Complexity to achieve self-sustainable peace.  The complex-systems approach should thus 
only be applied to those groupings of societies that are, or have the potential to become, self-
sustainable states.  
 
The fifteenth recommendation was that coherence should be understood to pursue an optimal 
level of cooperation among agents in a given context. In a complex-systems context, the 
concept thus recognises that what is optimal will be determined by the specific context within 
which the system is operating.  
 
These recommendations can be summarised into three core findings: 
 
10.4.1 Peacebuilding, complexity and epistemology 
 
The first finding is the recognition that peacebuilders’ ability to gain knowledge of the 
complex social systems they are dealing with is inherently limited. The concept of Critical 
Complexity was introduced in Chapter 5 and it was explained that Critical Complexity holds 
that the study of complex systems may assist peacebuilders in improving their understanding 
of such systems, but cannot help them predict or control the behaviour of a specific complex 
system. Critical Complexity reminds participants that any insights or knowledge they may 
have gained about any given complex system is provisional, because the non-linear and 
highly-dynamical nature of complex systems implies that the system will continue to change 
in unpredictable ways.  
 
With hindsight it may be possible to connect the dots; however, it remains impossible to 
predict future events, even if the circumstances appear similar to others already encountered, 
because complex systems are non-linear and dynamic. In other words, causality can be traced 
looking back to the history of the system, but it cannot be used to project forward into, or to 
predict, the future – at least not beyond a very short horizon. Complexity does not generate 
definitive answers to policy problems. In fact, it clarifies why, in the context of complex 
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phenomena, the search for definitive answers and the pursuit of imagined definitive solutions 
is flawed. 
 
It is not just the conflict systems that are complex; the international peacebuilding instruments 
share the same messy characteristics. It needs to be recognised that the international 
peacebuilding system does not have a superior claim to knowledge about managing specific 
transitions. There are no off-the-shelf solutions and neither is there a single theory of change 
or model of state transformation, such as the liberal peace model, that can claim universal 
applicability.  
 
In this dissertation it has been suggested that an evolutionary approach to knowing should be 
explored. This means that what is already known should be generated, refined and adapted in 
an iterative and ongoing inductive process without ever expecting to arrive at definitive 
conclusions. It is thus not possible to diagnose definitive causes for, or to design solutions to a 
particular social conflict; instead, the focus should be on facilitating inductive processes that 
assist knowledge to emerge.  Complexity reminds us to be sceptical of results and findings, 
regardless of the method used to obtain them, because all methods are limited when 
considering highly dynamic and non-linear phenomena. 
 
In this dissertation, it was thus argued that one should not see peace as a problem to be 
solved. Peace does not, in any given context, have a stopping rule. There is no one right or 
wrong peace. Instead, from a complex-systems perspective, peace is emergent and thus has to 
be context specific. Making choices about a ‘good enough’ peace and determining whether 
specific policy choices have resulted in a better or worse outcome can thus ultimately only be 
done by those embedded in a given context. From the perspective of a particular 
peacebuilding agent, one can perhaps talk about an undesirable state based on the negative 
impact such a state is perceived to have on, for instance, a society or parts of that society. One 
can also talk about better or worse approaches, i.e. a scale of policy responses that range from 
having improved the situation from the perspective of what the policy set out to achieve on 
the one end of the scale, to policy approaches that made things worse, on the other. In all 
these cases it will be important to consider who the agents that make these decisions are, and 
especially whether such judgements are made by the societies themselves, or by others on 
their behalf. The overall point, however, is that when it comes to complex social conflicts, 
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one cannot talk about problems and solutions as if there is a right, correct or best solution for 
a problem that is just waiting to be discovered.  
 
10.4.2 Peacebuilding, complexity and practice  
 
The second insight is that peacebuilding is essentially about stimulating and facilitating the 
capacity of societies to self-organise. Self-organisation in this context refers to the various 
processes and mechanisms a society makes use of to manage its own peace consolidation 
process, i.e. the overall ability to manage its own tensions, pressures, disputes, crises and 
shocks without relapsing into violent conflict. This is a very delicate and inherently 
contradictory process fraught with built-in tensions. There is an inherent tension in the act of 
interfering in a local system, when that very interference is meant to assist the local system 
with gaining, or regaining the ability to self-organise.  
 
The robustness and resilience of the self-organising capacity of a society determines the 
extent to which it can withstand pressures and shocks that risk a (re)lapse into violent conflict. 
Peacebuilding should thus be about safeguarding, stimulating, facilitating, and creating the 
space for societies to develop robust and resilient capacities for self-organisation. 
 
International peacebuilding interventions should provide security guarantees and maintain the 
outer parameters of acceptable state behaviour in the international system, and they should 
stimulate, facilitate and create the space for the emergence of robust and resilient self-
organised systems.  
 
However, international peacebuilding interventions should not interfere in the local social 
process with the goal of engineering a specific outcome. Trying to control the outcome will, 
in all probability, produce the opposite of what peacebuilding aims to achieve; it will generate 
ongoing instability, and dependence, and it will undermine self-sustainability. 
 
Many international peacebuilding interventions to date have made the mistake of interfering 
so much that they ended up undermining the ability of the local society to self-organise. The 
key to successful peacebuilding thus lies in finding the appropriate balance between 
international support and local ownership.  
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Local ownership cannot be reduced to a type of hybridity where the international community 
gives some space to the local society to add local flavour to an internationally-designed 
model. Local ownership is not power, authority and legitimacy given by international 
peacebuilders to the local society.  Local ownership is the recognition that peace can only be 
achieved if it is emergent from the local society. For peace to be self-sustainable, it has to be 
home-grown. Local ownership therefore is an essential precursor for self-sustainable peace. 
Local ownership is thus the core ingredient for successful peacebuilding and is non-
negotiable.  
 
It is the role of the international peacebuilders that needs to be negotiated in every specific 
case to suit that particular context. They can have almost no role, as in South Africa’s 
transition, a minimum role, such as in Rwanda or Ethiopia, or a significant role, such as in 
Liberia or South Sudan, but they cannot have a dominant role, such as in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, because that is incompatible with self-sustainable peace.  
 
Hybridity may thus be re-framed to refer to the role that would be appropriate for the 
international community to have in any given peacebuilding process. Local ownership needs 
to be understood as a necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient, condition for self-sustainable 
peace. In some cases the assistance of the international community may be needed. The 
critical difference between this approach to hybridity, and the approach most generally 
associated with hybridity (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2011) is that it is not the degree of 
local ownership that is regarded as the variable that defines the degree of hybridity in a given 
case, but rather the level of international interference.  
 
There may be cases where external parties have such a strong interest in seeing a particular 
norm adhered to, or a particular state of affairs maintained, that they are willing to sacrifice 
the goal of self-sustainability and accept the cost of continued interference. However, such a 
type of intervention could not be categorised as peacebuilding – as defined in this 
dissertation– even though, for political reasons of legitimacy and credibility, the countries 
involved may choose to frame it as ‘peacebuilding’ and may include references too ‘self-
sustainability’ in their stated goals. One thus need to draw a distinction in some cases between 
peacebuilding rhetoric aimed at creating a legitimising narrative for an intervention that is 
aimed at norm enforcement, or that may pursue some other over-riding national interest, and 
peacebuilding interventions that genuinely pursue self-sustainable peace consolidation. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 310 
 
In addition, there may, of course, be exceptional situations where the international community 
chooses to intervene against the wishes of some parts of the local society in order to stop or 
prevent genocide, severe abuse of human rights or war crimes, such as was recently the case 
in Darfur, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. These exceptional powers are provided for under the 
enforcement articles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The interventions that flow from such 
authority are not peacebuilding interventions but are aimed at the protection of civilians and 
the stabilisation of affected societies. However, once such situations have been sufficiently 
pacified, they typically change into a new phase where self-sustainable peace consolidation 
becomes the new goal of the operation, and when this happens, there has to be a significant 
shift in the ownership of the process from the international to the local. 
 
The essential difference between the complex-systems approach and a determined-design 
approach like the liberal peace model is that, under the latter, the solution is understood to 
come from the outside. The agency to solve the problem resides in the international capacity 
to assess the situation and to design a solution and to then undertake an intervention where the 
solution is applied. The implication from Complexity for peacebuilding is that, for any society 
to live sustainably in peace, it needs to generate its own capacity to self-organise. This is a 
process that can be facilitated and supported by external peacebuilders, but it ultimately has to 
be a bottom-up and home-grown process. Self-organisation cannot be imposed. Any attempt 
to make a society self-organise will constitute interference and disruption in the system, and 
the more you intervene, the more you will undermine the process of self-organisation. 
 
The essential difference between these two approaches thus is the recognition that self-
sustainable peace is directly linked to, and influenced by, the extent to which a society has the 
capacity, and space, to self-organise. For peace consolidation to be self-sustainable, it has to 
be the result of a home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific process. In this understanding, 
the art of peacebuilding lies in pursuing the appropriate balance between international support 
and home-grown context-specific solutions. In this dissertation, we argued that the 
international community has, to date, failed to find this balance. In the process, the 
peacebuilders have contributed to the very weaknesses and fragilities in complex social 
systems that they were meant to address.  
 
The dissertation therefore presents the case for a significant re-balancing of the relationship 
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between international influence and local agency, and, on the basis of insights drawn from our 
understanding of how complex systems function, it argues for a new understanding of 
peacebuilding as something that is essentially local. 
 
10.4.3 Peacebuilding, complexity and ethics 
 
The third insight is that the general understanding of how complex systems function has 
important ethical implications for interventions in social systems. Critical Complexity holds 
that we cannot predict the future and therefore cannot control future behaviour, but it also 
argues that this does not mean that we are somehow powerless or without agency. In Chapter 
5, reference was made to Woermann (2010:121), who explained that a Critical Complexity 
approach implies a shift from trying to discover ‘the Truth’ about given situations, to a 
process of making choices and developing strategies for living and acting, and for dealing 
with the often unexpected outcomes of these strategies. An uncertain future can be 
meaningfully anticipated, influenced, adapted to, and engaged, but such engagement needs to 
be informed by an awareness of the limits of anyone’s ability to ultimately fully know 
complex systems, and that awareness has important implications for the ethical status of 
interventions into such systems. No party can claim moral superiority on the basis of  pre-
determined models or lessons learned elsewhere, nor can anyone hide behind ignorance, 
because it is  known that complex systems are non-linear and dynamic. Therefore, 
peacebuilders need to be careful, cautious and self-critical when considering and reflecting on 
the choices they make, because their actions may have negative consequences for the people 
affected by those decisions and actions. 
An explicit, reflexive awareness of the incompleteness of our understanding is therefore vital so 
that decisions are taken with a large degree of caution (and humility) while at the same time 
demanding that we think through the possible ramifications. A big part of the challenge for the 
international community is to accept that what eventuates may not approximate the Western 
liberal democratic model. (Hughes, 2012:116) 
 
 The dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems implies that competing theories of 
change need to be contextualised before their validity and applicability can be judged. 
Choices will thus have to be made by taking a range of factors into account and the selection 
of a given approach ultimately would need to be a local and context-specific informed choice.  
 
In this dissertation, the argument was made that it is the local societies who have to live with 
the consequences of peacebuilding operations, and who have to pay the cost of any lapses into 
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violent conflict, who are best positioned to make such judgements. They should thus have the 
ultimate right to make decisions about their own future. Rights also imply responsibility, but 
local societies can only have that responsibility if they have agency over the outcome. The 
international community cannot expect a local society to take responsibility for the 
peacebuilding process when they continue to insist on a pre-determined liberal end state. 
Local ownership implies taking ethical responsibility for the process and its results, and thus 
implies that the international community must be willing to give up control over the outcome 
of the process. 
 
The acknowledgement that the decisions made when choosing a given peacebuilding 
approach is the product of a deliberate political choice, as opposed to a choice based on an 
proven optimal model, represents a significant shift in locating ethical responsibility for the 
outcomes of a peacebuilding intervention squarely with those exercising such a choice. The 
ethical responsibility thus clearly shifts from the perceived pre-determined virtue of a proven 
model or theory of choice, to those that have the agency to choose which model or theory of 
change will be applied in a given context. 
 
However, any local society is also part of the international system and, as such, cannot exist 
in isolation. Whilst the local society has the rights and responsibility to control its own future, 
it should also be recognised that their freedom to choose future paths are constrained by the 
international parameters set for responsible behaviour in the international system. The 
international system will act to prevent, and may even use force to stop, mass abuse of human 
rights, genocide and war crimes.  
 
The implications is that the international peacebuilding agents have a role in assisting local 
societies to develop the capacity to become responsible members of the international 
community, but this role does not give them the agency to make decisions on behalf of the 
local society. The exception would be those extraordinary circumstances where local 
behaviour crosses the parameters set for acceptable behaviour in the international system, i.e. 
in cases where genocide, severe abuses of human rights or war crimes result in an 
internationally sanctioned intervention to protect civilians. However, when such a situation 
has been sufficiently stabilised and the focus shifts to self-sustainable peace consolidation, the 
agency has to shift to the local. 
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As discussed in preceding chapters, the notion of local ownership also raises several concerns, 
such as that local societies are not necessarily well informed about their options and that there 
seem to be persistent and challenging questions about who can legitimately speak on behalf of 
these local societies. These are legitimate concerns that need to be addressed, but the fact that 
it has been challenging to operationalise local ownership does not imply that the principle 
lacks an ethical foundation. The soundness of the principle, now also supported by the 
perspective of a Complexity-theory informed analysis, should inspire policymakers and 
practitioners to find new ways of engaging with, empowering, and giving space to local 
societies, so as to give practical meaning to the notion of local ownership.  
 
This does not exclude international actors from having a role in assisting local societies in 
understanding their choices and otherwise supporting and facilitating their transition, but it 
does imply that such actors offering assistance should stop short of taking decisions on behalf 
of local societies on the basis of superior claims to knowledge about what is in the best 
interest of those societies. Hence, a much clearer understanding needs to be developed of 
what are, and are not, appropriate degrees of influence for international peacebuilders and 
how intrusive peacebuilding should be.  
 
Critical Complexity thus implies that the peacebuilders, local and international, have to take 
responsibility – ethically – for their choices and actions. Taking responsibility means that 
peacebuilders need to think through the ethical implications of both their macro theories of 
peacebuilding and their specific choices and actions in any given context. They cannot base 
their decisions on the claimed superiority of one or other theory of change, because no one 
model, e.g. the liberal peace model, can be held up as inherently superior. They have to 
understand the choices they make and the potential consequences of their actions for each 
specific context and take responsibility for them. 
 
 
10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The application of Complexity to peacebuilding in this dissertation has generated a number of 
unconventional findings and many of them are likely to be controversial. This dissertation 
thus opens up considerable room for further research.  
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The dissertation presents a particular interest in the peacebuilding coherence dilemma, and a 
number of findings have been generated in this regard, including that the scope for coherence 
is determined by the context within which peacebuilding interventions take place. Based on 
these findings, it was argued that the correlation between coherence and effective 
peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been misinterpreted. The correlation 
does not imply that there is a causal relationship between coherence and effectiveness, but 
rather that the systems that have achieved relative stability, and that may thus be associated 
with effective peacebuilding, are also conducive to greater coherence.  
 
These claims can be tested against the empirical record, and it would be useful to analyse the 
scope for coherence achieved in several peacebuilding interventions against the context that 
prevailed in each of these cases. Specifically, it would be useful to explore whether a 
correlation can be established between the degree of volatility, and especially the level of  
violence in a given context, and the degree of coherence that was achieved in that context.  
 
A further argument in the dissertation, on the basis of insights drawn from the application of 
Complexity to peacebuilding, is that, for peace consolidation to be self-sustainable, local 
societies have to (re)gain the resilience and robustness necessary to achieve a level of self-
organisation that will enable them to manage their own tensions and internal conflicts without 
relapsing into violent conflict. Whilst the principle of local ownership has been established in 
peacebuilding theory, it thus far has failed to be operationalised in practice.  The primacy of 
local self-organisation for self-sustainable peacebuilding, presented in the context of a broader 
complex systems approach to peacebuilding interventions, has the potential to inject new 
vigour in the local ownership debate. The dissertation argues that peacebuilding programmes 
should be focused on assisting societies to develop the capacity to self-organise. Much more 
research will be needed to improve our understanding of self-organisation in the social 
context and especially in the context of societies emerging out of conflict where self-
organisation needs to be (re)gained. Research can be directed at trying to identify entry points 
for stimulating and facilitating self-organisation and especially to determine how feedback 
can be manipulated to influence complex systems. 
 
The researcher has also cautioned against levels of international intervention that undermine 
the ability of societies to self-organise and has argued that the ‘art’ of peacebuilding lies in 
finding the appropriate balance between too little and too much international intervention. 
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The last decades have presented the researcher with ample cases against which these claims 
can be explored. Empirical research and case studies could elaborate on the examples 
provided in this study of situations where too much international interference has had 
perverse effects. In fact, research that aims to identify and explain the opposite would be even 
more useful, namely cases where societies have been able to consolidate the peace without 
international interference, or with limited international support. Some research has already 
been undertaken on Somaliland (Boege et al., 2008:13), Bougainville (Boege et al., 2008:14) 
and Rwanda (Donais, 2012:6), but there is not yet a sufficient body of literature on this kind 
of locally-driven peace process to support or disprove this hypothesis.  
 
The dissertation has also argued for a new perspective on peacebuilding, whereby 
peacebuilding should be understood as an effort by the international community to influence a 
local complex social system. This perspective on peacebuilding has important implications 
for how peacebuilding is planned and undertaken. Thus there is ample room for applied 
research into the implications of such a complex system approach for assessments, planning, 
coordination, leadership, evaluation and organisational learning in the peacebuilding context. 
 
More research that tests, probes and further explores the findings of this dissertation would be 
very useful towards further illustrating the utility of Complexity for peacebuilding, as well as 
the implications of understanding peacebuilding as something that is essentially local. 
 
This study has demonstrated the utility of applying Complexity to peacebuilding, and this 
may encourage others to explore the relevance of insights from Complexity for related fields 
such as conflict management, security studies, and peace studies.  
 
 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The intention with this dissertation was to make a contribution to the larger critical discourse 
around improving peacebuilding practice. Some of the contributions made by this dissertation 
to the literature on peacebuilding includes the introduction of Complexity into the 
peacebuilding debate (Chapter 5); the framing and analysis of the peacebuilding coherence 
dilemma (Chapters 3 and 4); the comparative analysis of the determined-design and complex 
systems approaches (Chapter 7); the development of recommendations for coping with 
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peacebuilding Complexity (Chapter 9); and, overall, the exploration of the utility of applying 
Complexity to the study of peacebuilding. As such, this study is also an example of the value 
that can be generated by applying theory to a particular field of practice. 
 
On the basis of the application of the general characteristics of Complexity to peacebuilding, 
the following three recommendations reflect the core findings of the study: 
(1) Peacebuilders need to concede that they cannot, from the outside, definitively analyse 
complex conflicts and design ‘solutions’ on behalf of a local society. Instead they 
should facilitate inductive processes that assist knowledge to emerge from the local 
context, and such knowledge needs to be understood as provisional and subject to a 
continuous process of refinement and adaptation.  
(2) Peacebuilders have to recognise that self-sustainable peace is directly linked to, and 
influenced by, the extent to which a society has the capacity, and space, to self-
organise. For peace consolidation to be self-sustainable, it has to be the result of a 
home-grown, bottom-up and context-specific process.  
(3) Peacebuilders need to acknowledge that they cannot defend the choices they make on 
the basis of pre-determined models or lessons learned elsewhere. The ethical 
implications of their choices have to be considered in the local context and the effects 
of their interventions - intended and unintended - needs to be continuously assessed 
against the lived-experience of the societies they are committed to assist. 
Peacebuilding should be guided by the principle that those who will have to live with 
the consequences should have the agency to make decisions about their own future.  
 
It was argued that the insights drawn from Complexity for peacebuilding presented in this 
dissertation makes a compelling case for shifting the locus and agency of peacebuilding from 
the international to the local. The dissertation also posits the argument that, if we accept the 
implications of Complexity for peacebuilding presented in this dissertation, we should also 
support a shift from understanding the essential act of peacebuilding as being in the external 
design, e.g. in the liberal peace model, to one whereby peacebuilding is understood as 
emergent from the local, and whereby self-sustainability is thus understood to be dependent 
on local self-organisation. The dissertation thus argues for a significant shift away from 
understanding peacebuilding as something that the international community do to help local 
societies, to a new approach of understanding peacebuilding as something that has to be 
essentially local. 
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The primary objective of this study was to explore the utility of using Complexity to gain 
insights into the coherence dilemma in peacebuilding systems. The dissertation presents the 
finding that the application of Complexity has been fruitful in that it has: 
 Generated unconventional insights into the role of coherence in peacebuilding. 
 Alerted us to various potential perverse effects and unintended consequences of the 
determined causality approach. 
 Suggested a potential new perspective on peacebuilding, from which peacebuilding 
can be seen as an effort to influence a complex system, with important implications 
for how we plan and undertake peacebuilding. 
 Provided a theoretical framework for the local ownership principle and introduced 
self-organisation as an essential precursor to self-sustainable peace. 
 Emphasised local context and local ownership as core requirements for self-
organisation to occur and in the process identified the need for a significant shift in 
peacebuilding, away from peacebuilding as something undertaken by the 
international community and towards a new approach that recognises peacebuilding 
as something that has to be essentially local. 
 
The dissertation thus concludes that there is indeed utility in using Complexity to improve our 
understanding of peacebuilding.  
 
This dissertation represents a personal journey of exploration and discovery. The researcher 
set out to find theories and models that could help to solve the coherence dilemma. Along the 
way he discovered that the coherence dilemma is natural and indeed, necessary. The 
‘problem’ that needed to be resolved was not the coherence dilemma itself, but rather our 
approach to understanding and dealing with the kind of Complexity represented by the 
coherence dilemma.  
 
Consequently, the focus of the study shifted from solving the coherence dilemma to coping 
with its complexities. As a result, the dissertation’s engagement with peacebuilding gradually 
shifted from an initial preoccupation with the international to the essential role of the local. 
For peacebuilding to be self-sustainable, the dissertation found that self-organisation has to 
emerge from the local society itself and be informed by the local context. In this context the 
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role of the international peacebuilder has to be limited to assisting, facilitating and stimulating 
the capacity and resilience of the local society to self-organise.  
 
For such a Copernican shift to take place in peacebuilding agency from the international to 
the local, the peacebuilding community will have to fundamentally alter the underlying 
theories of change that inform the currently dominant liberal peace approach to peacebuilding 
and development. In general, the prospects for this kind of major paradigm shift are bleak. 
However, at this particular point in history we are witnessing a major shift in international 
power and influence from the West to the East. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Global South 
in general, and the BRICS countries in particular, are sceptical of the motives behind the 
liberal peace approach and favours an approach to international cooperation that give much 
more weight to the principles of self-determination and sovereignty in international relations. 
These changes in global power and influence have created an historic opportunity for the 
peacebuilding community to reflect on the assumptions and theories of change that have 
influenced its policies and practices to date, and in particular to reassess the role and agency  
of local societies in peacebuilding. The most important question here is who has agency to 
make decisions about the future? The central finding of this dissertation has been that if self-
sustainable peace consolidation is the goal, then the answer to this question is that 
peacebuilding has to be essentially local. 
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